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**Noble Soul and the Metaphysics of Celestial Life
in the *Liber de causis* Commentaries of Albert the Great,
Thomas Aquinas, and Giles of Rome**

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The thesis is submitted to University College Dublin in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy.

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Abstract

The *Liber de causis*, from 9th-c. Baghdad describes three primary causes of the universe: the first cause, intelligence, and noble soul. The first cause is the source of all existence, intelligence the source of all form, and noble soul the origin of life motion in bodies. This third primary cause, noble soul, sparked a tradition of interpretation in the Latin West that existed from the 12th-16th centuries and includes understandings of that concept as diverse as the conclusion that it is human soul, celestial soul, world soul, an angel, and even the Holy Spirit. This dissertation describes the foundational moment of that history in the commentaries of three masters of theology in Paris in the 13th c., Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, and Giles of Rome. Through these three commentators, noble soul is drawn into the celestial metaphysics of the Peripatetics, then set against the background of the Platonic tradition, and finally subsumed within the celestial hierarchies of Ps.-Dionysius the Areopagite. Albert the Great offers one of the first interpretations of noble soul as a celestial mover after readers from the 12th c. tended to understand that concept as human soul (Ch. 1). Albert incorporates noble soul into his understanding of the tradition of Arabic celestial metaphysics using the concept to resolve tensions between Peripatetic authorities and to articulate the perfection of Aristotelian metaphysics. For Albert, noble soul's celestial office ultimately belongs to the larger metaphysical framework of emanative causality called *fluxus* which he bases on the writings of Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Algazel (Ch. 2). In this system noble soul becomes a necessary part of the process by which the light of the first cause flows into all of reality. Thomas Aquinas is the first to demonstrate the dependence of the *De causis* on Proclus' *Elements of Theology*, and in his commentary, noble soul contributes to an effort to clarify the Platonic doctrines of the forms and participation and to correct them through Aristotle and Ps.-Dionysius (Ch. 3). Thomas remains sceptical about the existence of noble soul but uses the concept as an opportunity to develop an understanding of participation that incorporates aspects of the Platonic doctrines into a Dionysian metaphysics of creation. Giles of Rome takes up Thomas' engagements with platonic doctrine to develop his own understanding of *contractio*—the dynamic by which all created essences participate the being bestowed on them by the first cause (Ch. 4). This contraction of being unfolds in a hierarchy of creatures in which noble soul plays the role of mediator between the orders of separate intelligences and bodies. Noble soul's role as mediator depends on Giles' understanding that the primary causes of the *Liber de causis* belong to the angelic hierarchies of the Christian faith (Ch. 5). Giles thereby interprets noble soul's celestial operations through the principles of Dionysian hierarchy and so doing also provides the metaphysical basis by which he will later articulate his theory of papal power.

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Statement of Original Authorship

I hereby certify that the submitted work is my own work, was completed while registered as a candidate for the degree stated on the Title Page, and I have not obtained a degree elsewhere on the basis of the research presented in this submitted work.

INTRODUCTION

*Veritas de terra orta est
et iustitia de caelo prospexit.*
—Ps. 85.11

1. Noble Soul, the *Liber de causis*, and its Commentary Tradition

The purpose of this dissertation is to explore the history of the interpretation of noble soul (in Arabic, *naḥs šarīf* and in Latin, *anima nobilis*) in 13th c. Latin commentaries on the *Liber de causis* by Albert the Great (c. 1200-80), Thomas Aquinas (1225-74), and Giles of Rome (1243-1316). The origins of this text lie in 9th c. Baghdad where an anonymous author adapted Proclus' *Elements of Theology* and the Arabic translation of Plotinus into a short propositional work on metaphysics called *The Book of the Exposition of Aristotle on the Pure Good* (*Kitāb al-Īdāḥ li-Aristūṭālīs fī l-khayr al-maḥd*),¹ or as it would come to be known, the *Liber de causis*. The author, who seems to have been from the circle of al-Kindī, or even to be al-Kindī himself,² carefully incorporated his Neoplatonic sources into a monotheistic and creationist system of 31 Propositions.³ The text, which seems to have been intended for use as a theological handbook supplementing the study of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, had little impact on the Arabic speaking milieu,⁴ but after it was translated into Latin in the 12th c. by

¹ On the Arabic background of the *Liber de causis*, see R.C. Taylor and C. D'Ancona, "Le *Liber de causis*", in R. Goulet (ed.), *Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques, Supplément au vol. I* (Paris: Editions du CNRS, 2003), p. 599-647, and the bibliography cited therein; see also D'Ancona's research on the *De causis* gathered in her *Recherches sur le Liber de causis* (Paris: Vrin, 1995), and the bibliography of Taylor's work on the *Liber de causis* listed in his "Primary and Secondary Causality", in R.C. Taylor, L.X. López-Farjeat (eds), *The Routledge Companion to Islamic Philosophy* (London/New York: Routledge, 2016), p. 225-35. On the different titles by which the *Liber de causis* was known in the Arabic tradition, see R.C. Taylor, *The Liber de Causis (Kalām fī maḥd al-ḥayr). A Study of Medieval Neoplatonism*, PhD dissertation (University of Toronto, 1981), p. 54-56.

² On the hypothesis that al-Kindī is the author of the *Liber de causis*, see D'Ancona, "Al-Kindi et l'auteur de *Liber de causis*" in *Recherches sur le Liber de causis* (Paris: Vrin, 1995), p. 156-194, especially at p. 166 and 170ff. D'Ancona seeks to demonstrate this through the doctrinal and stylistic similarities between the *Liber de causis* and the writings of al-Kindī, pointing in particular to Prop. 32(31) of the *De causis* and al-Kindī's *On First Philosophy* in which one finds identical statements about unity and "the one" (see *ibid.*, p. 163). On the *Liber de causis* in the circle of al-Kindī, see R.C. Taylor, "Contextualizing the *Kalām fī maḥd al-khair / Liber de causis*", in D. Calma (ed.), *Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes. Volume 2: Translations and Acculturations* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2021), p. 211-32 at p. 222-28. And on the circle of al-Kindī in general, see G. Endress, "The Circle of al-Kindī: Early Arabic Translations from the Greek and the Rise of Islamic Philosophy", in G. Endress and R. Kruk (eds), *The Ancient Tradition in Christian and Islamic Hellenism* (Leiden: Research School CNWS), p. 43-76.

³ On the relationship of the *Liber de causis* to its neoplatonic sources, see, for example, C. D'Ancona, "Sources et structure du *Liber de causis*", in *Recherches sur le Liber de causis* (Paris: Vrin, 1995), p. 23-52, together with her other studies in that volume. Most Latin manuscripts transmit the *De causis* in 32 Propositions, dividing Prop. 4 of the Arabic text in two. Where necessary, in my citations of the *De causis*, I will indicate the numbering according to the Arabic text in parenthesis, e.g., "Prop. 5(4)".

⁴ On the purpose of the *De causis* in its Arabic context, see Taylor, "Contextualizing the *Kalām fī maḥd al-*

Gerard of Cremona,⁵ its popularity exploded in the Latin world and it soon became one of the most studied and commented on metaphysical texts in the European Universities. The first reception of the Latin *De causis* appears in the works of Allan of Lille (1128-1202/3) and others,⁶ and by the early 13th c. it is clear the text had made its way from Spain to Oxford, Paris, and Italy.⁷ Thereafter it continued to be transmitted, copied, and commented upon in virtually every University of the European World, the subject of a distinct exegetical tradition which was active until at least the 16th c.⁸

The fundamental principle of the *Liber de causis* is that the causes of the universe which are more “primary” infuse their effects more powerfully than the secondary causes which follow after them.⁹ This distinction between primary and secondary causes structures the work: the world is composed by a series of causes that operate in participation with one another, the more primary providing the substrate into which the latter infuse their subsequent effects. The *Liber de causis* identifies three causes that are primary to every other:

khair”, p. 225-28; and on the Arabic reception of the *De causis*, see D’Ancona and Taylor, “Le Liber de causis”, p. 624; C. D’Ancona, “Avicenna and the *Liber de causis*: A Contribution to the Dossier”, in *Revista Española de Filosofía Medieval*, 7 (2000), p. 95-114; E. Wakelnig, “Les Chapitres sur les thèmes métaphysiques d’al-‘Āmirī et l’anonyme Kitāb al-ḥaraka: deux interprétations du Liber de causis en arabe”, in D. Calma (ed.), *Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes. Volume 2: Translations and Acculturations* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2021), p. 198-210; J. Rachak, “La présence du Liber de causis dans l’oeuvre d’Ibn Bāḡḡa et pseudo-Ibn Bāḡḡa: un philosophe péripatéticien du XIe/XIIe siècle de l’Occident islamique”, in *Ibid.*, p. 233-44; and A. Bertolacci, “God’s Existence and Essence: The *Liber de causis* and School Discussions in the Metaphysics of Avicenna”, in D. Calma (ed.), *Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes. Volume 3: On Causes and the Noetic Triad* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2022), p. 251-80.

⁵ On Gerard of Cremona’s translation of the *Liber de causis* as well as the evidence that Gerard’s translation depends on a second translation of the text by Dominicus Gundisalvi, see D.N. Hasse, “Three Double Translations from Arabic into Latin by Gerard of Cremona and Dominicus Gundisalvi”, in *Ibid.*, 247-74; and J. Janssens, “Doubles traductions et omissions: une approche critique en vue d’une édition de la traduction latine du *Liber de causis*”, in *Ibid.*, 275-316. The *Liber de causis* was also translated into Armenian and twice into Hebrew; see D’Ancona and Taylor, “Le Liber de causis”, p. 617-19.

⁶ See I. Caiazzo, “La première réception du *Liber de causis* en Occident (XII^e–XIII^e siècles)”, in *Ibid.*, p. 46-69.

⁷ Through her study of the early manuscript tradition of the *De causis*, Caiazzo determines that the text was transmitted from Spain to Oxford very soon after it was translated. See *Ibid.*, p. 46-51.

⁸ On the transmission of the *De causis* around Europe and its extensive exegetical tradition see D. Calma, “The Exegetical Tradition of Medieval Neoplatonism. Considerations on A Recently Discovered *Corpus* of Texts”, in D. Calma (ed.), *Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages. I. New Commentaries on Liber de causis (ca. 1250-1350)* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2016), p. 11-52; Idem, “Reading Proclus and the *Book of Causes*: Notes on the Western Scholarly Networks and Debates”, in D. Calma (ed.), *Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes. Volume 1: Western Scholarly Networks and Debates* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2019), p. 1-13 at p. 1-2; D. Poirel, “Tradition exégétique: âges, styles et formes d’une réception par le commentaire”, in *Ibid.*, p. 17-45.

⁹ *Liber de causis*, Prop. 1 (ed. Pattin), p. 46.1-2: “Omnis causa primaria plus est influens super causatum suum quam causa universalis secunda.” Until the time when the highly anticipated new edition by I. Székely appears, while Pattin’s edition of the *De causis* is incomplete and problematic (see section 4), all citations of *Liber de causis* except those from Prop. 3 will be from his text. For citations of *Liber de causis*, Prop. 3, I cite the partial collation of that text in 13th c. manuscripts which I have prepared in Appendix A.

the first cause, intelligences, and noble souls.¹⁰ The first cause is the creative first principle which is before eternity and the source of all being.¹¹ Intelligences, which are closest to the first cause, possess the most universal forms and are prior to every other existence.¹² Noble souls, finally, receive their existence from the first cause, but also the influence of the intelligences, and by means of what they receive, they guide and direct the motions of the heavens and the operations of nature infusing life into all bodies.¹³

Noble soul is introduced by name in the third proposition of the work, which reads, “Every noble soul has three operations, for its operations include an animal operation, an intelligible operation, and a divine operation.”¹⁴ The cosmic office of noble souls involves the relationship between these three operations. First, noble souls have an animate operation in that they move the heavens and all natural bodies. Second, they have an intelligible operation which they receive through the influence of the primary intelligences which precede them. It is then by their intellectual activities that they produce the regular, continuous, and circular motion of the heavens. Finally, they have a divine operation in that, as they govern the motions of the heavens, they also “prepare nature”,¹⁵ influencing all of nature and moving all natural bodies. Noble souls, then, are the movers of the spheres, and, as the third proposition puts it, “the cause of the motion of bodies and the cause of nature’s operations”,¹⁶ and an “image of higher power”.¹⁷

All of this, however, is to drastically oversimplify the matter, for medieval interpreters did not agree on the meaning or identity of noble soul and there is much ambiguity that exists within that text. As an immediate example of the often surprising diversity which ends up characterizing the Latin interpretation of noble soul, when the soul of the *De causis* first appears in Latin literature in the 12th c., virtually every instance refers to

¹⁰ See *Liber de causis*, Props. 2 and 3.

¹¹ See *Liber de causis*, Props. 2 and 4.

¹² See *Liber de causis*, Props. 4 and 10(9).

¹³ See *Liber de causis*, Prop. 3.

¹⁴ *Liber de causis*, Prop. 3: “Omnis anima nobilis tres habet operationes. Nam ex operationibus eius est operatio animalis et operatio intelligibilis et operatio divina.” All citations of Prop. 3 are from the text in Appendix A. On the nature of this text, see section 4, below.

¹⁵ *Liber de causis*, Prop. 3: “Operatio autem divina est quoniam ipsa preparate naturam cum virtute que est in ea, id est natura, a causa prima.”

¹⁶ *Liber de causis*, Prop. 3: “ipsa est causa motus corporum et causa operationis nature”.

¹⁷ *Liber de causis*, Prop. 3: “ipsa est exemplum virtutis superioris”.

it as a human soul, and not as a celestial mover.¹⁸ From that beginning, one can find in the Latin reception of the *Liber de causis* such diverse understandings of noble soul, ranging from the conclusion that noble soul is human soul,¹⁹ the best kind of human soul,²⁰ a celestial soul understood according to the Peripatetic tradition,²¹ a celestial soul understood according to the Platonic tradition,²² a separate intelligence or an angel,²³ world soul,²⁴ or even the Holy Spirit.²⁵

This diversity of approaches and opinions represents both the idiosyncrasies of the interpreters, but also the questions and difficulties that belong to the text itself. In this introduction we will begin our study of noble soul's Latin reception by looking to the history and sources of Prop. 3 of the *Liber de causis*. Like many of the propositions of the *De causis*, Prop. 3 is adapted from propositions of Proclus' *Elements of Theology* and blended with notions drawn from the *Enneads* of Plotinus; these Neoplatonic sources, moreover, are modified according to the monotheistic and creationist standpoint and purposes of the author and the circle of intellectuals in Baghdad to which he belonged—the same circle which produced the paraphrases of Plotinus known as the *Plotiniana arabica*, which features

¹⁸ See the 12th-c. discussions of soul in the *Liber de causis* by Allan of Lille, Dominique Gundisalvi, Alexander Neckam, and others in Caiazzo, "La première réception du Liber de causis", p. 51-63.

¹⁹ See Ps.-Henry of Ghent, *Quaestiones in Librum de causis* (ed. Zwaenepoel), p. 50.33-37; and E. Joly "L'âme noble et l'âme humaine dans le commentaire du Pseudo-Henri de Gand sur le *Livre des Causes*", in *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 72/1 (2005), p. 29-53.

²⁰ See Dante, *Convivio* IV.21; and S. Negri, "The 'Noble Soul' Between Heaven and Earth: Reflections on the third proposition of *Liber de causis* and its employment in Dante's *Convivio*" in A.A. Robiglio (ed.), *The Question of Nobility. Aspects of Medieval and Renaissance Conceptualization of Man* (Cordoba/Leuven, forthcoming).

²¹ See Albert the Great's interpretation of noble soul according to his understanding of Peripatetic celestial dynamics in Ch. 1.2.

²² See Thomas Aquinas' understanding of noble soul through Proclus' *Elements of Theology* in Ch. 3.3.

²³ See Giles of Rome's interpretation on noble soul as an "inferior angel" in Ch. 5.2.3.

²⁴ Albert the Great relates noble soul to the concept of *anima mundi* in his *De sex principiis* 1.2, p. 6.8-19: "De mundi enim anima quid sit et qualiter longum et difficile est determinare et pertinet ad primum philosophum secundum eam partem in qua de causis primariis et universalibus determinatur. Breviter tamen dicimus quod non est causa prima nec est aliqua intelligentia sed motor mobilis primi quod est sibi principium vitae et motus secundum locum et secundum hunc motum est causa vitae et motus in omnibus, sicut dicitur in libro de causis." All citations of the works of Albert the Great are from the Cologne edition except where otherwise noted.

²⁵ See Heymericus de Campo, *Disputatio de potestate ecclesiastica* (ms. Trier, Codex Cusanus 106), f. 116r-v: "Ad idem in eodem habetur, quod deus per suum verbum, quod est extra ipsum ad modum, quo Plato ponit mentem et Peripatetici ponunt intelligencias, et cum eius spiritu, qui se habet ut anima mundi secundum Platonem vel anima nobilis secundum Peripateticos, fecit universa et per concors decretum illorum sermo dei Machometo est data lex salvacionis, ex hoc arguens illius legis perfeccionem, quod prodierit de superno concilio plurium. Cum ergo se papa habeat ad concilium generale sicut Machometus ad providenciam dei verbi et suscipit suam legem, ut fingit, per modum mutui concilii dictatam, patet propositum." This transcription is cited from F. Hamann, "Koran und Konziliarismus. Anmerkungen zum Verhältnis von Heymericus de Campo und Nikolaus von Kues", in *Vivarium* 43 (2005), p. 275-91 at p. 284, n. 36.

many similar themes and tendencies.²⁶ By examining the relationship of Prop. 3 to its sources, we can draw out some of the fundamental tensions and ambiguities of that text which faced each of our commentators—even where the sources of the text were unknown or only partially understood. Then we will introduce each of the three commentaries by Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, and Giles of Rome that are the focus of this dissertation. These authors represent three different generations of Master of Theology at the University of Paris. Each of them produces a distinct interpretation of noble soul which is determined according to the distinct purposes and methods of their commentaries, shaped by the authors' different understandings of the history and sources of the text, and influenced by the conversations and difficulties that occupied university life, their religious orders, and as is especially the case with Giles, the political situation of the time.

The importance of the *Liber de causis* to the history of philosophy has long been recognized,²⁷ but much of the immense breadth of its commentary tradition remains unstudied, even as our understanding of this tradition has expanded massively in recent years.²⁸ Until 2011 there were only eight commentaries available in printed editions.²⁹ In 1983 Richard Taylor published a list of manuscripts containing fourteen unstudied commentaries,³⁰ and more recently, a team of researchers examined these manuscripts and discovered sixty additional commentaries,³¹ publishing thirteen of them in either whole or partial editions.³²

²⁶ On the sources of *Liber de causis*, Prop. 3, see D'Ancona, "La doctrine de la création « mediante intelligentia » dans le *Liber de causis* et dans ses sources", in *Recherches sur le Liber de causis* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1995), p. 73-95; E. Joly, *L'ame, l'éternité et le temps dans les commentaires médiévaux du Livre des causes*, dissertation (Université Leval, 2003), p. 18-26; and Negri, "The 'Noble Soul' Between Heaven and Earth", p. 71-79. On the *Plotiniana arabica*, see C. D'Ancona, "Divine and Human Knowledge in the *Plotiniana Arabica*", in J.J. Cleary (ed.), *The Perennial Tradition of Neoplatonism* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1997), p. 419-42; and A. Treiger, "Palestinian Origenism and the Early History of the Maronites: In Search of the Origins of the Arabic Theology of Aristotle", in D. Janos (ed.), *Ideas in Motion in Baghdad and Beyond: Philosophical and Theological Exchanges between Christians and Muslims in the Third/Ninth and Fourth/Tenth Centuries* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2016), p. 44-80.

²⁷ In addition to the literature cited above, see Calma's account of the history of the scholarship on the *Liber de causis* and its commentary tradition in "The Exegetical Tradition of Medieval Neoplatonism", p. 11-20.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 21-26.

²⁹ These are the commentaries of Roger Bacon, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Siger of Brabant, Ps.-Henry of Ghent, Giles of Rome, Jacob of Gostynin, and Chrysostom Javelli Canapicius.

³⁰ R.C. Taylor, "The *Liber de causis*: A Preliminary List of Extant Mss", in *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 25 (1983), p. 62-84.

³¹ On the origin, methods, and progress of this project, see D. Calma, "Du néoplatonisme au réalisme et retour. Notes préliminaires sur la fortune latine du *Liber de causis* du xiii^e au xvi^e siècle", in *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 54 (2012), p. 217-76.

³² See Calma, "The Exegetical Tradition of Medieval Neoplatonism", p. 23-24. The new editions are published in D. Calma (ed.), *Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages. I. New Commentaries on Liber de causis* (Turnhout:

The results of the recent study of this new corpus of commentaries demonstrates that it constitutes a distinct exegetical tradition which comprises one of the longest and broadest engagements with Neoplatonism in the Latin tradition.³³ The unity of this exegetical tradition can be discerned through the patterns and trends that appear across multiple commentaries. A canon of questions and problems were established through the constant reference of commentators to earlier commentaries that became classics in the genre, offering common touch points for those writing on the *De causis* in different locations and time periods.

The commentaries of Albert the Great (1268-71), Thomas Aquinas (1272), and Giles of Rome (1289-91) are three such classics of the exegetical tradition of *De causis*.³⁴ Albert's commentary is used by the authors of other commentaries on the *Liber de causis* from as early as the *Questiones* attributed to Peter of Auvergne (1270-77) until as late as the commentary of John Krosbein (probably in the second half of the 14th c.).³⁵ The massive accomplishment of

Brepols, 2016), and *Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages. II. New Commentaries on Liber de causis and Elementatio theologica* (ca. 1350-1500) (Turnhout: Brepols, 2016), including those of those of Henry of Geismar (ed. I. Székely and D. Calma), Iacobus de Gostynin (ed. W.P. Góra), Iohannes de Mallinges (ed. A. Baneu and D. Calma), John Krosbein (ed. D. Calma), Radulphus Brito (?) (ed. I. Costa and M. Borgo), William of Leus (ed. D. Carron), as well as anonymous commentaries, including the *Questiones super Librum de causis* of a Parisien master preserved in Erfurt (ed. I. Székely and D. Calma), some *Glose super Librum de causis* (ed. A. Baneu and D. Calma), a *Questiones super Librum de causis* (ed. A. Baumgarten), the *Questiones super Librum de causis* attrib. to Petter of Auvergne (ed. M. Maga), and the *Questiones super Librum de causis* attrb. Johannes Wenck (ed. M. Meliadó).

³³ See Calma, "The Exegetical Tradition of Medieval Neoplatonism", p. 27-41; see also his "Du néoplatonisme au réalisme et retour", p. 223ff, which offers suggestions about how to investigate this heritage, whether through specific universities, religious orders, or geographical regions; and Poirel, "Tradition exégétique", p. 17-45. For the most recent research into the *Liber de causis* and its commentary tradition see the essays published in the three volumes which were the fruit of the three sessions of the conference, "*Les Éléments de théologie et le Livre des causes du Ve au XVIIe siècle*", which took place in Paris between 2015-16: D. Calma (ed.), *Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes. Volume 1: Western Scholarly Networks and Debates* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2019), *Volume 2: Translations and Acculturations* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2021), and *Volume 3: On Causes and the Noetic Triad* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2022).

³⁴ On the dating of these commentaries, see W. Fauser, "Albert the Great's Commentary on the *Liber de Causis*", in *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 36 (1994), p. 38-44 at p. 39; H.-D. Saffrey, "Introduction", *Thomas D'Aquin, Super Librum de causis expositio*, ed. H.-D. Saffrey (Paris: J. Vrin, 2002), p. xiii-lxxiv, at p. xxxiii-xxxvi; and P. Porro, "The University of Paris in the Thirteenth Century. Proclus and the *Liber de causis*", in S. Gersh (ed.), *Interpreting Proclus from Late Antiquity to the Renaissance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 264-98 at p. 292.

³⁵ See D. Calma, "The Exegetical Tradition", p. 28-30. Calma also cites examples of the use of Albert's *De causis* commentary by "the Anonymous of Augsburg, the Anonymous *Sectator philosophie*, Ps.-Peter of Auvergne, John of Mallinges and William of Leus" (*Ibid.*, p. 28). For an exploration of the relationship between Albert's *De causis* commentary and the works of Meister Eckhart, see A. Beccarisi, "Proclus and the *Liber de causis* in Meister Eckhart's Works", in D. Calma (ed.), *Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes. Volume 2: Translations and Acculturations* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2021), p. 340-75. See also Jean of Mallinges' reference to Albert's commentary in D. Calma, "AL- 'AQL dans la tradition Latine du *Liber de Causis*", *Arabic sciences and philosophy* 31 (2021), p. 127-48 at p. 128-33.

Thomas Aquinas' *De causis* commentary, which as Dragos Calma points out, "is clearly well-known by all later commentators, even those who allowed themselves to be more deeply influenced by Albert", was to publish the conclusive evidence that *De causis* was not an Aristotelian text, but based on writings of the Platonist, Proclus.³⁶ De Libera goes even further to say that Thomas, in his *De causis* commentary, "fait un manière de 'révolution copernicienne', et que cette révolution marque le début d'une époque nouvelle, disons un 'changement de paradigme' dans la conception de l'essence de la philosophie".³⁷ About Giles of Rome's commentary, Calma argues that it also became "a classic in the interpretative tradition of the *Liber de causis*, holding the same stature as the commentaries of Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas", the evidence of which can be seen in the use of his commentary by William of Leus, John of Nova Domus, perhaps by John of Krosbein, and others.³⁸ A testament, finally, to the collective importance of these three commentaries to the tradition that follows them can be seen in the manuscripts that contain all or some of their commentaries together.³⁹

In addition to their importance for the exegetical tradition of the *De causis*, these three authors represent three generations of Masters of Theology in the University of Paris in the mid to late 13th c., and their commentaries also document and bear witness to the

³⁶ Calma, "The Exegetical Tradition", p. 27. See for example the evidence of Siger of Brabant's use of Thomas' commentary (*ibid.*, p. 27-28), and for some examples of later commentators following Thomas' (and then Siger's) inclusion of the Platonic forms among the themes to be treated in *De causis*, Prop. 3, see the introduction of Ch. 3. On the legacy of Thomas Aquinas and Siger of Brabant's commentaries relative to the topic of occasionalism, see D. Calma, "*Sine secundaria*: Thomas d'Aquin, Siger of Brabant et les débats sur l'occasionalisme", in D. Calma (ed.), *Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes. Volume 1: Western Scholarly Networks and Debates* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2019), p. 268-300.

³⁷ A. de Libera, "Albert le Grand et Thomas d'Aquin interprètes du *Liber de causis*", *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologique*, 74 (1990), p. 347-78 at p. 347.

³⁸ Calma, "The Exegetical Tradition", p. 37. Calma points to the use of Giles' commentary by John of Nova Domus (p. 33), and also indicates that the broad diffusion Giles' reading of the *De causis* and its relationship with other texts on the *De causis* can also be discerned through the manuscript and commentary tradition of his *Theoremata de esse et essentia* (*Ibid.*, p. 35-36). C. D'Ancona provides examples of the ways that William of Leus makes use of Giles' commentary in her "L'uso della sententia Dionysii nel commento di s. Tommaso e Egidio Romano alle proposizioni 3, 4, 6 del *Liber de causis*", in *Medioevo* 8 (1982), p. 1-42, at p. 18, 29, and 37-38; on William of Leus see also D. Calma, who points to the ways he makes use of Thomas' commentary as well in "The Exegetical Tradition", p. 36-37. And for the possibility of Giles' use by John of Krosbein, see D. Calma, "A Medieval Companion to Aristotle: John Krosbein's Paraphrase on *Liber de causis*", in D. Calma (ed.), *Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages. I. New Commentaries on the Liber de causis (ca. 1250-1350)* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2016), p. 11-97 at p. 52ff.

³⁹ See Calma, "Du néoplatonisme au réalisme et retour", p. 273-74. These manuscripts are Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Cod. Lat. Z.288 (=1839), which contains the text of the *De causis* (f. 2-12v) and the commentaries of Albert (f. 13r-152v), Thomas (f. 153r-196v), and Giles (f. 197r-397v), and Bruges, Grootseminarie, Hs. 104/132 which contains the commentaries of Albert (f. 1r-84r) and Giles (f. 85r-131r).

massive intellectual developments and challenges of that period.⁴⁰ Albert the Great lectured at the University of Paris from as early as 1240 to 1248, after which he founded the *studium generale* at Cologne.⁴¹ His last three years in Paris were spent there as regent master of the Dominican chair.⁴² Thomas Aquinas studied with Albert while he was in Paris, and then accompanied him at the *studium* in Cologne for three to four years. In 1251 or 1252, Thomas was sent back to Paris to lecture on the *Sentences*. He was made regent master in Paris in 1256 and he held the Dominican until 1259 (after which he spent time as *lector* in Orvieto and established the *studium generale* at Santa Sabina).⁴³ It was during Thomas' second regency in Paris between 1268-72 that Giles of Rome is likely to have studied with him.⁴⁴ Giles, after being excluded from the University in Paris between 1278-85 as the result of a commission before Bishop Tempier in 1277,⁴⁵ returned eight years later, and he was the first to hold the chair as regent master of the Augustinian Order from 1285 to as late as 1293.⁴⁶

⁴⁰ While Thomas wrote his *De causis* commentary in 1272 during the period of his second regency in Paris, Albert and Giles did not write their commentaries in Paris. Albert's was written at some point between 1268-71 in either Würzburg, Strasbourg, or Cologne (see Fauser, "Albert the Great's Commentary", p. 39-40), and Giles' was probably written in Bayeux at some point between 1289-91 (see Porro, "The University of Paris in the Thirteenth Century", p. 292).

⁴¹ There is some controversy about when Albert arrived in Paris. See I.M. Resnick, "Albert the Great: Biographical Introduction", in I.M. Resnick (ed.), *A Companion to Albert the Great: Theology, Philosophy, and the Sciences* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2013), p. 1-11, at p. 5.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁴³ P. Porro, *Thomas Aquinas: A Historical and Philosophical Profile*, trans. J.G. Trabiic and R.W. Nutt (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2015), p. 3-5; and 439-42.

⁴⁴ See P. Porro, *Thomas Aquinas*, p. 262; and C.F. Briggs, "Life, Works, and Legacy", in C.F. Briggs and P.S. Eardley (eds), *A Companion to Giles of Rome* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2016), p. 6-33, at p. 9.

⁴⁵ This commission which convened between May 7-28 in 1277 censored Giles on the basis of its examination of 51 suspect articles from Giles' *Commentary on the First Book of the Sentences*. This was a separate procedure from Bishop Tempier's censorship of 219 articles on Mark 7, 1277. See Briggs, "Life, Works, and Legacy", p. 10-11. For the documents surrounding Giles' censorship in 1277, including Giles' defence, see *Apologia*, ed. R. Wielockx, *Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia III*, 1 (Florence: Unione Accademica Nazionale, 1985). See also R. Wielockx, "La censure de Gilles de Rome", in *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 22 (1980), p. 87-88; the criticism of Wielockx's interpretation by J.M.M.H. Thijssen, "1277 Revisited: A New Interpretation of the Doctrinal Investigations of Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome", in *Vivarium* 35 (1997), p. 72-101; and Wielockx's reply in "Procédures contre Gilles de Rome et Thomas d'Aquin: Réponse à J.M.M.H. Thijssen" in *Revue des sciences philosophiques et thologiques* 83 (1999), p. 293-313. See also G. Pini's study of Giles' doctrine of the real difference between *esse* and *essentia* in light of his censorship in "Being and Creation in Giles of Rome", in J.A. Aertsen, K. Emery, and A. Speer (eds), *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277 / After the Condemnation of 1277: Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte / Philosophy and Theology at the University of Paris in the Last Quarter of the Thirteenth Century. Studies and Texts* (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2001), p. 390-409.

⁴⁶ See Briggs, "Life, Works, and Legacy", p. 12-13. Seeing that Giles was elected Prior General of the Augustinian order in 1291, there has been some controversy about when he formally ended his teaching duties in Paris. See G. Pini, "Giles of Rome", in C. Schabel (ed.), *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2006), p. 233-86, at p. 240-44.

In the over fifty years of time between Albert's arrival in Paris, and Giles' departure, much changed in the relationship of those at the University of Paris to the newly available Greek and Arabic learning that was entering continental Europe from Spain and Italy.⁴⁷ This period saw both the appearance of the first complete series of Latin commentaries on Aristotle by Albert the Great (completed by at least 1271) as well as the censorship ten years later by Bishop Tempier of 219 articles that implicate much of the new learning.⁴⁸

It is to the history of this translation movement and its legacy in the Universities of Europe that the reception of the concept of noble soul in the Latin west belongs. The newly available works of Aristotle and his Arab interpreters introduced a world of intellectual separate substances that are the causes of motion in the heavens and the source of order and influence on earth.⁴⁹ In the Arabic tradition, these metaphysics had already been interwoven with the doctrines of the Abrahamic traditions: there are authors who explicitly identify the Aristotelian separate substances with angels,⁵⁰ and, like the *Liber de causis*, there are theological elaborations on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* blended from monotheistic adaptations of Platonic texts and with theologies of creation.⁵¹ As is particularly evident from the so called "condemnations" of 1277, there were many concerns about the meaning of this new literature, especially on the question of spiritual substances, angels, and intelligences. What do these new texts disclose about the immaterial principles of the world? What is the status of the knowledge they contain compared to that of *sacra doctrina*? And how do they relate to the doctrines and authorities of the Christian faith?

⁴⁷ On the translation movements of the 12th and 13th centuries from Arabic and Greek into Latin, see C. Burnett, "The Coherence of the Arabic-Latin Translation Program in Toledo in the Twelfth Century", in *Science in Context* 14/1-2 (2001), p. 249-88; J.M. Gázquez, *The Attitude of the Medieval Latin Translators Towards the Arabic Sciences* (Florence: SISMEL, 2016); and on the legacy of Arabic learning leading into the Renaissance, see D.N. Hasse, *Success and Suppression: Arabic Sciences and Philosophy in the Renaissance* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2016).

⁴⁸ On the censorship of 1277, see D. Piché, "Introduction", *La condamnation parisienne de 1277*, ed. D. Piché and C. Lafleur (Paris: J. Vrin, 1999), p. 7-62; T. Suarez-Nani, *Connaissance et langage des anges selon Thomas d'Aquin et Gilles de Rome* (Paris: J. Vrin, 2002), p. 171-84; Eadem, *Les anges et la philosophie. Subjectivité et fonction cosmologique des substances séparées à la fin du XIII^e siècle* (Paris: J. Vrin, 2002), p. 75-86 and 173-82; and D. Calma, "Du bon usage des grecs et des arabes. Réflexions sur la censure de 1277", in L. Cianchi (ed.), *Christian readings of Aristotle from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011), p. 115-84.

⁴⁹ See E. Grant's account of these doctrines and interpretations and their reception in the Latin world in his *Planets, Stars, and Orbs: The Medieval Cosmos, 1200-1687* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 488-568; see also R.C. Dales, "The De-Animation of the Heavens in the Middle Ages", in *Journal of the History of Ideas* 41/4 (1980), p. 531-550.

⁵⁰ See the examples in the introduction of Ch. 5.

⁵¹ See the discussion of the doctrine of creation in the *Liber de causis* and the *Theology of Aristotle* in section 2.3 below.

The history of the interpretation of noble soul that this dissertation seeks to outline begins with Albert's commentary on the *De causis* which attempts to synthesize the entire history of Greek and Arabic learning in a metaphysical system that is, in his understanding, the summation of the Peripatetic tradition. Within that project, noble soul is one of the necessary primary causes of the universe from which flows the motions of the heavens—a doctrine which he uses to unify the tensions within the history of Peripatetic celestial metaphysics. Thomas Aquinas, just a few years later, fundamentally alters the medieval understanding of the *Liber de causis* by demonstrating that it depends not on Peripatetic sources, but rather on the *Elements of Theology* of Proclus, although it nevertheless still has significant similarities to Aristotle and Ps.-Dionysius. In this way, Thomas' commentary contributes to the clarification of the history and character of the Platonic tradition, and his interpretation of noble soul plays a central role in that effort as he uses his commentary on that concept to summarize and explain the Platonic hierarchy and to compare this to the hierarchy of Ps.-Dionysius.⁵² And finally, Giles of Rome's commentary takes up Thomas Aquinas' discussions of Platonic doctrines, but incorporates them even more seamlessly into his own thought. However, as it becomes clear through Giles' interpretation of noble soul as an angel, his use of Platonic thinking ultimately belongs to his effort to subordinate the metaphysics of the *Liber de causis* completely to Christian Theology. In summary, there is a movement in the interpretations of noble soul of these three authors that reflects a changing relationship to the metaphysics of the Aristotelian and Platonic traditions, from the encyclopedic summation of Greek and Arabic learning in Albert, to the critical complication and clarification of the history of Platonism and its relationship to Christian Theology in Thomas Aquinas, to the more complete subordination of both Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysics to Christian Theology in Giles of Rome.

2. The Sources and Background of Noble Soul

2.1. Noble Soul and the *Elements of Theology*: Descended and Undescended Souls

While Prop. 3 is a text about the soul that moves the heavenly spheres, there is, admittedly, some ambiguity about the identity of this cause: is noble soul a celestial soul only, or does it also, in some respect, refer to human soul? After speaking explicitly about

⁵² See Calma, "The Exegetical Tradition", p. 11-12.

the celestial significance of noble soul in the first few sentences of the proposition (it “prepares nature with a power that is in it from the first cause” and moves the “first body and all bodily natures”⁵³), the rest of the proposition is about soul’s intelligible and animate operations in a less specific way that could be understood to describe any intellectual soul, whether celestial or human. For example, we read that soul “receives the impression of intelligence”, that it has an “operation more inferior” than intelligence, that “it only imprints on things through motion”, and that the “property” of soul is to “vivify bodies”.⁵⁴ Any of these descriptions might describe the soul of the human being as much as it could that of the heavens.

This ambiguity, however, is absent in the proposition’s primary source, Prop. 201 of Proclus’ *Elements of Theology*. As Thomas Aquinas makes clear (thanks to William of Moerbeke’s translation), the *anima nobilis* of Prop. 3 is an adaptation Proclus’ “divine souls” (αἱ θεῖαι ψυχαί).⁵⁵ The author of the *Liber de causis* adapts Proclus’ θεῖαι using the word “*šarīf*”, which becomes *nobilis* in Gerard of Cremona’s Latin translation. As we will see in the next section, the term “*šarīf*” also plays a significant and related role in other texts from 9th-c. Baghdad, including the *Plotiniana Arabica* and the philosophical works of al-Kindī.

From Prop. 201, the *De causis* takes noble soul’s three operations: divine, intelligible, and animate. There is, however, a significant shift of emphasis from Proclus’ proposition which focuses on divine soul’s divine operation, which consists in manifesting “on the psychic plane a rank analogous to the gods”, and that “the summit of their being is possessed by a god”. As Prop. 204 clarifies, this divine activity consists of exercising “universal sovereignty” over other souls that either remain or exist for a time in their

⁵³ *Liber de causis*, Prop. 3: “Operatio autem divina est quoniam ipsa preparat naturam cum virtute que est in ea, id est natura, a causa prima. [...] Operatio autem animalis est quoniam ipsa movet corpus primum et omnia corpora naturalia”.

⁵⁴ *Liber de causis*, Prop. 3: “Et quia anima suscipit impressionem intelligentie, facta est inferioris operationis quam ipsa inpressione sua in id quod est sub ipsa. Quod est quia non inprimit in res nisi per motum, scilicet quia non recipit quod est sub ea operationem eius nisi ipsa moveat ipsum. Propter hanc ergo causam fit quod anima movet corpora. De proprietate namque anima est ut vivificet corpora”.

⁵⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 3, p. 18.1-7. See also Proclus, *Elementatio Theologica*, Prop. 201 (ed. Dodds), p. 176.1-5: “Πᾶσαι αἱ θεῖαι ψυχαὶ τριπλᾶς ἔχουσιν ἐνεργείας, τὰς μὲν ὡς ψυχαί, τὰς δὲ ὡς νοῦν ὑποδεξάμεναι θεῖον, τὰς δὲ ὡς θεῶν ἐξηρητημέναι καὶ προνοοῦσι μὲν τῶν ὅλων ὡς θεοί, γινώσκουσι δὲ τὰ πάντα κατὰ τὴν νοερὰν ζωὴν, κινοῦσι δὲ τὰ σώματα κατὰ τὴν αὐτοκίνητον ὑπαρξιν”; and for Moerbeke’s Latin translation (ed. Boese), p. 98.1-15: “Omnes divine anime triplices habent operationes: has quidem ut anime, has autem ut suscipientes intellectum divinum, has autem ut diis extraiuncte; et provident quidem totis ut dii, cognoscunt autem omnia secundum intellectualem vitam, movent autem corpora secundum per se mobilem existentiam.”

“divine company”, that is, undescended souls above nature in the intelligible realm.⁵⁶ The *De causis*, by contrast, says merely that noble soul’s operation is divine in that it “prepares nature”. This might imply something similar to *Elements*, Prop. 204, but the influence of divine souls over other souls that remain in the divine realm of intelligence has been translated to the rule of a celestial soul over other souls that belong to the realm of nature.

There is another difference between Prop. 3 and Proclus’ divine soul in the emphasis the *De causis* places on the mediation and influence of intelligence over noble soul. Where Prop. 3 of the *De causis* says that “the first cause creates the being of soul by a mediating intelligence”,⁵⁷ it indicates a theme that is much less prominent in Proclus’ Prop 201. Noble soul, the *De causis* says, “receives the impression of intelligence” and, as a consequence, has an operation that is “inferior” to that of intelligence in that, by contrast, it only imprints on its effects “through motion”.⁵⁸ Proclus, by comparison, does not emphasize the derivative nature of the intelligence in divine soul. This intelligence is, “through participation”, in that it receives the influence of “intelligible essences”, but it is nevertheless divine soul’s own “intellectual substance” — an “immanent intelligence”.⁵⁹ So on the one hand, the intellectuality of both noble soul and divine soul are understood to receive an intelligible influence, but where in the *De causis* this is the cause of noble soul’s inferiority and the reason why noble soul moves bodies, in Proclus, there is no emphasis on this kind of inferiority at all.

These differences between the *Liber de causis* and the *Elements of Theology* foreground an important structural difference in the psychology of these two works. Where Proclus’ divine souls belong to a hierarchy of three distinct kinds of soul, the *De causis*, by contrast, only describes two: “intellectual” souls (to which noble soul belongs) and “inferior” souls;⁶⁰

⁵⁶ Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, Prop. 204 (ed. and trans. Dodds), p. 178-79: “Every divine soul is sovereign over many souls which are perpetually in the divine company, and over yet more which are at certain times admitted to that station. For being divine, it must be endowed with a rank of universal sovereignty and primal operation in the order of souls [...]”.

⁵⁷ *Liber de causis*, Prop. 3: “causa prima creavit esse anime mediante intelligentia”.

⁵⁸ *Liber de causis*, Prop. 3: “Et quia anima suscipit impressionem intelligentie, facta est inferioris operationis quam ipsa impressione sua in id quod est sub ipsa. Quod est quia non inprimit in res nisi per motum”.

⁵⁹ See Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, Prop. 201 (ed. Dodds), p. 176-77: “And because they have an intellectual substance which renders them susceptible of influence from the intellectual essences, they use not only a divine but also an intellectual activity, the former based upon the unity within them, the latter upon their immanent intelligence;” and also that, *Ibid.*: “their intellection and providence are derived through participation”.

⁶⁰ *Liber de causis*, Prop. 5(4) (ed. Pattin), p. 57.98-58.5 and Prop. 19(18), p. 86.68-87.71.

and where it is clear in the *Elements of Theology* that human souls belong exclusively to the third and lowest of its three kinds of souls, the *De causis* does not identify whether human souls belong specifically to either the superior or inferior kind. Proclus' three orders of soul are the divine souls, intellectual souls, and souls that are only intermittently intellectual.⁶¹ E.R. Dodds explains that the class of divine souls includes the souls of the planets and stars, as well as the world-soul of Plato's *Timaeus* and the unparticipated Soul,⁶² which would correspond to the third Plotinian hypostasis.⁶³ Inferior to these, the class of intellectual souls include the daemons, angels, and heroes of Hellenic paganism. While this specified taxonomy of divine and intellectual souls is not made clear in the *Elements*, in which neither celestial movers nor daemons, angels, and heroes are mentioned explicitly, it is clear that the divine souls are gods on the level of soul who are participants of the divine intelligences.⁶⁴ These divine souls are distinct because they have "the divine light illuminating them from above".⁶⁵ By contrast, intellectual souls are participants of the "purely intellectual"⁶⁶ and by that intellectual activity are perpetually attendant upon the gods, but are not gods themselves.⁶⁷ Their perpetual company with the gods is, then, contrasted to the intermittent company of those particular souls that are only sometimes intellectual and periodically descend into bodies on earth. This third, lowest kind of soul are those rational souls that come to belong to human beings.⁶⁸

Thus, in Proclus there are three classes of soul divided according to two fundamental distinctions: souls are either participated or unparticipated by a body (only the very highest member of the divine souls is unparticipated. See Prop. 164), and they are either undescended (i.e., remain in the company of the gods) or descended into bodily life on earth. Divine souls are all undescended, and some are unparticipated while others are

⁶¹ See Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, Prop. 184 (ed. Dodds) p. 160-61. On Proclus' psychology in general, see J. Trouillard, *L'Un et l'âme selon Proclus* (Paris, Les belles lettres, 1972); and J.F. Finamore and E. Kutash, "Proclus on the Psychê: World Soul and the Individual Soul", in P. d'Hoine and M. Martijn (eds), *All From One: A Guide to Proclus* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 122-38.

⁶² See, for example, Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, Prop. 164.

⁶³ See Dodds, "Commentary", in Proclus, *The Elements of Theology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 187-310 at p. 295.

⁶⁴ See Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, Prop. 182.

⁶⁵ See Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, Prop. 185.

⁶⁶ See Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, Prop. 183.

⁶⁷ See Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, Prop. 185.

⁶⁸ In Proclus, plants and animals, which do not appear at all in the *Elementatio theologica*, are only understood to have "a part" of soul; see Dodds, "Commentary", p. 296.

participated by bodies (for example, the souls of the planets and stars). Intellectual souls are undescended but participated by astral bodies, and Particular souls are descended and participated.

The author of the *Liber de causis* adapts the divine souls of Prop. 201, but fits them into a scheme that has only two orders of soul: intellectual souls that are superior, and inferior souls. The author introduces this distinction in Prop. 5(4):

Therefore, souls which follow intelligence are complete, perfect, and of slight declination and separation, and souls that follow inferior being are in complement and declined beneath superior souls. And superior souls infuse the goods which they receive from intelligence over inferior souls.⁶⁹

The *De causis* thereby contrasts the continuity and regularity of those superior souls “that follow intelligence” to the “declination” of inferior souls. Prop. 19(18) adds to this, saying that superior souls “depend on intelligence” while inferior souls are “soul only”.⁷⁰ By these distinctions, it is clear that noble soul, which Prop. 3 calls “*anima intelligibilis*” belongs to the superior class, but what of human soul?

Considering the fact that human souls are also intellectual, there is a significant ambiguity here as to whether human souls are “superior” or “inferior”. The matter is much more clear in the *Elements of Theology* where the difference is between whether or not a soul descends from the company of the gods into a human body. There is no such distinction in the *Liber de causis* that pertains to the human being and this ambiguity is present in Prop. 3. While, as we pointed out above, the first part of that proposition explains clearly that noble souls are celestial movers with a divine operation that “prepares nature” and an animate operation that is the cause of the motion of all bodies, there is no reason why the rest of the text about the relationship between soul and intelligence and its animate operation could not also describe the intellectual souls of human beings.⁷¹

⁶⁹ *Liber de causis*, Prop. 5(4) (ed. Pattin), p. 57.98-58.5: “Igitur animae quae sequuntur intelligentiam, sunt completae, perfectae, paucae declinationis et separationis; et animae sequuntur esse inferiores sunt in complemento et declinatione sub animabus superioribus. Et animae superiores influunt bonitates, quas recipiunt ab intelligentia, super animas inferiores.”

⁷⁰ *Liber de causis*, Prop. 19(18) (ed. Pattin), p. 86.68-87.71: “Et ex animabus est quae est anima intellectibilis, quoniam est pendens per intelligentiam; et ex eis est quae est anima tantum.”

⁷¹ This ambiguity is increased by the fact that the name “noble soul” only appears in the opening sentence of the proposition, while what follows speaks of only of “soul” (*anima*).

2.2. The *Plotiniana Arabica*, and al-Kindī on the Nobility of Human Soul

The term “noble soul” also appears in the *Plotiniana arabica*,⁷² and while the indefinite place of the human being in the two-fold order of souls in the *Liber de causis* is alien to Proclus’ *Elements of Theology*, it bears much more similarity to those Arabic adaptations of Plotinus’ *Enneads*.⁷³ Proclus’ clear distinction between descended and undescended souls is famously more ambiguous in the *Enneads* of Plotinus, for whom part of the human being remains perpetually in the presence of intellect, even while joined to a body.⁷⁴ This ambiguity between the lower and higher life of soul is also present in the *Plotiniana Arabica* and can also be found in another form in the philosophical writings of al-Kindī.⁷⁵

In the *Theology of Aristotle*, one of the central texts in the *Plotiniana Arabica*, “noble soul” (*fi al-naḥs al-ṣarīfa*) is the subject of its Chapter VII, and noble soul does not belong here to the heavens, but rather to the human being.⁷⁶ In this chapter, the *Theology of Aristotle* distinguishes between two aspects of human soul, which are related to two different worlds: “When the soul is in the intelligible world she is superior and nobler (*āṣraf*)”, but when she

⁷² See, for example, the reference to “noble, divine soul” in *Theology of Aristotle*, Proem (ed. Badawi), p. 7.2-13: “Then we will mention the universal celestial soul and also describe how power emanates from the intellect to it, and how [the intellect] makes [the soul] resemble it. [...] Then, we will mention the state of these rational souls in descending to their world and joining to the world of bodily things, and their ascent, and the discovery of the cause in this. And we will mention the noble, divine soul [*al-naḥs al-ṣarīfa al-ilāhiyya*], which adheres to the intellectual excellences, and is not overwhelmed with bodily desires” (trans. P. Adamson, *The Arabic Plotinus: A Study of the “Theology of Aristotle” and Related Texts*, Dissertation, University of Notre Dame [2000], p. 60-61). See D’Ancona, “La doctrine de la création « mediante intelligentia »”, p. 76, n. 10. Except where noted (as in this case), quotations of the *Theology of Aristotle* are that of G. Lewis, included in vol. 2 of Plotinus, *Enneads*, ed. Henry and Schwyzer. The transliterations are my own.

⁷³ On the relationship between *Liber de causis* and the *Plotiniana Arabica*, see G. Endress, *Proclus Arabus*, p. 186-87; Taylor, “Contextualizing the *Kalām fi maḥd al-khair*”, p. 214-21; and D’Ancona, “Sources et structure de *Liber de causis*”, p. 38, where she identifies 15 propositions (according to the Latin enumeration) that have affinities with the *Plotiniana Arabica* as well as with Proclus: Props. 2-9(8), Props. 16(15)-25(24), and Prop. 25(24).

⁷⁴ On Plotinus’ doctrine of the undescended human soul, see J.M. Rist, “Integration and the Undescended Soul in Plotinus”, in *The American Journal of Philology* 88/4 (1967), p. 410-22; H.J. Blumenthal, *Plotinus’ Psychology: His Doctrines of the Embodied Soul* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971); and J. Phillops, “Plotinus and Iamblichus on Πρωτογενής”, in *Ancient Philosophy* 15/1 (1995), p. 135-53.

⁷⁵ The *Theology of Aristotle* was written by the Christian Scholar ‘Abd al-Masīḥ ibn Nā’ima al-Ḥimṣī and edited by al-Kindī. See the Prologue of the *Theology of Aristotle* (ed. Badawi), p. 3; and Treiger, “Palestinian Origenism and the Early History of the Maronites”, p. 44.

⁷⁶ *Theology of Aristotle*, VII.45-48 (ed. Badawi) p. 91; (trans. G. Lewis), p. 249-51: “We say that every soul has something that is joined to the body below and is joined to the mind above. [...] The individual soul which is in these individual bodies is noble [*ṣarīfa*] too, controlling the bodies nobly [...]” This passage adapts Plotinus *Ennead* IV.8, 7.1-2 (ed. Henry and Schwyzer, vol. II), p. 248.11-250.18. On Soul in the *Theology of Aristotle*, see D’Ancona, “Porphyry, Universal Soul and the Arabic Plotinus”, in *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy*, 9 (1999), p. 47-88; and P. Adamson, “Aristotelianism and the Soul in the Arabic Plotinus”, in *Journal of the History of Ideas* 62/2 (2001), p. 211-32, in addition to Adamson’s later essay, “Two Early Arabic Doxographies”, cited above.

descends into sensibility, “she is in the lower world” and “is baser and viler on account of the body she has entered”.⁷⁷ In this way, human soul has a nobler part which belongs to the intelligible world, in contrast to the inferior life of sensibility through the body.

This theme returns again in Chapter X which contrasts “noble soul” to “animal souls” and describes the higher, undescended part of the human soul that remains with intellect even though it has been joined to the sense-experience of a body.⁷⁸ This passage adapts Plotinus, *Ennead* VI.7, which describes the human being who has both a descended part and a divine part that remains connected to the intelligible world.⁷⁹ In this case, where Plotinus uses the word “divine” (θειοτέρα), the *Theology of Aristotle* uses the word “noble” (šarīf), just as the *De causis*, does in Prop. 3’s translation of Proclus.⁸⁰

Al-Kindī, who led the circle of translators and intellectuals in Baghdad that produced both the *Liber de causis* and the *Theology of Aristotle*, also uses the word “noble” (šarīf) in his philosophical works to describe what is best in the human soul.⁸¹ For al-Kindī, however, nobility is also the possession of the heavens in their intellectuality, excellence, and obedience to God—a use of the term that is reminiscent of its appearance in Prop. 3 of the *Liber de causis* to name the mover of the “first body”.

⁷⁷ *Theology of Aristotle*, VII, 22 (ed. Badawi), p. 87; (trans. G. Lewis), p. 247. This passage adapts Plotinus, *Enneads* IV.8.7, 1-2 (ed. Henry and Schwyzer, vol. II), p. 244.29-30.

⁷⁸ *Theology of Aristotle*, X.72-73 (ed. Badawi), p. 145; (trans. G. Lewis), p. 449: “This man is the man whom Plato defined, but he added to his definition, saying that the man who uses the body and performs his functions with bodily instruments is nothing but a soul using the body primarily, while the noble and divine soul [*al-naḥs al-šarīfa al-ilāhiyya*] uses the body in a secondary man, that is, through the medium of the animal soul. For when the created animal soul becomes percipient the reasoning living soul follows her and gives her a life nobler [*āšraf*] and more honourable. I do not say that she descends from the upper world, but I do say that she adds to her a life nobler [*āšraf*] and higher than her own life”.

⁷⁹ See Plotinus, *Ennead* VI.7.5 (ed. Henry and Schwyzer, vol. II), p. 446.21-448.31: “Ο δὲ ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἄνθρωπος ψυχῆς ἤδη θειοτέρας, ἐχούσης βελτίω ἄνθρωπον καὶ αἰσθήσεις ἐναργεστέρας. Καὶ εἴη ἂν ὁ Πλάτων τοῦτον ὀρισάμενος, προσθεὶς δὲ τὸ ἡρώμενην σώματι, ὅτι ἐποχεῖται τῇ ἡτὶς προσχρῆται πρῶτως σώματι, ἢ δὲ δευτέρως ἢ θειοτέρα. ἡδὴ γὰρ αἰσθητικοῦ ὄντος τοῦ γενομένου ἐπηκολούθησεν αὕτη τρανότεραν ζωὴν διδοῦσα: μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδ’ ἐπηκολούθησεν, ἀλλὰ οἷον προσέθηκεν αὐτήν: οὐ γὰρ ἐξίσταται τοῦ νοητοῦ, ἀλλὰ συναψαμένη οἷον ἐκκρεμαμένην ἔχει τὴν κάτω συμμίζασα ἑαυτὴν λόγῳ πρὸς λόγον. ὅθεν καὶ ἀμυδρὸς οὗτος ὦν ἐγένετο φανερός τῇ ἐλλάμψει”.

⁸⁰ G. Endress in *Proclus Arabus* shows that this the same translation of šarīf for θειοτέρα is also used in the Arabic translation of Alexander of Aphrodesias, *Quaestiones* and it translates θεῖον in Aristotle’s *De caelo* II.1, 284a4. See G. Endress, *Proclus Arabus*, p. 128-30. This translation of the *De caelo* is particularly noteworthy for our purposes seeing that Aristotle speaks there about “the divine” and “immortal” motions of the heavens which “have no limit” but are the “limit of every other motion” and is thus another example of šarīf appearing in a cosmological context. See Aristotle, *De caelo* II.1, 284a2-6.

⁸¹ On al-Kindī’s psychology, see P. Adamson, “Two Early Arabic Doxographies on the Soul: Al-Kindī and the ‘Theology of Aristotle’”, in *The Modern Schoolman*, 77/2 (2000), p. 105-25; and Idem, *Al-Kindī* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 106-43.

In his *Letter to Aḥmad ibn al-Mu'taṣim*, al-Kindī discusses the nobility of the prostration and obedience of the “outermost body” to God. He argues there that we know the heavens are noble and rational because a cause must be more noble than its effect, and the heavens are the cause of what is rational and noble in human beings. By this reasoning, he concludes that the heavens must be rational, and indeed more rational than human beings, and that their nobility consists in this rationality.⁸² This celestial nobility is exemplified most clearly through the prostration and obedience of the heavens to God: “Thus it is clear that [the stars] carry out the command of someone, great be His praise. For they follow one prescribed motion without alteration”.⁸³ Later in the same text, al-Kindī compares the universe to a single animal with both a body and a nobler, psychic power. He reiterates there that what is inferior—for example, the human being—only receives its powers of life and reason (and thus, its own nobility) from that noble and celestial source.⁸⁴ It is the nobility of the heavens that for al-Kindī provides the standard by which the nobility of the human soul can be understood. In his work *On the Doctrine of the Soul*, which presents the doctrine of Aristotle, Plato, and Pythagoras, al-Kindī explains the soul is “simple and has nobility (*šaraf*), perfection, and great status”⁸⁵, and that the life of the soul after death belongs to the “higher, noble (*šarīf*) world” which is “near to the Creator,” and “near to His light and His compassion”.⁸⁶ This most noble life consists of seeing God “intellectually”, and to be counted among those on whom he emanates “from His light and His compassion”.⁸⁷

⁸² al-Kindī, *Letter to Aḥmad ibn al-Mu'taṣim, Explaining the Prostration of the Outermost Body and its Obedience to God* (ed. R. Rashed and J. Jolivet, Vol II), p. 191.10-16; (trans. P. Adamson and P.E. Pormann), p. 182, 2-3: “Furthermore, they must be either rational or not. The rational body is nobler [*āšraf*] than the non-rational body. So, if they were non-rational, we would be nobler [*āšraf*] than they. [...] They are the agent of our reason, which is our species, yet they are supposedly not rational? Then the effect would be nobler [*āšraf*] than the cause, and it is repugnant that anyone should think this. It must, then, be the case that they make us rational either by impressing in us what is naturally in them, or by means of an animal organ. If they bestow rationality on us by impressing in us what is naturally in them, then they are rational.”

⁸³ al-Kindī, *Letter to Aḥmad ibn al-Mu'taṣim* (ed. R. Rashed and J. Jolivet, Vol II), p. 179-81; (trans. P. Adamson and P.E. Pormann) p. 176, 5.

⁸⁴ al-Kindī, *Letter to Aḥmad ibn al-Mu'taṣim* (ed. R. Rashed and J. Jolivet, Vol II), p. 197.18-21; (trans. P. Adamson and P.E. Pormann) p. 185, 2: “One ought to imagine the universe as a single, articulated animal, since it is a body with no void in it. In the largest [part] of it—I mean the higher, nobler [*āšraf*] body—is the psychic, noble [*šarīfa*] power. In what is below it, in accordance with the power of a superior command, these psychic powers are in each of the things that possess souls, for example a single man.”

⁸⁵ al-Kindī, *On the Doctrine of the Soul, Epitomised from the Book of Aristotle and Plato, and the other Philosophers* (ed. 'Abū Rīda, vol. 1), p. 273; (trans. P. Adamson and P.E. Pormann) p. 113.

⁸⁶ al-Kindī, *On the Doctrine of the Soul* (ed. 'Abū Rīda, vol. 1), p. 227; (trans. P. Adamson and P.E. Pormann) p. 116.

⁸⁷ al-Kindī, *On the Doctrine of the Soul* (ed. 'Abū Rīda, vol. 1), p. 227; (trans. P. Adamson and P.E.

However, the human soul may only ascend to this “highest sphere” if it first becomes pure, cleansed from sensation and phantasms.⁸⁸ Crucially, then, in order to ascend to the world of nobility, the soul must first become noble herself: “the soul is able to reach this place and noble (*šarīfa*) rank in this world and the next only by being cleansed of stains”.⁸⁹ It is through this cleansing that one becomes able to know the “secrets of hidden things” as the quality of the soul becomes commensurate with the nobility of the heavens.

To review this comparison of the sources and texts related to the intellectual context of the *Liber de causis* in 9th-c. Baghdad, in Proclus’ *Elements of Theology*, divine soul is a wholly undescended principle that remains eternally in the presence of divine intelligence. Human soul, by contrast, when it is embodied leaves no part behind in the divine or intelligible sphere; it, as Prop. 211 says, “descends entire”.⁹⁰ In the *Theology of Aristotle*, however, like in Plotinus, the division between divine and human soul is less defined, for a part of human soul ever remains in the presence of intellect, even when it is joined to a body. One finds something similar in the writings of al-Kindī: “nobility” can both describe the quality of the celestial sphere, or that part of the human soul which is capable of ascending thither and becoming celestial in character itself.

There is no explicit account of human nobility in the *Liber de causis*, but the use of the word *šarīf* in the *Theology of Aristotle* and the writings of al-Kindī evince the ambiguity of the term which has both ethical and cosmological significance, a fact that is also true for the Latin *nobilis* or *nobilitas*.⁹¹ Prop. 3 of the *De causis* describes the higher life of the soul that moves the “first body” and “all natural bodies”, but because this soul is called “noble” and

Pormann) p. 116.

⁸⁸ al-Kindī, *On the Doctrine of the Soul* (ed. ‘Abū Rīda, vol. 1), p. 228; (trans. P. Adamson and P.E.

Pormann) p. 116.

⁸⁹ al-Kindī, *On the Doctrine of the Soul* (ed. ‘Abū Rīda, vol. 1), p. 228-9; (trans. P. Adamson and P.E.

Pormann) p. 117.

⁹⁰ Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, Prop. 211 (ed. Dodds), p. 184.10-11.

⁹¹ As A. Colli has shown, it is clear from the uses of the word *nobilis* to translate various terms from Aristotle that the word can have diverse connotations: ethical, social, political, metaphysical, natural, and cosmological. See A. Colli, *Alberto Magno e la nobiltà: Genesi e forme di un concetto filosofico* (Pisa: Editio ETS, 2017), p. 23-50. For a significant cosmological and metaphysical example, see Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, XII.7, 1072b28-30, *Translatio anonyma*, (ed. Vuillemin Diem), p. 214: “Dicimus autem Deum esse animal sempiternum nobilissimum, quare vita et semper continua, sempiterna inest Deo; hoc enim est Deus”; see also Averroes’ commentary on that passage, *In Aristotelis Metaphysicae*, XII, comm. 39 (ed. Venice, 1562), f. 323rD: “Deinde Deus igitur est unus, etc. idest secundum hoc quod sonat hoc nomen, est unum aeternum valde nobile. Et declaratum est ratione aliquod tale esse: et est illud, quod movet omne. Hoc igitur est Deus”. Colli discusses these texts on *Alberto Magno e la nobiltà*, p. 40-41.

not “divine” or “celestial”, something like the ambiguity present in the *Theology* and al-Kindī can be discerned here too: human beings too can strive for the intellectuality of noble soul and seek to live in imitation of its perfect and complete life.

2.3. Noble Soul and the Doctrine of Creation

While one can discern similarities and differences in the accounts and orders of soul in the *Liber de causis* on the one hand, and in Proclus and Plotinus in the other, there is one element in Prop. 3 of the *De causis* which is entirely alien to both Greek philosophers, and that a doctrine of creation. In the middle of Prop. 3, the author of the *De causis* introduces the following:

This is because the first cause creates the being of soul by a mediating intelligence. And for this reason soul comes to effect a divine operation. After, therefore, the first cause creates the being of soul, it lays it as the ‘thatch’ of intelligence, so that it effects its operations. For this reason, intelligible soul effects an intelligible operation.⁹²

This is the very first mention of creation in the *Liber de causis*, and as scholars have argued, the presence of this notion in the *Liber de causis* is one of the most distinct ways in which the author adapts the pagan Neoplatonism of his sources to the needs of the text’s first Muslim and Christian readers in Baghdad. D’Ancona has pointed out that while this concept of creation is indeed absent in both Proclus and Plotinus, it is clear that the reference to creation in Prop. 3 involves an adaptation of Plotinus’ *Enneads* that one also finds in texts from the *Plotiniana Arabica*.⁹³

In Plotinus, intellect is the first emanation from the one, and D’Ancona argues that this priority of intellect in Plotinus is adapted in the *Liber de causis* through the concept of the “mediating intelligence”.⁹⁴ The central difference, however, is that where for Plotinus, intellect emanates from the one, and then soul from the intellect, the *De causis* speaks of the creation of soul by the mediation of intellect. On this theme, D’Ancona points to a similar adaptation of Plotinus in the *Theology of Aristotle*:

For when the true one which is above completeness creates the complete thing, that

⁹² *Liber de causis*, Prop. 3: “Quod est quia causa prima creavit esse anime mediante intelligentia. Et propter illud facta est anima efficiens operationem divinam. Postquam ergo creavit causa prima esse anime posuit eam sicut stramentum intelligentie, quod efficiat operationes suas. Propter illud ergo anima intelligibilis efficit operationem intelligibilem.”

⁹³ D’Ancona, “La doctrine de la création « mediante intelligentia »”, p. 76-80.

⁹⁴ See Plotinus, *Enneads* V.1.6. D’Ancona, “La doctrine de la création « mediante intelligentia »”, p. 76.

complete thing turns to its originator and casts its gaze on it and is filled with light and splendour from it and becomes intellect. [...] But the true One creates the being of intellect, and the intellect creates the form of soul, from the being which is originated from the true One through the medium of the being of the intellect.⁹⁵

This passage adapts Plotinus, *Enneads* V.2, which says that “Intellect, then, being in a way the One and pouring forth abundant power, produces things that are the same as it [...]. And this activity, arising from the substantiality of Intellect, belongs to Soul”.⁹⁶ The manner in which the *Theology* adapts this passage is similar to the text from *De causis*, Prop. 3 above; soul arises entirely from the activity of intellect, as one might understand in Plotinus, but its being is from “the true One” is through the “medium of the being of intellect”. D’Ancona draws out similar connections between the *Theology of Aristotle*, and *De causis*, Prop. 9[8], which also discusses creation and the mediation of intelligence.⁹⁷

While the primacy of intelligence as the first procession is similar in Plotinus and his Arabic adapters, there has also been a groundbreaking shift to understanding the source of being in terms of creation.⁹⁸ The role of intelligence is still primary and still mediates the creation of what follows after it, but being is understood to arise from the first cause and the first cause alone in a unique creative act.

Prop. 3 is the first text of the *De causis* in which this notion of creation appears, and the author weaves the doctrine into his account of noble soul and its operations. Noble soul is created by the first cause through a mediating intelligence, and as the text says, “this is the

⁹⁵ *Theology of Aristotle* X.1, 8-12 (ed. Badawi), p. 135.8-136.18; (trans. G. Lewis), p. 292-93, translation modified with reference to D’Ancona’s translation in, “La doctrine de la création « mediante intelligentia »”, p. 78.

⁹⁶ The entire passage adapted by the *Theology of Aristotle* above is Plotinus, *Ennead* V.2.1 (ed. Henry and Schwyzer, vol. II), p. 292.11-17: “Καὶ ἡ μὲν πρὸς ἐκεῖνο στάσις αὐτοῦ τὸ ὄν ἐποίησεν, ἡ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ θέα τὸν νοῦν. Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἔστι πρὸς αὐτό, ἵνα ἴδῃ, ὁμοῦ νοῦς γίγνεται καὶ ὄν. Οὗτος οὖν ὢν οἷον ἐκεῖνος τὰ ὅμοια ποιεῖ δυνάμιν προχέας πολλήν – εἶδος δὲ καὶ τοῦτο αὐτοῦ – ὥσπερ αὖ τὸ αὐτοῦ πρότερον προέχεε· καὶ αὕτη ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς τοῦτο μένοντος ἐκείνου γενομένη” (trans. G. Boys-Stones *et al.*).

⁹⁷ D’Ancona, “La doctrine de la création « mediante intelligentia »”, p. 80. See *Liber de causis*, Prop. 9(8) (ed. Pattin), p. 68.80-69.90: “Ergo intelligentia continet omnes res; et non est facta intelligentia ita nisi propter causam primam quae supereminet omnibus rebus, quoniam est causa intelligentiae et animae et naturae et reliquis rebus. Et causa quidem prima non est intelligentia neque anima neque natura, immo est supra [intelligentiam et] animam et naturam, quoniam est creans omnes res. Verumtamen est creans intelligentiam absque medio et creans animam et naturam et reliquas res, mediante intelligentia.” Compare this to *Theology of Aristotle* (ed. Badawi), p. 26.9-27.3; (trans. G. Lewis), p. 231.

⁹⁸ About this transformation, D’Ancona says: “La rencontre entre le thème néoplatonicien de la dérivation de toute la réalité de l’Un et les exigences d’une théologie fondée sur la notion de création est un événement parmi les plus importants de l’histoire de la métaphysique entre l’Antiquité tardive et le Moyen Âge”, “La doctrine de la création « mediante intelligentia »”, p. 84.

reason why soul comes to effect a divine operation". Speaking both of an original act of creation as well as the mediation of a secondary principle, Prop. 3 raises many questions about the meaning of creation and structure of causality, and in commentaries on the *De causis* the way an author understands creation here forms the basis for how it is understood in the text as a whole.

3. Noble Soul and the *Liber de causis* Commentaries of Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, and Giles of Rome

In the early 14th c., in Book IV of Dante's *Convivio*, there appears an account of human and celestial nobility of remarkable likeness to that of the circle in Baghdad that produced the *Liber de causis*.⁹⁹ For Dante, the subject of Prop. 3 of the *Liber de causis* is the human being. Even so, the life of the noble human soul in the *Convivio* is one lived through the nobility of the life of the heavens. Nobility, Dante says, is embodied supremely in the Philosophia contemplated by the celestial intelligences,¹⁰⁰ that love of wisdom that is both united to the divine essence and the "exemplar of human essence"¹⁰¹ whose nobility descends like a seed from the heavens into human being who is receptive of her nobility at birth.¹⁰² The celestial perfection of noble soul is incarnated in the life of the noble human being, and the destiny of this soul is to ascend back to its noble and celestial source to be united with its principle.¹⁰³

⁹⁹ On Dante's use of *De causis*, Prop. 3, see Negri, "The 'Noble Soul' Between Heaven and Earth", Forthcoming. See also, V. Arroche, "The *Liber de causis* and the *potential sive virtus intellective* Formula in Dante's Political Philosophy", in D. Calma (ed.), *Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes. Volume 2: Translations and Acculturations* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2021), p. 376-90; and B. Nardi, "L'origine dell'anima umana secondo Dante", in *Giornale critic della filosofia italiana* 12 (1931), p. 433-56.

¹⁰⁰ See Dante, *Convivio*, III.xii, 11-14 (ed. and trans. A. Frisardi), p. 186-89: "I say then that God, who perceives all (for his 'circling' is his 'perceiving'), sees nothing so gracious and noble as what he sees when he gazes on the place where Philosophy is. [...] Divine philosophy, therefore, is of the divine essence, for no thing can be added in him to his essence; and she is most noble, because the divine essence is most noble; and she is in him perfectly and truly, as if through eternal marriage. [...] O most noble and most excellent heart, which aspires for the bride of the Emperor of heaven, and not only bride, but sister and most tenderly loved daughter!"

¹⁰¹ See Dante, *Convivio*, II.vi.6 (ed. and trans. A. Frisardi), p. 154-55: "Therefore, when I say, 'She [Philosophia] holds each heavenly Intellect in thrall,' I simply mean that she is made thus as the intentional exemplar of the human essence in the divine mind, and, therefore, in all the others, most of all in those angelic minds which create with heaven the things here below".

¹⁰² See Dante, *Convivio* IV.xxi.2 (ed. and trans. A. Frisardi), p. 310-11: "man is composed of soul and body; but nobility is in the soul, where, as has been stated, it is like a seed of divine power"; and IV.xxi.9, p. 312-13: "And this is consistent with the view of Tully in his book *On Old Age*, where, speaking in the persona of Cato, he says: 'Indeed a celestial soul descended into us, coming from the highest abode to a place which is contrary to the divine nature and eternity.' And within such a soul there exists its own proper power, as well as in the intellectual power and the divine—the influx, that is, which has been mentioned. And so it is written in the *Book of Causes*: 'Every noble soul has three activities, namely vita, intellectual, and divine.'"

¹⁰³ See Dante, IV.xxiii, 3 (ed. and trans. A. Frisardi), p. 320-23: "[T]his divine seed, which was discussed above, spontaneously sprouts in our soul, developing and differentiating into each of the soul's faculties, in

In other words, through Dante, the interrelated significance of human and celestial nobility of soul's al-Kindian background becomes realized in the Latin tradition, despite the continued ignorance of Dante and his contemporaries of the precise provenance of the *Liber de causis* itself.

The history of noble soul that is the subject of this dissertation falls between these human interpretations of the concept in Ps.-Henry (1245-55) and Dante (1304-7) and is necessary to fully understand the thread that connects them.¹⁰⁴ Compared to Ps.-Henry and Dante, the human being is much less present in the commentaries of Albert, Thomas, and Giles. However, their approaches to noble soul contain the constituent parts of what Dante gathers and articulates after them. For example, in Albert the Great's commentary, he compares the life of noble soul by analogy to the life of lesser souls, including human beings, whose imperfect motions imitate the perfect motions of the heavens.¹⁰⁵ In Thomas Aquinas' commentary he identifies that noble soul is a celestial cause adapted from Proclus' divine souls, but by the end of his commentary he betrays his skepticism about the existence of this concept as he subtly substitutes celestial soul for human soul in the discussion's conclusion.¹⁰⁶ And Giles of Rome's commentary emphasizes the causal role that noble soul as the angel who moves the heavens plays in the generation of the human being, seeing that, as Aristotle says, "man is generated by man and the sun".¹⁰⁷

Arising from the problems and ambiguities of the text, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, and Giles of Rome, each confront three interpretive questions that occupy their commentaries:

1. What is noble soul? (Is it really a celestial soul or a human soul, or it is an intelligence or an angel, or perhaps it is not necessary that this principle exist at all?)
2. What is the nature of noble soul's operations? (How does noble soul contribute to the metaphysics of celestial motion and influence?)

conformity with their needs. It sprouts, then, in the vegetative faculty, and in the sensitive and the rational; and branches out into the powers of them all, directing them to their perfection, and always persevering within them until that moment when, with the part of our soul that never dies, it returns to heaven, to the highest and most glorious Sower of seeds." Much of the rest of Book IV is dedicated to the account of the development of this divine seed in the life of the person with a noble soul.

¹⁰⁴ For more on Ps.-Henry's interpretation of noble soul, see the introduction of Ch. 1.

¹⁰⁵ See Ch. 1.2.2.1.

¹⁰⁶ See the conclusion of Ch. 3.

¹⁰⁷ See Ch. 4.2.3-4.

3. What is the meaning of noble soul's creation? (What influence, if any, does intelligence have on the creation of noble soul, and similarly, what is the relationship of noble soul to the creation of the bodies over which it has an influence?)

Each of our three commentators confront the diverse array of references to soul in the *De causis* and strive to formulate a coherent picture in which the concept of noble soul belongs. The differences between their three interpretations of the meaning of noble soul are influenced by a considerable number of factors: by the distinct readings in the manuscripts of the *De causis* they had to hand while preparing their commentaries, and by their understanding of the text's origin and history. Related are what texts, translations, resources were available to the commentator, as well as the influence of the needs of their religious orders and the controversies and questions that occupied the University in Paris in each generation. Moreover, the three commentaries each have a distinct method and purpose which belongs to larger projects and trends that can be discerned in the author's works taken as a whole.

The sections that follow introduce the *De causis* commentaries of Albert, Thomas, and Giles with respect to the considerations described above. Seeing that Albert and Thomas' commentaries have been the subject of much more scholarly attention than that of Giles, his has received the most attention here. An effort has also been made to discern the relationships of these commentaries to one another, and Giles' commentary is particularly important in this matter. Albert's and Thomas' commentaries are very methodologically and philosophically distinct, and they contribute to the construction of very different historical hypotheses.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, Thomas does not reference or cite Albert's commentary anywhere in his own.¹⁰⁹ Giles' commentary, however, makes use of both and in this way, provides a perspective on the *De causis* that also draws Albert's and Thomas' commentaries closer together.

3.1. Albert the Great's *De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa*

¹⁰⁸ As de Libera puts it, these two commentaries "représentent deux époques à la fois dans l'histoire de la philosophie et dans l'histoire de l'histoire de la philosophie", "Albert le Grand et Thomas d'Aquin", p. 347. Thomas, for de Libera, is the "premier philologue et la premier historien de la philosophie tardo-antique" while Albert is "le dernier, du moins le suprême représentant de la doxographie péripatéticienne arabe", p. 350.

¹⁰⁹ Calma, "The Exegetical Tradition", p. 28.

Albert's *De causis* commentary, which he calls the *De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa* (1268-71), is the concluding work in his series of commentaries written on the works of Aristotle and the tradition of Peripateticism.¹¹⁰ In this commentary project Albert seeks, as he says, to make the whole of *philosophia realis* intelligible to the Latins.¹¹¹ In the opening chapters of his *De causis* commentary, Albert clarifies the historical paradigm of this project, or as de Libera calls it, "l'horizon herméneutique",¹¹² of his approach to the Peripatetic tradition. Albert distinguishes there between three schools of philosophy, the Epicureans (who include, among others, the presocratics), the Stoics (who include such figures as Pythagoras, Hermes, Socrates, and Plato), and the Peripatetics (including Anaxagoras, Aristotle, Alexander, Alfarabi, Avicenna, Algazel, Averroes and others).¹¹³ It is according to this conception of the history of philosophy that Albert constructs his interpretation of the *Liber de causis*, which for him discloses the summation of Peripatetic

¹¹⁰ The critical edition of Albert's commentary is *De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa*, ed. W. Fauser, Editio Coloniensis xvii/2 (Münster i.W., Aschendorff, 1993). There have been two partial translations of the work, one in German and the other in French: *Buch über die Ursachen und den Hervorgang von allem aus der ersten Ursache. Liber primus*, trans. H. Anzulewicz, M. Burger, S. Donati, R. Meyer, and H. Möhle (Hamburg: FelixMeiner, 2006); *Le traité du flux. Tractatus de fluxu causatorum a causa prima et causarum ordine*, trans. S. Milazzo (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2013). There is an extensive body of literature on this work. For an incomplete list, see L. Sweeney, "Esse primum creatum in Albert the Great's *Liber de causis et processu universitatis*", in *The Thomist* 44 (1980), p. 549-646; Idem, "A Controversial Text on esse primum creatum in Albert the Great's *Liber de causis et processu universitatis*", in *Proceedings of the Patristics, Medieval, and Renaissance Conference* 5 (1982), p. 137-50; Fauser, "Albert the Great's Commentary"; D. Twetten, "Albert the Great, Double Truth, and Celestial Causality", in *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 12 (2001), p. 275-358; Idem, "Albert's Arguments for the Existence of God and the Primary Causes", in I.M. Resnick (ed.), *A Companion to Albert the Great: Theology, Philosophy, and the Sciences* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2013), p. 658-87; T. Bonin, *Creation as Emanation. The Origin of Diversity in Albert the Great's 'On the Causes and the Procession of the Universe'* (Southbend, IN: Notre Dame, Notre Dame University Press, 2001); Eadem, "Albert's *De causis* and the Creation of Being", in I.M. Resnick (ed.), *A Companion to Albert the Great: Theology, Philosophy, and the Sciences* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2013), p. 688-94; A. de Libera, "Albert le Grand et Thomas d'Aquin"; Idem, *Métaphysique et noétique, Albert le Grand* (Paris: J. Vrin, 2005), p. 77ff; K. Krause and H. Anzulewicz, "From Content to Method: the *Liber de causis* in Albert the Great", in D. Calma (ed.), *Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes Volume I: Western Scholarly Networks and Debates* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2018), p. 180-208; Calma, "AL- 'AQL dans la tradition Latine du *Liber de Causis*"; H. Anzulewicz, "Hat Albertus Magnus das proklische Paradigma des *Liber de causis* erkannt?", in *Przegląd Tomistyczny* 28 (2022), p. 109-34; I. Moulin, "« Agir par son être-même »: La question de la liberté créatrice dans le *Liber de causis* et sa réception chez Albert le Grand", in D. Calma (ed.), *Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes. Volume 3: On Causes and the Noetic Triad* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2022), p. 371-88 at 381-86; and J. Casteigt, "Le chapitre xi[xii] du *Liber de causis* commenté par Albert le Grand : l'unité de la cause et de son effet comme immanence réciproque", in *Ibid.* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2022), p. 476-502. See also de Libera's references to other earlier 20th c. literature on Albert's commentary in "Albert le Grand et Thomas d'Aquin", p. 347. For literature on Albert's doctrine of *fluxus* in particular, see below.

¹¹¹ Albert the Great, *Physica*, I.1.1, p. 1.9-14, 44-49.

¹¹² De Libera, "Albert le grand et Thomas d'Aquin", p. 348.

¹¹³ See Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis* I.1.1, p. 1.9-13; and *De caelo* I.4.1, p. 79.3ff. See also A. de Libera, "Épicurisme, stoïcisme, péripatétisme. L'histoire de la philosophie vue par les Latins (XIIe-XIIIe siècle)", in A. Hasnawi, A. Elamrani-Jamal, and M. Aouad (eds), *Perspectives arabes et médiévales sur la tradition scientifique et philosophique grecque* (Paris: Peeters, 1997), p. 343-64.

theology that avoids the materialism of the Epicureans on the one hand and the idealism of the Stoics on the other.¹¹⁴ Albert uses the *De causis* to resolve perennial difficulties in the Peripatetic tradition, and to perfect the work of Aristotelian theology, which, to his mind, remains incomplete in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.¹¹⁵

In the course of Albert's outline of the history and system of Peripatetic metaphysics, which is the subject of the first book of his *De causis* commentary, he identifies that the doctrine of celestial animation is one which involves considerable controversy in the history of philosophy.¹¹⁶ In this introductory discussion, Albert summarizes the different opinions from the Epicurean, Stoic, and Peripatetic schools on the causes of celestial motion.¹¹⁷ It then becomes clear in his commentary on noble soul and Prop. 3 of the *Liber de causis*, that he presents his interpretation of noble soul in such a way that it resolves the disagreements about celestial animation in the Peripatetic school,¹¹⁸ drawing together both the arguments of Avicenna that the proximate motion of the heavens must be through a celestial soul, with those of Averroes, that celestial motion must ultimately depend on the eternity, stability, and continuity of separate intelligence.

Albert the Great incorporates these two sides into his understanding of the primary causality of the *Liber de causis*, which for him includes four primary causes: the first cause, intelligence, noble soul, and nature.¹¹⁹ These four primary causes together comprise the complete system of celestial metaphysics: the source of the all form is the first cause from which flows the primal form of being; intelligences are the final causes of celestial motion and the paradigms of its circular perfection; noble soul is the proximate cause of this motion which contemplates the perfection of intelligence and communicates that perfection to the heavens in the form of its circular motion; and nature, finally, is the power and motion of the heavens themselves, which orders all of the motions of the world generation and

¹¹⁴ On the materialism of the Epicureans, see *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.1.1, p. 1.14ff, and the idealism of the Stoics and Platonists, see I.1.4, p. 10.10ff.

¹¹⁵ See Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.1, p. 59.34-60.5; and II.5.24, p. 191.38-40, discussed in Ch. 1.1.

¹¹⁶ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.6, p. 52.6-11.

¹¹⁷ See Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.7, p. 52.15ff.

¹¹⁸ See Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.11-16, discussed in Ch. 1.2.

¹¹⁹ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.4, p. 64.47ff.

corruption.¹²⁰ Albert calls this causal system *fluxus*, or *forma fluens*.¹²¹ All form flows into the universe through the creative emanation of a single primal form from the first cause. This single form flows into the separate intelligences through whom it begins to be diversified, and from the separate intelligences into noble soul and finally into the heavens themselves.

Within this system, Albert carefully distinguishes between the substance and operations of noble soul from those of celestial intelligences. Intelligences are pure intellectual substances that have no causal relationship with bodies besides the role they play as final causes, moving those beings beneath them through love and desire. Noble souls, by contrast, are proper to each sphere and while they are also intellectual, their intellectual activity is not self-complete, but depends on receiving the form it contemplates from the intelligences that precede it.¹²² It is, then, thanks to this inferiority that noble soul can move its celestial sphere and be the cosmic mediator of intelligible form to bodies.

It is clear, then, that Albert's understanding of what noble soul is, "the principle of life and motion" in the heavens¹²³, is determined by his understanding of the origin of the *Liber de causis* and its belonging to the Peripatetic tradition (the understanding of which is also something that Albert constructs). Albert interprets noble soul in conversation with other Peripatetic sources, especially Averroes, Moses Maimonides, Avicenna, Algazel, Isaac Israeli, and as we will also see in Ch. 2, the astrologer Messahalah, and it is into this larger philosophical-historical project that Albert's understanding of noble soul belongs.

3.2. Thomas Aquinas' *Super Librum de causis expositio*

While Thomas Aquinas wrote his commentary on the *De causis* (1272) very shortly after Albert completed his own, Thomas interprets the text according to a very different

¹²⁰ See the discussion of Albert's use of the artist metaphor of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* to explain the primary causality of the *De causis* in Ch. 2.1.1.

¹²¹ See I. Moulin and D. Twetten, "Causality and Emanation in Albert", in I.M. Resnick (ed.), *A Companion to Albert the Great: Theology, Philosophy, and the Sciences* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2013), p. 694-721; M.E. Malgieri, "«Universale latissimae universalitatis»: origine della creazione e natura del *fluxus* nel *De causis* di Alberto", in *Quaestio* 20 (2021), p. 389-413; and H. Anzulewicz, "Die Emanationslehre des Albertus Magnus: Genese, Gestalt und Bedeutung", in L. Honnefelder, H. Möhle, S. Budillo del Barrio (eds), *Via Alberti. Texte – Quellen – Interpretationen* (Münster: Aschendorff, 2009), p. 219-42.

¹²² See Ch. 5.3 for how this understanding differs from that of Giles of Rome.

¹²³ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.12, p. 75.47: "Anima enim per substantialem rationem principium et causa vitae et motus est in eo quod habet motum a seipso."

conception of the history of philosophy and in conversation with very different sources.¹²⁴ This was made possible through his use of some of the newly available translations by William of Moerbeke, especially of the writings of Simplicius, and the *Elements of Theology* of Proclus.¹²⁵

From Simplicius, Thomas receives a late-ancient account of the distinction between the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions and philosophical methods that is very different from Albert's distinction between the Stoics and Peripatetics. See, for example, Thomas' use of Simplicius on Aristotle's *Categories* in his *De spiritualibus creaturis* (c. 1267-68) to distinguish in the history of philosophy between two modes of reasoning, that of Aristotle, and that of the Platonists:

The diversity of these two positions stems from this, that some, in order to seek the truth about the nature of things, have proceeded from intelligible reasons, and this was the particular characteristic of the Platonists. Some, however, have proceeded from sensible things, and this was the particular characteristic of the philosophy of Aristotle, as Simplicius says in his commentary *Upon the Categories*.¹²⁶

¹²⁴ The critical edition of Thomas' *De causis* commentary is *Super librum de causis expositio*, ed. H.-D. Saffrey (Paris: Vrin, 2002). It has been translated numerous times, for example, *Commentary on the Book of Causes*, trans. V.A. Guagliardo, C.R. Hess, and R.C. Taylor (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996; and *Commentaire du Livre des causes*, trans. B. Decossas and J. Decossas (Paris: Vrin, 2005). See the studies of C. Vansteenkiste, "Notes sur le commentaire de S. Thomas du *Liber de causis*", in *Études et recherches: Cahiers de théologie et philosophie* 8 (1952), p. 171-91; Idem, "Il Liber de causis negli scritti di San Tommaso", in *Angelicum* 35 (1958), p. 325-74; W. Beierwaltes, "Der Kommentar zum Liber de causis als neuplatonisches Element in der Philosophie des Thomas von Aquin", in *Philosophische Rundschau* 11/3-4 (1963), p. 192-215; J. chiu yuen Ho, "La doctrine de la participation dans le commentaire de saint Thomas d'Aquin sur le *Liber de Causis*", in *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* 7 (1972), p. 360-83; R.C. Taylor, "St. Thomas and the *Liber de causis* on the hylomorphic composition of separate substances", in *Mediaeval Studies* 41 (1979), p. 506-13; D'Ancona, "L'uso della sententia Dionysii nel commento di s. Tommaso e Egidio Romano"; Eadem, "Saint Thomas lecteur du Liber de Causis. Bilan des recherches contemporaines concernant le De Causis et analyse de l'interprétation thomiste", in C. D'Ancona, *Recherches sur le Liber de causis* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1995), p. 229-58; de Libera, "Albert le grand et Thomas d'Aquin", (1990); R.A. te Velde, *Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas* (Leiden/New York/Köln: E.J. Brill, 1995), p. 257-61; Porro, *Thomas Aquinas*, 2015, p. 340-45; W.J. Hankey, "The Concord of Aristotle, Proclus, the *Liber de causis* & Blessed Dionysius in Thomas Aquinas, Student of Albertus Magnus", in *Dionysius* 34 (2016), p. 137-209; D. Calma, "Sine secundaria: Thomas d'Aquin, Siger of Brabant", (2019); P. Bermon, "Les mots arabes du *Liber de causis* dans le commentaire de Thomas d'Aquin", in D. Calma (ed.), *Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes. Volume 1: Western Scholarly Networks and Debates* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2019), p. 317-39; J.-L. Solère, "Thomas d'Aquin, l'étiologie proclusienne et la théorie du concours de Dieu à la causalité naturelle", in D. Calma (ed.), *Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes. Volume 3: On Causes and the Noetic Triad* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2022), p. 303-37; O. Boulnois, "Deux modèles de causalité, deux théories de la liberté: À propos de deux interprétations de la proposition i du *Livre des causes*", in D. Calma (ed.), *Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes. Volume 3: On Causes and the Noetic Triad* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2022), p. 338-70 at p. 344-55.

¹²⁵ See W.J. Hankey, "Thomas' Neoplatonic Histories: His following of Simplicius", in *Dionysius* 20 (2002), p. 153-78.

¹²⁶ Thomas Aquinas, *De spiritualibus creaturis* 3, p. 40. 275-82: "Harum autem duarum opinionum diuersitas ex hoc procedit quod quidam ad inquirendam ueritatem de natura rerum processerunt ex rationibus

Thomas' central distinction is between the Platonic movement from immaterial principles downwards to sensible realities, in contrast with the Aristotelian method which begins from sensible motions and reasons to up to unmoved movers that they require. It is then through Moerbeke's translation of the *Elements of Theology* that Thomas identifies that the *De causis* is a text that adapts platonic doctrines in a way that is often in concord with Aristotle and also of Ps.-Dionysius.¹²⁷

In light of this discovery, the interpretive method of Thomas' *De causis* commentary proceeds according to the critical work of comparing the text to its Proclean sources, and then using the examples of Aristotle and Ps.-Dionysius to demonstrate how the *De causis* modifies and adapts them. At times Thomas uses Proclus to clarify some matter that is obscure in the *De causis*, and in other places he uses Aristotle and Ps.-Dionysius to draw out the ways the *De causis* has departed from the polytheism of Proclus.

Within this larger effort, Thomas' approach to noble soul is much more critical than that of Albert the Great. Thomas identifies the primary source of noble soul, the divine souls of *Elements of Theology*, Prop. 201, and then uses the hierarchy described by Proclus in the *Elements* to explain the meaning of noble soul's divinity as it providentially influences the motion of bodies through the motions of the heavens.¹²⁸ Thomas, however, points out in multiple places that the faith has not affirmed the existence of celestial souls.¹²⁹ Accordingly, he does not dedicate space in his commentary to discussing the necessity of the principle (as does Albert), and neither does he in this case adapt noble soul to his own understanding that the heavens are moved by angels (as does Giles).¹³⁰

intelligibilibus : et hoc fuit proprium Platoniorum, quidam uero ex rebus sensibilibus : et hoc fuit proprium philosophie Aristotilis, ut dicit Simplicius in Commento super Praedicamenta" (trans. Hankey, "Thomas' Neoplatonic Histories", p. 165). Thomas refers here to Simplicius, *In Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, Prologus (ed. Pattin, vol. 1) p. 8.70-85.

¹²⁷ See Saffrey, "Introduction", in *Super Librum de causis expositio*, ed. H.-D. Saffrey (Paris: Vrin, 2002), p. vii-lxiv at p. xxxvi. On the significance of Thomas' developing understanding of Platonism, see te Velde "Participation: Aquinas and His Neoplatonic Sources", in A.J.B. Hampton and J.P. Kenney (eds), *Christian Platonism: A History* (Cambridge University Press, 2021), p. 122-42; Fabro, "The Intensive Hermeneutics of Thomistic Philosophy: the Notion of Participation", *The Review of Metaphysics* 27 (1974), p. 449-91; Hankey, "The Concord of Aristotle, Proclus, the *Liber de Causis* & Blessed Dionysius"; and Idem, "Dionysius in Albertus Magnus and his student Thomas Aquinas", in M. Edwards, D. Pallis, G. Steiris (eds), *Oxford Handbook to Dionysius the Areopagite* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), p. 394-416.

¹²⁸ See Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 3, p. 17.1ff.

¹²⁹ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 2, p. 16.15-18; and Prop. 3, p. 25.9-14.

¹³⁰ Thomas does adapt Aristotelian celestial dynamics to his angelology in other works; see Ch. 5.2.3.

Instead, the central focus of Thomas' commentary on Prop. 3 is his critical engagement with its doctrine of creation. Through Proclus' *Elements of Theology*, Thomas identifies that the description of creation in Prop. 3 depends on the Platonic doctrine of participation, and to his mind, the *De causis* does not in this case sufficiently correct the polytheism of its sources.¹³¹ Thomas uses Ps.-Dionysius to articulate a more radically monotheistic notion of participation: noble soul does not participate its being from the first cause but its intellectuality from intelligence, but rather participates its being and every thing that its being requires to be what it is (including intelligence) from the first cause alone. Beginning from this discussion, then, Thomas Aquinas' critical engagement with noble soul and Prop. 3 contributes to his development of a distinct notion of creation as participation in *esse*, a doctrine which plays a large role in Thomas' late writings.

Finally, as a consequence of Thomas' skeptical attitude towards the existence of celestial soul as well as his emphasis on the doctrines of creation and participation, by the end of his discussion of noble soul, Thomas shifts the meaning of that concept to be about human soul. While Thomas Aquinas acknowledges that noble soul is the celestial mover described by the Platonic tradition, for his own purposes he uses it instead to develop notions relevant to human beings: their creation, participation, and relationship with the angels.¹³²

3.3. Giles of Rome's *Super De causis*

When Giles writes his commentary between 1289-91, much has shifted in the intellectual world of Paris since Thomas completed his commentaries. In 1277, Bishop Tempier censured the teaching of many propositions that had arisen from the new Greek and Arabic learning, some of which bear upon the *Liber de causis* and its doctrines.¹³³ Giles

¹³¹ See Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 3, p. 23.21ff.

¹³² See Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 3, p. 24.12-17 and 25.15-24.

¹³³ For an example of a censured article that bears upon the interpretation of noble soul in particular, see *La condamnation parisienne de 1277*, Article 92 (ed. D. Piche and C. Lafleur), p. 106: "Quod corpora celestia moventur a principio intrinseco, quod est anima; et quod moventur per animam et per virtutem appetitivam, sicut animal. Sicut anim anima appetens moventur, ita et celum." See also Articles 102, 212 and Suarez-Nani's discussion of them in *Les anges et la philosophie*, p. 173ff. For accounts of Giles' biography, see F. Del Punta, S. Donati, and C. Luna, "Egidio Romano", in *Dizionario biografico degli Italiani*, vol. 42 (Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1993), p. 319-41; B.E. Holstein, "A Commentary on the *De predestinatione et prescientia, paradiso et inferno* by Giles of Rome on the Basis of ms Cambrai BM 487 (455)", dissertation (Technische Universität Berlin, 2007), p. 16-46; C.F. Briggs, "Life, Works, and Legacy", p. 6-33; and E.L. Saak, *High Way to Heaven: The Augustinian Platform Between Reform and Reformation, 1292-1524* (Leiden/Boston/Koln: Brill, 2002), p.

himself was examined and censured in a separate examination in the same year on the grounds of his commentary on the first book of the *Sentences*. As a result, Giles was excluded from university life in Paris for seven years. This fact, however, does not seem to have greatly impacted the success of Giles' career which was fruitful and massively influential, especially in the new Augustinian order for which his works were declared to be the doctrinal standard in 1287.¹³⁴ Giles was also subsequently elected Prior General of the order in 1292. Thanks to the intercession of Pope Honorius IV, Giles' censorship was reversed in 1285 and it was then that he became Master of Theology and the first Augustinian to hold a chair in the University of Paris.¹³⁵

Giles' *De causis* commentary belongs to the period of his return to Paris as Master of Theology,¹³⁶ a time in which he wrote extensively on angels, and developed a close friendship with the future Pope Boniface VIII, Benedict Caetani—two facts related to his *De causis* commentary which is distinctly angelological in character and is dedicated to Caetani.¹³⁷

19-28.

¹³⁴ In May 1287 (one and a half years after he became regent master in Theology of the Augustinian order), the general chapter of Florence declared his works (both those *scriptas* and *scribendas*) to be made the standard for the entire Augustinian order (this is following the example of the Dominicans who proclaimed Thomas Aquinas their official doctor in 1279): *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, 4 vols, ed. H. Denifle and É. Chatelain (Paris: Université de Paris, 1891), vol. 2, p. 12: "Quia venerabilis magistri nostri Egidii doctrina mundum universum illustrat, diffinimus et mandamus inviolabiliter observari ut opiniones, positiones et sententias scriptas et scribendas predicti magistri nostri omnes nostri Ordinis lectores et studentes recipiant eidem prebentes assensum, et ejus doctrine omni qua poterunt sollicitudine, ut et ipsi illuminati alios illuminare possint, sint seduli defensores." See Briggs, "Life, Works, and Legacy", p. 6. G. Pini points out that this only applied "to the teachers and students in the Augustinian studia system" rather than "to those who were to become, and those who were already, Masters of Theology at Paris"; see Pini, "Building the Augustinian Identity: Giles of Rome as Master of the Order", in K Emery, Jr, W.J. Courtenay, and S.M. Metzger (eds), *Philosophy and Theology in the Studia of the Religious Orders and at Papal and Royal Courts* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2012), p. 409-25 at p. 415-16.

¹³⁵ Briggs, "Life, Works, and Legacy", p. 13-14.

¹³⁶ There is no critical edition of Giles' commentary, but an early modern printed edition was produced in Venice in 1550. I have cited Giles' commentary from ms Paris, BnF, 16122 which is a *pecia* and contains substantially different readings from the Venice edition. I Appendix B I provide a transcription of Prop. 3 from the Paris ms collating the different readings from the Venice edition and another 14th-c. ms., Vat. lat. 831, that seems closely related to the Paris ms.

¹³⁷ See Ch. 5.5. For literature on Giles' commentary, see G. Trapè, "Il neoplatonismo di Egidio Romano nel Commento al «*De causis*»", in *Aquinas* 9 (1966), p. 49-86; D'Ancona, "L'uso della sententia Dionysii nel commento di s. Tommaso e Egidio Romano"; J.-L. Solère, "Néoplatonisme et rhétorique: Gilles de Rome et la première proposition du *De causis*", in L. Benakis (ed.), *Néoplatonisme et philosophie médiévale. Actes du Colloque international de Corfou, 6-8 octobre 1995* (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997), p. 163-96; L. Catana, *The Concept of Contractio in Giordano Bruno's Philosophy* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005), at p. 103-32; L.M. de Rijk, "Introduction", in *Hervaeus Natalis O.P. De quattuor materiis sive Determinationes contra magistrum Henricum de Gandavo. vol. II: De esse et essentia. De material et forma. A critical Edition from Selected Manuscripts* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2013), p. xlvii-liv; P. Porro, "Prima rerum creaturarum est esse: Henri de Gand, Gilles de Rome et la quatrième proposition du *De causis* et l'*Elementatio theologica* de Proclus", in V. Cordonier and T. Suarez-Nani (eds), *L'Aristotélisme exposé. Aspects du débat philosophique entre Henri de Gand et Gilles de Rome* (Fribourg: Academic

To what extent Giles' commentary on the *De causis* was impacted by the shift in attitudes towards the new learning at the University of Paris is still unclear, but in general, in contrast to Thomas, Giles' commentary occupies itself less with the careful distinction and correction of philosophical authorities, and more with the effort to subordinate the notions of the *De causis* directly to the doctrines of the faith, especially as represented by Ps.-Dionysius the Areopagite. In the first case, Giles takes up Thomas' discussion of the Platonic doctrine of participation in Prop. 3 of Thomas' commentary, and incorporates it into his own thinking in a way that is much less critical than Thomas.¹³⁸ In the second case, in Giles' interpretation of noble soul he determines that what the *Liber de causis* calls intelligences and noble souls are equivalent to superior and inferior orders of angels according to the faith. To make this identification possible, Giles makes a number of conscious interpretive choices, opting for the reading of the text that agrees most with faith and then, by means of that subordination, undertakes an interpretation of noble soul that is entirely structured by the principles and order of the Dionysian account of celestial hierarchies.

In this hierarchical interpretation of the *Liber de causis*, noble soul plays a central role as the mediator between the celestial and natural worlds. Giles makes sense of the reason and purpose of noble souls through the Dionysian concept of the *lex divinitatis*: noble souls are necessary for joining "the bottom of the top with the top of the bottom".¹³⁹ This connection between angels and bodies through noble soul ends up playing a foundational role in other works Giles wrote in the latter part of his career, especially those written in relation to and support of Boniface VIII's papacy where Giles develops an understanding of the church as a hierarchy whose structure and meaning depends on its place within the hierarchy of nature, and its imitation of the hierarchy of angels.¹⁴⁰

Press Fribourg, 2014), p. 55-81; Idem, "The University of Paris in the Thirteenth Century", p. 286-98; Idem, "Egidio Romano, la tradizione procliana e l'«averroismo di san Tommaso». Qualche considerazione sul senso e sulla storia della distinzione reale tra essere ed essenza", in *Quaestio* 20 (2020), p. 307-43 at p. 322-39; and G. Battagliero, "Egidio Romano, Proclo e il *Liber de causis*", in *Revista Española de Filosofía Medieval* 24 (2019), p. 117-37.

¹³⁸ See Ch. 4.1 and D'Ancona, "L'uso della sententia Dionysii nel commento di s. Tommaso e Egidio Romano", p. 6 and 16-19. Nevertheless, there is nuance to Giles' engagement with Proclus. See, for example, Battagliero's accounts both of where Giles follows Proclus, and where he criticizes him, "Egidio Romano, Proclo, e il *Liber de causis*", p. 127-36.

¹³⁹ See Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 10vb; V f. 10v): "Dicendum quod lex divinitatis est reducere infima in suprema per media. Dionysius Source Sic enim Deus colligavit universum quod semper infima supremorum coniunxit supremis infimorum"; Ch. 4.2.3 and Ch. 5.3.

¹⁴⁰ This is especially the case in Giles' *De ecclesiastica potestate* whose theory of papal and ecclesial power depends on the cosmic and hierarchical structures that Giles articulates in his *De causis* commentary; see Ch. 5.5.

Seeing that much less has been written in the scholarship about Giles of Rome's commentary, it is useful in this introduction to consider the method and structure of his *Super De causis*, and its relationship with the commentaries of Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. Giles' commentary is organized by proposition, each of which are divided into lemma that are treated according to a familiar pattern: after commenting on the place of the proposition in the *divisio* of the text as a whole, and dividing the logic of the proposition itself, Giles raises any *notanda* which he deems are required to understand the text's meaning, and then introduces a series of *dubia* in which he poses and resolves difficulties raised in its themes. Then, after discussing these doubts, he introduces the next lemma (*Deinde cum dicit [...]*).

While Giles wrote his commentary on the *Liber de causis* it is evident that he had Thomas' commentary constantly before him. As D'Ancona has noted, Giles frequently uses the same phrases, discusses the same topics, and explores the same sources that appear in Thomas' *Expositio*. One way Thomas' commentary is especially present is in Giles' *divisio textus*. It is clear from Giles' *divisio*, which is reproduced in Appendix C together with Thomas' *divisio* in Appendix D, that he observes the same basic structure of the text as that provided by Thomas' commentary. However, as is often the case with Giles' use of Thomas, he also expands upon and modifies what his teacher provides. See, for example, in Prop. 3, where Thomas says in his *divisio* that this proposition is about "the participation that noble soul shares with the superior causes". While Giles' *divisio* is otherwise very consistent with Thomas' to this point, he makes a significant shift and uses the term *connexio* instead *participatio*. As we will see in Ch. 4, this shift in wording betrays the shift in Giles' interpretation of Prop. 3 and his understanding of the necessity of noble soul as a celestial mover compared to Thomas' more skeptical position.

While Giles makes an extensive use of Thomas' discussions of the Platonic doctrines of the forms and participation, where Thomas carefully criticizes these doctrines, Giles incorporates them into his own conclusions about noble soul in a much more robust way. Giles includes nine *dubia* on Prop. 3, and two of these especially depend on Thomas' discussions of the Platonists:

Dubium 1. *Quomodo superiora sunt in inferioribus participative.*

Dubium 2. *Quid appellat hic Auctor animas nobiles.*

Dubium 3. *Quid potuit movere Auctorem istum et alios philosophos ut darent ipsis celis animas alias ab intelligentiis.*

Dubium 4. *Utrum hec philosophorum opinio possit aliquo modo cum fide concorare, vel possit reduci ad fidem.*

Dubium 5. *Utrum possit ad modum fidei trahi quod ponantur anime celorum preter intelligentias.*

Dubium 6. *Quomodo anima celi dicatur habere operationem divinam prout naturam preparat.*

Dubium 7. *Quomodo anima celi sciat res per virtutem intelligentie existentis in ea.*

Dubium 8. *Quomodo anima habet operationem divinam, quia creata est a Deo mediante intelligentia.*

Dubium 9. *Utrum movere corpora sit operatio essentialis anime.*

Notions from Thomas' commentary are particularly evident in *Dubium 2* where Giles uses Thomas' indication of how Proclus can explain that "*nobilis*" comes from "*divina*", and that divine really means "*providential*", and in *Dubium 6* where Giles uses Thomas' summary of the Platonic doctrine of the forms to explain noble soul's divine operation according to the language of divine providence. Moreover, as we will see in Ch. 3, in his commentary on Props. 2 and 4, Giles uses Thomas' discussions of Platonic participation to develop his own doctrine of creation as *contractio*. In each case, Giles' use of these considerations differs greatly from that of Thomas, a fact that is already apparent from the list of *dubia* themselves, which include several themes that are entirely foreign to Thomas' commentary, including Giles' extensive and positive discussions of noble soul as a celestial mover in *Dubium 3*.¹⁴¹

Giles also makes use of Albert the Great's commentary, and as Giulia Battagliero has pointed out, there is evidence of his effort to incorporate and balance what he takes from Thomas' commentary with the *De causis et processu universitatis*.¹⁴² See, for example, Giles' commentary on Prop. 2 that raises the question of whether nature should be included among the primary causes (as was Albert's understanding), but determines in the end that it should not and is instead a "universal secondary cause".¹⁴³ See Giles' commentary on Prop. 3

¹⁴¹ Another indication of the divergence of Giles' interests from Thomas' commentary is the fact that each of them evidently has a different list of favourite propositions, judging from the number of lines dedicated to their commentaries. Thomas' longest comments are on Props. 9, 4, 3, 5, and 7, while Giles' longest are Props. 4, 1, 16, 26, and 30. It is also helpful to note that the list of neither commentator is determined by the length of the propositions themselves, the longest of which are Props. 14, 12, 7, 19, and 9.

¹⁴² For a prominent example, Battagliero indicates the Prologue of Giles' commentary which incorporates elements from Albert and Aquinas; see "Egidio Romano, Proclo, e il *Liber de causis*", p. 120-24.

¹⁴³ See Ch. 4.2.4.

provides arguments for the necessity of noble soul that are familiar from Albert's commentary, while, in the conclusion of his discussion of Prop. 3, Giles rejects the conclusion that noble soul's animate operation is "proper" to its essence which is Albert's conclusion.¹⁴⁴

It is common practice when writing on Giles' *Super De causis* to cite the early modern printed edition from Venice, 1550. For my citations of Giles' commentary, I have cited the manuscript BnF 16122, a 13th-c. *pecia* preserved in Paris. I have also included a transcription of Prop. 3 from this manuscript in Appendix B that also collates the differences between it, the 14th-c. manuscript, Vat. lat. 831, and the early modern printed edition from Venice. Much remains to be revealed about the text of Giles' commentary when a critical edition is produced, but it is already clear from my comparisons of the Paris ms. (P) to the Venice *incunabulum* (V) that there are many significantly different readings between them.

4. A Note on the Latin Text of *Liber de causis*, Prop. 3

The basic problem for any study of the Latin *De causis* and its tradition of interpretation is that there is no reliable edition of this text which takes into consideration its more than 268 manuscripts.¹⁴⁵ The current edition by A. Pattin claims to be compiled with the help of "90 manuscripts",¹⁴⁶ however, as Richard Taylor pointed out in 1989, Pattin's edition does not follow the oldest manuscript, Aosta, Seminario Maggiore, 71, which he demonstrates is the Latin text closest to the oldest Arabic manuscript. On these grounds, Taylor proposes a series of corrections to the text,¹⁴⁷ and these W. Fauser incorporates into the version of Pattin's *De causis* that is included in the Cologne edition of Albert's *De causis et processu universitatis*.¹⁴⁸ However, while these corrections may provide a text that is closer to the Arabic *De causis*, as Calma points out, it remains that "there exists no study on the entire tradition of manuscripts which would determine whether the Aosta witness has had any

¹⁴⁴ See Ch. 5.3.

¹⁴⁵ This list was compiled by I. Szekeley from a variety of sources, catalogues, and through personal discoveries with the partnership of other collaborators; it is available at www.neoplat.eu/the-book-of-causes/.

¹⁴⁶ A. Pattin, "Le Liber de causis. Édition établie à l'aide de 90 manuscrits", in *Tijdschrift voor Philosophie* 28 (1966), p. 90-203; repr. in A. Pattin, *Miscellanea. I. Liber de causis* (Leuven: Bibliotheek van de Faculteit der Godgeleerdheid, 2000).

¹⁴⁷ R.C. Taylor "Remarks on the Latin Text and the Translator of the *Kalām fī maḥd al-khair / Liber de causis*", in *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 31 (1989), p. 75-102 at p. 84ff.

¹⁴⁸ See W. Fauser, "Prolegomena", in *Alberti Magni De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa*, ed. W. Fauser, *Opera Omnia* XVII/2 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1993), p. v-xxii at p. vi.

influence on the Latin tradition”.¹⁴⁹ Pattin only collates 10 manuscripts and explains in his introduction that he consults 35 others.¹⁵⁰ This pales not only in comparison to the 90 manuscripts he claims to have consulted in the title of his article, but is woefully inadequate to the richness of the over 268 manuscripts we now know to be extant. For example, of the 16 known 13th-c. manuscripts that have been identified,¹⁵¹ Pattin only collated two¹⁵² and “consults” three more.¹⁵³ Moreover, as Calma shows, Pattin has an editorial bias in favour of variant readings suggested by Thomas Aquinas rather than following what portion of the manuscript tradition he has to hand, readings moreover that even Giles of Rome rejects in his own commentary.¹⁵⁴ A study that does justice to the entirety of this textual tradition is required, and for that we eagerly anticipate the work of Iulia Székely who is currently preparing a new edition of the *Liber de causis*.

As Székely’s new edition has not yet become available at the time of writing this dissertation, she graciously shared with me the sixteen extant 13th-c. mss of the *Liber de causis* and I prepared a comparison of their different readings of Prop. 3, which can be found in Appendix A. The text I present there is not a complete edition, but rather a report of the variant readings in these manuscripts that would be most relevant to the interpreter (for example, I have not reported differences in word order, or the variation between “intelligibiles” and “intellectibilis”). I have also collated the differences of this text with Pattin’s edition of Prop. 3, as well as the readings that are quoted in the commentaries of Albert, Thomas, and Giles (this provides a very limited witness to the texts they used while preparing their commentaries, as Albert’s paraphrases are often too free to know exactly what he is quoting, and Thomas does not include all the lemma in his commentary). The text provides a glimpse into the diversity of possible interpretations that arise from a diversity of readings in the 13th c.

5. Structure of the Dissertation

¹⁴⁹ Calma, “The Exegetical Tradition”, p. 18; see also his “Du néoplatonisme au réalisme et retour”, p. 220-22.

¹⁵⁰ Pattin, “Le Liber de causis”, p. 44-45.

¹⁵¹ For a complete list of 13th c. mss of the *De causis*, see Appendix A.

¹⁵² Oxford, Bodleian Library Ms. Selden Supra 24 and Brugge, Stadsbibliotheek Ms. 463.

¹⁵³ Paris, BnF lat 8802, Brugge, Groot Seminarie Ms. 102/105, and Aosta, Biblioteca del Seminario Maggiore MS. 71.

¹⁵⁴ See Calma, “The Exegetical Tradition”, p. 18-20.

This dissertation has three parts. **Part I** on “Noble Soul and Celestial Life” focuses on Albert the Great’s *De causis* commentary and his conclusion that noble soul is the principle of life and motion in the heavens. **Chapter 1** discusses Albert’s use of noble soul to resolve the difficulties he discerns in the history of philosophy on the notion of celestial animation. As Albert reports, some Peripatetics argue the heavens are moved by celestial soul while others argue that it is moved by intelligence. In Albert’s understanding of noble soul’s place in the system of primary causality in the *Liber de causis*, there are two causes necessary to the motion of each heaven: an unmoved intelligence and a moved noble soul. **Chapter 2** then explores the way that this two-mover solution to celestial dynamics belongs ultimately to Albert’s theory of *fluxus*, a creationist account of an emanative causality wherein all form flows into the universe from the first cause. Albert compares the flow of form into the universe to the flow of form through the faculties of an artist, and in this metaphor, he compares noble soul to the artist’s spirit which mediates between the immaterial form of intelligence and the form of the motions of the artist’s hand or instrument. This chapter also examines Albert’s use of Arabic astrological sources to develop his understanding of how form flows through noble soul in his commentary on Prop. 3.

Part II, considers the *De causis* commentary of Thomas Aquinas, and in **Chapter 3** examines his use of Proclus’ *Elements of Theology* to demonstrate that the *De causis*’ concept of noble soul is adapted from the “divine souls” of Proclus. Through this discovery, Thomas demonstrates that noble soul’s operations are structured by the Platonic concept of participation, which the author of the *De causis* has translated into other language. Thomas compares the adaptation of Platonic doctrines in the *De causis* to the correction in Ps.-Dionysius, and draws all of these elements together to articulate a monotheistic doctrine of participation that is also a metaphysic of creation. Finally, throughout this discussion, Thomas takes a skeptical stance towards the existence of noble soul and shows a tendency towards using the references in the *De causis* to celestial animation to discuss themes that concern human soul.

Part III on noble soul in the *De causis* commentary of Giles of Rome and begins with **Chapter 4**, which explores Giles of Rome’s use and development of Thomas’ discussions of Platonic doctrines in his formulation of his own doctrine of participation which he calls *contractio*. However, where Thomas Aquinas remains skeptical of noble soul, Giles of Rome’s

discussions of participation incorporate noble soul's celestial office into a hierarchical system that is bound together by his concept of the *connexio universi*. In this universal connection, the participation and contraction of being in bodies depends on the mediation of the participation and contraction of being in separate substances, and especially in noble soul whose divine operation mediates between the orders of intelligences and bodies. **Chapter 5**, finally, explores Giles' understanding that the intelligences and noble souls of the *Liber de causis* are orders of superior and inferior angels whose causal influence should be understood according to the structures of the Dionysian hierarchy. By synthesizing the angels of the faith with the primary causes of the *Liber de causis*, Giles' commentary draws the celestial hierarchy and the hierarchy of nature into a single system that also, in the end, encompasses the hierarchy of the church, which must imitate nature in its expression of its own authority over the entire human community.

PART I. ALBERT THE GREAT

CHAPTER 1: NOBLE SOUL AND CELESTIAL MOTION IN ALBERT THE GREAT

The noble souls of the *Liber de causis* are those celestial causes which infuse the heavens with motion and order the operations of nature. As Prop. 3 says, every noble soul has an *operatio animalis*, and this “vital” or “animate” operation consists of “moving the first body” —that is, the heavens—“and all bodily natures.”¹⁵⁵ Later propositions speak about the class of superior souls to which noble souls belong. Prop. 5(4) says that superior souls follow the intelligences that precede them and are “perfect” and “complete.”¹⁵⁶ From these intelligences, the higher souls receive the infusion of goodnesses which they, in turn, pour over the inferior souls that follow them.¹⁵⁷ The *De causis* reserves many venerable titles for this superior class of souls: it is the *causa temporis*,¹⁵⁸ the *causa motus corporum*,¹⁵⁹ the *causa operationis naturae*,¹⁶⁰ and the *causa corporum*.¹⁶¹ This higher kind of soul “contains nature”¹⁶² and dwells on “the horizon of eternity”¹⁶³, eternal in substance and yet temporal in operation.¹⁶⁴

Of course, as we saw in the Introduction, to present these various references to the superior kinds of soul in the *Liber de causis* together is already an act of interpretation. Ambiguities in the *Liber de causis* abound, and each Latin commentator works out the meanings and relationships of these texts differently. Even so, it does not seem controversial to say that noble souls are, at the very least, the causes responsible for moving the heavens, and thereby the world of natural bodies.

But despite how cosmically oriented this picture of noble soul appears, many of the earliest Latin engagements with soul in the *Liber de causis* in Prop. 2 (where soul is the “cause

¹⁵⁵ *Liber de causis*, Prop. 3: “Operatio autem animalis est quoniam ipsa movet corpus primum et omnia corpora naturalia, quoniam ipsa est causa motus corporum et causa operationis naturae.”

¹⁵⁶ *Liber de causis*, Prop. 5(4): “Animae igitur quae sequuntur intelligentiam sunt completae, perfectae, paucae declinationis et separationis”.

¹⁵⁷ *Liber de causis*, Prop. 5(4): “Et animae superiores influunt bonitates quas recipiunt ab intelligentia super animas inferiores.”

¹⁵⁸ *Liber de causis*, Prop. 2 (ed. Pattin), p. 51.97.

¹⁵⁹ *Liber de causis*, Prop. 3.

¹⁶⁰ *Liber de causis*, Prop. 3.

¹⁶¹ *Liber de causis*, Prop. 14(13) (ed. Pattin), p. 77.18.

¹⁶² *Liber de causis*, Prop. 9(8): “Quod est quia natura continet generationem et anima continet naturam et intelligentia continet animam.”

¹⁶³ *Liber de causis*, Prop. 2: “Esse autem quod est post aeternitatem et supra tempus est anima, quoniam est in horizonte aeternitatis inferius et supra tempus.”

¹⁶⁴ *Liber de causis*, Prop. 31(30): “Omnis substantia cadens in quibusdam suis dispositionibus sub aeternitate et cadens in quibusdam suis dispositionibus sub tempore est ens et generatio simul.”

of time” and dwells on “the horizon of eternity”) and Prop. 3 (where it possesses a “divine operation”) use these texts to discuss human soul. Irene Caiazzo examines the Latin reception of the *Liber de causis* in the 12th and early 13th centuries and provides examples of thinkers like Alain of Lille (1128-1202/3), Dominicus Gundissalinus (1115-90), and Alexander Neckam (1157-1217), among others, each of whom use soul from Prop. 2 in service of discussions about human immortality, as well as the example of the anonymous text, *Homo cum in honore esset*, that uses Prop. 3 for similar purposes.¹⁶⁵ And this trend was not limited to the reception of the *De causis* in the 12th and early 13th centuries. One example is the anonymous *De causis* commentary attributed to Henry of Ghent, one of the earliest extant written in Paris around 1245-1255¹⁶⁶ and which argues explicitly that noble soul is human soul, and not the mover of the heavens. Throughout his commentary, Ps.-Henry labors to read those passages that seem to imply a celestial cause in human terms.¹⁶⁷ In Ps.-Henry’s case, the need to read Prop. 3 in this way likely arises from the tensions that belong to the understanding that the *Liber de causis* was written by Aristotle. The challenge, Eric Joly suggests, was to understand Prop. 3 in a way that is consonant with Aristotle’s psychology from the *De anima*, where soul is said to be the “form of a body that is potentially alive” and

¹⁶⁵ Caiazzo provides examples from the writings of Alain of Lille, Dominique Gundisalvi, and Alexander Neckam who each use the soul of Prop. 2 which is said to be “in horizons aeternitatis inferius et supra tempus” (ed. Pattin, p. 50.81-82) to put forward arguments about the immortality of the human soul (see “a première réception du *Liber de causis*”, p. 53-9). Caiazzo hypothesizes that this trend arises due to the heated debates on the immortality of the human soul at the end of the 12th and beginning of the 13th c. (*Ibid.*, p. 64-5). Caiazzo also provides an example of the early 13th-c. anonymous text, *Homo cum in honore esset*, which says that noble soul of Prop. 3 is human soul (*Ibid.*, p. 61). See *Homo cum in honore esset* (ed. Alverny), p. 281-82: “Et vere homo in honore factus est, quia quoad corpus meliorem compositionem et temperatiorem complexionem habet, omni compositione et complexione, quo etiam ad animam nobiliori anima omni alia regitur et vivificatur, et de ea dictum est: ‘quia ad ymaginem et similitudinem Dei creatus est’, et de ea dixit Aristoteles in Bonitate pura: ‘quia anima nobilis, scilicet rationalis, creatur a Deo mediante intelligentia, et posuit eam Deus stramentum intelligentie, in quod intelligentia efficiat operationes suas’ quod est dicere: anima rationalis nobilis, primo loco post angelum creata a Deo, et ab ipso, mediante angelo, suas recipit bonitates et operationes.”

¹⁶⁶ Ps.-Henry was Parisien master around 1250. See J.P. Zwaenepoel, “Introduction”, in *Les Quaestiones in Librum de causis attribuées à Henri de Gand*, ed. J.P. Zwaenepoel (Louvain/Paris: Publications Universitaires/Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1974), p. 7-21 at p. 15-9.

¹⁶⁷ See Ps.-Henry, *Quaestiones in Librum de causis*, Prop. 3, q. 18 (ed. Zwaenepoel), p. 49.2-51.52. Ps.-Henry asks here whether noble soul should be understood to be an intelligence moving an orb or a human soul. He argues that while Prop. 3 might seem to be speaking about intelligence, since it is intelligence who moves the “corpus primum caeleste, et mediante illo omnia corpora naturalia”, he nevertheless argues that the text refers to human soul which moves the heavens as a final cause because the generation of the human soul is the purpose of celestial motion: “Licet ergo anima humana non movet corpus primum nec omnia corpora naturalia sicut efficiens, movet tamen tamquam finis. Movet enim corpus caeleste propter generationem, ut habetur fine ⁱ Caeli et mundi. Generatio autem finaliter est propter complementum hominis, in quo est finis naturae. Secundum illud nos sumus quodammodo finis horum” (p. 51.44-47). See E. Joly, “L’âme noble et l’âme humaine”, p. 31ff.

“the body’s act”¹⁶⁸. If, as Ps.-Henry requires, the heavens are moved by an intelligence which, according to Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, moves the heavens not as their form or activity, but as an unmoved, perfect intelligible act which moves all things through love,¹⁶⁹ then it would seem that the noble soul which is said to be “inferior to intelligence” and merely an “image of higher power” is not at all equal to that office.¹⁷⁰

Ten to fifteen years later, Albert the Great comes to the opposite conclusion and offers the first account of noble soul as a celestial mover in the Latin commentary tradition of the *Liber de causis*.¹⁷¹ Albert, when he writes his *De causis et procursu universitatis* at some point between 1268-1271, understands, like Ps.-Henry, that the *Liber de causis* is an Aristotelian text, but Albert articulates a much more complex and detailed historical hypothesis about what this means. The *De causis*, Albert hypothesizes, was written by a Peripatetic, David Iudaeus—possibly a reference to the “Avendauth” to whom one 13th c. manuscript of the *Liber de causis* attributes the text¹⁷²—who synthesized the work from sayings of Aristotle, Avicenna, Algazel, and Alfarabi and organized them into propositions.¹⁷³ Through this theory about the origins of the *Liber de causis*, the text becomes,

¹⁶⁸ See Aristotle, *De anima* II.1, 412a.19-21, trans. Michael Scot (ed. F.S. Crawford), p. 133-34: “Unde necesse est ut anima sit substantia secundum quod est forma corporis naturalis habentis vitam in potentia. Et ista substantia est perfectio; est igitur perfectio talis corporis.” The implication is that noble soul, understood along these lines, could not be the efficient cause of celestial motion. See Joly, “L’âme noble et l’âme humaine”, p. 30-1.

¹⁶⁹ See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XII.7, 1072a-b. See also Giles of Rome’s engagement with the same doctrine of unmoved intelligences which he joins to the angels of the faith in Ch. 5.4.

¹⁷⁰ Joly, “L’âme noble et l’âme humaine”, p. 33-4.

¹⁷¹ Roger Bacon’s commentary (written between 1245-55) predates Albert’s, but it is unknown how he interpreted noble soul in his commentary since the leaves of the manuscript containing that portion of the text have been lost. See R. Steele, “Introduction”, in Roger Bacon, *Questiones supra Librum de causis*, ed. R. Steele (Oxford: Oxonii), p. xv-xxiv at p. xvi. Some light can be shed in his understanding of noble soul from his *Quaestiones supra undecimum prime philosophie Aristotelis* (ed. R. Steele and F. Delorme, vol. VII), p. 37.21-22, where Roger says that, “scribitur in *De causis* quod anima movet corpus primum: hoc autem est celum”, but then continues to deny that the heavens can be moved by soul, p. 37.26-31: “non movetur ab intelligentia sensitiva, vegetativa, intellectiva, ergo ab ipsa [i.e. anima] non movetur. Probatio quod non ab hiis, quia non est perfectibile ab aliqua istarum, ergo nec motum: quod non sit perfectibile visum est et videbitur, quia non habet intelligentiam vel animam ut formam, se solum ut motorem.” See Joly, “L’âme noble et l’âme humaine”, p. 33 and 40.

¹⁷² See ms. Selden Supra 24, which on its last folio reads “Explicit *Metaphysica* Avendauth” (f. 83v). While Fauser has demonstrated that Albert did not use this exact manuscript while writing his commentary, it is possible that Albert had come into contact with a similar attribution in a different copy; see Fauser, “Prolegomena”, p. vii.

¹⁷³ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.1, p. 59.9-14: “Accipiemus igitur ab antiquis, quaecumque bene dicta sunt ab ipsis, quae ante nos David Iudaeus quidam ex dictis Aristotelis, Avicennae, Algazelis et Alfarabii congregavit, per modum theorematum ordinans ea quorum commentum ipsemet adhibuit”; and p. 61.65-8: “David autem, sicut iam ante diximus, hunc librum collegit ex quadam Aristotelis epistula, quam de principio universi esse composuit, multa adiungens de dictis Avicennae et Alfarabii sumpta”. For discussions of Albert’s hypothesis about the origin of the *De causis*, see Thérèse Bonin, *Creation as Emanation*,

for Albert, one of the most important metaphysical authorities in the Peripatetic tradition. Defining this Peripatetic tradition is one of the objectives of his series of commentaries on Aristotle, begun in 1251 with the *Physica*.

In these commentaries Albert offers paraphrases of Aristotle's works which are elucidated through a synthesis of the history of Greek and Arabic learning that was newly entering the Universities from Spain and Italy.¹⁷⁴ From this wealth of new literature, Albert discerns three principal philosophical schools: the Epicureans, Stoics, and Peripatetics.¹⁷⁵ Among these three, Albert determines that the true philosophical account of reality belongs to the Peripatetics, who in Albert's account include Anaxagoras, Aristotle, Alexander, Alfarabi, Avicenna, Algazel, Averroes and others. For Albert, the "Peripatetic tradition" makes intelligible the true meaning of Aristotle's writings and is synonymous with the "Aristotelian tradition" even while we can from our present vantage point recognize the massive presence of Platonic and Neoplatonic influences within that heritage (thinking especially of the *Liber de causis*).¹⁷⁶

It is entirely within the framework of this understanding of the Peripatetic tradition that Albert interprets the *Liber de causis*. Albert's *De causis et processu universitatis* is composed of two books, and the entirety of the first (about thirty percent of the work's total length) he dedicates to constructing this metaphysical framework.¹⁷⁷ The work begins with an account of the three philosophical schools where Albert distinguishes the metaphysics of the Peripatetics from the materialism of the Epicureans on the one hand and the idealism of the Stoics on the other.¹⁷⁸ He then proceeds to outline the content of Peripatetic first

p. 3-4; and Alain de Libera, "Albert le Grand et Thomas d'Aquin", p. 354ff; and Anzulewicz, "Hat Albertus Magnus das proklische Paradigma des *Liber de causis* Erkennt?", which argues that despite Albert's comments about David *Iudaeus*, it is also possible he was aware of the Proclean background of the *De causis* as well.

¹⁷⁴ See Gázquez, *The Attitude of the Medieval Latin Translators*, 2016. On the translation movement in Spain, see See Burnett, "The Coherence of the Arabic-Latin Translation Program in Toledo in the Twelfth Century", (2001). On the translations from Greek of William of Moerebeke in Italy, see Grabmann, *Guglielmo di Moerbeke*, (1946).

¹⁷⁵ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis* I.1.1, p. 1.9ff. See also *De caelo* I.4.1, p. 79.3ff, and de Libera, "Épicurisme, stoïcisme, péripatétisme", p. 343-364. See Albert's three philosophical schools, see de Libera, *Métaphysique et noétique*, p. 159-160.

¹⁷⁶ On the nature of Albert's Peripateticism, see de Libera, *Métaphysique et noétique*, p. 166-178.

¹⁷⁷ As E. Malgieri points out, in Book II of *De causis et processu universitatis*, Albert frequently refers back to the introductory book indicating that his interpretation takes place within those theoretical boundaries. See Malgieri, "Origine della creazione e natura del *fluxus*", p. 390. On the method and structure of the *De causis et processu universitatis*, see de Libera, *Métaphysique et noétique*, p. 151-55.

¹⁷⁸ Albert criticizes the materialism of the Epicureans at *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.1.1, p. 1.14ff, and the idealism of the Stoics and Platonists at I.1.4, p. 10.10ff. Connected to the difference between the Stoics and

philosophy, which, as he says at the work's conclusion, demonstrates "the first cause and the order of secondary causes, and how the first being of the universe is the principle and how all things flow from the first".¹⁷⁹

Albert's interpretation of noble soul as a celestial mover belongs to this Peripatetic account of order of causes and the flow of all things from the first cause.¹⁸⁰ The questions of what noble soul is and how it operates in the heavens belong, for Albert, to a considerable difficulty within the Peripatetic tradition. Albert spends an entire chapter in this introductory book outlining the various positions from the different philosophical schools on the question of what moves the heavens, focusing especially on the differences between Avicenna and Averroes, for whom (as Albert characterizes them in this work) the former argues that the heavens are moved by souls, while the latter argues they are moved by intelligences.¹⁸¹ With the tensions between these two positions in the background, Albert looks finally to noble soul to provide the perfection of Aristotle's metaphysics, and from the

Peripatetics is Albert's description in his *Metaphysics* commentary of how Plato proceeds only through "probably propositions" while Aristotle proceeds through demonstration; see Albert, *Metaphysica*, XI.3.7, p. 541.21-69: "Platonis autem via fundatur super propositiones probabiles, non necessarias, quod videlicet incorporeum sit ante corporeum et simplex ante compositum [...] Aristoteles autem non dicit aliquid in his nisi per demonstrationem. Et quia non potest esse demonstratione primorum per causam, ideo contentus est demonstratione 'quia', quae est per effectum." See D. Twetten and S. Baldner "Introduction to Albert's Philosophical Work", in I.M. Resnick (ed.), *A Companion to Albert the Great: Theology Philosophy, and the Sciences* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2013), p. 165-72 at 170; and Twetten, "Albert's Arguments for Gods' Existence", p. 664.

¹⁷⁹ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.5.24, p. 191.18-21: "Ostendimus enim causam primam et causarum secundarum ordinem et qualiter primum universi esse est principium et qualiter omnium esse fluit a primo secundum opiniones Peripateticorum."

¹⁸⁰ See Albert's tractate on *fluxus* in *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4. For studies of celestial soul in the writings of Albert the Great, see J. Weisheipl, "Celestial Movers in Medieval Physics", in *The Thomist* 24/2 (1961), p. 286-326; Twetten, "Albert the Great, Double Truth", (2001); Idem, "Albert's Arguments for the Existence of God", (2013); and A. Takahashi, "Albert the Great as a Reader of Averroes: A Study of His Notion of the Celestial Soul in *De Caelo et Mundo* and *Metaphysica*", in *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 30 (2019), p. 625-53.

¹⁸¹ See Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.7, discussed further below. As A. Bertolacci points out, it is Albert's method in his Aristotelian commentaries to proceed by bringing Averroes and Avicenna into conversation with one another, however, seeing that Albert does not have a commentary by Averroes on the *Liber de causis*, part of the purpose of the first book of his commentary is to construct this interpretive background himself, a hypothesis that is confirmed by his use of Averroes and Avicenna's arguments about celestial soul to background his own interpretation of noble soul. A. Bertolacci, "Between Avicenna and Averroes, from Arabic into Latin: Albert the Great and the 4th Proposition of the *Liber de causis*", Communication held at the conference *The First Created Thing. Sources and Reception of the Book of Causes, Prop. IV*, 5-6 November 2021, org. Dragos Calma, Maria Evelina Malgieri, online. See also Idem, "Avicenna's and Averroes' Interpretations and Their Influence in Albert the Great", in F. Amerini and G. Galluzzo (eds), *A Companion to the Latin Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle's Metaphysics* (Brill, Leiden 2014), p. 95-135; and Idem, "Averroes ubique Avicennam persequitur: Albert the Great's Approach to the Physics of the *Šifā'* in the Light of Averroes' Criticisms", in D.N. Hasse and A. Bertolacci (eds), *The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna's Physics and Cosmology* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018), p. 397-431.

Liber de causis he develops a model of celestial causation that reconciles the tension within the Peripatetic tradition to itself.¹⁸²

This chapter has two parts. Part 1 begins by outlining Albert's understanding of the Peripatetic tradition and the crucial place of his *Liber de causis* commentary as the crowning achievement of his interpretation of Aristotle. It continues then to examine Albert's presentation of the problem of celestial animation according to the Peripatetic tradition through which he will interpret noble soul and Prop. 3 of the *De causis* later in the commentary. Part 2 considers Albert's interpretation of noble soul itself, arguing that he uses Prop. 3 to reconcile the authorities of Avicenna and Averroes. Part two also examines how Albert locates noble soul's celestial animation within Aristotle's *De anima* by which he carefully defines what this cause is in distinction from the unmoved intelligences.

Albert's conclusion about noble soul, which he understands belongs to the authoritative account of Aristotelian metaphysics, is that each heavenly sphere is animated by a noble soul, and that each noble soul, in turn, is illuminated by an unmoving intelligence. Through this determination, Albert's commentary on the *De causis* emphasizes a distinct causal moment in the dynamics of celestial motion, which is that power moving all of nature: the unmoving intelligences provide the paradigm of celestial motion, but noble souls are required to translate that intelligible form into motions that order and vivify the world of bodies. For Albert, then, noble souls are essentially cosmic mediators between the intelligible light which flows out from the first cause into intelligences, and the universe of bodies which receives that light as the structure of its own existence.

1. Noble Soul and the Peripatetic Tradition

1.1. The *Liber de causis* and the Perfection of Aristotelian Metaphysics

Albert's commentary on the *De causis* is the crowning achievement and final installation of his series of Aristotelian paraphrase-commentaries that begins in 1251 with his *Physica*. In these commentaries Albert endeavours to engage with every level of Aristotelian science, commenting on each of Aristotle's own works while supplying original philosophical treatises or commentaries on other philosophical texts to cover topics not

¹⁸² On Albert's engagements with the celestial dynamics of Avicenna and Averroes see Twetten, "Albert the Great, Double Truth", (2001). For Twetten's judgements that, on the one hand, for Albert, "the faithful follower of Aristotle in the *Metaphysics* is not Avicenna but Averroes", while on the other hand, "Albert looks like Avicenna in affirming celestial souls and intelligences", see *Ibid.*, p. 316-18.

treated in Aristotle's extant writings.¹⁸³ And while a commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* might seem to be the natural conclusion of such a project, in his commentary on that work, Albert notes at its end that many crucial questions about separate substances remain unanswered.¹⁸⁴ For this reason, Albert gives four reasons in the *De causis et processu universitatis*, why the *Liber de causis* should be joined to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* so that it might "receive its final perfection":

The first of which [reasons] is because it [the *Liber de causis*] is about such things whose definitive reason is conceived neither with matter, nor with extension, nor with motion. And these are beyond physics and mathematics, as it is proved in Book VI of *First Philosophy*. The second is because it is about the principles of being as such which is not determined according to any part of being in genus or species. And this is pertains to the metaphysician as it is said in Book IV of *First Philosophy*. The third is that because the only things discussed here are divine substances, namely, the first cause, intelligence, and noble souls, which pertain to the Theologian [and] which metaphysics considers in its last and most perfect part. The fourth is because, seeing that treating separate substances, which Aristotle and Plato discuss in different ways, belongs to the metaphysician, separate substances are discussed here according to full truth, which in Books XII and XIII of the *Metaphysics* Aristotle only discussed according to opinion. For this reason, this book [the *Liber de causis*] should be added to the *First Philosophy* so that it might receive from it final perfection.¹⁸⁵

Thus, Albert concludes that the *Liber de causis* must be adjoined to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* on the basis of the definition of first philosophy that Aristotle himself describes there: first philosophy considers those things that are without matter, extension or motion, with what is beyond the sciences of physics and mathematics, with being qua being (and not with a part only), and with those divine separate substances that are the subject of theology.¹⁸⁶ For

¹⁸³ See Twetten and Baldner, "Introduction", p. 168-172; and Weisheipl, "Life and Works", p. 30-2.

¹⁸⁴ See Albert the Great, *Metaphysica*, XI.3.7, p. 541.90-542.6. Book XI of Albert's *Metaphysica* corresponds to XII (Lambda) of modern editions. See Twetten, "Albert the Great, Double Truth", p. 320.

¹⁸⁵ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.1, p. 59.22-60.5: "Quarum prima est, quia agit hic de talibus quorum ratio diffinitiva nec cum materia nec cum continuo nec cum motu concepta est. Haec autem sunt ultra physicam et mathesim, sicut in VI *Primae Philosophiae* probatum est. Secunda est, quia agitur hic de principiis entis simpliciter, quod non secundum partem aliquam entis in genere vel specie determinatum est. Et hoc metaphysici est, ut in IV *Primae Philosophiae* probatum est. Tertia est, quia non determinatur hic nisi de divinis substantiis, scilicet causa prima, intelligentia et nobilibus animabus, quod ad theologiam pertinet, quam in ultima parte sui et perfectissima considerat metaphysica. Quarta est, quia cum de separatis substantiis, quas diversimode Aristoteles et Plato determinaverunt, sit agere metaphysici, determinatur hic de separatis substantiis secundum plenam veritatem, de quibus in XII et XIII *Metaphysicae* non nisi secundum opinionem determinavit Aristoteles. Propter quod et iste liber *Philosophiae Primae* coniungendus est, ut finalem ex isto recipiat perfectionem." See Twetten, "Albert's Arguments for the Existence of God", p. 675.

¹⁸⁶ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VI.1, 1026a (trans. Ross): "[T]he first science deals with things which are both separable and immovable. [...] it is obvious that if the divine is present anywhere, it is present in this sort. [...] If

Albert, each of these qualifications are met by the *Liber de causis* and its system of the primary causes of the universe, and it is thus the study of these causes, including noble souls, that brings the science of metaphysics to its perfection.

At the conclusion of his *De causis* commentary, Albert returns to these themes and outlines what he understands his work to accomplish:

In this book, therefore, we have reached the end of our intentions, for we demonstrate the first cause and the order of secondary causes, and how the first being of the universe is the principle and how all things flow from the first according to the opinions of the Peripatetics. And indeed, once these things are added to Book XI of *First Philosophy*, then the work is most perfected.¹⁸⁷

It is, then, through the *Liber de causis* that Albert reaches the end of his intention, the *fine* both of the present work, and also, by extension, of that intention he outlined twenty years earlier in his *Physica* to make intelligible the three parts of *philosophia realis*: physics, mathematics, and metaphysics.¹⁸⁸ The science of metaphysics, as Albert here summarizes it must include 1.) a demonstration of the first cause, 2.) an account of the order of secondary causes, 3.) a discussion of the first cause as the first being and principle of the universe, and 4.) an account of how being flows from that first principle. It is the *Liber de causis* that provides these four demonstrations, and these four together constitute for Albert an emanative creationism whose contemplation is the pinnacle and perfection of all Aristotelian science.

The consequence, to reiterate, is that the *Liber de causis* contains for Albert the most complete and authoritative account of Aristotelian theology in all Peripatetic literature. Since it has been compiled from fragments of a lost work of Aristotle together with the sayings of Avicenna, Algazel, and Alfarabi, it contains within itself a summation of the Peripatetic tradition on first philosophy. Albert's account of the text's origin justifies his intention to interpret the *Liber de causis* within the context of the Peripatetic metaphysical framework and it is to this larger effort that his understanding of noble soul ultimately belongs.

there is an immovable substance, the science of this must be prior and must be first philosophy, and universal in this way, because it is first. And it will belong to this to consider being qua being—both what it is and the attributes which belong to it qua being”.

¹⁸⁷ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.5.24, p. 191.17-23: “In hoc ergo libro ad finem intentionis pervenimus. Ostendimus enim causam primam et causarum secundarum ordinem et qualiter primum universi esse est principium et qualiter omnium esse fluit a primo secundum opiniones Peripateticorum. Et haec quidem quando adiuncta fuerint XI Primae philosophiae, tunc primo opus perfectum est.”

¹⁸⁸ Albert the Great, *Physics* I.1.1, p. 1.52ff.

1.2. The Peripatetic Tradition and the Problem of Celestial Animation

In the fourth tractate of Book I of the *De causis et processu universitatis* Albert famously outlines his doctrine of causal emanation called *fluxus*.¹⁸⁹ Within that discourse, which, as Maria-Evalina Malgieri points out, acts as the “hinge point” between the work’s introduction about Peripatetic theology and the commentary on the *De causis* itself,¹⁹⁰ he synthesizes the cosmologies of the ancient philosophers with the Peripatetics,¹⁹¹ and then summarizes this cosmic order in which he understands all of the most venerable philosophical authorities agree.¹⁹² The order of causes proceeds as follows:

1. *Causa prima universaliter agens*
2. *Intelligentia* (“the light of the first cause”)
3. *Anima caelorum* (“the reception of the intellectual light”)
4. *Caelum* (the celestial form “explicated by soul corporally through uniform local motion”)
5. *Mixtionis motus* (the motion “which in the heaven is simple, received in a mixed way”)
6. *Natura* (the “nature of the mixtures of generations and corruptions”)
7. *Propositus* (“the cause of the voluntary through the will”)
8. *Ars* (“the imitation of nature”)
9. *Fortuna* (“a natural power or impotence”)
10. *Casus* (which “is to nature [...] just as fortune is to purpose”).¹⁹³

¹⁸⁹ Albert, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4, p. 42.35ff. On *fluxus* see Malgieri, “Origine della creazione e natura del *fluxus*”, (2021); de Libera, *Métaphysique et noétique*, p. 143ff; and the discussions and literature in Ch. 2, below.

¹⁹⁰ Malgieri, “Origine della creazione e natura del *fluxus*”, p. 390.

¹⁹¹ After discussing the systems of Apuleius and Hermes, in *De causis et processu universitatis* I.4.6, he says that everything in Apuleius’ book *On the Philosophy of Plato*, “agrees with what Trismegistus says”, and, moreover, that “the sayings of Trismegistus are not difficult to resolve with the sayings of Aristotle” (p. 51.34-9).

¹⁹² Albert, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.6 p. 51.40ff.

¹⁹³ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.6, p. 51.40-52.5: “[1.] primo ponentes causam primam universaliter agentem; [2.] secundo vero intelligentiam, quia dicunt, quod causae primae lumen intellectual est [...]. [3.] Tertio vero ordine ponunt animam, quam caelorum animam esse dicunt, eo quod susception intellectualis luminis primo casu cadit ad intellectum imaginativum. [...] [4.] Quarto vero ordine adiungunt caelum, quod formam acceptam ab anima corporaliter explicat per motum locale uniformem et regularem, qui primum motum est. [5.] Quinto loco ponunt mobile motu recto, qui mixtionis motus est et id quod in caelo simpliciter est, mixte recipit. In mixto enim necesse est leve descendere ad grave et grave ascendere ad leve et utrumque in specie manere, quamvis alteretur in qualitate utrumque ab altero. [...] [6.] Sexto naturam ponunt mixtorum generatorum et corruptorum, quae natura formative est generatorum. [7.] Septimo loco ponunt propositum, quod per voluntatem causa est voluntariorum. [8.] Per imitationem autem ad naturam ponunt Artem, qua cuncta vigere dicunt. Et hanc dicunt octavum locum tenere [...]. [9.] Nono gradu adiungunt fortunam, quae nihil aliud est quam naturalis potential vel impotentia [...]. [10.] Decimo ordine ponunt casum, qui sic se habet ad naturam et naturae periodum sicut fortuna ad propositum.”

This series contains, for Albert, the teaching of the ancients summarized in a single system that describes the process by which intelligible light or form flows from the first cause into all of reality. Albert is clear that this account is meant to be comprehensive: “These, then, are what the ancients taught on the order of the causes; if others say different things, they are easily reduced to this.”¹⁹⁴ Albert does admit, however, that there is one term in the order that involves particular difficulty, about which “there are many doubts among them”, and that is the doctrine of celestial soul.¹⁹⁵ Albert has, to this point, acknowledged that Peripatetic authors do not agree on this point. And Albert has already indicated some hesitation about celestial soul earlier in the chapter, where, when he lists those realities that never fail from receiving the influence of the first cause, he wavers: “intelligence, celestial soul, if the heaven has soul, and the whole order of motion in all the spheres of the heavens; or, if the heaven does not have soul, it will be in the order of intelligences and the order of celestial motions”.¹⁹⁶ There is here a significant question to be answered: do the permanent and primary causes of the universe include celestial soul or not?¹⁹⁷ For this reason, before turning to his final account of “the flux of the being of the universe from the first”, Albert explains that first “it is necessary to undergo a disputation about this [celestial soul]”.¹⁹⁸ Albert dedicates the entirety of the next chapter to this purpose and doing so establishes the philosophical problems that noble soul of the *Liber de causis* must solve.

Albert opens the disputation about celestial soul of *De causis et processu universitatis* I.4.7 by asking whether the heavens are moved by nature, soul, intelligence, or some

¹⁹⁴ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.6, p. 52.6-8: “Haec igitur sunt quae antiqui de ordine causarum tradiderunt. Si enim aliqua alia dixerunt, facile reducuntur ad ista.”

¹⁹⁵ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.6, p. 52.8-9: “Sunt autem in eis dubitationes multae et maxime de hoc quod caeli animas habere dicuntur.”

¹⁹⁶ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.6, p. 50.24-34: “Semper enim sunt, quae necessitati subiacent et ab ordine fluendi nullo modo cadere possunt, sicut intelligentia et anima caelestis, si caelum habeat animam, et totus ordo motuum in omnibus sphaeris caelorum. Si vero caelum non habeat animam, erit in ordine intelligentiarum et ordine motuum caelestium, in quibus nihil contingenter fit, sed omnia fiunt sub necessitatis ordine propter eam quae est ad primum, quod est necesse esse, propinquitatem.”

¹⁹⁷ The significance of this question for Albert is highlighted by the fact that in his Aristotelian commentaries thus far, he has turned numerous times to the arguments against the doctrine of celestial animation. See, for example, the catalogues of the arguments against celestial soul in Albert’s *Physica*, VIII.2.8; *De coelo*, I.1.3; *Metaphysica*, XI.3.2. For a discussion of these texts, see Twetten “Albert the Great, Double Truth”, p. 298-300.

¹⁹⁸ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.6, p. 52.10-11: “Ed ideo antequam determinemus universi esse fluxum a primo, de hoc oportet inducere disputationem.”

combination of the three.¹⁹⁹ There are, after all, passages in Aristotle that suggest each of these options. In *Metaphysics* Lambda, Aristotle describes the unmoved intelligences that move the cosmos as objects of desire.²⁰⁰ However, he also calls the heaven “animate”, possessing a “principle of life”,²⁰¹ and in another place says that we should think of the stars as “partaking of action and life”, with actions that are “similar to that of animals and plants”.²⁰² And yet, *De caelo* II.1 complicates these notions, for Aristotle also says that “it is not conceivable” that the heavens should “persist eternally by the necessitation of a soul”,²⁰³ and earlier in *De caelo* had implied that this circular motion is, rather, through nature, for if simple bodies “possess a principle of motion in their nature”, then there must be a simple body that moves “in virtue of its own nature with a circular motion”.²⁰⁴ It would seem, then, that there are at least these three possibilities represented in Aristotle: the heavens are moved by separate intelligence, they also may be moved by souls, and finally, they might be moved by their natures.

Among Aristotle’s interpreters, there is a long tradition that explores the relationship between the nature, soul, and intelligence of the heavens.²⁰⁵ To mention a few major figures, Alexander of Aphrodisias (as quoted by Simplicius in his *De caelo* commentary) argues that the heavens are moved by a soul that is identical with its nature.²⁰⁶ Simplicius himself argues

¹⁹⁹ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.7, p. 52.16-18: “Antequam ordo fluentium a primo determinetur, inquirere oportet, utrum caelum movetur vel a natura vel ab anima vel ab intelligentia vel ab omnibus his vel a duobus primis ex tribus inductis.”

²⁰⁰ See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XII.7, 1072a.19-35. See H.A. Wolfson, “The Plurality of Immovable Movers in Aristotle and Averroës”, in *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 63 (1958), p. 233-253; and Idem, “The Problem of the Souls of the Spheres from the Byzantine Commentaries on Aristotle Through the Arabs and St. Thomas to Kepler”, in *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 16 (1962), p. 65-93 at p. 67.

²⁰¹ Aristotle, *De caelo* II.2, 285a.29-30. See Wolfson, “The Problem of the Souls of the Spheres”, p. 68.

²⁰² Aristotle, *De caelo* II.12, 292b.1-1.

²⁰³ Aristotle, *De caelo* II.1, 284a.27-35.

²⁰⁴ Aristotle, *De caelo* I.2, 268b.27-269a.7.

²⁰⁵ See Wolfson, “The Problem of the Souls of the Spheres”, p. 65ff. For more on the history and problems of the doctrine of celestial animation, see Idem, *Crescas’ Critique of Aristotle* (Cambridge, MS: Harvard University Press, 1929), p. 535-53; and Idem, *Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism Christianity and Islam* (Cambridge, MS: Harvard University Press, 1947; third printing, 1962), p. 363-66 and 417-18.

²⁰⁶ Simplicius quotes from what is likely Alexander of Aphrodisias’ lost commentary on the *De caelo*; see Simplicius, *In De caelo*, II.1 (ed. Heiberg) p. 380.29-34: “We are trying to prove that the nature of the divine body is not different from its soul, but it is like the heaviness of earth and the lightness of fire. For, just as when we say that these things are moved by nature we are saying that they are moved in accordance with these powers, and their motion in accordance with their own powers is not something different from motion in accordance with nature, so too the nature of the divine body would reasonably appear also to be the power of its soul” (trans. I. Meuller, *Simplicius: On Aristotle On the Heavens* 2.1-9, [London: Bloomsbury, 2004], p. 26). Meuller also points to similar passages from Alexander’s other works, including Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On the Cosmos*, ed. and trans. C. Genequand (Leiden: Brill, 2001), p. 4-22; and *Quaestiones* I.25, in *Alexandri Aphrodisiensis scripta minora*,

against Alexander's position saying instead that the heavens are moved by a soul that is separate from its nature as well, in part by its nature.²⁰⁷ In the Arabic tradition, Avicenna maintains a view much like that of Simplicius and argues for the fundamental difference between the intelligence, soul, and nature of the heavens.²⁰⁸ By contrast, Averroes in his *De substantia orbis* follows Alexander's position, saying there that the heavens have a soul which is identical with its nature,²⁰⁹ while in his long commentary on the *Metaphysics* he argues that the soul of a sphere which desires the intelligence which is the final cause of celestial motion is, in the end, identical with that intelligence because of its immateriality.²¹⁰

Albert did not have use of Simplicius' *De caelo* commentary, and his account of this dispute is therefore dominated by Avicenna and Averroes. Of the three possible celestial

Quaestiones, De Fato, De Mixtione, ed. I. Bruns (Berlin: Goerg Reimer, 1892), p. 39.8-41.19. See also R.W. Sharples, "The Unmoved Mover and the Motion of the Heavens in Alexander of Aphrodisias", in *Apeiron* 17 (1983), p. 62-66; I.M. Bodnar, "Alexander of Aphrodisias on Celestial Motions", in *Phronesis* 42 (1997), p. 190-205; and Wolfson, "The Problem of the Souls of the Spheres", p. 71-75.

²⁰⁷ See Simplicius, *In De caelo*, II.2 (ed. Heiberg), p. 387.12-19: "If somebody asks, how, on the one hand, nature moves the heaven and how, on the other, soul moves it, it is not to be said as Alexander has said, namely, that nature there is the same as soul. For how can it be the same, when nature is a passive power of that which is moved, existing in a subject which is moved, whereas soul is that which causes motion from without. It is, therefore, not to be said that soul and nature in the heaven are the same but rather that the same motion is moved according to both [soul and nature], that is to say, by soul as by something which causes motion from without and by nature as by a principle inherent in that which is moved" (trans. Wolfson, "The Problem of the Souls of the Spheres", p. 75).

²⁰⁸ That the heavens, for Avicenna, are not moved by nature, but by a soul, see *Liber de philosophia prima*, IX.2 (ed. Van Riet), p. 448.68-84 and 454.89-95. Wolfson points out the similarity between Avicenna's position and that of Simplicius, for while Avicenna argues the heavens are moved by souls, this produces an inclination in the sphere that may also be called nature. See Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima* IX.2, p. 449.88-91; and Wolfson, "The Problem of the Souls of the Spheres", p. 83.

²⁰⁹ See Averroes, *Sermo de substantia orbis*, 1 (ed. Venice, 1562), p. 5vH-I: "Et non est dictum celum habere animam nisi propter appetitum existentem in eo, et motum localem. Appetitus vero qui est in hoc corpore non est nisi quia est corpus celeste viuum per se appetens per se, non propter potentiam existentem in eo divisibilem per eius divisionem. Esset enim generabile et corruptibile et dicitur esse motum per principium separatum quod est in eo, non per principium quod est per se in eo. Et hoc modo dicere viuum et intelligens"; p. 6rC: "Natura igitur istius corporis non est nisi natura anime moventis in loco"; and p. 6rF: "Videtur quod forme corporum celestium et maxime forma ultimi continentis sit quodammodo anima". This means, as Wolfson summarizes, that the heaven "is said to be living and intelligent 'in virtue of its essence'" which means that "in the celestial bodies the soul is the same as their essence or nature"; see Wolfson, "The Problem of the Souls of the Spheres", p. 83.

²¹⁰ See Averroes, *Commentaria in libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis* (ed. Venice, 1562), p. 318rH-vK: "Et ex hoc quidem apparet bene hec corpora esse animate et quod non habent virtutibus anime nisi intellectum et virtutem desiderativam, que movet in loco. [...] Quapropter movens est intellectus et est movens, quia agit motum et quia est finis motus. Hec autem differunt in nobis, scilicet illud quod movet nos in loco secundum quod est agens et quod movet nos in loco secundum quod est finis. Et habet duplex esse, in anima et extra animam, quod autem est in anima est agens motum. Secundum vero quod est extra animam est movens secundum finem. Verbi gratia quoniam balneum duplicem habet formam, in anima et extra animam. [...] Si igitur forma balnei non esset in materia tunc moveret et secundum agens et secundum finem, fine aliqua motione contingente. Et sic est intelligendum de moventibus corpora celestialia, secundum igitur quod illa intellecta sunt forme eorum, sunt moventia secundum agentis, secundum autem quod sunt fines eorum moventur ab illis secundum desiderium." We will return to this text again below.

movers—nature, soul, or intelligence—he identifies each with one of his three philosophical schools: that the heavens are moved by nature he attributes to the Epicureans, that it is moved by soul to the Stoics (and Platonists), as well as to some of the Peripatetics, including Avicenna, Algazel, Alfarabi, and Alexander, and that it is moved by intelligence with Averroes and Maimonides.

1.2.1. Nature

The first option Albert considers is that the heavens are moved by nature. According to Albert's account of the three philosophical schools, the Epicureans are materialists and do not posit an immaterial principle or principle of motion beyond the natures that inhere in bodies.²¹¹ For this reason, the Epicurean principle of heavenly motion must be the nature of the heavenly bodies themselves. Albert quickly dismisses the Epicurean opinion, following the arguments that can be found in Avicenna's *Metaphysics*.²¹² This position is, Albert says, one which the Peripatetics universally deny,²¹³ citing five arguments against it which are familiar from similar discussions of celestial dynamics Albert undergoes in the *Physica*, *De caelo* and *Metaphysica*.²¹⁴

In *Physics* II.1 Aristotle defines nature as the cause of movement and rest that is present in a subject because of what it is—for example, the nature of earth to move downwards and the nature of fire to move up.²¹⁵ The natural principle, however, is insufficient to explain the circular and everlasting motions of the heavenly bodies. Natural motions are from the combination of form and matter in a substance, and as Albert explains in his *Physica*, a material form “cannot be the principle of an infinite motion”.²¹⁶ If, then, the motion of the heavens flows not from their nature, that is, from their form and matter, it

²¹¹ For Albert's appraisal of the Epicureans and their materialism, see *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.1.1, p. 1.14ff.

²¹² See Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima*, IX.2 (ed. Van Riet), p. 447.45ff, which begins with the title, “Propinquus motor caelestium non est natura nec intelligentia sed anima et quod principium longinquum est intelligentia.”

²¹³ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.7, p. 52.19-20.

²¹⁴ See, for example, Albert the Great, *Physica*, II.1.3; *De caelo et mundo*, I.1.3; *Metaphysica*, XI.3.2.

²¹⁵ Aristotle, *Physics* II.1, 192b21-23.

²¹⁶ Albert the Great, *Physica*, II.1.3, p. 81.20-28: “[...] natura hoc modo dicta dicitur de forma et materia. Forma autem et materia non sunt principium motus infiniti, et ideo motus superiorum non est a natura, sed est a voluntate et intellectu motoris alicuius separati, propter quod etiam superiora in suis locis moventur, quod non faciunt aliqua corpora, quae a natura moventur, et ideo natura, prout hic consideratur, in inferioribus est corporibus.”

must instead be from a separate substance, and for this, there are two possibilities: soul, or intelligence.

1.2.2. Celestial Souls

That the heavens are moved by soul Albert attributes principally to Avicenna, but also to Algazel, Alfarabi, and “the Greeks”, Alexander and Porphyrius, as well as to the entire school of the Stoics (including the Platonists).²¹⁷ Albert provides four arguments that are summarized from Avicenna’s *Philosophia prima*: 1) Seeing that celestial motion passes through a series of consecutive points, it is necessary that the movers of the heavens have the powers of imagination and choice so that they can both be aware of those points and choose to move the sphere around them, and both of these powers belong to soul.²¹⁸ 2) Because the points along the path of the sphere’s motion are particular opposite to one another, its motion cannot be caused by an intelligence, which only knows in a universal way.²¹⁹ 3) Celestial motion does not begin, and thus cannot be from nature; it is, then, through either soul or intelligence, but because of the preceding arguments, it must be soul.²²⁰ 4) Finally, it is necessary that the cause of the motion of the heavens be the act of a body, and this is impossible for intelligence.²²¹

Avicenna’s conclusion, then, is that the heavens are moved by an imaginative and elective soul, that is, a soul that is both aware of (through imagination) and chooses to move (through election) the successive points lying upon its circular path.²²² Even more crucial to Avicenna’s arguments as Albert uses them, however, is that this separate substance which moves the heavens cannot be an intelligence. The operation of intelligence is too universal to

²¹⁷ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.7, p. 53.3-5; 65-7: “Et hanc opinionem Hermes Trismegistus, Socrates et Plato et tota secta defendit Stoicorum et multi Peripateticorum”.

²¹⁸ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.7, p. 53.10-17. See Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima*, IX.2 (ed. Van Riet), p. 450.17 and p. 483.61ff.

²¹⁹ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.7, p. 53.18-25. See Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima*, IX.2 (ed. Van Riet), p. 453.61-75.

²²⁰ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.7, p. 53.26-35. See Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima*, IX.2 (ed. Van Riet), p. 447.52-448.84.

²²¹ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.7, p. 53.36-42. See Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima*, IX.2 (ed. Van Riet), p. 458.70-3.

²²² Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.7, p. 53.58-64. See Avicenna’s own account of this conclusion at *Liber de philosophia prima*, IX.2 (ed. Van Riet), p. 454.86-90: “Si autem ita fuerit in re, tunc caelum movetur per animam et anima est propinquum principium sui motus, et in illa anima renovator imagination et voluntas, et ipsa aestimat se habere apprehensionem rerum variabilium particularium et voluntatem essendi ipsas res particulares, et ipsa est perfectio corporis caeli et eius forma.”

be the direct cause of any particular motion. Intelligence is completely unchanging and all motion involves change. Intelligence, however, is impassible and cannot be united to a body in order to move it.²²³ And if the heavens cannot be moved by nature nor by an intelligence, they must be moved by soul.

1.2.3. Separate Intelligences

That the heavens are moved by intelligence Albert presents through Averroes and Maimonides.²²⁴ Albert admits that this is the stronger position,²²⁵ whose central argument against the imaginative soul of Avicenna is that if celestial motion is eternal and changeless, then an imaginative soul, which is changeable insofar as it is imaginative, cannot produce such an eternal and changeless effect; the powers of imagination and choice belong to a realm of particulars, but a “universal motion must be moved by a universal mover.”²²⁶ The everlasting circularity of heavens is the only movement to be entirely uniform, and intelligence is the only cause that is “always and everywhere in one way.”²²⁷ It seems to follow, then, that intelligence must be the cause of the heavenly motion which is also “always and everywhere in the same way” but according to time.²²⁸

But what of Avicenna’s argument that the universality of intelligence renders it incapable of being joined to a body? This is the question Albert poses next and seeks to explain how, from the position of Averroes and Maimonides, the influence of a separate intelligence can be understood to move the celestial sphere:

If someone asks from these things how what they [Averroes and Maimonides] say can be [the case], since every mover is conjoined and immediate to its mobile (as established at the beginning of *Physics* VII), but the intelligence is separate and not united by nature to anything, they say that intelligence operates immediately and is conjoined through the emission of its light into this or that thing, or through the light

²²³ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.7, p. 53.36-42.

²²⁴ See Averroes, *Commentaria in libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis* (ed. Venice, 1562), p. 318vH-K; and Moses Maimonides, *Dux perplexorum*, II.5-6 (ed. Paris, 1520), f. 42r-43r. Both speak of intellectual souls. Albert’s distinction between this position and that of Avicenna, then, could be understood as the difference between celestial soul as imaginative and “perfectio corporis caeli et eius forma” (Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima*, IX.2 [ed. Van Riet], p. 454.90), and the celestial soul as purely intellectual.

²²⁵ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.7, p. 53.70.

²²⁶ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.7, p. 54.31-2: “Motus igitur circularis caelestis ab intelligentia et non ab anima est.”

²²⁷ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.7, p. 54.1-2.

²²⁸ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.7, p. 54.3-5.

infusing this or that.²²⁹

The necessary distinction is between the light that intelligence emits because of what it is, and how that same light is received in what it illuminates. The celestial spheres have intelligence, but this is not because intellectual substances are joined to them as their movers. Albert summarizes the Averroean position in this way, “they say that the intelligences [which] are in us or in anything are nothing other than the illuminations of intelligences”.²³⁰ Thus, the intelligence illuminates the celestial sphere with light, and it is this intellectual light received in the sphere that moves it, all the while the intelligence remains in its separation: “And thus, it [the intelligence] moves any part of the [celestial] mobile towards being everywhere, given that intelligence is everywhere.”²³¹

Albert represents here Averroes’ reasoning in his long commentary on the *Metaphysics* that while one can speak of the soul of the heavens as the efficient cause of its motion, this is not in the end different in substance from the final cause of its motion, the separate intelligence.²³² Albert describes this position saying,

This [intelligible] light cannot be the light of soul, as just now established. But what is received in the heaven is specific to the heaven, so that sometimes, although less properly, it is called the soul of the heaven (*anima caeli*).²³³

In other words, the effect of separate intelligence upon the heaven (the infusion of its light) when it is made specific to the heavenly body may be called its soul, however, it remains that, as we read above, “the intelligences [which] are in us or in anything are nothing other than the illuminations of intelligences”. Thus, while the light of intelligence is received in the

²²⁹ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.7, p. 54.42-9: “Si autem ab isti quaeritur, quomodo hoc quod dicunt, possit esse, cum omnis motor coniunctus et immediatus sit suo mobile, sicut in principio VII *Physicorum* probatum est, intelligentia autem separata est et nulli per naturam coniuncta, dicunt, quod intelligentia per lumen suum emissum in hoc vel in illud sive per lumen influxum huic vel illi efficitur immediata et coniuncta.”

²³⁰ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, p. 54.49-52: “Dicunt enim, quod intelligentias esse in nobis vel in quibuscumque nihil aliud est quam illustrationes intelligentiarum esse in nobis vel in quibuscumque.”

²³¹ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, p. 54.60-2: “Et ideo movet quamlibet partem mobilis ad esse ubique, sicut intelligentia ubique est.”

²³² See Averroes, *Commentaria in libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis* (ed. Venice, 1562), p. 318rH-vK, quoted above.

²³³ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, p. 54.62-6: “Hoc autem lumen animae lumen esse non potest, sicut iam habitum est. Sed acceptum in caelo esse specificum caeli est et ideo quandoque, quamvis minus proprie, anima caeli vocatur.”

heaven, this light does not comprise a new separate substance—a soul, for example—but is rather just an illumination.

The implication is that “celestial soul” is but the name for the emission of intelligence in the sphere, and does not refer to something with distinct existence in itself. Albert appears to take this suggestion very seriously, for throughout the first book of the *De causis et processu universitatis* (as we already saw an example of above), he consistently reminds the reader that the existence of celestial souls are in question.²³⁴ Is there, then, such thing as a celestial soul at all, and what is one to make of the noble soul of the *Liber de causis*?

1.2.4. Two Movers

The final position Albert considers in *De causis et processu universitatis* I.4.7 before concluding his introductory disputation about celestial movers is that the heavens are actually moved by more than one cause, specifically, by an intelligence and by a soul. It is in this concluding section that Albert provides a glimpse of the solution he himself will articulate in the second book of the work, but for the present, for a representative of this doctrine, he looks to Alpetragius (Al-Bīṭrūjī):

There is one who by my judgement speaks more probably, namely Alpetragius, who says that the secret of astrology was revealed to him. Concerning the motion and causes of the motion of the superior things, he says each heaven has two movers, namely a universal first [mover] common to all which moves each proper mover as an object of desire.²³⁵

The two movers, then, are one that is “universal” and “first”, and a second that is “proper” to each sphere. The first mover is the final cause of celestial motion and the object of desire, while the proper mover is the efficient cause which desires that universal end.

While Alpetragius does not identify the proximate movers with celestial souls, it is clear from Albert’s descriptions of how these two principles work together that this doctrine will be instrumental for his interpretation of noble soul:

²³⁴ See, for example, Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.6, p. 50.24-33; and I.4.8, p. 56.7-8 and 22-4.

²³⁵ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.7, p. 54.88-55.4: “Unus autem, qui meo iudicio probabilius loquitur, Alpetragius scilicet, qui secretum astrologiae sibi esse revelatum dicit, quantum ad motus et causas motuum superiorum quodlibet caelum duos dicit habere motores, universalem scilicet et primum et communem omnibus, qui sicut desideratum quemlibet proprium movet motorem.” See Al-Bīṭrūjī, *De motibus caelorum* (ed. F.J. Carmody), p. 71 and 80.

He accepts this proposition as self-evident that every power of the first mover in each order is greater in an immediate conjunction with a mobile than in that which is conjoined to it through a medium. He calls the first mover, as others do, an intelligence, or a universally active intellect. And thus it moves towards being everywhere and always. And since no body according to itself can be entirely everywhere and always, it follows that the proximate mover itself is everywhere through a succession of heres and nows. For through a succession of wheres it is made everywhere and through a succession of nows it is made always. And in this way, according to a simple and uniform motion the first mobile is made everywhere and always.²³⁶

It is unclear for the moment how exactly Albert understands the difference between this position and that of Averroes above. In both cases there is a universally active intellect that moves the heavens towards being “everywhere”. However, in the position of Averroes the light of intelligence is received in the heaven without a mediator, while in this case, the light is said to be participated by each mobile:

But the thing through which each mobile follows the power of the first mover, he does not determine whether it is soul or nature. It is, however, certain that it is light or goodness proceeding from the first mover, participated in different ways by each mobile [...].²³⁷

What is certain, then, is that the light of the first mover is participated by each heaven, although it is still unclear whether it is the soul or nature of the sphere which is the participant.

When the chapter concludes, Albert is not yet willing to offer a conclusive judgment about the question of celestial animation, leaving the matter, he says, to the “judgment of the reader”²³⁸. This alone he grants: “there is something between intelligence and the heaven,

²³⁶ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.7, p. 55.4-17: “Accipit autem hanc propositionem per se notam, quod omnis primi motoris in quocumque ordine virtus maior est in immediate coniuncto mobili, quam in eo quod coniungitur sibi per medium. Motorem autem primum dicit intelligentiam esse, sicut et alii, sive intellectum universaliter agentem. Et hic movet ad ubique esse et semper. Et cum nihil corporeorum secundum se totum possit ubique esse et semper, consequitur ipsum motor proximus secundum partes ubique esse secundum successionem ubi et nunc. Per successionem enim ubi efficitur ubique et per successionem nunc efficitur semper. Et hoc modo secundum motum simplicem et uniformem primum mobile efficitur ubique et semper.”

²³⁷ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.7, p. 55.34-8: “Id autem per quod quodlibet mobile virtutem primi motoris consequitur, non determinat, utrum sit anima vel natura. Hoc tamen constat, quod est lumen vel bonitas procedens a motore primo diversimode participatum a quolibet mobilium [...].”

²³⁸ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.7, p. 55.56-7: “Has opiniones et opinionum rationes nos non determinamus, quid quilibet eligat, lectoris iudicio relinquentes.”

either as soul or as nature, by which the heaven is made the participant in the goodness [which is] flowing into it from intelligence.²³⁹ The discussion has, moreover, produced a number of conclusions that will remain in the background of Albert's interpretation of noble soul in Book II of the work. First, it is clear that nature alone cannot be a cause of celestial motion because the form of a material body cannot be the cause of an unchanging motion. Second, from Avicenna's arguments, it remains true that universality of intelligence does not permit it to be joined directly to a sphere as its mover; there must be a mediating principle. Third, Averroes and Maimonides, argue conclusively that Avicenna's celestial soul which moves the heavens through imagination and choice is unequal to that celestial office. However, Averroes' suggestion that the light of intelligence is received by the heaven without a mediator and that the light received is, in the end, not a distinct substance seems inadequate, for as Albert concluded with Alpetragius' two-mover doctrine, the sphere must desire the unmoved end of its motions and the light of intelligence must be participated in the sphere so that it can become "everywhere and always" through its motion. It is with these arguments that Albert prepares the theoretical framework for his interpretation of noble soul, and it is the tension between these distinct positions that Albert's understanding of noble soul will resolve.

2. Albert the Great's Interpretation of Noble Soul

2.1. The Two Movers of the Heavens: Intelligences and Noble Souls in the *Liber de causis*

When Albert turns to Book II of the *De causis et processu universitatis* which contains the actual commentary on the *Liber de causis*, he identifies all three of the possible celestial movers from the discussion above—intelligence, celestial soul, and nature—as primary causes.²⁴⁰ For Albert the celestial motion of each sphere ultimately involves all three principles: 1) each heaven is moved by an unmoving intelligence which is the source of the perfect form of its circular motion; 2) it is also moved by a noble soul conjoined to the sphere that desires and contemplates the form of intelligence infusing its power over the heavenly

²³⁹ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.7, p. 55.56-61: "Has opiniones et opinionum rationes nos non determinamus, quid quilibet eligat, lectoris iudicio relinquentes. Hoc solum habetur pro constanti, quod inter intelligentiam et caelum aliquid est sive ut anima sive ut natura, quo caelum particeps efficitur bonitatis in se ab intelligentia defluentis."

²⁴⁰ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.2, p. 62.1-70.

body; 3) finally, that power is received in the sphere itself as its motion, and this celestial power Albert calls nature.²⁴¹

Midway through his commentary on the *Liber de causis*, Albert offers the most clear articulation of his solution to the problem of celestial motion which gathers together the arguments of the different positions we encountered above:

Since the heavens are moved from themselves and not from a generator, it follows by necessity, that nature is not their mover. Thus, because everything moved has a mover conjoined to itself, as is established at the beginning of *Physics* VII, and we see that the celestial bodies are moved, it is necessary, then, that they are moved by a mover conjoined to themselves, which is the act, that is, the perfection of the thing moved, *per se* and not *per accidens*. But intelligence by definition is not the act of any body. Thus, a celestial body does not have an intelligence as a mover which is conjoined as a mover to a body. It follows then, that it has a soul as a mover. For, as we said before, soul is the principle of life and of local motion. But then soul, insofar as it is soul, cannot be the principle of a motion that is uniform, simple, regular, and infinite according to time. For it is fitting that of what is uniform and regular there be a uniform and regular principle. But there is no uniform and regular principle except intelligence [which] exists (*se habet*) uniformly and regularly in every time. For soul as soul, does not exist (*se habet*) uniformly unless it is formed and contained by [something] uniform. [...] It is necessary, then, that the first mover in each mobile which is moved uniformly and regularly be uniform and regular. It is necessary, then, to attribute a uniform and regular first mover for each celestial motion which cannot be other than intelligence which infuses soul with a uniform, regular, continuous, and infinite motion, and is the first and immobile mover.²⁴²

²⁴¹ That Albert includes “nature” among the primary causes of the *Liber de causis* is one of the distinctive features of his commentary (which as we will see in Ch. 4 is a determination that Giles of Rome criticizes). Albert defines the primary cause, “nature”, as “*primaria forma et virtus diffusa est in omnibus caelis, quae principium motus est in ipsis*” (*De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.2, p. 62.59-60). In this he follows the example of Isaac Israeli in *Liber de definitionibus*, 9 (ed. Muckle), p. 320.5-9: “*Et [natura] dicitur etiam de coelo et virtute coelesti quam ordinavit deus gloriosus et sublimis in natura et destinavit eam cum ipsa super impressiones generacionis et corrupcionis et augmenti et diminucionis et motus et quietis*” (on this point see also de Libera, “Albert le Grand et Thomas d’Aquin”, p. 376-77). Avicenna’s theory of celestial dynamics also seems to be relevant to Albert’s understanding of nature, seeing that Avicenna also distinguishes between the souls and natures of the heavens. See Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima* IX.2, p. 449.88-91.

²⁴² Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.2.1, p. 92.48–93.10: “*Cum enim caelestia a se moveantur et non a generante, sequitur necessario, quod natura non sit motor eorum. Adhuc autem, cum omne quod movetur, motorem habeat coniunctum sibi, ut probatum est in principio VII Physicorum, et videamus, quod corpora caelestia moventur, oportet, quod motore sibi coniuncto moveantur, qui sit actus, hoc est, perfectio mobilis per se et non secundum accidens. Intelligentia autem de ratione sui nullius corporis est actus. Corpus ergo caeleste intelligentiam non habet motorem, qui sit motor coniunctus corpori. Relinguitur ergo, quod motorem habeat animam. ‘Anima enim’, sicut in antehabitis dictum est, ‘principium est vitae’ et motus localis. Sed adhuc anima, in quantum anima est, uniformis et simplicis et regularis et infiniti per tempus motus principium esse non potest. Eius enim quod uniforme et regulare est, uniforme et regulare convenit esse*

Here Albert synthesizes the doctrines of Avicenna, Averroes, and Alpetragius, which he presented in the discussion above. It is also the model of celestial dynamics that he understands to be the true interpretation of the *Liber de causis*. From Avicenna he takes the argument that intelligence cannot be conjoined as a mover to a body, and from Averroes he takes the argument that soul cannot, on its own, be the cause of an everlasting and uniform effect. From Alpetragius, finally, he takes that both causes are necessary, intelligence as the source of the form of celestial motion and noble soul as the sphere's conjoined mover participating that form.²⁴³

This two-mover model of celestial motion depends on what is different between intelligence and noble soul, and articulating this difference is one of his commentary's objectives. Albert introduces both primary causes in the opening chapters of the work's second book:

Intelligence is a substance which, from itself and not from acquisition or possession, is intellectual or an intellectual substance. Its intellectual light is desired by all things that move and are moved. And thus, unmoving it moves all that is just as something desirable moves desire without moving. For this reason, it is not necessary that it be extended existentially through all things. However, the presence of [its] light and the influence and potency of [its] power is necessary because it is a potency of power extended through all that desires it. For this reason, the entire work of nature is the work of intelligence from which the entire work of nature receives the right intention, end, and appetite for perfection.²⁴⁴

As in Albert's summary of Averroes' position above, intelligence is understood here to be present to all that it moves through the emission of its light. In this it is intelligible illumination, however, it does not become conjoined to bodies, and is not extended through

principium. Uniforme autem et regulare principium non est nisi intelligentia uniformiter et regulariter se habens in omni tempore. Anima enim, inquantum anima est, non uniformiter se habet nisi ab uniformi formetur et contineatur. [...] Oportet igitur primum motorem in quolibet mobili, quod movetur uniformiter et regulariter, uniformem esse et regularem. Oportet igitur cuilibet motui caelestium motorem attribuere primum uniformem et regularem, qui non potest esse nisi intelligentia, quae animae influat motum uniformem et regularem et continuum et infinitum, qui est motor primus et motor immobilis." See also II.3.2, p. 140.38-141.30.

²⁴³ Twetten summarizes Albert's argument in "Albert's Arguments for the Existence of God", p. 677.

²⁴⁴ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis* II.1.2, p. 62.21-33: "Intelligentia vero est substantia, quae ex se et non ex acquisitione vel possessione intellectus est sive substantia intellectualis, cuius lumen sintellectuale ab omnibus moventibus et motis desideratum est. Et ideo movet immobilis omne quod est, sicut desideratum immobile movet desiderium. Propter quod non est necesse, quod essentialiter extensum sit per omnia. Sed praesentia luminis et influentia et potentia virtutis necesse est, quod extensa sit potentia virtutis per omnia quae desiderant ipsam. Propter quod totum opus naturae est opus intelligentiae, a qua totum opus naturae accipit rectam intentionem et finem et appetitum perfectionis."

them “existentially”, but rather it is present in a “potency of power” —its intelligible illumination is everywhere present and everywhere ready to be received by what is capable of receiving it.

But unlike Averroes, Albert does not equate the intelligible light that is received in the heavenly bodies with the intelligence itself. Instead, following Alpetragius (as well as, to some extent, Avicenna’s own two-mover solution, which Albert certainly knows, but has nowhere referenced in the discussion so far²⁴⁵), he determines that there must be an additional cause as well, one that is conjoined to the heaven and that desires and receives the illumination of intelligible light:

And thus, the Peripatetics say that the heavens are moved by soul and that each heaven has its own soul. This soul, desiring the light of intelligence, moves the heaven towards intelligence by a motion which is everywhere and always according to place so that the light of intelligence might unfold its influence through the motion of the heaven and bring it into effect. For intelligence considered by itself as intelligence cannot be a conjoined mover. For this reason, it is not necessary that soul is entirely extended in essence through its mobile, but from a certain beginning, which the Peripatetics call “right” (*dextrum*), the power of motion and the power of life infuses the entire mobile.²⁴⁶

The difference, then, between the intelligence and the soul of each heaven is that the soul belongs *to* the heaven and it is *its* soul. This soul is necessary because there must be something there proper to each heaven that can “unfold”, “extend”, or “explain” (*explicitet*) the light of intelligence within the sphere. There is, however, a crucial difference between these souls and those imaginative celestial souls of Avicenna. For Avicenna, as we saw above, celestial soul moves its sphere through its apprehension of particulars and through an imaginative power. But this also means, for Avicenna, that it is the “perfectio corporis

²⁴⁵ See, for example, Avicenna *Liber de philosophia prima*, IX.2 (ed. Van Riet), p. 457.66-458: “Certitudo autem huius est quod caelestis corporis movetur a virtute infinita; vitus autem quae est suae animae corporeae finita est. In quantum autem intelligit primum, fluit de eius lumine et virtute super eam semper, et fit ipsa quasi habens virtutem infinitam, sed intellectum de cuius lumine et virtute fluit super corpus caeleste est in substantia sua secundum perfectionem ultimam, eo quod non remansit in sua substantia aliquid quod sit in potentia.”

²⁴⁶ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis* II.1.2, p. 62.41-52: “Et ideo dixerunt Peripatetici caelos ab anima moveri et unumquodque caelum propriam habere animam. Haec autem anima lumen intelligentiae desiderans ad intelligentiam movet caelum motu, qui secundum situm ubique est et semper, ut lumen intelligentiae sibi influxum per motum caeli explicitet et producat ad effectum. Intelligentia enim ut intelligentia secundum seipsam accepta motor coniunctus esse non potest. Propter quod anima essentialiter extensa per totum suum mobile non est necesse, sed a quodam principio, quod dextrum vocatur a Peripateticis, virtutem motus influit toti mobili et virtutem vitae.”

caeli et eius forma” —precisely the position Albert has endeavored to deny.²⁴⁷ Noble soul, instead, moves its sphere “through the influence of form”, and that “the noble body is receptive of such motion according to itself and thus without medium and imagination, it participates from noble soul the motion from intelligence”. And finally, “noble soul, therefore, participates the influence of intelligence and moves the noble body towards the form of intelligence.”²⁴⁸ In this formulation Albert mingles the doctrines he had attributed to Averroes and Alpetragius in the work’s introductory book: from Averroes, the motion of the heavens is through the influence of intelligence, but from Alpetragius, a proximate cause that is proper to the sphere participates that influence and imparts it to the sphere.²⁴⁹

This condition that celestial soul be both proper to the sphere and yet separate from it raises considerable difficulty. If it is Albert’s intention to interpret the *Liber de causis* within the framework of the Peripatetic tradition, how can this doctrine of celestial soul be made to agree with what Aristotle says about soul in the *De anima*, that it is the “form of a body that is potentially alive”²⁵⁰, a relationship that certainly involves being joined with the body. In what sense, then, can this celestial soul be a soul if it is not the form of its body? How can it be proper to the heaven and at the same time distinct from it in essence?

2.2. What is Noble Soul?

Albert’s commentary on Prop. 3 of the *Liber de causis* begins by pointing out that since the order of primary causes and their existence has already been explored, it is necessary now to inquire how the first two primary causes, the first cause and intelligence, “through their impressions and influences, results in the third, and how the third operates and impresses upon universal nature”. In short, it is necessary to inquire now “about noble

²⁴⁷ Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima*, IX.2 (ed. Van Riet), p. 454.90.

²⁴⁸ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.1.12, p. 74.70-85: “Motor autem corporis nobilis causa est et principium simplices et continui et regularis motus. Non potest igitur movere per influentiam formae, quae ab intelligentia fluit in ipsum. Et hoc quidem omnes Peripatetici consenserunt praeter solum Avicennam, qui tali animae dixit inesse apprehensionem particularis eo quod sibi vedebatur, singulari movere non posset. Sed contra hoc disputavit Averroes ostendens, quod corpus nobile de seipso receptibile est talis motus et ideo sine medio et imaginatione ab anima nobili motum ab intelligentia participat. Anima ergo nobilis est influentiam intelligentiae participans et ad formam intelligentiae corpus nobile movens.”

²⁴⁹ See sections 1.2.3 and 1.2.4 above.

²⁵⁰ See Aristotle, *De anima* II.1, 412a.19-20, Aristotle, *De anima*, II.1, 412a.19-21, trans. Moerbeke (ed. R.-A. Gauthier), p. 67: “Necesse est ergo animam substantiam esse, sicut speciem corporis phisici potencia uitam habentis. Substantia autem, actus; huiusmodi igitur corporis actus est”. See also Michael Scot’s translation, quoted above.

soul”.²⁵¹ In this and the chapters that follow Albert considers a series of questions: What is noble soul? (II.1.11), How is noble soul made to be a cause of motion? (II.1.12), What does soul have from the first cause? (II.1.13), From what does soul have that it is soul? (II.1.14). As de Libera points out, it is only after covering these questions that Albert finally introduces Prop. 3 in II.1.15, and presents it there as something that follows easily from the preceding questions: *Ex praeinductis facile est accipere, quod omnis anima nobilis in genere tres habet operationes*.²⁵² Then in II.1.16 Albert provides his paraphrase of the entire proposition, introducing it, as is the method of his commentary, as the summary of the discussion so far (*pertringendo quae dicta sunt*).²⁵³ As de Libera also notes, noble soul is not the only subject of these chapters, for Albert also discusses soul in general.²⁵⁴ Albert describes here a hierarchy of different kinds of soul each with their own kinds of life and motion. But in order to include noble soul as the highest kind of soul in that series, it is necessary to expand Aristotle’s definition of soul from *De anima* II.1: if noble soul cannot be “the form of a body which is potentially alive”, then how can it really be thought of as soul? Over the course of this discussion, Albert reformulates the meaning of soul that he articulates in his *De anima* commentary, and establishes noble soul as the supreme psychic exemplar, to whose perfection all other kinds of life are compared.²⁵⁵

2.2.1 Noble Soul: “The cause and principle of life and motion in the heavens”

As Prop. 3 of the *Liber de causis* reads, “every noble soul has three operations,” and these include “an animating operation, an intelligible operation, and a divine operation.”²⁵⁶

²⁵¹ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.11, p. 73.28-35: “Iam habitum est de ordine causarum primum et de esse ipsarum, quo unaquaeque ipsarum causa est. Consequenter ergo inquirendum est, qualiter utraque duarum primum per suas impressiones et influxus resultent in tertia et qualiter tertia operetur et imprimat in universalem naturam, ut gradus ordinis servetur in entibus et causis. Quia vero anima nobilis tertia est, ideo de anima nobili quaerendum est.”

²⁵² Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.15, p. 78.69-70. See de Libera, “Albert le grand et Thomas d’Aquin”, p. 373.

²⁵³ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.16, p. 79.49-50. De Libera notes what is remarkable about this manner of introducing his paraphrases in his own voice and as the consequence, not the occasion, of the preceding discussions: “C’est le signe de contradiction de toute sa stratégie d’interprète. Il affirme ne faire rien d’autre que réciter, pourtant il parle *aussi* en première personne, une ambiguïté d’autant plus réfléchie qu’ailleurs ce *dicimus* fait partie du *commentarium* lui-même, Albert le fondant, évidemment sans insister là-dessus, dans sa propre écriture” (“Albert le grand et Thomas d’Aquin”, p. 373).

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 373.

²⁵⁵ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.12, p. 74.50-75.46.

²⁵⁶ *Liber de causis*, Prop. 3.1: “Omnis anima nobilis tres habet operationes. Nam ex operationibus eius est operatio animalis et operatio intelligibilis et operatio divina.”

When Albert paraphrases Prop. 3, he clarifies that of noble soul's three operations, the "animate" (*animalis*) operation alone belongs to noble soul as its "property" (*propria*).²⁵⁷ The term, *propria*, refers to Aristotle's logical term, ἰδιον, used in the *Categories* to specify a predicate that does not indicate a thing's essence, but which nevertheless belongs to that essence alone.²⁵⁸ In other words, that noble soul vivifies bodies is proper to what it is. The same cannot be said about either noble soul's intelligible or divine operations which it only possesses "according to analogy" (*secundum analogiam*)—while noble soul's activity is intelligible or divine *in quality*, it is not an intelligence or the first cause in itself. In contrast, as Albert specifies, noble soul's animating operation is the operation *proper* to its substance, which is to say, to its substances *as a soul*.

But while Albert concludes that noble souls have animate operations proper to what they are, he is careful to indicate that this does not mean that they are the "perfection" of the heavenly bodies they animate. Soul as the "act" or "perfection" of a body, which is to say as the body's *entelechia* (ἐντελέχεια), is the first definition of soul Aristotle gives in the *De anima* II.1.²⁵⁹ The soul, when understood in this way, cannot possibly animate the heavens for such a soul, which suffers the passions of its body, would be the cause of unequal motions.²⁶⁰ Moreover, a soul which is the perfection of a body cannot be without that body, while the celestial movers must be separate in order to have a continuous activity.²⁶¹ Albert is clear, then, that since "the motion of the noble body is an equal motion, noble soul cannot,

²⁵⁷ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.16, p. 79.51-7: "Nam de numero operationum eius est operatio animalis, ab 'anima' et non ab 'animali' denominata. Et haec est sibi propria. Et operatio secunda est operatio intelligibilis sive intellectiva. Et haec non est sibi propria, sed secundum analogiam communis animae et intelligentiae. Et ex operationibus eius est operatio divina, quae sibi secundum analogiam et primae causae communis est." Albert is looking ahead here to where the text says at the end of Prop 3 that the animate operation is the "*virtutem essentie eius*" (*Liber de causis*, Prop. 3).

²⁵⁸ See Aristotle, *Topics*, 102a18, and for Albert's commentary, *Topica*, I.2.3 (ed. Borgnet), p. 254bff.

²⁵⁹ Aristotle, *De anima*, II.4, 415b.8-14, trans. Moerbeke (ed. R.-A Gauthier), p. 95: "Est autem anima uiuentis corporis causa et principium. [...] Causa enim ipsius esse omnibus substantia est, uiuere autem uiuentibus est esse, causa autem et principium horum anima." See Albert, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.11, p. 73.39-41. This definition is also one that appears in Avicenna's account of celestial soul; see Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima*, IX.2 (ed. Van Riet), p. 454.86-90: "Si autem ita fuerit in re, tunc caelum movetur per animam et anima est propinquum principium sui motus, et in illa anima renovator imagination et voluntas, et ipsa aestimat se habere apprehensionem rerum variabilium particularium et voluntatem essendi ipsas res particulares, et ipsa est perfectio corporis caeli et eius forma."

²⁶⁰ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.11, p. 73.42-3.

²⁶¹ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.11, p. 73.43-6.

therefore, be by *entelechia*.²⁶² Thinking back to Albert's account of the Averroean criticism of Avicenna, this is the core reasoning of each argument against the action of celestial souls. Accordingly, if Albert wishes to understand that noble soul is a soul, he must adopt a different definition that does not violate the requirements of a celestial mover.

Next Albert reminds his readers that soul as *entelechia* is not the only definition of soul in Aristotle's *De anima*:

There is another definition of soul [in the *De anima*] which is given about the soul's proper substance saying [that] "soul is the principle and cause of life in all things living" and in things which do not have life from themselves. This definition is appropriate to every soul by analogy, both to those having life hiddenly and to those having it clearly.²⁶³

The source for this second definition is *De anima* II.4 where it reads that "soul is the cause and principle of living bodies", and that "living is the being of living things, and the cause and principle of these things is soul."²⁶⁴ As Albert explains in his *De anima* commentary, Aristotle introduces this second definition of soul because the first, that of soul as *entelechia*, is only relevant when the soul's power is expressed through a body, as in the activities of nutrition and sensation.²⁶⁵ Soul's intellectual power, however, is the act of no organ; its activity is entirely separate from the body.²⁶⁶ For this reason, Aristotle introduces this more universal definition, the "principle and cause of life in all things living", that can be used for every kind of soul.²⁶⁷ And as Albert explains above, this definition "is appropriate to every soul by analogy". Wherever life is present, the principle of that life is its soul, whether it is also the act and perfection of that living thing's body or not.

²⁶² Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.11, p. 75.49-50: "Motus autem nobilis corporis motus est aequalis. Anima igitur nobilis entelechia esse non potest." Albert makes similar caveats about the character of celestial life in the *Physica*, II.2.9, *De caelo*, II.1.5, and *Metaphysica*, XI.2.12.

²⁶³ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.11, p. 73.57-74.1: "Est autem et alia animae diffinitio, quae secundum substantiam animae propriam data est, quod 'anima scilicet est principium et causa vitae in viventibus' omnibus et vitam ex se non habentibus. Quae ratio secundum analogiam convenit omni animae tam in habentibus vitam occultam quam in habentibus vitam manifestam." See Albert the Great, *Metaphysica*, XI.2.12, p. 498.88, where he uses almost identical reasoning to this to explain how Aristotle can call God an "eternal, most-noble animal" (Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1072b26).

²⁶⁴ Aristotle, *De anima*, II.4, 415b.8-14, quoted above. For Albert's paraphrase of that passage, see Albert, *De anima*, II.2.2, p. 85.3-14.

²⁶⁵ Albert the Great, *De anima*, II.1.4, p. 69.71-81.

²⁶⁶ Albert the Great, *De anima*, II.1.4, p. 70.21-60.

²⁶⁷ Albert the Great, *De anima*, II.1.5, p. 70.69-71.30.

Albert references this more universal definition of soul some twelve times in his commentary on the *Liber de causis*, however, he does not cite in a strictly literal way: Albert consistently adds to the notion that soul is the principle of life—that it is also the cause of motion: “anima est principium et causa vitae et motus”.²⁶⁸ As he points out, life is present wherever something moves itself (even in the case of that pro-movement, growth), and this is as true for the heavens as it is for plants, animals, and human beings.²⁶⁹ In Aristotle’s *De anima*, the account of soul that follows from the more universal definition is a progressive treatment of how each kind of soul, vegetative, sensitive, and rational, is the cause of a mode of life that is differentiated according to their mode of awareness.²⁷⁰ Albert, by contrast, in the *De causis et processu universitatis*, orders his account of soul here according to the manner of its self-motion.²⁷¹ The vegetative life of a plant, for example, consists of the motion of growth, of increase and decrease according to its substantial form. To this, sensitive life adds rectilinear motion towards nutriment. The sensible form of the nutriment compels the motion of sensitive soul through its sensible awareness.²⁷² Both nutritive and sensitive soul, then, are principles of a specific kind of motion, towards (or relative to) a specific form, through a specific kind of awareness.

Albert’s reorientation of the hierarchy of modes of life according to its motion allows him to establish an analogy between the life of sensation and the life of the heavens. Where animals move towards a sensible form through sensible awareness, the heavens move towards an intelligible form through intelligible awareness. And in fact, every kind of soul is ordered in a series according to the perfection of the principle of its motion:

For according to its substantial reason, soul is the principle and cause of life and motion in that which has motion from itself. And the more perfect and noble the principle and cause of life and motion is, the more noble it is; and the more imperfect and ignoble the principle and cause of life and motion is, the more imperfect and

²⁶⁸ See the lists of references cited below.

²⁶⁹ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.11, p. 74.2-5.

²⁷⁰ The mode of “awareness” in case of vegetative soul is the proto awareness of digestion. See E. Diamond, *Mortal Imitations of Divine Life: The Nature of the Soul in Aristotle’s De anima* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2015), p. 78; on the serial logic of the *De anima* and its hierarchy of souls, see also 57-66.

²⁷¹ As Diamond points out, there is also a serial account of motion in the *De anima* in Book III, see *Ibid.*, p. 221-252.

²⁷² Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.11, p. 74.19-25 and II.1.12, p. 74.59-63.

ignoble it is.²⁷³

By this reasoning, noble soul is noble precisely in the sense that its life consists of the most noble kind of motion (circular) according to the most noble faculty (intellect). As Albert explains in his most succinct definition of noble soul:

Therefore, according to its substance and definition, *noble soul is the principle and cause of circular motion towards the form of intelligence*. It is “soul” since it is the principle and cause of such motion, and it is “noble” since it has that motion not due to nutrition, but directed to the form of intelligence. For soul is the principle of life because it extends itself into the thing whose soul it is, and it performs the operation and activity of life, and the act and operation of life in noble soul is circular motion.²⁷⁴

Compared to animal life, the life of noble soul in the heavens is a circular motion (instead of rectilinear) towards the form of intelligence (instead of towards the form of nutriment) which it receives through its intellect (instead of by sensible apprehension).²⁷⁵

Albert’s conclusion, then, is that noble soul is a soul in the sense that it is the “principle of life *and motion*” in the heavens.²⁷⁶ It is analogous to the souls of plants, animals, and human beings in that it also moves its body towards a form according to a mode of awareness, however, it is different from them on account of its nobility. Noble soul, then, is also the *most noble* soul. Alone of all souls, noble soul moves its body in a perfect motion according to an everlasting awareness of a perfect form.

2.2.2. On the Source and Meaning of Albert’s Definition of Soul: *Principium Vitae et Motus*

Albert’s frequent use of the formula *principium vitae et motus* in his *De causis* commentary and other works raises questions about its origin. The formula appears

²⁷³ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.12, p. 75.47-53: “‘Anima’ enim per substantialem rationem ‘principium et causa vitae’ et motus est in eo quod habet motum a seipso. Et quanto perfectius et nobilius ‘principium et causa vitae’ et motus est, tanto nobilior est; et quanto imperfectius et ignobilius talis ‘vitae et motus principium et causa est’, tanto imperfectior et ignobilior.”

²⁷⁴ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.11, p. 74.33-41: “Anima igitur nobilis secundum suam substantiam et diffinitionem est principium et causa motus circularis ad intelligentiae formam. Et anima est ex hoc quod principium et causa talis motus est, nobilis autem ex hoc quod motum talem non propter alimentum, sed ad formam habet intelligentiae. Anima enim est vitae principium per hoc quod exserens se in hoc cuius anima est, vitae facit operationem et actum. Actus autem et operatio vitae in anima nobili motus est circularis” (emphasis added).

²⁷⁵ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.11, p. 74.32-37; II.1.12, p. 74.70-75:

²⁷⁶ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.12, p. 75.47: “Anima enim per substantialem rationem principium et causa vitae et motus est in eo quod habet motum a seipso.”

frequently in his works,²⁷⁷ and almost always in the very same wording. However, as we saw above, this formula is not a direct quotation of Aristotle's *De anima* (which says, rather, that soul is the "principle and cause of life", only²⁷⁸), and neither have I found a precedent for speaking about soul in this way in any of the Arabic interpreters of Aristotle. Moreover, while Albert introduces the formula in his *De causis* commentary as a reading of *De anima* II.1, the phrase does not appear in Albert's *De anima* commentary at all, and furthermore, the discussion we considered above is the only place in Albert's works I have encountered where he attributes it explicitly to the *De anima*. In fact, Albert uses the phrase "principium vitae et motus" much more often in connection to the *Liber de causis*, and there are also two examples of his using the phrase in discussions of Platonic theories of soul.²⁷⁹

Consider these examples of Albert's use of this formula to describe soul in works besides his *De causis* commentary in which Albert introduces soul as the "principium vitae et motus" with specific reference to the *Liber de causis* and to the concept of world soul:

There is a lengthy and difficult answer regarding what the soul of the world is and how it exists. [The answer] pertains to the first philosopher in that part that explains the primary and universal causes. Nevertheless, we state briefly that [the soul of the world] is neither the first cause nor any intelligence, but it is the mover of the *primum mobile*, for which it is the principle of life and local motion. Through this motion it is the cause of life and motion in all things, as is said in the *Liber de causis*.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁷ In addition to those examples cited below, see Albert the Great, *De praedicamentis* 5.5 (ed. Borgnet), p. 254ab; and *Liber divisionum* 4.1 (ed. de Loë), p. 75.

²⁷⁸ See Aristotle, *De anima*, II.4, 415b.8-14, cited above.

²⁷⁹ See Albert the Great, *De sex principiis*, 1.2, p. 6.8-19; *Summa theologiae* Pars I, tract. 4, q. 20, cap. 2, p. 103.62-68; *De motibus animalium* (ed. Borgnet), I.1.1, p. 258a; and *Topica* (ed. Borgnet), II.1.6, p. 306b.

²⁸⁰ Albert the Great, *De sex principiis*, 1.2 (ed. Cologne), p. 6.8-19: "De mundi enim anima quid sit et qualiter longum et difficile est determinare et pertinet ad primum philosophum secundum eam partem in qua de causis primariis et universalibus determinatur. Breviter tamen dicimus quod non est causa prima nec est aliqua intelligentia sed motor mobilis primi quod est sibi principium vitae et motus secundum locum et secundum hunc motum est causa vitae et motus in omnibus, sicut dicitur in libro de causis" (trans. Twetten, "Albert's Arguments for the Existence of God", p. 218, modified).

So far I have found no precedent in authors before Albert for defining soul in these precise words,²⁸¹ and there are very few examples of other authors using the phrase after Albert.²⁸² For these reasons, I suggest that the formula *anima principium vitae et motus* is Albert's own, original to himself, and one that he formulates in his Aristotelian commentaries for the specific purpose of thinking through the meaning of celestial animation.

Surveying Albert's descriptions of noble soul as the principle of life and motion in his *De causis* commentary, it is clear that he uses this formula there for two related purposes.²⁸³ On the one hand it clarifies noble soul's relationship to other kinds of soul, and on the other hand, it highlights what is distinct about noble soul among the primary causes.

First, "soul as the principle of life and motion" identifies for Albert both what noble soul has in common with lesser souls on earth and what distinguishes them from one another. As we saw above, noble soul is the principle of celestial life and motion, but it is not the *entelechia* of the heavenly bodies (i.e., it is not the perfection of a body which is potentially alive). Noble soul does not perfect the heavenly bodies by being joined to them in substance, but rather moves them everlastingly through an animate operation. Souls of mortal beings, by contrast, perfect, make, and generate their bodies, and are separated from them when these bodies die. In the first case, the soul's influence is operational, while in the second it is substantial.

Second, "soul as the principle of life and motion" distinguishes noble soul from the other primary causes. Albert explains later in his *De causis* commentary that the first cause

²⁸¹ There is one Aristotelian precedent for the phrase in the *De animalibus* where Aristotle calls the heart the "principle of life and motion" in the body. Albert briefly discusses this passage in his commentary on that work, but he only discusses it briefly and does not make an analogy between the heart and the soul. See Albert the Great, *De animalibus*, XIII.1.1 (ed. Stadler), p. 896: "Causa vero propter quam canna posita est in anteriori gutturi, est quia cor positum est in anteriori pectoris in medio, ita tamen quod aliquantulum vergit ad sinistram. Est autem cor principium vitae, et principium omnis motus et omnis sensus est in eo. Sensus autem et motus omnis principiantur ab anteriori parte corporis ubi est cor: propter cor enim distinguitur medium quod est principium vitae et sensus et motus, et ultimum ad quod vehi potest virtus cordis."

²⁸² For examples of authors using the formula after Albert, see Denys the Carthusian, *Commentaria in Librum de divinis nominibus*, cap. 6, art. 73 (*Opera Omnia*, 1902), p. 244.34: "Insuper vita in inferioribus primo patet ac patuit per motum: unde et anima fertur principium vitae et motus"; Denys also uses the formula to describe soul in his *Enarratio in Genesim* 36 (*Opera Omnia*, 1896), p.168.25; and *Enarratio in Leuiticum* 30 (*Opera Omnia*, 1897), p. 226.41; see also John Krosbein, *Expositio Libri de causis*, Quaestio III (ed. Calma), p. 70.3: "Unde facta est in ipsa 'operatio animalis, quoniam ipsa' est principium vite et 'motus corporibus'; propter hanc causam 'ipsa movet corpus'." Both of these authors conceivably learned the formula from Albert's writings.

²⁸³ See Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.12, p. 75.7-54; II.1.14, p. 77.38-41; II.1.15, p. 78.71-5 and again at p. 78.86-8; II.2.1, p. 92.60-1; II.2.32, p. 126.56-8; II.2.36, p. 129.8-29, again at p. 129.62-73, and p. 130.22-9; II.2.38, p. 131.63-5; and II.5.18, p. 183.85-9.

and intelligence are also principles of life. Life originates from the first cause, and flows through intelligence, noble soul, and into the heavens. However, compared to the first cause and intelligence, it is only through noble soul that life and motion actually enter the world of bodies. Consider the specific role noble soul plays in the following passage where Albert describes the procession of life through each of the primary causes:

[I]t follows necessarily that life in act is in intelligence from the first life [that is, the life of the first cause] which through its light activates everything that acts; and life is in soul from the first principle of life and the first principle of motion constituting soul in the being of the principle of life and motion; and life is in the body from the fact that soul expresses itself either into a spiritual body (which according to itself is more noble than every spirit, in the manner in which spirits are moved in lower animate beings) or from the fact that soul expresses itself in the spirit which is moved through the living and animated organs, just as the celestial luminaries are moved in the world.²⁸⁴

Clearly, then, noble soul is not the only “principle of life”, however, it is the very first “principle of life and motion”. The first cause is the first principle of life, for all life “is a living procession or a continuous flux from the quiet existence” of the first cause.²⁸⁵

Intelligence is also a principle of life in that it possesses the paradigm of all natural forms and is the unmoved principle of all motions.²⁸⁶ Noble soul, however, is the first principle through which life and motion actually enter bodies. The cause of life and motion “among inferior living things is soul,”²⁸⁷ and noble soul is the first of all such animators and movers, which it has from its *propria*, that is, from the animate operation which belongs properly to its essence.

²⁸⁴ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.3.11, p. 148.68-79: “Propter quod necessario sequitur, quod vita in agere in intelligentia sit ex prima vita, quae lumine suo agit omne quod agit; et quod vita in anima sit ex primo principio vitae et primo motus principio constituyente animam in esse principii vitae et motus; et vita in corpore sit ex hoc quod anima se exserit vel in corpus spirituale, quod secundum seipsum nobilius est omni spiritu - ad cuius etiam modum spiritus moventur in animatis inferioribus -, vel ex hoc quod anima se exserit in spiritum, qui per organa vivi et animati movetur, sicut moventur lumina caelestia in mundo.”

²⁸⁵ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.3.11, p. 148.80-1. Albert is discussing here *Liber de causis* Prop. 17(18): “All living things have motion through their essence because of the first living thing” (*res vivae omnes sunt motae per essentiam suam propter vitam primam*). See also *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.2.2 where the first cause is said to be “*vivens et omnis vitae principium*”.

²⁸⁶ See Albert the Great, *Metaphysica*, II.2.12, p. 498.60-80.

²⁸⁷ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.3.11, p. 148.33-5: “*Vita autem quidam motus et processus est sive fluxus continuus ab ente quieto, quod est fons vitae, cuius quidem principium in inferioribus vivis anima est.*”

Conclusion

Thinking back to the problem of celestial animation Albert introduced in the introduction of his *De causis* commentary according to the Peripatetic tradition, it is clear now that he understands the doctrine of noble soul and the primary causality of the *Liber de causis* to be both the summation and synthesis of what is received in the history of philosophy. In the introductory book of the commentary, Albert introduces the problems of celestial dynamics according to the diversity of conflicting doctrines that are found in the different philosophical schools, and especially the tensions between the Peripatetics themselves. However, once he begins his discussion of the *De causis* itself in Book II, Albert transitions to introducing noble soul and the two-mover model of celestial motion as the doctrine of all “the Peripatetics”.²⁸⁸

Through noble soul, Albert synthesizes the arguments of Avicenna, who rightly articulates the need of a proximate cause of celestial motion in addition to separate intelligence, with those of Averroes, who identifies what this proximate cause cannot be, that is, neither a principle with the power of imagination nor one that is mixed with its body. Albert draws these two sides together through the solution represented first by Alpetragius: there must be both an intelligence which is the end of celestial motion, and a proximate cause that desires intelligence. Moreover, Albert even incorporates the doctrines of the Epicureans into his model of primary causality, for in his interpretation of the *De causis*, nature too finds its place among the primary causes, but only once its subordinate relationship to the separate substances has been established.

Noble soul is also a summation. Belonging as it does to a text which Albert deems to be compiled from the writings of Aristotle, Algazel, Alfarabi, and Avicenna, Albert introduces his understanding of the doctrines of the *De causis* not as one authority among many, but as a text that speaks for the entire Peripatetic tradition, and in which one finds perfected the highest part of Aristotelian science. At the conclusion of his commentary, Albert speaks about the summative significance of the doctrine of celestial animation for every school in the history of philosophy:

²⁸⁸ See, for example, Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.2, p. 62.34: “Anima autem nobilis secundum Peripateticos”; II.1.2, p. 62.41-52: “Et ideo dixerunt Peripatetici caelos ab anima moveri”; II.1.13, p. 76.79: “Et sic dixerunt antiqui Peripatetici, quod prima causa creat animam nobilem”; and II.2.1, p. 92.45: “Peripateticos igitur sequentes dicimus”.

We know, however, that some do not say that the celestial bodies are animated, the contradiction of whom we neither approve or deny. But this we say for certain, that they do not agree with the sayings of the Epicureans, nor the Stoics, nor with the Peripatetics.²⁸⁹

For Albert, then, noble soul of the *De causis* is the most authoritative account of a doctrine which is present in every philosophical school. On whether or not Albert does personally agree with this doctrine we will see further in Ch. 3.

For Albert, noble soul's distinct cosmic office is that of a mediator. It is through noble soul that the simplicity of intelligence and its forms are unfolded and explicated in the life of the heavenly bodies, whose circular motions contain the power of all of nature and through whose perfect life all other life consists. After recognizing the place of this doctrine in the larger structures of emanative metaphysics of Albert's *De causis* commentary in the next chapter, we will see his conclusion in contrast with that of Thomas Aquinas in Ch. 3, who interprets noble soul through very different sources and according to a distinct causal model, and then again in Ch. 5 with Giles of Rome, whose also describes a two-mover model for celestial motion, but one that has been substantially altered through the determination that intelligence and noble souls are, in fact, angels.

²⁸⁹ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.5.24, p. 191.24-9: "Scimus autem, quod quidam corpora caelestia animata esse non dicunt, quorum contradictionem nec approbamus nec improbamus. Sed hoc dicimus pro certo, quod nec cum Epicureis nec cum Stoicis nec cum Peripateticis dicta eorum conveniunt." See Twetten and Baldner, "Introduction", p. 171-72.

CHAPTER 2: NOBLE SOUL AND *FLUXUS* IN ALBERT THE GREAT

While it is certain that Albert the Great's account of the origin of the *Liber de causis* is a fiction, it remains that his hypothesis (that a "certain David Iudaeus" compiled the text from the sayings of Aristotle, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Algazel²⁹⁰) discerns something true about the real background and original spirit of that text.²⁹¹ First of all, the commonalities Albert perceives between the *Liber de causis* and the writings of Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Algazel are real. Each of these authors, together with the *De causis*, speak about the abundance of the first principle, and, excepting the texts Albert has of Alfarabi, they all speak about the flow of goodness from that source.²⁹² Avicenna and Algazel both describe systems of emanation using the language of *fluere* and *influere*,²⁹³ and there are indeed many other points of analogy between them and the *Liber de causis*, not the least of which is the common architecture of their first principles: the first cause, intelligences, and celestial souls.²⁹⁴ In view of the similarities between the first philosophy of these Peripatetic authors and the *Liber de causis*,²⁹⁵ Albert rightly theorizes that they share a common background or source; and since it is clear to Albert that Aristotle's *Metaphysics* does not itself contain the

²⁹⁰ See Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.1, p. 59.9-18 and p. 61.65-68.

²⁹¹ See de Libera, "Albert le grand et Thomas d'Aquin", p. 357; and Bonin, *Creation as Emanation*, p. 3 and 85.

²⁹² Compare, for example, Alfarabi, *De ortu scientiarum*, 3 (ed. Baeumker), p. 23.11-12: "creator eorum est praeter illa et largitor esse est"; Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima*, VI.5 (ed. Van Riet), p. 333.22-23: "quia debuit in fine divino esse largitatem dantem omni quod possibile est esse bonum in suo esse"; VIII.4, p. 402.48-49: "Primus igitur non habet quidditatem, sed super habentia quidditates fluit esse ab eo"; Algazel, *Metaphysica*, I.3 (ed. Muckle), p. 79.19-80.4: "primus largissimus est a quo emanat omne bonum. [...] Essencia enim eius talis est quod ex ea fluit super omne quod est, quicquid convenit ei. Ipse igitur vere largus est"; *Idem.*, I.V, p. 125.29-30: "bonitas fluit in esse quod est a primo principio"; and *Liber de causis*, Prop. 20(19) (ed. Pattin), p. 89.7-9: "Prima enim bonitas influit bonitates super res omnes influxione una"; *Idem.*, p. 90.23-24: "est propter magnitudinem suae largitatis." Fauser indicates these texts on p. 36 of his edition of the *De causis et processu universitatis*. While Albert is unaware of this fact, Alfarabi describes an emanation scheme that is similar in his *On the Perfect State*, which was not translated into Latin; see Alfarabi, *On the Perfect State*, I.2 (ed. and trans. Walzer), p. 88-91 and II.3, p. 100-5.

²⁹³ See Avicenna, *Philosophia prima*, IX.4 (ed. Van Riet), p. 478.68-69: "igitur primo placuit ut ex sua essentia fluere omne quod est"; and Algazel's summary of Avicenna in *Metaphysica*, I.3 (ed. Muckle), p. 80.2-4: "Essencia enim eius talis est quod ex ea fluit super omne quod est, quicquid convenit ei". Medieval authors were unaware that Algazel prepared his summary of Avicenna in order to criticize him.

²⁹⁴ See the accounts of emanation that flows from the first cause to intelligence, to celestial soul, to the celestial sphere in Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima*, IX.4 (ed. Van Riet), p. 483.85-91, and Algazel's summary of Avicenna's system in *Metaphysica*, I.5 (ed. Muckle), p. 120.23-121.3, both quoted below. For Alfarabi's earlier account of a similar three-fold emanation scheme, see the texts cited from *On the Perfect State* above.

²⁹⁵ After summarizing the four things that the perfection of the science of metaphysics must include in *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.1, p.59.19-60.5 (quoted above in Ch. 1.1.1), Albert shows how it is that each of these authors, Alfarabi, Algazel, Avicenna, and Aristotle, describe this part of first philosophy (p. 60.6ff).

perfection of that science,²⁹⁶ there must then be (as he reasons) an Aristotelian source at the root of this metaphysical tradition. Albert fills this lacuna with a text he reads about in Avicenna's *Metaphysics* which seems to him, through the limits of the Latin translation, to be attributed to Aristotle himself—the *Epistula de principio universi esse*.²⁹⁷

While Albert's comments about this lost theological work by Aristotle captured the imaginations of scholars for a time,²⁹⁸ it has long been clear that the *Epistula* is actually a text by Alexander of Aphrodesias.²⁹⁹ Even so, while Albert's hypothesis about the background of the *Liber de causis* and the Peripatetic theological tradition is incorrect, he nevertheless discerns a common heritage that is very real. Through the pseudonymous *Theology of Aristotle*, a text that was read both by Alfarabi and Avicenna, these authors, together with the summaries of Avicenna contained in Algazel's *Metaphysics*, all draw from that same neoplatonizing, Aristotelian circle of 9th-c. Baghdad that produced the *Liber de causis*.³⁰⁰

²⁹⁶ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.1, p. 60.3-5 and II.5.24, p. 191.17-23, discussed above in Ch. 1.1.1.

²⁹⁷ Albert says in his *De intellectu et intelligibili* that this *Epistula* is spoken about in Avicenna's *Metaphysics* (*De intellectu et intelligibili*, I.2 [ed. Borgnet], p. 479a). The reference is to Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima*, IX.2 (ed. Van Riet), p. 463.65-71, which, after introducing a doctrine of the "Magister primus" (i.e., Aristotle), goes on to say that "Quod autem firmitus est in dictis suorum sociorum manifestat et dicit, in sua epistola quae est de principiis omnium, quod motor universitatis caelorum unus est nec possunt esse plures, quamvis unaquaque sphaera habeat motorem proprium et amatum proprium." The Latin here begins with the neuter "quod" and implies that the subject remains Aristotle himself: "It is quite solid in the sayings of his followers; he shows and says in his letter [...]". By contrast, the passage as translated from Arabic by Marmura reads that, "One of his followers, who is more sound than [others] in what he says, declares and states in his treatise [...]" (Avicenna, *The Metaphysics of the Healing*, IX.2 [trans. Marmura], p. 317.17-25). On these points, see de Libera, "Albert le grand et Thomas d'Aquin", p. 357-58. As we saw in Ch. 1, Albert references this *Epistula* in *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.1.6, p. 13.68-72, and II.1.1, p. 61.65-68; as well as in *Summa theologiae*, I, 3, 18, 1, p. 88.5-13 and II, 1, 4, 5, 1 (ed. Borgnet), p. 97a; and *Problemata determinata*, q. 10, p. 53.1-9.

²⁹⁸ See the history of the scholarship on the *Epistula* in de Libera, "Albert le grand et Thomas d'Aquin", p. 354.

²⁹⁹ The actual text by Alexander of Aphrodesias is called *Kitāb mabādi' al-kull* in Arabic and has been edited by A. Badawi in his *Aristu 'inda 'l-'Arab* (Cairo: Dirasa Islamiyya, 1947), p. 253-77. See de Libera, "Albert le grand et Thomas d'Aquin", p. 358-59.

³⁰⁰ Avicenna wrote some notes on the *Theology of Aristotle* which was part of his larger work, *The Fair Judgement*, in which he discusses important works of philosophy. The portions on *Metaphysics* Lambda and the *Theology of Aristotle* are the only that survive. On this text see P. Adamson, "Correcting Plotinus: Soul's Relationship to Body in Avicenna's Commentary on the 'Theology of Aristotle'", in P. Adamson, H. Baltussen and M.W.F. Stone (eds), *Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin Commentaries*, vol. 2 (London: Institute of Classical Studies), p. 59-75; and Idem, "Non-Discursive Thought in Avicenna's Commentary on the *Theology of Aristotle*", in J. McGinnis (ed.), *Interpreting Avicenna: Science and Philosophy in Medieval Islam* (Leiden: Brill), p. 87-111. A longer version of the *Theology of Aristotle* is cited in the *Harmony of the Two Sages*, which is ascribed to Alfarabi; see P. Adamson, "Plotinus Arabus and Proclus Arabus in the *Harmony of the Two Philosophers* Ascribed to al-Fārābī", in D. Calma (ed.), *Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes. Volume 2: Translations and Acculturations* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2021), p. 182-97. For the relationship between Alfarabi and another part of the *Plotiniana Arabica*, see C. D'Ancona, "Aux origines du dator formarum. Plotin, l'Épître sur la science divine et al-Farabi", in E. Coda and C. Martini Bonadeo (eds), *De l'Antiquité tardive au Moyen Âge. Études de logique aristotélicienne et de philosophie grecque, syriaque, arabe et latine offertes à Henri Hugonnard-Roche* (Paris: Vrin,

Seeing, moreover, that one can find in the *Theology of Aristotle* the same themes that the *De causis* shares in common with Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Algazel (in particular, the language of emanative flow, the abundance of the first cause, and the three supreme causes),³⁰¹ it is clear, finally, that Albert's intuition about a thread that runs through the *De causis* and these Peripatetics identifies a real common heritage. They are each connected to a common tradition, even if it is different from the one Albert imagines. For this reason, de Libera judges that Albert is "l'héritier latin de l'interprétation kindienne, c'est-à-dire théologique, c'est-à-dire pour nous néoplatonicienne de la philosophie d'Aristote, et c'est cette interprétation, typiquement arabe, qu'il a, à son insu, transmise aux Latins."³⁰²

One of the clearest examples of Albert's inheritance of this theological and (for us) Neoplatonic approach to Aristotelian metaphysics can be found in the culminating effort of Book I of the *De causis et processu universitatis* in his account of *fluxus*.³⁰³ This flow is of the primal form from the first cause which unfolds in all of existence, a processional metaphysics which Albert adapts from the emanation schemes he finds in Avicenna's *Liber de philosophia prima*, IX.4 and Algazel's *Metaphysica*, I.5. This metaphysical framework remains in the background of the rest of his commentary on the *De causis*, guiding and structuring his interpretation of its primary causality, including that of noble soul and its celestial operation. It is, then, within this system of *fluxus* that the existence and operations

2012), p. 381-414.

³⁰¹ See, for examples the following passages from the *Theology of Aristotle* that also speak about the abundance of the first cause and the flow of light from the first principle: *Theology of Aristotle* X.1 (trans. G. Wilson), p. 291: "The proof that the absolute One is complete and above completeness is that it has no need of anything and does not seek to acquire anything, and because of the intensity of its completeness and super-abundance another thing is produced from it"; VII.7, 12-21, p. 247: "just as the mind cannot stand still in itself because of the perfecting power and the overflowing light in it, but needs to move and to travel either up or down [...] consequently it travels down by the necessary law which the first originator put in it, and pours forth its light and power on the things below it, until it reaches the soul"; and VIII, p. 263: "since the first Creator is the excellent, the perfect of excellence, whose excellence is more perfect and more complete than all the excellent ones [...], it is necessary that he be the one who first pours forth life and excellence on all things that are beneath him".

³⁰² De Libera, "Albert le grand et Thomas d'Aquin", p. 357. And as Anzulewicz has also argued more recently, Albert's insight into the *De causis* penetrates even further, as he seems also to have recognized key components of the text's Proclean paradigm as well as, in particular, its axiomatic structure and similarity with Proclus' *Elementatio physica* which it seems Albert may have been aware of. See Anzulewicz, "Hat Albertus Magnus das proklische Paradigma des *Liber de causis* erkannt?", p. 109-34 at p. 114-15 and p. 127-28; on Albert and Proclus' *Elementatio physica*, see p. 120-27.

³⁰³ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.8. On Albert's concept of *fluxus*, see Anzulewicz, "Die Emanationslehre des Albertus Magnus", (2009); the translation, notes and commentary of Milazzo, *Le traité du flux*, (2013); Moutlin and Twetten, "Causality and Emanation in Albert", (2013); Bonin, "Albert's *De causis* and the Creation of Being", (2013); and Maltieri, "Origine della creazione", (2021).

of noble soul ultimately make sense for Albert.

Albert orders his account of *fluxus* according to the emanative principle which he finds in almost all the Peripatetics, “from one, only one proceeds”,³⁰⁴ and describes how, from the primal form flowing out of the first cause, the diversity of the universe arises. The first and indeed the only thing to proceed from the first cause into nothingness is its intelligible light which emanates progressively into and through the series of separate intelligences, noble souls, and spheres that follow them.³⁰⁵ This first form, which Albert understands through Prop. 4 of the *Liber de causis*, is the pure, undifferentiated, and first-created *esse*, a concept of the divine mind that contains in itself the possibility of everything into which it flows.³⁰⁶ In every moment of this *fluxus*, it is the same light, the same divine form that flows and over flows, and at each stage the principles that emerge contribute their own activities to its purity so that *unum ab uno* the diversity of creation emerges from the unity of the primal font.

In the last chapter we considered the distinct role noble soul must play in Albert’s understanding of the two-mover solution to the problem of celestial motion. Each distinct motion in the heavens requires both an unmoved intelligence, which is the source of its perfect form, and a noble soul that translates that form into motion. By the end of that

³⁰⁴ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.8, p. 55.72-76: “Supponentes autem propositionem, quam omnes ante nos philosophi supposuerunt, scilicet quod ab uno simplici immediate non est nisi unum secundum naturae ordinem”; see also I.1.6, p. 13.68-72. See also the presence of this formula in Alfarabi, *Fontes quaestionum*, 7 (ed. Schmoelders), p. 47: “Prima creatura, ab illo [i.e. ente primo] profecta, una est numero: intellectus scilicet primus”; Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima*, IX.4 (ed. Van Riet) p. 481.65-74: “Nosti etiam, quod ex uno, secundum quod est unum, non est nisi unum”; Averroes, *Commentaria in libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, XII, 44 (ed. Venice, 1562), f. 344B: “Ab uno autem et simplici non provenit nisi unum”; Algazel, *Metaphysics*, I.2 (ed. Muckle), p. 57.7: “ab uno autem non provenit nisi unum”; and I.5.1, p. 119.25-26: “a primo non provenit nisi unum”; and Moses Maimonides, *Deux neutrorum*, II.23 (ed. Paris), f. 53v: “Aristoteles et omnes qui profundaverunt in philosophia, convenerunt in hac propositione, quod ex simplici non postest provenire nisi unum simplex”. These references are from the notes on p. 13 of Fauser’s edition of *De causis et processu universitatis*. As Bonin in “Albert’s *De causis* and the Creation of Being”, p. 689, points out, the formula is also suggested by Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption*, II.10, 336a.27, *translatio Vetust*: “idem enim et similiter habens semper idem innatum est facere”. For more on the Latin reception of this formula, see W.J. Hankey, “*Ab uno simplici non est nisi unum*: The Place Of Natural And Necessary Emanation in Aquinas’s Doctrine of Creation”, in W. Otten, W. Hannam, and M. Treschow (eds), *Divine Creation in Ancient, Medieval, and Early Modern Thought: Essays Presented to the Rev’d Dr Robert Crouse* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2007) p. 309-33; C. D’Ancona, “*Ex uno non fit nisi unum* : storia e preistoria della dottrina avicenniana della Prima Intelligenza”, in E. Canone (ed.), *Per una storia del concetto di mente* (Florence: Olschki, 2007), p. 29-55; and W.M. Amin, “‘From the One, Only One Proceeds’: The Post-Classical Reception of a Key Principle of Avicenna’s Metaphysics”, in *Oriens* 48 (2020), p. 123-55.

³⁰⁵ See, Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.8, p. 55.80ff, which is discussed further below.

³⁰⁶ See, Albert’s understanding of the *esse primum creatum* in *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.17, p. 81.19-47, discussed below.

discussion, however, a difficult question remained unanswered: for noble soul to move its sphere everlastingly, it must not be mixed with that body; but how does noble soul both become proper to its sphere while at the same time remaining separate from it? Noble soul is that necessary mediator between intelligible form and corporeal motion. But if we cannot explain its animate operation in the same terms as human or animal animation (where soul is the perfection of the body), what does it mean for noble soul to belong to its sphere and to be inclined towards it? This inclination in noble soul is required for its office, but where does it come from and how does it emerge?

The purpose of the present chapter is to see how the existence and operation of noble soul ultimately belong, for Albert, within the larger process of the emanative metaphysics of *fluxus*. According to the processional creationism of that doctrine, as each heaven is illuminated by its separate intelligence, and that light is participated by noble soul, this is only one moment in a universal procession of light by which the first cause fills all of reality. It is, moreover, the dynamics of the first form itself which makes noble soul distinctly what it is. The being of each creature emerges out of the first created *esse* in its procession, and the nature of noble soul belongs, in the end, to the progress of that form which acquires the power and potential that belong to noble soul's nature through the increasing distance of its procession from the first cause.³⁰⁷ That the noble soul receives the light of intelligence and is proper to its sphere does not arise from any privation, or indeed from any other cause besides the power emerging in the dynamics of *fluxus* itself.

This chapter has three parts. 1) It begins by introducing the central concept of *fluxus* in Albert's account of its structure in *De causis et processu universitatis* I.4, seeing how the Peripatetic law, *ex uno non fit nisi unum*, remains true without resulting in an "Avicennian" cosmos in which each principle is creative of the one that follows it. Instead, Albert envisions the flow of form as a single primary flux of intelligible light which contains in itself the potency of all beings, and that primary flow then unfolds itself through the primary causes and into the universe, including the subsequent activities of intelligence, noble soul, and nature within its own power. And by way of an analogy with art, Albert depicts the distinct role noble soul must play in the flow of form into the universe. Noble soul, as the *spiritus* of

³⁰⁷ On this theme see especially Albert's discussion in *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.14, p. 77.21ff, discussed below.

a cosmic artist, is the medium by which the intelligible form contemplated in the mind becomes the form that guides the hand of the artist as she shapes her material. 2) By looking again to Albert's commentary on Prop. 3, we will see next how the doctrine of *fluxus* shapes the way that Albert interprets the *Liber de causis* and describes the origins of noble soul's being and operations. Crucially, the copy of the *De causis* Albert uses to prepare his commentary includes an Arabic transliteration, "*alatyr*", which becomes an essential part of his commentary on noble soul's creation. In the course of this discussion, this section also pauses to explore the identity of those "wise among the Arabs" (*sapientes Arabum*) to whom Albert attributes the meaning of "*alatyr*",³⁰⁸ a term Albert uses in multiple of his works and which seems to be connected to a mysterious, unidentified text by the 9th-c. Arab astronomer, Messahalāh. 3) Finally, we will look to see the role that *fluxus*, and noble soul within it, plays in Albert's final theological works—a concluding testament to the formative role that noble soul plays in Albert's thought as he can be seen synthesizing the concepts of the *Liber de causis* into his theology of divine will.

1. *Fluxus*: Albert the Great and Arabic Emanationism

Albert defines *fluxus* as "simply the emanation of form from the primal font, which is the font and origin of all forms."³⁰⁹ In this formulation, it is crucial that what emanates from the font of all forms (plural), is one single *forma* according to the law, "from a simple one only one can proceed".³¹⁰ Taking this principle seriously, Albert concludes that there is, in the end, only one creation, that of a first form which is the light of the first cause: a simple, undifferentiated being. This primal *esse*, which Albert takes to be the subject of not only Prop. 4 of the *Liber de causis*, which says that "the first of all created things is being", but also the subject of the science of first philosophy according to Aristotle's *Metaphysics*,³¹¹ and also

³⁰⁸ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.13, p. 76.15-22.

³⁰⁹ *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.1, p. 43.1-3: "Ex his patet, quod fluxus est simpliciter emanatio formae a primo fonte, qui omnium formarum est fons et origo."

³¹⁰ In addition to the references cited above, see Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.2.7, p. 100.50-52: "Hoc tamen constat, quod ab uno agente secundum formam et eodem modo se habente immediate non est nisi unum secundum formam."

³¹¹ See Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VI.1, 1026a and what Albert says in his *Metaphysics*, I.1.1, p. 3.1-4: "Esse enim, quod haec scientia considerat, non accipitur contractum ad hoc vel illud, sed potius prout est prima effluxion dei et creatum primum, ante quod non est creatum aliud"; and I.4.8, "Ens autem scimus esse causatum primum causae primae". See Bonin, *Creation as Emanation*, p. 47.

the first divine participation according to Dionysius the Areopagite in *On the Divine Names*.³¹²

Albert begins his account of *fluxus* by distinguishing what it means “to flow” (*fluere*), from *causare* and *principiare*. The difference lies in the fact that “to be a principle” or “to cause” both imply the presence of an agent and a patient, a cause and something it works upon.³¹³ *Fluere*, by contrast, is a pure procession that assumes no prior recipient, is conveyed by no vehicle or medium, and presupposes nothing. This is the sense in which *fluere*, for Albert, is a creation *ex nihilo*: it is the flow from the first cause of form into nothingness.

Albert describes the first form in different ways. He calls it “intellectual light”,³¹⁴ “the being of each thing”,³¹⁵ “a flowing form”,³¹⁶ and “a simple concept” or “*intelligentia*”.³¹⁷ According to Albert’s interpretation of *De causis*, Prop. 4, when the text says that “the first created thing is being” and that this “being is an *intelligentia*”,³¹⁸ this does not mean (as Thomas Aquinas understands the passage) that the first created being of Prop. 4 is the being of the first separate intelligence or the mover of the outermost sphere,³¹⁹ but rather, that it is a *simplex mentis conceptus*. As Maria-Evalina Maltieri points out, this does not mean merely the concept of the human mind, but, importantly, the concept of *esse* in the divine mind: before it proceeds, this first form is one with the divine mind, a universal *ante rem*, which highlights the fact that Albert attributes an almost univocal relationship between the first

³¹² See Albert the Great, *Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus* V.20, p. 314.4-10: “Dicendum, quod esse simpliciter secundum naturam et rationem est prius omnibus aliis; est enim prima conceptione intellectus et in quo intellectus resolvens ultimo stat. Ipsum etiam solum percreationem producit non praesupposito alio, omnia autem alia per informationem, scilicet per ens praeeexistens, ut dicit Commentator in *Libro de causis*.” See Bonin, *Creation as Emanation*, p. 45-46; and Moulin and Twetten, “Causality and Emanation in Albert”, p. 696.

³¹³ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.1, p. 42.59-71. On this distinction, see Maltieri, “Origine della creazione”, p. 390.

³¹⁴ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.2.1, p. 26.19-25; and I.4.8, p. 55.84-88. For this list, see Maltieri, “Origine della creazione”, p. 396.

³¹⁵ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.2.8, p. 34.3-4: “Adhuc, primum causatum est esse uniuscuiusque. Esse enim fundamentum est omnium aliorum”.

³¹⁶ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.1, p. 42.61-62.

³¹⁷ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.17, p. 81.19-47.

³¹⁸ *Liber de causis*, Prop. 4 (ed. Pattin), p. 54.37: “Prima rerum creaturarum est esse [...] id est intelligentia, complete et ultima in potential et reliquis bonitatibus”.

³¹⁹ On Thomas Aquinas’ interpretation of Prop. 4, see *Super Librum de causis*, Prop. 4, p. 26.1ff. On the differences between Albert and Thomas’ interpretations of this proposition, see P. Porro, “The University of Paris in the Thirteenth Century”, p. 281-86. As Moulin and Twetten point out, Albert also calls the first celestial intelligence “first created”, however, in the relationship between the first created *esse* and the first created intelligence, *esse* is prior because the first intelligence presupposed *esse* in its existence; see “Causality and Emanation in Albert”, p. 699; and Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.23, p. 87.3-25, where it says that “Verumtamen intelligentia illa est sub intelligentia eius quod est esse, et inferior tam in complemento quam in virtute et aliis bonitatibus et nobilitatibus, sicut causa secundaria inferior est quam primaria.”

cause and the first effect, even calling the light of the universally acting intellect “its essence”.³²⁰ Therese Bonin clarifies that according to Albert’s distinction, the divine concept of *esse* can be considered in three different ways: 1) As it is in God, one and identical with Him (this coincides with the universal *ante rem*); 2) As it is received in beings (the universal *in re*); 3) and as it flows from God, not yet multiplied in particular beings, but no longer identical with God’s simplicity.³²¹ Albert’s account of *fluxus* includes each of these moments, describing how the pure, undifferentiated *esse* that in God is one with his simplicity is received by a multiplicity of beings insofar as it flows out from God through the primary causes and into diversity.

Albert uses three images to depict the procession of this form: a river,³²² art,³²³ and light.³²⁴ Albert uses all three images to emphasize that *fluxus* really is the flow of a single form that only proceeds “from one to one” and also to depict how in that simple procession diversity arises. The image of the river elegantly summarizes these points: the water which flows from the river’s font is the very same water that continues to flow downstream, although in the river’s process more and more sediment of the river bed becomes incorporated into its flow.³²⁵ The question of what this river bed might represent, however, does prove the limits of this metaphor, seeing that *fluxus* is a creation *ex nihilo* that has no vehicle.³²⁶ In the sections that follow we will look at the image of art, which clarifies the necessity of what noble soul contributes to procession of *forma fluens*, and the image of light, which is of the three the most adequate to depicting the fact that *fluxus* is not a procession that is conveyed by any vehicle or poured into any subject. It is, indeed, a flow into nothing.

³²⁰ See *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.1, p. 43.43-47: “Inter omnia autem quae principiorum habent nomen et rationem, praecipue sic fluit intellectus agens, qui lumine, quod sibi essentia est, de se sic semper formas emanat, quibus constituit ea quae agit.” See Malgieri, “Origine della creazione e natura del *fluxus*”, p. 395. On the *esse primum creatum* as a universal *ante rem*, see also Bonin, *Creation as Emanation*, p. 41-42.

³²¹ See Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.20, p. 85.39-44: “Tales autem formae tripliciter accipi possunt, scilicet ut in principio processionis huius, et sic omnes accipiuntur ut unum; et ut in lumine extenso a primo procedentes, et sic differentes sunt ratione; et tertio ut in lumine terminato ad res, et sic accipiuntur secundum esse diversae”; see also II.2.12, p. 105.9-10. Bonin points out that these three correspond to the triad of unparticipated, participated, and participant from Dionysius in *De divinis nominibus* II.5 and XI.6. See Bonin, “Albert’s *De causis* and the creation of being”, p. 693.

³²² Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.1, p. 42.38-48.

³²³ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.1, p. 42.48-59.

³²⁴ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.1, p. 43.18-22.

³²⁵ Moulin and Twetten, “Causality and Emanation in Albert”, p. 708-9.

³²⁶ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.1, p. 43.48-49.

As we will see, it is the fact that light emits into darkness and gradually become distant from its source that finally explains why noble soul is what it is.

1.1. Noble Soul, *spiritus*, and the Cosmic Artistry of *forma fluens*

Within the process by which form flows into reality, we have seen that noble souls play a necessary role, translating that form in its intelligible immateriality into the bodily motions of the heavens. To depict this act of mediation, Albert likens noble soul to the *spiritus* of an artist, mediating between the form that the artist contemplates, and her hands and tools which impart that form to the matter of the artefact.³²⁷ The concept of *spiritus* belongs to the late ancient and medieval interpretation of Aristotle's biology, is related to the pseudo-Aristotelian *De spiritu*, and plays a large role in Hellenic medicine and its reception in the Arabic and Latin traditions.³²⁸ According to the biology of *spiritus*, it is necessary that there be a mediating substance between the soul and bodily organs. This spirit is something subtle that approaches soul's immateriality but is nevertheless connected to the body as well. By this analogy, noble soul is likened to the medium between the intelligence and instrument of a cosmic artist, whose work requires that there be something which can receive intelligible form and communicate it to its celestial instrument.

Albert develops this image in his *De causis* commentary through an elaboration of Aristotle's discussion of art in *Metaphysics* VII. In any art, Aristotle explains, the form as it exists in the soul (whether it be of health, or a house) proceeds into its matter, and the art itself consists of this motion or transference from thinking into making:

[F]rom art proceeds the things of which the form is in the soul. (By form I mean the essence of each thing and its primary substance.) [...] [I]n a sense health comes from health and house from house, that with matter from that without matter; for the medical art and the building art are the form of health and of the house; and I call the essence substance without matter. Of productions and movements one part is called thinking and the other making,—that which proceeds from the starting-point and the form is thinking, and that which proceeds from the final step of the thinking is

³²⁷ See Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.6, p. 50.2-21.

³²⁸ See J.J. Bono, "Medical Spirits and the Medieval Language of Life", in *Traditio* 40 (1984, p. 91-130); and M.J. Ortúzar Escudero, "The Role of the *spiritus animalis* in Accounts of Perception: Medical and Philosophical Remarks from three 13th-century Encyclopedias", in *Vincent of Beauvais Newsletter* 42 (2018), p. 4-16.

making. [...] The active principle then and the starting point for the process of becoming healthy is, if it happens by art, the form in the soul [...].³²⁹

By this account, art can be understood as the transference of a single form from the soul into matter by means of the movement from thinking into making. The active principle of the art is the form which begins in the soul and through thinking and making flow into matter.

Albert frequently uses this description of the flow of form in human artistry to depict the flow of form from intelligence into nature. Before looking to see how Albert orders this analogy in the *De causis et processu universitatis*, it is useful to see how he articulates a more simple version of the same analogy in his *Metaphysica*. Albert compares there the relationship between the form in the mind of the artist to the form as it exists in the matter of the artefact to the way that intelligence uses the heavens as an instrument to order and govern the natural world.

In one example, Albert begins by explaining that in art, “the house, which is in the wood, arises from the house which is in the soul of the architect”,³³⁰ referring to Aristotle’s text above. However, later on he makes a crucial transition and illustrates the same principle on a cosmic level:

And from this it is clear that just as the hand is the instrument of practical intellect in artificial things, so the entire celestial circle is the instrument of that intellect towards the entire matter of nature which it moves.³³¹

Albert thus understands that just as the hand is the instrument of the practical intellect in things made by human art, so the entire circle of the heaven is the instrument of that intelligence by which it moves the “entire matter of nature”.

In this example from the *Metaphysica*, there are three terms, the intelligence, the heavens, and the matter of nature. In Albert’s *De causis* commentary he takes the same structure, but multiplies its parts into five distinct levels so that it now includes the first

³²⁹ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VII.7, 1032a.32-1032b.23 (trans. Ross).

³³⁰ Albert the Great, *Metaphysica* XI.1.6., p. 466.70-72: “domus, quae est in lignis, fit a domo, quae est in anima architecti”.

³³¹ Albert the Great, *Metaphysica* XI.2.12, p. 499.83-86: “Et ex hoc patet, quod sicut manus est instrumentum intellectus practici in artificialibus, ita totus caelestis circulus est instrumentum huius intellectus ad totam materiam naturae, quam ambit”; see also XI.2.13, p. 500.67-88.

cause, intelligence, noble soul, nature (as in the heavenly bodies), and the world of generation and corruption:

The form which flows first is more and more determined and compressed as it flows into the second, third, and subsequent [levels]. It is just as in the example we spoke about from art which flows from the mind of the artist into the spirit, from the spirit into the organs of the members, from the organs into the instrument, and from the instrument into exterior matter. For, in all these things it is the same thing that flows, although it exists according to one mode of being in the first, according to another in the second, another in the third, and so on. According to this manner, it is necessary to say that the goodness or light flowing from the first towards the illumination of the whole matter flows from the first [cause] into intelligence, and from the intelligence of the first order it flows into that which is of the second order and so on, and from each intelligence into its proper orb and from the last orb into the sphere of the active and passive and from the sphere of the active and passive into the centre of each entity, in which, just as a formative power, it forms matter towards a species. For this is the order which all Peripatetics posit.³³²

In Albert's use of the art analogy here, the form of the artefact which begins in the active intellect flows from faculty to faculty in a process that is an image of *fluxus*. The single form emanates from the first cause, and it is the same form at each level. As the image makes clear, the immaterial form the artist contemplates must also be present in the artist's body if she is to manipulate her tools towards that end, and it must also be in the tools if they are to manipulate their material and become finally the form that resides in the artefact itself. At each level, the form remains the same, but it is made more and more complex through the activities that each causal level contributes, progressively shadowing the form's initial simplicity.

The role that noble souls plays in this procession is highlighted by the fact of its absence in Albert's use of the analogy in the *Metaphysica*. In that case, it is the intellect that

³³² Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.6, p. 50.2-21: "Forma, qua fluit primum, magis et magis determinatur et coarctatur, secundum quod fluit in secundo vel tertio vel deinceps. Sicut in exemplo diximus de arte, quae a mente artificis fluit in spiritum, de spiritu in organa membrorum, de organis in instrumenta et de instrumentis in materiam exteriorem. In omnibus enim his idem est quod fluit, licet secundum aliud esse sit in primo et secundum aliud in secundo et secundum aliud in tertio et sic deinceps. Et secundum hunc modum dici oportet, quod bonitas fluens a primo sive lumen ad totius materiae illustrationem a primo fluit in intelligentiam et ab intelligentia primi ordinis fluit in eam quae est ordinis secundi, et sic deinceps, et ab intelligentia qualibet in proprium orbe et ab ultimo orbe in sphaeram activorum et passivorum et a sphaera activorum et passivorum in centrum cuiuslibet entis, in quo sicut virtus formativa materiam format ad speciem. Hoc enim est ordo, quem omnes posuerunt Peripatetici."

moves its celestial instrument without a mediator. By contrast, in the *De causis et processu universitatis*, nature (as in the heavens themselves) is compared to the hand or instrument of a cosmic artist, while noble soul is the artist's spirit, separate intelligence the form contemplated in the artist's mind, and the first cause the artist's active intellect.³³³ Likening noble soul to a cosmic *spiritus* which is the vehicle of intelligible form to celestial bodies, Albert emphasizes that necessary distinction we encountered in the previous chapter: separate intelligence operates as the end of celestial motion, while noble soul is its efficient cause. Moreover, these two causal moments must belong to two distinct causes because on the one hand, intelligence cannot be joined to a body, and on the other, noble soul cannot be the source of a stable and unchanging form.

Albert thereby locates noble soul's distinct role as mediator within the larger procession of all things from the first cause. The form noble soul translates into celestial motion is one and the same as that form which emerges in the original act of creation, and it is through noble soul that the intelligible light of that primal form becomes the structure of the life and motion of natural bodies.

There is, however, a notable limit to this cosmic art-image, for artistry presupposes the existence of both the artist's faculties which are the channel through which the form of art flows, and also the matter which the instrument manipulates. As we saw above, this cannot be the case for the *fluxus* which is into nothing, presupposes nothing, and is wholly self-communicating. While the art metaphor clearly depicts the order and operations of the primary causes within the procession of *forma fluens*, it is not capable of illustrating the fact that the form which flows is also the origin of the existence of these causes. To capture this aspect of Albert's *fluxus*, we will turn next to the image of emanating light.

1.2. Noble Soul and the Procession of Intellectual Light

³³³ See another example of this metaphor at Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.2.35, p. 128.15-31: "Et omnes res quidem naturales in natura universali sunt sicut in principio sui motus et corporaliter formativo, sicut artificata sunt in potentia manus artificis. In anima nobili sunt sicut in determinativo ad figuram naturalem et esse, sicut artificata sunt in spiritu artificis, qui vehiculum est formam vehens in organa et instrumenta determinans eam ad figuram tripodae vel domus vel alicuius alterius artificati. In intelligentia vero sunt sicut in lumine formata et esse influente. Et ideo in illo sunt absque figura et intentione figurae secundum solas suas quiditatum intentiones, sicut formae artificatorum sunt in arte sive in artis lumine. In causa vero prima sunt sicut in primo causante et primo fonte et emittente, sicut artificata sunt in activo intellectu artificis, qui ex seipso producit formas artificiatorum." See also Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.2.16, 109.54-65.

Albert's account of the emanation of intelligible light into and through the primary causes belongs to the concluding and culminating chapter of his tractate on *fluxus*.³³⁴ In that text Albert produces a three-fold emanation scheme reminiscent of those in Avicenna and Algazel which follows the process they describe by which the series of celestial intelligences unfold from one another, each followed by a celestial soul and sphere.³³⁵ The ways that Albert adapts these Arabic exemplars is illustrative of what he wishes to emphasize in his *fluxus*: in each stage of the procession, the primary causes that emerge from the primal form contribute their own activities to that flow, but the creation of each primary cause is nevertheless from the first cause alone.

Avicenna's account of procession also begins from the law that "only one can proceed from one"; there are many intelligences, and these cannot emerge from the first simultaneously.³³⁶ Instead, intelligences emerge each from the one that precedes it. The first being to emerge, then, is of the first intelligence. Then, from that intelligence proceeds three things, a celestial soul, a sphere, and another intelligence. Crucially, "the possibility of the existence of these three are from that first intelligence".³³⁷ This process unfolds as follows:

Therefore, from the first intelligence, [1.] insofar as it understands the first, there follows the being of another intelligence inferior to it, [2.] and insofar as it understands itself, there follows from it the form of the outermost heaven and its perfection, that is [its] soul. [3.] And because of the nature of being possible which it has and retains insofar as it understands itself, the being of the corporality of the outermost heaven which is contained in the totality of the outermost heaven.³³⁸

³³⁴ See Moulin and Twetten, "Causality and Emanation in Albert", p. 706.

³³⁵ On Albert's use of Avicenna's *Liber de philosophia prima*, see A. Bertolacci, "Le citazioni implicite testuali della «Philosophia prima» di Avicenna nel Commento alla «Metafisica» di Alberto Magno: analisi tipologica", in *Documenti E Studi Sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale* 12 (2001), p. 179-274; and A. Bertolacci, "The Reception of Avicenna's 'Philosophia Prima' in Albert the Great's Commentary on the 'Metaphysics': The Case of the Doctrine of Unity", in W. Sennner (ed.), *Albertus Magnus. Zum Gedenken nach 800 Jahren: Neue Zugänge, Aspekte und Perspektiven* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2001), p. 67-78.

³³⁶ Avicenna, *Liber de Philosophia Prima*, IX.4, p. 482.76-80: "Iam autem manifestum est nobis ex praedictis quod intelligentiae separatae sunt plures numero. Igitur non habent esse simul ex primo, sed necesse est ut excellentior omnibus illis sit esse quod primum est ex eo, post quod sequitur intelligentia et intelligentia." See Amin, "The Post-Classical Reception of a Key Principle of Avicenna's Metaphysics", p. 125-33, which explores the basis and consequences of the "rule of one" in Avicenna's thinking.

³³⁷ Avicenna, *Liber de Philosophia Prima*, IX.4, p. 483.82-84: "Igitur sub omni intelligentia sunt tria in esse; unde oportet ut possibilitas essendi haec tria sit ab illa intelligentia prima".

³³⁸ Avicenna, *Liber de Philosophia Prima*, IX.4, p. 483.85-91: "Igitur ex prima intelligentia, inquantum intelligit primum, sequitur esse alterius intelligentiae inferioris ea, et inquantum intelligit seipsam, sequitur ex ea forma caeli ultimi et eius perfectio et haec est anima, et propter naturam essendi possibile quae est ei et quae est retenta inquantum intelligit seipsam, est esse corporeitatis caeli ultimi quae est contenta in totalitate caeli ultimi."

For Avicenna, then, diversity emerges in the cosmos through this three-fold self-relation which follows from the first intelligence, and not from the first cause. Through its thinking the first cause, another intelligence proceeds, through thinking itself, there follows the soul of the outermost sphere, and, then finally, corporeality of the sphere arises from its *naturam essendi possibile*—the fact that the first intelligence is “possible”, that is, from another and not from itself.

Albert follows the structure of Avicenna’s procession and his also unfolds through the three-fold comparison of each intelligence.³³⁹ However, Albert adapts what he reads in Avicenna through the *Liber de causis*, and especially his interpretation of Prop. 4, that being alone is the “first created”. Rather than beginning from the first intelligence, he begins by describing the emanation of this first form which is universally active “in all things”:

For we think that the universally active intellect only acts and constitutes things by thinking and by emitting concepts (*intelligentias*). And while it thinks in this way, it constitutes through itself the thing at which the light of its intellect terminates. Thus, while the first universally active intellect understands itself in this way, the light of intellect, which is from itself, is the first form and the first substance having the form of intelligence in all things, before that which is from another.³⁴⁰

The *intellectus universaliter agens* refers here to the first cause, a title Albert adopts in Book I of the *De causis et processu universitatis* from *De anima* III.5.³⁴¹ Albert’s use of this name captures what is distinct in his understanding of emanation: the first cause is a self-thinking intelligence whose thought is active in *all things*.

Compare this to Algazel’s summary of the same scheme, which Albert was also aware of, in *Metaphysica* I.5 (ed. Muckle), p. 120.23-121.3: “Igitur ex primo provenit intelligentia nuda, que non habet ex primo in pari, nisi esse in parem scilicet, primum, propter quod necesse est eam esse; possibilitatem vero habet ex se ipsa, non ex primo; cognoscit autem se, et cognoscit suum principium. Si autem cognoscit se et principium suum quoniam ex ipso est suum esse, multiplicatur autem consideracio eius propter hoc tunc secundum considerationem huius multitudinis, provenit ex ea multitudo, et deinde non cessat multiplicari paulatim donec perveniatur ad ultimum eorum que sunt; postquam igitur opus fuit multitudine, nec esse potest multitudo nisi hoc modo; ipsa autem multitudo parvissima est, tunc ea que fuerunt prima, non fuerunt multum plurima, sed secundum gradus ceciderunt in multitudinem, ita quod sunt intelligentie, et anime, et corpora, et accidentia, et hec sunt divisiones omnium que sunt.”

³³⁹ Moulin and Twetten, “Causality and Emanation in Albert”, p. 701.

³⁴⁰ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis* I.4.8, p. 55.80-88: “Supponimus etiam, quod intellectus universaliter agens non agit et constituit res nisi active intelligendo et intelligentias emittendo. Et dum hoc modo intelligit, seipso rem constituit, ad quam lumen sui intellectus terminatur. Dum ergo primus intellectus universaliter agens hoc modo intelligit se, lumen intellectus, quod est ab ipso, prima forma est et prima substantia habens formam intelligentis in omnibus praeter hoc quod ab alio est.”

³⁴¹ *De anima* III.5, 430a.12-13. See Malgieri, “Origine della creazione e natura del *fluxus*”, p. 397.

When the first cause understands itself, its intelligible light, which “is the first form and the first substance” and its universality consists in that it is “form of intelligence in all things”. The emission of this light is “before that which is from another”, which means that it is before the entire series of celestial intelligences each of which are constituted through this primal form. Thus, where emanating principles in Avicenna’s system are the origin of the inferior that follow, Albert shifts the Avicennian formulation to maintain that while intelligence does infuse noble soul, the being of noble soul is nevertheless from the first cause alone:

Therefore, [1.] when that intelligence, which is first among the substances that are made, understands itself to be from the first intellect [the first cause], it is in the light of the first intellect, and [is] light itself and thus an intelligence. [2.] But as it understands itself according to “what it is”, its light extends to some other being, and thus it is extended into soul, or that which [in the heavens] is in the place of soul. [3.] But as it understands itself to be from nothing and to be in potency, [it] descends toward material being, and so it happens that the first mobile is under a form of corporality.³⁴²

In this passage too, the “first intellect” is the universally active first cause. Thus, Albert makes it clear that when “intelligence which is first among the substances that are made” (i.e., the unmoved mover of the outermost sphere) understands that it is from the first cause, it emerges from the light itself: “it is the light of the first intellect” and thus it is “an intelligence”. It is, moreover, this same light in the first created intelligence that extends to soul, and towards the corporeality of the first sphere. It is the dynamism and self-communication of that first-created *esse* that flows into and through each primary cause and is present in each level of reality.

There is, however, also an important difference between the light received in the first intelligence, and the light with which it illumines celestial soul, and that is what the first intelligence contributes through its own activity which is derivative of the first and inferior to it:

³⁴² Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.8, p. 56.18-27: “Intelligentia ergo, quae inter factas substantias prima est, secundum quod intelligit se a primo intellectu esse, in lumine primi intellectus est et ipsum lumen et sic intelligentia est. Secundum autem quod intelligit se secundum ‘id quod est’, lumen suum extendit ad aliud quoddam esse et sic extenditur in animam vel id quod loco animae est. Secundum autem quod intelligit se ex nihilo esse et in potentia, ad esse materiale descendit, et sic fit id quod primum mobile est sub forma corporeitatis.”

The first intelligence, therefore, only has necessary being insofar as it understands itself to be from the first intellect [the first cause]. But as it understands itself according to “what it is”, the light of the first intellect falls into it—[that light] by which it understands itself to be from the first intellect. And so it is necessary that an inferior is constituted beneath it. And this is the second substance which is called soul or that in the heavens [which] is in the place of soul.³⁴³

When the first intelligence understands that it is from another, the light of the first cause falls into it, and it is through this moment of derivation and decline that the emergence of soul becomes necessary.

The existence of each thing is from the first cause alone, but that existence is informed and diversified by the activities of those that precede it, the light of the first falling in and through them, and it is this process which constitutes the entire order of primary causality:

When the light of intellect of the first principle flows into the first intelligence and over-abounds, it follows that the over-abundance of light be referred again to the first. And while it understands itself in this way, by the same reason it constitutes an intelligence of the second order. This one also understands itself as according to “what it is” and thus constitutes the proximate mover. For it understands itself insofar as it is in potency and so it constitutes the second mobile, which is the second heaven. [...] And in this way it is not difficult to determine the intelligences, movers, and heavens as far as the heaven of the moon [...].³⁴⁴

In the end, then, what really distinguishes Albert’s *fluxus* from the emanationism of Avicenna and Algazel (and also, although Albert does not know this fact, Alfarabi) is that first moment in which the universally active intellect of the first cause thinks itself and emits a first-created form which is before all and in all. This form does not flow into anything

³⁴³ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.8, p. 56.1-8: “Intelligentia ergo prima non habet necesse esse nisi secundum quod intelligit se a primo intellectu esse. Secundum autem quod intelligit seipsam secundum ‘id quod est’, occumbit in ea lumen intellectus primi, quo intelligit se a primo intellectu esse. Et sic necesse est, quod inferior constituatur sub ipsa. Et haec est secunda substantia, quae vel anima dicitur vel id quod in caelis est loco animae.”

³⁴⁴ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.8, p. 56.44-64: “Cum autem lumen intellectus primi principii fluat in primam intelligentiam et exuberet, constat, quod exuberatio luminis iterum refertur ad primum. Et dum sic intelligit se, per eadem rationem constituit intelligentiam secundi ordinis. Haec etiam intelligit se secundum ‘id quod est’ et sic constituit motorem proximum. Intelligit etiam se, secundum quod in potentia est, et sic constituit mobile secundum, quod est secundum caelum. [...] Et hoc modo non est difficile determinare intelligentias et motores et caelos usque ad caelum lunae”. See Moulin and Twetten, “Causality and Emanation in Albert”, p. 700-2.

other than what it itself constitutes through its procession, and this can only be called a procession “into reality” because it is the form of all reality.

It is this emanative logic that shapes Albert’s interpretation of noble soul in his commentary on Prop. 3. The pressing question is how the flow of form *unum ab uno* can produce difference. How does it happen that while intelligences are completely separate from bodies, the noble souls which emerge after them are proper to bodies? This is a crucial moment in the procession of the universe when immaterial form becomes the structure of corporeal body, but how does it arise? We saw above that soul is constituted as the first created *esse* falls into each intelligence, and as that intelligence understands itself to be derivative, adding its own activity to the purity of the light it receives. Now it remains to be seen how Albert understands how *forma fluens* in its diminution and occlusion becomes the nature and being of noble soul.

2. Noble Soul, *medians intelligentia*, and *alatyr*: The Procession of Form from the First Cause

If noble soul is “the principle and cause of circular motion towards the form of intelligence”, it is evident then that there are two essential components necessary to what it is: it must receive this intelligible form and it must belong to the sphere that it moves. Thus, for noble soul to be “what it is”, i.e., the principle of life and motion in the heavens, two formal relationships are required: one with the intellect which is the source of the form of the heaven’s motion, and the other in a proportion to the sphere which it moves. In his commentary on Prop. 3, Albert introduces these two relationships as follows:

[1.] If, therefore, noble soul is formed into the principle of motion towards the form of intelligence, it is necessary that noble soul participates the form of intelligence. However, it does not participate the form of intelligence as pertaining to the intelligence save through an intellect or an intellectual nature. The form and being of noble soul, then, is not drawn towards the perfect kind of motion except by the mediating of something intellectual.

[2.] Yet, from this it cannot be deduced that this is a soul. For there is a soul—a soul that is the principle and cause of movement—in whatever is moved by itself. It is the principle of motion, moreover, only through a form determining and proportioning it to the mobile. It is necessary then that the ultimate, perfecting difference and

determiner of noble soul's being is a circular inclination and proportion to the mobile.³⁴⁵

Noble souls, then, require both that they receive the form of intelligence from an intellectual nature preceding them, but also that they "be a soul", that is, they also must move the sphere "through a form determining and proportioning it to the mobile".

For Albert, both of these requirements are addressed in a single passage from Prop. 3, which in many manuscripts reads, "the first cause creates the being of soul by a mediating intelligence".³⁴⁶ And while it might seem that this text is relevant only to the first criteria, this is not precisely the text that Albert reads in the copy of the *De causis* he uses while preparing his commentary. Albert's text also includes a corrupted transliteration of the Arabic word, *al-'aql*, which appears for Albert as "*alatyr*".³⁴⁷ It was Gerard of Cremona's practice to include transliterations like these in his work, indicating what Arabic word the Latin translates, and while some scribes copying the *Liber de causis* introduce "*id est*" to make this clear, the transliterations quickly became corrupted through transmission, as for example, one manuscript reads: "*alachic, id est intelligentia*".³⁴⁸ Albert's manuscript belongs to a family retaining corruptions of these transliterations, but he, by contrast, paraphrases the passage in this way: "the first cause creates soul by a mediating intelligence and by *alatyr*".³⁴⁹ Albert's manuscript apparently reads "*intelligentia et alatyr*", and he understands this to mean that

³⁴⁵ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.13, p. 76.2-18: Si ergo anima nobilis formata est in principium motus ad formam intelligentiae, oportet, quod anima nobilis formam participet intelligentiae. Non autem participat formam intelligentiae ut intelligentiae nisi per intellectum vel naturam intellectualem. Forma igitur animae nobilis et esse non deducitur ad perfectam speciem motoris nisi mediante intellectualitate. Ex hoc tamen non habet, quod anima sit. Anima enim secundum quod anima principium et causa motus est in eo quod movetur a seipso. Non autem principium motus est nisi forma determinante et proportionante ipsam ad mobile. Oportet igitur, quod differentia ultima finiens et determinans esse nobilis animae sit ad mobile circulariter inclinatio et proportio."

³⁴⁶ *Liber de causis*, Prop. 3: "causa prima creavit esse anime mediante intelligentia." For variant readings of this passage in other 13th-c. mss see Appendix A.

³⁴⁷ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.13, p. 76.24-25: "prima causa creat animam mediante intelligentia et alatyr."

³⁴⁸ See, Cava dei Tirreni, Biblioteca del Monumento Nazionale dell' Abazia della S.S. Trinita Ms. 31, which is included in the edition from 13th-c. mss of Prop. 3 in Appendix A. See also "mediante intelligentia, *alachil*" (Aosta, Biblioteca del Seminario Maggiore MS. 71), and "mediante intelligentia, *alachh*" (Oxford, Bodleian Library Ms. Selden Supra 24). For more information on the transliterations of the *De causis* manuscript tradition, see Calma, "*Al-'aql* dans la tradition latine du *Liber de causis*", p. 127-48, who catalogues and considers the transliterations present in 110 different manuscripts.

³⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

when the first cause creates noble soul, this is both by a mediating intelligence and in a completely separate relation, “according to *alatyr*”:

[T]he first cause created the being of soul, not with a simple being, but *by means of a mediating intelligence*, for it is a being formed towards the light and power of intelligence. [But] not by this mediation only, for [the first cause] produced the being [of soul], further, according to *alatyr*, that is, so far as it is proportioned according to the influence of life and motion in the celestial circle in the way which was said.³⁵⁰

The meaning of the mediation of intelligence is clear enough: noble soul is created with an intelligible faculty, yet unlike intelligence, for whom being intellectual is inherent to its substance, noble soul can only attain its intelligence as it receives a form from the intelligence above it. But what does it mean for noble soul to be created “according to *alatyr*” and what does *alatyr* have to do with being “proportioned according to the influence of life and motion in the celestial circle”?

2.1. *Forma fluens* and the Being of Noble Soul

As Albert explains these relationships to intelligence and to *alatyr*, it is clear from the fact that they are both related to noble soul’s creation, that the larger framework here is the emanative *fluxus* we considered above. How, in the procession of form from the first cause does noble soul have “what it is”?³⁵¹ Albert raises this question in the midst of his commentary on Prop. 3:

The constitutive difference of soul is the contracting and determining of soul’s being to being the principle and cause of life and local motion in the animated body, as was proven before. Since, therefore, it cannot have such a form or constitutive difference from the first cause nor from intelligence, nor does it have [this] from itself according to “what it is”, it seems astonishing: from where does soul have what soul is or the being of soul by which soul is?³⁵²

³⁵⁰ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.16, p. 80.12-19: “*prima causa creavit esse animae ; non quidem simplici esse, sed mediante intelligentia, quod est esse formatum ad lumen et virtutem intelligentiae ; nec tantum mediante illo, sed esse illud produxit ulterius secundum alatyr, scilicet ut sit proportionatum secundum influentiam vitae et motus caelesti circulo per modum, qui dictus est*”.

³⁵¹ See Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.14, p. 77.21ff.

³⁵² Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.14, p. 77.38-48: “*Animae autem differentia constitutiva contrahens est et determinans esse animae ad principium et causam esse vitae et motus localis in corpore animato, sicut per antecedentia probatum est. Cum ergo talem formam sive constitutivam differentiam nec a prima causa nec ab intelligentia habere possit nec habet a seipsa secundum ‘id quod est’, mirabile videtur, unde habeat anima, quod anima est, sive esse animae, quo anima est.*”

It might seem strange for Albert to say that soul does not receive what it is from the first cause, since it is the first cause that creates soul, but it is important to bear in mind that according to the metaphysics of Albert's commentary, there is, properly speaking, only one creation, and that is of the first form which contains the possibility of every other creature. As Albert continues, he rules out other possibilities as well.

Noble soul cannot receive its nature from its body, nor can it receive it from the fact that it "falls from the light of intelligence and the first cause", nor from distance, nor from any kind of defect.³⁵³ All of these are examples of privation, and privation can in no way be a cause of what is. By contrast, Albert presents the following solution:

Still, there are some philosophers who respond that potentiality mixed with constitutive difference is the cause of the being of soul, saying there is more in the potency which is in potency with respect to two than that which is in potency with respect to one. The first cause is in no way potential. For it has nothing mixed with [its] power (*potentiae*). Intelligence, rather, is in potency with respect to one, that is, to the first cause. And soul is in potency with respect to two, that is, to the first cause and to intelligence. [...] And for this reason they say that it constitutes a third.³⁵⁴

The background of this solution is the procession of *forma fluens*. As beings are constituted from the light of the first form, they have greater and greater potency relative to the terms that precede them, and noble soul is preceded by two, intelligence and the first cause. But this also seems strange, for as Albert points out, "potency can in no way be the cause of an act".³⁵⁵

The conclusion, finally, is to realize that this potency from which soul has the *ratio ad aliud* that its nature requires³⁵⁶ is not the cause itself, but rather belongs to the primal form itself as it proceeds from the first cause:

To this it seems it must be said that the efflux or procession of the first cause is the form which by the procession itself from the first cause is made to be the second, and

³⁵³ See Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.14, p. 77.49-61.

³⁵⁴ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.14, p. 77.70-81: "Adhuc, fuerunt quidam philosophi respondentes quod potentialitas permixta cum differentia constituente est causa esse animae, dicentes, quod magis est in potentia, quod est in potentia ad duo, quam id quod est in potentia ad unum. Prima autem causa nullo modo in potentia est. Nihil enim habet potentiae admixtam. Intelligentia autem in potentia est ad unum, scilicet ad causam primam. Anima vero in potentia est ad duo, ad causam primam scilicet et ad intelligentiam. [...] Et propter hoc decebant, quod constituit tertium."

³⁵⁵ See Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.14, p. 77.83-84: "Potentia enim in nullo est causa actus".

³⁵⁶ See Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.14, p. 78.8-21.

by the fact that it is the second, it is made distant and is placed in diversity of essence from the first cause, because nothing distant from the first cause has the same essence with it. [...] Nevertheless, whatever has being and power has it from the first cause. And the being of such a form, distant in this way and in the potentiality of act, is the cause of the being of soul.³⁵⁷

Thus, after setting aside “distance” as a possible cause of what noble soul is above, Albert returns to it here in a new light. It is not, in the end, the distance of noble soul from the first cause itself which is the cause of the being of noble soul, but rather the procession of the primal form in its distance that makes soul what it is.³⁵⁸ There is, in other words, nothing at all added to the being of noble soul that is not already contained in the primal form, and in accordance with the principles of *fluxus* it is this same form that through its procession becomes the distinct being of noble soul. In this sense, distance and potentiality are the cause of soul’s being, but only in that this distance and potency are of the primal form itself in the progress of its flow.

Returning to noble soul’s creation “*mediante intelligentia et alaty*”, it is clear that Albert’s understanding of noble soul’s origin through the procession of form from the first cause structures his interpretation of *De causis*, Prop. 3. In his paraphrase of this passage, Albert uses the language of proportion to describe how noble soul’s creation is from the procession of divine power that gives rise to a receptivity to intelligence and in a *ratio ad aliud*, a relationship to the body it moves:

And as it is clear from the preceding, soul does not effect these three operations from itself, according to what it is, neither from the distance by which it stands apart from

³⁵⁷ See Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.14, p. 78.31-36: “Ad quod dicendum esse videtur, quod effluxus sive processus primae causae forma est, quae ipso processu a causa prima secunda efficitur et per hoc quod secunda est, distans efficitur et in diversitate essentiae a prima causa ponitur, quia nihil distans a prima causa eiusdem essentiae est cum ipsa. [...] Nihilominus quidquid habet esse et virtutis, habet a causa prima. Et tale esse formae sic distans et in potentialitatem actae causa est esse animae.” See also *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.14, p. 78.55-62: “In hoc enim virtus causae primariae procedit in effectum. Processus igitur talis non in quantum distans causat esse animae, sed in quantum virtus primae causae in tali processu procedit in effectum et efficitur operans in ipso. Idem voluerunt dicere, qui potentialitatem causam esse dixerunt, non quod potentialitas causa sit, sed quod causa sit processus sive forma procedens per distantiam subacta potentialitati.” Moulin and Twetten, “Causality and Emanation in Albert”, p. 705-6.

³⁵⁸ This distance is also, in the end, the source of matter. See Albert’s descriptions of how the corporeality of the sphere emerges through *fluxus*, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.2, p. 44.26-31: “Quarto modo, quando fluit permixtum tenebris. Sicut quando fluit in materiam distinctam contrarietate et subiectam varietati, quae contraria sunt limpiditati et sinceritati primi luminis. Fluit ergo ut distans, ut cadens, ut occumbens et ut oppressum tenebris”; I.4.8, p. 56.9-12: “Secundum autem quod intelligit se ex nihilo esse et in potential fuisse, necesse est, quod incipiat gradus substantiae, quae in potential est. Et hoc est materia sub prima forma, quae est materia corporis caelestis”. See Moulin and Twetten, “Causality and Emanation in Albert”, p. 706-7.

the first, but insofar as it is an *exemplum of a higher power*, whose power is infused into it from a superior cause and is preserved in itself. And the explanation of this is that *the first cause created the being of soul*, not with a simple being, but *by means of a mediating intelligence*, for it is a being formed towards the light and power of intelligence. [But] not by this mediation only, for [the first cause] produced the being [of soul], further, according to *alatyr*, that is, as it is proportioned according to the influence of life and motion in the celestial circle in the way which was said. And *for this reason*, because the first cause creates the being of soul by means of its procession, *soul has a potency or a power to effect a divine operation*.³⁵⁹

In this paraphrase, Albert summarizes his preceding discussion and orders it according to the structures of the Peripatetic theology he has endeavored to synthesize and elucidate. What it means, in the end, for the being of soul to arise through the procession of form is that it is, as Prop. 3 says, an *exemplum virtutis superioris*. Albert understands this to mean that the power or potency of noble soul's operations is not from itself, but from the fact that the primal form flowing from the first cause is preserved in it (*salvatur in ipsa*). The flow of this form from the first cause, into intelligence and then into noble soul forms the being of soul "towards the light and power of intelligence", and through the potency this affords, noble soul's being is also proportioned to its sphere. There is nothing in noble soul, then, that does not belong to the first form and the progress of its flux, and noble soul's nature and operations arise from that procession.

2.2. *Creatio alatyr* and the *Liber de sphaera mota* of Messahalah: On the Identity of an Elusive Text

In his paraphrase of Prop. 3, when Albert explains the creation of noble soul "according to *alatyr*", he explains that this means it is "proportioned according to the influence of life and motion in the celestial circle in the way which was said". We will turn now to see more clearly what Albert says about this *alatyr* and how he determines its meaning. As Albert explains earlier in the commentary, "according to the wise among the

³⁵⁹ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.16, p. 80.8-22: "*Et sicut ex praehabitis patet, has tres operationes non efficit anima ex se secundum 'it quod est' nec ex distantia, qua distat a primo, sed secundum quod est exemplum virtutis superioris, cuius virtus a superiori causa sibi influxa est et salvatur in ipsa. Et huius quidem explanatio est, quod prima causa creavit esse animae; non quidem simplici esse, sed mediante intelligentia, quod est esse formatum ad lumen et virtutem intelligentiae; nec tantum mediante illo, sed esse illud produxit ulterius secundum alatyr, scilicet ut sit proportionatum secundum influentiam vitae et motus caelesti circulo per modum, qui dictus est. Et propter hoc, quia processu sui prima causa creavit esse animae, habet anima potentiam vel virtutem efficiendi operationem divinam.*"

Arabs", *alatyr* means "the celestial circle".³⁶⁰ Thus, the meaning of this text is that "The being of soul, then, is formed intellectually and determined towards *alatyr*", that is, determined towards the celestial sphere it moves. Albert continues:

This is what some of the ancients said, that "the first cause creates soul by a mediating intelligence and by *alatyr*", not that the first cause uses intelligence as a medium, but that the form of intelligence is medial in the being of the definition of soul, just as sensible is medial (*medium*) in the being of the definition a human, because [the human] is called a living, sensible, rational thing. In this way, the end (*terminus*) in the being of noble soul is a proportion to *alatyr*—not that *alatyr* makes or constitutes soul, for the thing moved does not constitute the mover, but on the contrary, the thing moved is constituted by the mover.³⁶¹

Thus, by means of "the wise among the Arabs" from whom Albert knows that *alatyr* means the celestial circle, he understands that in noble soul's definition, intelligence is the *medium*, while *alatyr* is the *terminus*. By comparison with the human being, who is rational (its *terminus*) by means of sensation, noble soul is the principle of life and motion in the celestial circle (its *terminus*) by means of intelligence. But who are these wise among the Arabs and how has Albert come to understand that *alatyr* means "the celestial circle".

This is not the first time in Albert's writings that he references an Arabic transliteration from Prop. 3. In his *De homine* (c. 1242), Albert makes use of this same text but apparently cites from a manuscript with a different reading: "the first cause creates the being of soul by a mediating *aladith*, that is, by intelligence".³⁶² In this case, the text Albert cites clearly indicates that transliteration means *intelligentia*, and he accordingly passes over that word and does not expand upon it. By contrast, *alatyr* in Albert's *De causis* commentary is the occasion for a detailed elaboration on the nature of noble soul's creation, not to mention

³⁶⁰ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.13, p. 76.15-22: "Oportet igitur, quod differentia ultima finiens et determinans esse nobilis animae sit ad mobile circulariter inclinatio et proportio. Caelestis autem circulus apud sapientes Arabum *alatyr* vocatur. Esse igitur animae est intellectualitate formatum et ad *alatyr* determinatum. Hoc igitur modo anima nobilis a causa prima procedit, ut in esse nobilis animae constituatur.

³⁶¹ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.13, p. 76.23-33: "Et hoc est, quod quidam antiquorum dixerunt, quod *prima causa creat animam mediante intelligentia et alatyr*, non quod intelligentia pro medio prima causa utatur, sed quod forma intelligentiae media sit in esse diffinitionis animae, sicut sensibile medium est in esse diffinitionis hominis, cum dicitur vivum sensibile rationale. Et hoc modo terminus in esse animae nobilis est proportio ad *alatyr*, non quod *alatyr* sit faciens animam vel constituens, quia mobile non constituit motorem, sed e converso mobile per motorem constituitur."

³⁶² Albert the Great, *De homine*, p. 409.42-45: "causa prima creavit esse animae mediante *aladith*, idest intelligentia".

the fact that the word stands in for that crucial difference in noble soul's being: its proportion to its sphere.

The temptation to suggest that Albert simply invents the definition of *alatyr* in his commentary must be disregarded, for as it is clear from other references to the same or similar transliterations in other works, *alatyr* and other transliterations like it, belong for Albert to his understanding of the technical vocabulary of Arabic astrology and they belong to that very specific context.³⁶³ His first reference to *alatyr* appears in his *De caelo* (around 1251-54)³⁶⁴ where he explains that some authors use this word to name the power that is distinct to the light of the second heaven. *Alatyr* in this context, he says, is "the effective circle" which is "the circle that principally distinguishes things according to the being of essential difference".³⁶⁵ In this case Albert ascribes the term a technical definition from writings on celestial influences, although he offers no specific reference.

Albert uses a very similar transliteration in the *De fato* (1256), *alatir*, but in this text he shifts his report of its meaning but also provides a source of the definition: the 9th-c. Jewish astronomer, Messahalāh (740-815).³⁶⁶ Albert introduces the transliteration while gathering evidence against the theory of astral determinism. Celestial influence over bodies, he argues,

³⁶³ *Alatyr* is just one example of a transliteration with many different analogous forms represented in the different editions and manuscripts of Albert's works. In the editions of the *De causis et processu universitatis*, Fauser provides the variants *alathyr* and *athathyr*, p. 76.19, 25, while Borgnet, p. 460a, and Jammy, p. 577a, read *alachir*. For the sake of a complete list, in all the different editions of Albert's works the following forms appear: *alatyr*, *alathyr*, *athathyr*, *alachir*, *alatir*, *alatre*, *alakir*, and *alacuc* (these will be noted more carefully in each text where they appear). The situation in the manuscript tradition of Albert's works is like that of the *Liber de causis* where many different forms of these transliterations appear across its manuscripts as copyists attempted to copy the pen strokes of their exemplars without knowing the word. For examples of different forms of the transliteration in the *Liber de causis* mss. tradition, see Calma, "Al-'aql dans la tradition latine du *Liber de causis*", p. 133ff.

³⁶⁴ Before the *De caelo*, Albert does quote *Liber de causis*, Prop. 3 in the *De homine* (around 1242) in a version containing the transliteration *aladith* as quoted above (the Colone edition also supplies the variant *alidiht*, while Borgnet, p. 463a, and Jammy, p. 251a, read *alidith*). This text is excluded from the present discussion due to the fact that, since Albert does not draw attention to *aladith* in the *De homine*, he appears to accept that it is, in that case, simply a gloss of *intelligentia* as the text suggests ("*idest intelligentia*").

³⁶⁵ Albert the Great, *De caelo et mundo*, II.3.15, p. 178.55-62: "Et ideo dico, quod caelum primum est universale in lumine movente ad esse. Et caelum secundum habet lumen distinctum, sed non figuratum ad expressas figuras; et huius virtutem potissimum quaerunt auctores imaginum et vocant ipsum *alatyr*, hoc est circulum effectivum, eo quod circulus ille principaliter res distinguit secundum esse differentiae essentialis, quod est ante figuram." (ed. Borgnet, p. 209b, and Jammy, p. 132a, read *alacuc*.)

³⁶⁶ That is, Māšā'allāh. For English spelling, unless quoting other texts, we will follow the example of Hasse's *Success and Suppression*, and use the anglicized "Messahalāh" (*Success and Suppression*, p. 389). In the different editions of Albert's works, Messahalāh's name is represented in different forms: Messehallach, Mesalon, Messeallach, Messalach, Messhalach, Meseallach, Messehalach, Messealach, Messehallach, Meseallach, Mesalach, Messahala.

cannot be absolute, for in some cases “bodily dispositions and apprehensions aid the effect of the heavens (*caelestis effectus*) through harmonizing (*convenientes*) with the celestial motion.”³⁶⁷ This *caelestis effectus*, Albert explains, is what Messahalalah calls *alatir* when he says that “the effect of the heavens [...] is aided by the wise astronomer, just as it is aided in producing the fruits of the earth (*terraenascentibus*) by ploughing and sowing (*aratione et seminatione*).”³⁶⁸ The one who understands how the heavens affect the earth (like a farmer who understands how the seasons govern the harvest), may participate in the operation of that effect. *Alatir*, in this case, implies the effect of celestial influence construed in a broad way.

Albert offers a reprise of this material on fate in Part I of his *Summa* (written after 1268),³⁶⁹ and again he makes use of an Arabic transliteration with reference to Messahalalah. The transliteration, which appears in Borgnet and Jammy’s editions as *alkir* appears in a familiar argument on astral determinism, however, in this case Albert shifts the definition again. In the *De fato*, *alatir* meant the “celestial effect”, but in the *Summa*, *alkir* means the “celestial circle”:

Unless it were so, even the knowledge of the stars would be useless, for then the evils which had been foreseen could not be hindered, neither goods [foreseen] promoted. For this reason, Messahalalah, one learned in stars, said that *alkir*, that is, the celestial circle (*circulus caelestis*), is aided towards an effect by devoted wise men, just as the earth is aided towards harvest by sowing and ploughing (*seminatione et aratione*).³⁷⁰

This version of Albert’s definition is notable for being the same as the one he provides for *alatyr* in his commentary on Prop. 3 in the *De causis et processu universitatis*. And while the

³⁶⁷ Albert the Great, *De fato*, p. 70: “Per convenientes autem motui caelesti dispositiones corporales et apprehensiones animales iuvatur caelestis effectus.”

³⁶⁸ Albert the Great, *De fato*, p. 70: “Et hoc est quod dicit Messehallach, quod caelestis effectus, quem ille alatir vocat, iuvatur a sapiente astronomo, sicut in producendis terraenascentibus iuvatur aratione et seminatione” (the Mandonnet edition, p. 405, reads *alatre*.).

³⁶⁹ See A. Palazzo, “*Dupliciter autem ponitur fatum*. La questione sul fato nella tarda *Summa theologiae* di Alberto Magno”, in *Divus Thomas*, 122/2, *Albert the Great and the Holy Scriptures* (2019), p. 219-62, for a discussion and comparison of Albert’s two treatments of fate. Palazzo argues that the most remarkable differences between Albert’s earlier and latter discussions of fate is the greater emphasis in the latter on Astrological themes and the more extensive use of Pagan and Arabic sources (see especially p. 221 and 227).

³⁷⁰ Albert the Great, *Summa theologiae*, Pars I, tr. XVII, q. 68, p. 701b-2a: “Nisi enim sic esset, ipsa etiam scientia astrorum esset inutilis : quia mala praevisa in eis impediri non possent, nec bona promoveri. Propter quod etiam Messeallach praecipuus in astris, dicit quod alkir, hoc est circulus coelestis, studio periti viri iuvatur ad effectum, sicut iuvatur terra ad fructum seminatione et aratione” (the Borgnet, p. 701b, and Jammy editions, p. 384a, read *alkir*).

definition Albert provides diverges from the one which appeared in *De fato* ("celestial effect"), Albert uses the same argument from Messahalalah to illustrate: the celestial circle is aided by the learned one.

From this reference in the *Summa* it appears that while Albert defines *alatyr* in his *De causis* commentary according to "the wise among the Arabs", he also has a more specific source in mind, and that is Messahalalah. For in both the *Summa* and the *De causis et proessu universitatis*, Albert defines the transliterations as the "celestial circle".

Seeking the specific context for Albert's familiarity with *alatyr* (or an analogous transliteration) in the works of Messahalalah has been an elusive and still-unsolved question. Even so, it is possible to learn more about Albert's source from his references to Messahalalah in other works. Messahalalah is a recurring Astronomical authority in writings, and two references are particularly helpful. In both Part II of his *Summa* and in the *Politica*, Albert recalls again the doctrine that a wise man aids the celestial circle in its effects, but in these cases, he also provides a specific source—Messahalalah's *Liber de sphaera mota*:

Politica: [...] and Meseallach, in the *Liber de sphaera mota*, says that the wise man aids the celestial circle just as the field by a farmer in ploughing and sowing (*aratione et seminatione*).³⁷¹

Summa theologiae: And thus, Messehallach, in the *Liber de sphaera mota*, says that the wise man aids the celestial circle just as the earth is aided in [bearing] fruit by ploughing and sowing (*aratione et seminatione*).³⁷²

It is remarkable, first, how similar Albert's references are to this doctrine across the two citations quoted above, as well as those indicated from the *De fato*, the *Politica*, and the two parts of the *Summa*. And from two of these references, Albert provides a specific source. However, the identity of the *Book on the Moving Sphere* remains a mystery. No such text is listed in the catalogues of Messahalalah's works,³⁷³ and I have only found two other references

³⁷¹ Albert the Great, *Politica*, VII.14, p. 734ab: "[...] et Meseallach in libro de Sphaera mota, dicit quod sapiens homo juvat coelestem circulum, sicut ab agricola ager aratione et seminatione."

³⁷² Albert the Great, *Summa theologiae*, Pars II, tr.11, q.58, p. 582ab: "Et ideo dicit Messehallach in libro de Sphaera mota, quod 'sapiens homo juvat coelestem circulum, sicut ad fructum juvatur terra aratione et seminatione.'"

³⁷³ For a list of Messahalalah's works available in Latin, see Hasse, *Success and Suppression*, p. 289.

to this work outside the writings of Albert, both of which were probably copied from Albert's own references.³⁷⁴

There are three suggestions about what Messahalāh's *Liber de sphaera mota* may be, and while all of them are incorrect, at least two of them warrant further discussion. The first suggestion is that what Albert calls the *Liber de sphaera mota* of Messahalāh is actually the *Liber de sphaera mota* of the ancient astronomer Autolycus, a text also translated by Gerard of Cremona. But this is certainly incorrect for the simple fact that Autolycus' book does not contain the doctrines Albert attributes to that work. The two other possibilities we will explore below. The first is suggested through Ulrich of Strassburg's citation of the same doctrine as Albert, which he attributes instead to Ptolemy. The second possibility is that when Albert speaks about the *De sphaera mota*, he is using an idiosyncratic name for another text that also circulated widely under Messahalāh's name, the *Liber de orbe* (*Liber de scientia motus orbe*, or *Liber de motus orbis*).³⁷⁵ Both of these suggestions are incorrect, but they nevertheless reveal some important characteristics of Albert's mysterious source.

Ulrich of Strassburg provides the first notable suggestion about the identity of the *Liber de sphaera mota*, when he references the same doctrine that the "wise man aids the heavens", but then attributes the saying to Ptolemy:

And thus, we say that the proposition of the Philosopher is true universally, [...] for as Ptolemy says, the wise man aids the celestial effect, just as the earth is aided by

³⁷⁴ Outside the works of Albert, I have located at least two other references to Messahalāh's *De sphaera mota*. It is possible that both copy from Albert's own references in the *De caelo*. 1.) The first is in Cecco d'Ascoli's commentary on Sacrobosco's *Sphaera* (ed. Thorndyke), p. 354: "Tertio est dubitatio utrum celi sint eiusdem forme vel nature specifice et videtur quod sic. Nam Mesalach in libro de sphaera mota probat propositum tali ratione. Aliqua natura concludit omnibus orbibus motum circularem; hunc autem non possunt participare omnes simul nissi per formam eandem; ergo videtur quod omnes orbes non differant secundum formam vel speciem". Albert references the same doctrine at *De caelo et mundo* II.3.4, p. 148.28-41. 2.) The second is from an Anonymous Quaestio on the *De caelo* from 1277-1321 which G. Galle, argues are compiled from Peter of Auvergne's and Albert's questions on the *De caelo*. See *Quaestiones supra Librum de caelo et mundo*, II, q. 18 (ed. Galle), p. 490.31-45: "Contrarium huius dicunt multi in philosophia et Messeallach in libro *De Sphaera Mota*. [...] Dicendum quod omnis stella caeli illuminatur a sole sicut luna. Sed est differens receptio luminis in ipsis sive in modo recipiendi sicut etiam different in nobilitate naturae". Albert references the same doctrine at *De caelo* II.3.5, p. 151.72-74 and in other texts as well (see the note below). Thomas Aquinas refers twice to the "*Scientia de sphaera mota*" (although not to Messahalāh or to a specific book on the topic) in his commentary on Boethius' *De trinitate*, Pars 3, q. 5, a. 3, arg. 6, and Pars 3, q. 5, a. 3, ad 5.

³⁷⁵ While the *Liber de orbe* has long been attributed to Messahalāh, T. Mimura has recently demonstrated through two recently discovered Arabic Manuscripts of the *Liber de orbe* that due to the fact that these texts describe events taking place after Messahalāh's death, he cannot have been the author. See T. Mimura, "The Arabic original of (ps.) Māshā 'allāh's *Liber de orbe*", in *The British Journal for the History of Science* 48/2 (2015), p. 321-52 at p. 344ff.

ploughing and sowing (*quod sapiens iuvat caelestem effectum, sicut iuvatur terra aratione et seminatione*) [...].³⁷⁶

In this passage, Ulrich references the same doctrine as Albert, but rather than following his teacher's reference to Messahalāh, he seems to have noticed the striking similarities to Verbum 8 of the *Centiloquium* and decides to ascribe the passage to Ptolemy instead. Consider, for example, how similar Adelard of Bath's translation of Verbum 8 is to what Ulrich writes above:

Verbum 8: The wise soul aids the action of the stars just as the capable sower aids natural things with ploughing and clearing (*Anima sapiens actum stellarum adiuvat sicut seminator potens adiuvat naturalia cum aratione et mundatione*).³⁷⁷

The difficulty with Ulrich's suggestion, ultimately, is that Albert also ascribes several other doctrines to the *De sphaera mota*, which we will review below, and none of these are present in the *Centiloquium*. Even so, the similarities are remarkable. So remarkable that one might suggest Ulrich's reference here was not inspired by Albert's references to Messahalāh at all, but rather is paraphrasing a reference to the *Centiloquium* itself. This, however, is not likely due to Ulrich's use of vocabulary that is distinctive in all four of Albert's references to the doctrine. In particular, the words *aratione* and *seminatione*. Of the seven Latin translations of Verbum 8 that Jean-Patrice Boudet compares in his essay on the different Latin versions of the *Centiloquium*, only two use the distinctive word *aratione*, but the word *seminatione* does not appear in any of them. It is probable, then, that Ulrich took the saying directly from Albert's writings, but noting the similarity to Verbum 8, decided to redirect its attribution.

Albert, however, cannot have made the mistake Ulrich's reattribution implies, for he cites both the *Centiloquium* and the *De sphaera mota* as distinct authorities while discussing fate in his *Summa*.³⁷⁸ Moreover Albert also attributes at least six other doctrines to the *De sphaera mota*, including:

³⁷⁶ Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, IV.2.3, p. 76.237-43: "Et ideo nos dicimus propositionem Philosophi universaliter esse veram, [...] propter quod dicit Ptolemaeus, quod sapiens iuvat caelestem effectum, sicut iuvatur terra aratione et seminatione [...]."

³⁷⁷ Ps.-Ptolemy, *Centiloquium*, Verbum 8, in the translation of Adelard of Bath. The text is quoted from J.-P. Boudet, "The Medieval Latin Versions of Pseudo-Ptolemy's *Centiloquium*: A Survey", in D. Juste, B. van Dalen, D.N. Hasse, and C. Burnett (eds), *Ptolemy's Science of the Stars in the Middle Ages* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2020), p. 283-304 at p. 287.

³⁷⁸ See Albert the Great, *Summa theologiae*, Pars I, tr. 17, q. 68, 1, p. 696b. For a discussion of Albert's question on fate in the *Summa*, see Pelazzo, "Dupliciter autem ponitur fatum", p. 219ff.

1. That the wise man aids the celestial circle just as the farmer aids in ploughing and sowing.
2. That the motion of the heavens is like the motion of the wise man.³⁷⁹
3. That the sun illumines the moon and other stars.³⁸⁰
4. That there are two great motions, a fast one rotating diurnally from east to west and a much slower motion rotating one degree a day from west to east.³⁸¹
5. That the celestial bodies are more rarefied or dense depending on their order.³⁸²
6. That there is no vacuum between the spheres.³⁸³

³⁷⁹ This is one of Albert's favourite doctrines from the *De sphaera mota* to quote, sometimes without citing a specific source, and sometimes without citation. See, for example, Albert the Great, *De generatione et corruptione*, I.6.4, p. 171.37-38: "Cum autem motus caeli sit sicut motus sapientis, sicut dicit Messahalla in *Libro de sphaera mota* [...]"; *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.3.1, p. 36.38-43: "Sicut dicit Messahalla, quod motus caeli motus sapientis est eo quod sapientis uno modo est agere et semper et non per inconstantiam aliquando agere et aliquando non agere vel sic et aliter agere"; *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.2.6, p. 99.6-7: "Propter quod Messahalla dicit, quod caeli motus est motus sapientis"; *Summa theologiae*, Pars II, tr. 11, q. 63, m. 2, p. 610b: "[...] motus circularis uniformis regularis, qui sicut dicit Messehallach in *libro de Sphaera mota*, est motus sapientis : non tamen est anima, sed est virtus animaliter movens, quae in coelis est jussu divino." There are un-cited references to this doctrine in *Metaphysica*, XI.2.24, p. 514.12-15; *Physics*, II.1.2, p. 78.52-57; and *In IV Sententia*, 44.20, p. 572a, among others.

³⁸⁰ In his *De caelo et mundo*, Albert says Messahalalah provides a figure as a proof for the doctrine at II.3.5, p. 151.72-74. See also *Summa theologiae*, Pars II, tr. 11, q. 59, p. 584a: "Adhuc, Aristoteles in II de Proprietatibus planetarum et elementorum, et Avicenna in Sufficientia coeli et mundi, expresse dicunt, quod nulla stella a se lucet, sed mutuato lumine a sole. Et hoc idem dicit Messehallach in *libro de Sphaera mota*." Albert lists Messahalalah as an authority on the doctrine without providing a source in the *De causis proprietatum elementorum*, II, tract. 1, cap. 1, p. 636b, and he cites the doctrine in relation to a different work of Messahalalah's, the *Liber de motu orbis*, at *In II Sententia*, 15.1, p. 274ab.

³⁸¹ Albert refers to this doctrine in relation to the *De sphaera mota* once: Albert the Great, *De caelo et mundo*, II.3.11, p. 167.24-29: "Auctores autem imaginum ponunt etiam istum motum et ad ipsum potissime refereunt effectum circuli obliqui in motibus omnium planetarum. Et hanc opinionem ego iudico veram, et ipsam sequitur Meseallach in *Libro de sphaera mota*." Albert also refers to the doctrine in connection with Messahalalah but without referring to a specific work at *In II Sententia*, 15.3, p. 275b.

³⁸² Albert refers to this doctrine in relation to the *De sphaera mota* twice, and in both cases cites it alongside Averroes' *De substantia orbis*: *De praedicamentis*, tract. 2, cap. 12, p. 190b: "Averroes de substantia orbis dicat, quod Messhalach probat in *libro de Sphaera mota*, quod corpus coeleste susceptibile sit raritatis et densitatis secundum suae substantiae mutationem"; *Summa theologiae*, Pars I, tr. 18, q. 75, m. 2, p. 786a: "Ad aliud potest dici, quod illud procedit : licet enim corpus coeleste, ut dicit Messeallach in *libro de Sphaera mota*, et Averroes in *libro de Substantia orbis* sit inspissabile et rarefactibile quoad positionem partium propinque vel remote, eo quod aliter sequeretur quod intercideret vacuum inter sphaeras orbium : tamen non est rarefactibile et densabile ad divisionem substantiae, et alterationem passivam abicientem a forma et a specie [...]." This passage from the *Summa* also supports doctrine 6 below.

³⁸³ Albert refers to this doctrine in relation to the *De sphaera mota* twice in his *Summa*, Pars I, tract. 18, q. 75, m. 2, p. 786a, quoted in a note above, and in *Summa*, Pars II, tract. 11, q. 53, m. 1, art. 1, p. 559a: "Si autem dicitur, quod coeli isti contingunt se et distincti sunt ab invicem : tunc sequitur inconueniens quod concludit Messeallach in *libro de Sphaera mota*, sic : 'Cum elevationes sphaerarum sint inaequalis altitudinis et inaequalis motus, si inferior movetur a summa altitudine superioris : aut oportet, quod remaneat vacuum spatium inter superiorem et inferiorem : et hoc est inconueniens, quia vacuum in natura non est.'"

7. That the stars and orbs are one in genera and species.³⁸⁴

This list leads to the second notable, although still insufficient suggestion about the identity of the *De sphaera mota*, that it is actually the *Liber de orbe*, a well-attested work attributed to Messahalah that enjoyed two Latin translations,³⁸⁵ one of them widely available in the 13th c. by Gerard of Cremona.³⁸⁶ The *Liber de orbe* circulated under various names,³⁸⁷ and perhaps, as Norman Roth suggests, the *De sphaera mota* was simply Albert's name for that work.³⁸⁸ The problem, in the end, is that most of the doctrines listed above cannot be found in Cremona's translation of the *De orbe*. However, Roth's suggestion still has some explanatory merit, for doctrines 3 and 4 do have a president in the *Liber de orbe*,³⁸⁹ and in one of Albert's references to doctrine 3 he does attribute it to "Messahalah, in the *Liber de motu orbis*". Thus, while Albert's references to the *De sphaera mota* are not ultimately references to the *Liber de orbe*, it is clear that at least two of the doctrines Albert attributes to the *De sphaera mota* are attested in another of Messahalah's authentic works.

In the end, it is not known what text Albert has in mind when he writes of this *Liber de sphaera mota* which appears to be his source for his definitions of *alatyr* (either "the celestial effect" or "the celestial circle") as well as for numerous other doctrines on the nature

³⁸⁴ Messahalah is the primary authority on this doctrine in *De caelo et mundo*, II.3.4. See, for example, p. 148.28-41: "Et est ratio, quod omnes convenient in genere uno et specie, quia aliqua una natura attribuit eis unum motum circularem, et cum omnes similiter habeant illum motum circularem, videntur eum participare per formam eiusdem speciei in omnibus. [...] Meseallach autem ista argumentando dicit in *Libro de sphaera mota*, in quo loquitur de stellis et motibus orbium. Et videtur ratio ista confirmari ex numero quinque essentialium, quia sicut quattuor elementa sunt determinatarum formarum et specierum, ita videtur quantum corpus totum esse unius naturae et unius speciei."

³⁸⁵ For more information on the provenance and differences between the two translations, see B. Obrist, "William of Conches, Māshā'allāh, and Twelfth-Century Cosmology", *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 76 (2009), p. 29-87 at p. 38-41; and Mimura, "The Arabic original of (ps.) Māshā 'allāh's *Liber de orbe*", p. 322-35.

³⁸⁶ In the catalogue of Gerard's translations, the text is listed as the "*Liber Messehala de orbe tractatus*". See C. Burnett, "The Coherence of the Arabic-Latin Translation Program in Toledo in the Twelfth Century", *Science in Context* 14/1-2 (2001), p. 249-88, which includes an edition of the catalogue, p. 273-87, with specific reference to the *Libe de orbe* on p. 278.

³⁸⁷ Hasse, *Success and Suppression*, p. 289.

³⁸⁸ N. Roth, "Mashā'allāh", in N. Roth (ed.), *Medieval Jewish Civilization: An Encyclopedia* (New York, NY/London: Routledge, 2003), p. 432.

³⁸⁹ For the doctrine that the sun illumines the stars see *Liber de scientia motus orbe* (1504) Cap. 12, p. B5v: "Sermo in hoc quod stelle mutant lumen a sole. Et dico iterum quod lumen stellarum est a sole." For the doctrine on the two great motions of the heavens, see Cap. 19, p. C2v: "Dico ergo quod orbis magnus est ille qui dicitur rectus et est temperatrio orbium et velocior eorum qui revoluit in omni die et nocte revolutionem cclx partium cum orb signorum et revoluitur ex eo orbis stellarum fixarum parte una in omnibus centum annis."

of the heavenly bodies, their motions, and their influence. Even so, this background provides a useful context for better understanding Albert's discussion of noble soul in the *De causis et processu universitatis*.

For Albert, the *alatyr* or celestial circle in proportion to which noble soul's being is formed implies a background of Arabic astrological doctrines, and this background in Albert's commentary serves to emphasize and specify noble soul's mediating role in the universal flux of power from the first cause. Through *alatyr*, Albert more clearly links the activity of noble soul to the heavens themselves. It is only because noble soul is inclined towards its sphere that its animating activity links the causality of intelligible light among the separate substances to the causality of celestial influence upon earth. *Alatyr* or its analogues, wherever Albert encountered them first, function in the *De causis et processu universitatis* as a textual mechanism by which Albert draws the metaphysical origin of celestial power in the *Liber de causis* together with the corporeally effectual influence of that power upon earth.

3. Conclusion: Noble Soul and *Fluxus* in Albert's Late Theological Writings

Noble soul, as we have seen, belongs to Albert's final interpretation of Aristotelian metaphysics, and that this solution to the problem of Peripatetic celestial dynamics arises out of his larger system of creationist emanation called *fluxus*. What does one make, however, of the many disclaimers Albert makes throughout these discourses, claiming, that in the *De causis et processu universitatis* he seeks only to describe the doctrines of the Peripatetics, adding nothing of his own opinions.³⁹⁰ A summarizing example can be found at

³⁹⁰ On the relationship between Albert's Peripatetic first philosophy and his Christian theology, see Twetten's account of the positions of A. de Libera, and L. Sturlese in "Albert the Great, Double Truth", p. 275-77. Twetten concludes in the end that "philosophy's success and limits must be assessed by a theologian who is an authentic philosopher. In fact, a theologian must employ philosophy, bringing into theology itself—even into its very subject—those philosophical contributions that bear on the human aspiration for wisdom and happiness" (p. 358). Compare this to Bonin in *Creation as Emanation*, who points to the tensions between what Albert says in his *De causis* commentary and what he says in his theological writings and concludes, "What becomes of the intelligences, then? Unlike the philosophers, Albert has no use for them, much less for celestial souls, although he cannot demonstrate his position any more than the philosophers can theirs" (p. 64). See also, J. Weisheipl, "Albert's disclaimers in the Aristotelian paraphrases", in J.C. Schnaublet, J.J. Hagen, and J. Reino (eds), *Proceedings of the PMR Conference*. 5 (Villanova, PA: Villanova, 1982), p. 1-27; A. de Libera, *Albert le Grand et la philosophie* (Paris: Vrin, 1990), p. 39-43; L. Sturlese, "Il razionalismo filosofico e scientifico di Alberto il Grande", in *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale*, 1/2 (1990), p. 373-426, reprinted in *Storia della filosofia tedesca nel medioevo. Il secolo XIII* (Florence: Olschki, 1996), p. 69-126; and A. Bertolacci, "Albert the Great's Disclaimers in the Aristotelian Paraphrases: A Reconsideration", in *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale* 30 (2019), p. 295-338.

the end the commentary, after Albert deems that through this work the first philosophy of *Metaphysics* Lambda receives its final perfection³⁹¹:

We know, however, that some do not say that the celestial bodies are animated, the contradiction of whom we neither approve or deny. But this we say for certain, that they [who deny that celestial bodies are animated] do not agree with the sayings of the Epicureans, nor the Stoics, nor with the Peripatetics. For we know that some maintain that the spirits, which are commonly called angels, are intelligences, but it is certain that [these] angels are intellectual substances and are distributed according to ministries of grace. But that they are intelligences in the way intelligences are reckoned by the Peripatetics, namely, that they are immobile in place and operation, it is clearly absurd and does not agree with the statements of those who speak about the motions and apparitions and operations of angels.³⁹²

Albert claims only to have disclosed the teachings of the philosophical schools, neither approving nor denying those teachings himself. However, it has also been abundantly clear that Albert's discussions bear upon theological concerns, not the least of which is this immediate example of angels and their operations.³⁹³ *Fluxus*, moreover, is ultimately a philosophical theology of creation, and despite Albert's disclaimers, it is clear from his final theological writings, especially the *Problemata determinata* and Part II of his *Summa*³⁹⁴, that the Peripatetic philosophy he has set out to explain informs his personal understanding of both the causes of celestial motions and his theology of creation. In these two related areas, it is clear that the *De causis* and noble soul play an important role in Albert's thinking until the very end of his career.³⁹⁵

³⁹¹ See Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.5.24, p. 191.17-23, quoted above in Ch. 1.1.1.

³⁹² Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.5.24, p. 191.24-192.7: Scimus autem, quod quidam corpora caelestia animata esse non dicunt, quorum contradictionem nec approbamus nec improbamus. Sed hoc dicimus pro certo, quod nec cum Epicureis nec cum Stoicis nec cum Peripateticis dicta eorum conveniunt. Scimus etiam, quod quidam contendunt spiritus, qui vulgariter angeli vocantur, intelligentias esse. Sed hoc certum est, quod angeli intellectuales substantiae sunt secundum ministeria gratiae distributae. Sed quod hoc modo intelligentiae sint, quo intelligentiae a Peripateticis ponuntur, scilicet quod immobiles sint loco et operatione, penitus absurdum est et non convenit cum dictis eorum qui de motibus et apparitionibus et operationibus angelorum locuti sunt. Eligat ergo unusquisque, quod vult.

³⁹³ For a further discussion of Albert's changing ideas about angels and celestial motion, see Ch. 5.2.1, and 3.

³⁹⁴ As Palazzo points out, while the authenticity of Albert's *Summa* has been often debated, the first part is generally admitted today to be genuine, and while the second part is more controversial, there are those who still argue for its authenticity; for the literature on this question, see Palazzo, "La questione sul fatto nella tarda *Summa theologiae*", p. 220-21, n. 3. As Twetten argues, the themes reviewed in this section that the *Summa* shares in common with the *De causis et processu universitatis* is further evidence of its authenticity; see Twetten, "Albert the Great, Double Truth", p. 326.

³⁹⁵ Twetten argues for this conclusion at length in his, "Albert's Arguments for the Existence of God", p.

The *Problemata determinata* consists of Albert's replies to a questionnaire sent in 1271 by John of Vercelli, Master General of the Order of Preachers, to Albert, Thomas Aquinas, and Robert Kilwardby.³⁹⁶ Of John of Vercelli's 43 questions, a number concern the topic of celestial metaphysics directly:

1. Does God move any physical body immediately?
2. Are all things which are moved naturally, moved under the angels' ministry moving the celestial bodies?
3. Are angels the movers of celestial bodies?
4. Is it infallibly demonstrated according to anyone that angels are the movers of celestial bodies?
5. Assuming that God is not the immediate mover of those bodies, is it infallibly demonstrated that angels are the movers of celestial bodies?

Albert's answers are in close accord with the conclusions he describes in *De causis et processu universitatis*. For example, in the conclusion of his answer to the second question, in addition to ruling out the angels as movers of the celestial bodies,³⁹⁷ Albert summarizes the two-mover theory he understands in the *Liber de causis*, distinguishing the separate unmoved intelligence from the mover which is proximate to the orb, moving it through a desire for intellect:

Now that these things have been made known in this way, it is therefore clear that an intelligence does not cause motion except as immobile, in the way that what is desired moves desire. For, since an Intelligence by its own light actualizes all of the forms of its own sphere and order, and [since] those forms are its light, the proximate mover, also desiring to educe this light into being, moves an orb and by moving [it] draws form into being. All of these things, moreover, have been proved in philosophy, and the proofs of the philosophers have been carefully explained by us in the [commentary on] *Liber de causis*.³⁹⁸

The role of the proximate mover he identifies in this passage is precisely the one Albert determines for noble soul in the *De causis et processu universitatis*. Moreover, as the work

681ff.; and "Albert the Great, Double Truth, and Celestial Causality", p. 326ff.

³⁹⁶ See Weisheipl, "Celestial Movers in Medieval Physics", p. 286.

³⁹⁷ Albert the Great, *Problemata determinata*, 2, p. 50.33-47.

³⁹⁸ Albert the Great, *Problemata determinata*, 2, p. 50.24-33: "His igitur sic notates patet, quod intelligentia non movet nisi immobilis hoc modo quo desideratum movet desiderium. Cum enim intelligentia suo lumine agat omnes suae sphaerae et ordinis formas et formae illae sint lumen eius et hoc lumen desiderans ad esse deducere, motor sui orbis Proximus movet orbem et movendo ad esse ducit formam. Haec autem omnia probate sunt in philosophia, et diligenter a nobis in Libro de causis sunt explanatae probationes philosophorum." (Trans., Twetten, "Albert's Arguments for the Existence of God", p. 682, modified).

continues, Albert remarks that the movers are related to their spheres like the souls of animals to their bodies,³⁹⁹ and then finally in his reply to question 21 noble soul appears by both name and definition:

[L]ife is a continuous act flowing from a stable existence and ordered towards the first principle of life, which according to Aristotle is the soul of the *prime mobile* from which it [life] flows through motion. [...] For noble soul is properly and *per se* the cause of life and motion as it is exactly put in the *Liber de causis*.⁴⁰⁰

Albert speaks here about life as a “continuous act” that flows from a “stable existence” and, moreover, he evokes the multi-faceted doctrines of noble soul and the *forma fluens* of his *De causis* commentary in a summary way. Noble soul, he says, is the principle of life and motion, and this celestial life belongs ultimately to the *fluens* originating from the first principle.

Albert’s integration of *fluxus* into his theology is more complete in Part II of his *Summa*. Asking there which cause moves the heavens, Albert summarizes the doctrines he establishes in the *De causis et processu universitatis*:

Aristotle and his followers, namely Avicenna, Averroes, and others, by the reason shown above, said that the proximate mover is soul and that this [soul] is moved by an intelligence which is the origin of motion ordered towards the last by the creator, or the first cause.⁴⁰¹

This is precisely the doctrine of the *De causis et processu universitatis*, including that of noble soul. However, while Albert affirms that the doctrines of the Peripatetics are reasonable, they are also, Albert says, “contrary to the tradition of the Fathers and also of the faith”.⁴⁰² Albert raises the authority of John of Damascus, for whom the universe is moved by divine will

³⁹⁹ Albert the Great, *Problemata determinata*, 17, p. 55.12-15: “Motores enim caelestes ad sua corpora mota, quae sunt orbes caelestes, habent comparisonem sicut animae animalium ad sua corpora.”

⁴⁰⁰ Albert the Great, *Problemata determinata*, 21, p. 56.43-49: “[...] vita est actus continuus ab ente quieto fluens et ordinatur ad primum vitae principium, quod secundum Aristotelem est anima primi mobilis, a quo fluit per motum. [...] Anima enim nobilis proprie et per se est causa vitae et motus, ut subtiliter in *Libro de causis* est probatum.”

⁴⁰¹ Albert the Great, *Summa*, II, q. 53, m. 3, quaset. 1c, p. 567ab: “Aristotelse autem et sui sequaces, scilicet Avicenna et Averroes, et alii, ratione superius inducta, dixerunt proximum motorem esse animam, et illam moveri ab intelligentia quae est ordinatrix motus ad finem a creatore dispositum, sive a prima causa.”

⁴⁰² Albert the Great, *Summa*, II, 1. 53, m. 3, quaset. 1c, p. 567b: “Sed quia haec omnia contraria sunt traditioni Patrum, et etiam fidei”. See Twetten, “Albert the Great, Double Truth, and Celestial Causality”, p. 335-38.

alone,⁴⁰³ and calls on Ambrose, who says in the *Hexameron* that God's will is the "foundation of the universe".⁴⁰⁴ By these authorities, as Albert summarizes,

Hence, we say that all of these things are moved by divine command and arrangement, and that God is the mover of all things here. [...] [S]o [the heavens] are moved in their own places by having a mover, not nature or soul, but a power of the divine command, to which all that is in nature obeys [...].⁴⁰⁵

It might seem, then, that the Peripatetic tradition and the faith provide incommensurable accounts for the order and motions of the universe, the one positing an order of primary causes, and the other attributing it to divine will and company.

This point of tension, however, is not Albert's conclusion, for after meditating on the theology of divine command he returns again to the Peripatetics, and seeks to synthesize the philosophical theology of *fluxus* with the Christian doctrine of creation. Albert broaches this synthesis through a warning. One can confess that the universe is God's will, but this must not mean that God becomes merely the first mover of the outermost sphere—an office far beneath his power and transcendence:

And if someone wishes to speak in this way [about divine will], beware that one does not say God is the first mover, for the power of God neither perfects nor fails to perfect the being of something moved in a comparison to an immediate or intermediate mobile; [the power of God] is, rather, infinite and immense in comparison to anything. But one should say that the prime mover is a power created by God [as] an infusion over the first mobile by which it extends its motive power proportionally into any mobile conjoined to it, as it was said. This power is like soul, and for this reason, it is sometimes called soul by some philosophers, although it is neither an angel, nor a soul, nor God.⁴⁰⁶

⁴⁰³ Albert the Great, *Summa*, II, q. 53, m. 3, quaset. 1c, p. 567b: "Damascenus, sic dicens: 'Universa divina jussione facta et firmata sunt, et divinam voluntatem et consilium, fundamentum inconcussibile habent. Quia ipse dixit, et facta sunt: ipse mandavit, et creata sunt'".

⁴⁰⁴ Albert the Great, *Summa*, II, q. 53, m. 3, quaset. 1c, p. 567b: "Eicit enim Ambrosius in *Hexameron*, libro primo: 'Ego qui profundum majestatis ejus et artis excellentiam non quaero comprehendere, non disputationum me libramentis committo atque mensuris, sed omnia in ejus reposita existimo potestate, quod voluntas ejus fundamentum sit universorum.'"

⁴⁰⁵ Albert the Great, *Summa*, II, q. 53, m. 3, quaset. 1c, p. 567b-86a: "[...] Hec omnia contraria sunt traditioni Patrum, et etiam fidei, sicut probat auctoritas Damasceni superius inducta [...]. Unde nos dicimus, quod omnia haec moventur jussu et dispositione divina, et quod Deus omnium hic motor est. [...] ita moventur in locis suis motorem habentia, non naturam, nec animam, sed virtutem imperii divini, cui obedit omne quod in natura est [...]." (Trans., Twetten "Albert the Great, Double Truth, and Celestial Causality", p. 335; see Twetten's discussions of the passage on the same page).

⁴⁰⁶ Albert the Great, *Summa*, II, q. 53, m. 3, p. 569a: "Si quis hoc modo dicere vult, caveat ne dicat motorem primum esse Deum: quia virtus Dei esse moventis nec perficit, nec deficit comparata ad immediatum

By this understanding, God does move all things through the power of his will, but, lest one fall into the error of making God the direct and busy mover of bodies, it must be understood that the divine will moves the heavens *by giving to them their movers*. And how God gives the movers their heavens is precisely what Albert's account of *fluxus* in the *De causis et processu universitatis* has described. In other words, while theology confesses that the divine will governs creation, Albert concludes that the divine will is ultimately operative through the procession of form into the universe.

On the question of whether or not Albert personally adopts a doctrine of noble or celestial soul in his own thinking, it is conspicuous here that he refrains from insisting that the proximate mover of the heavens is a soul. However, as Twetten points out, "it remains that, despite his equivocal language and Damascenes' opinion *sed contra*, Albert leaves himself no option short of personally adopting the proximate celestial mover that is like a soul."⁴⁰⁷ The crucial point is that Albert's treatment of heavenly movers in the *Summa* affirms the two-mover doctrine of the *De causis et processu universitatis*, arguing both that there must be an unmoved and a proximate mover of each sphere, and, finally, that this agrees with the saints, for it is through these movers that God accomplishes his providential ordering of creation.⁴⁰⁸

Albert grants noble soul such a fundamental role in the *De causis et processu universitatis* because he deems that this principle is necessary to the perfection of Aristotelian metaphysics, and in the end he makes a place for noble soul in his personal and theological writings insofar as he unites this perfect Aristotelian metaphysics to the Theology of the *Summa* in a single system of philosophical-theological creationism. Noble soul's cosmic mediation and providential life are intrinsic to Albert's understanding of the universal flux in which the creation of all things unfolds through a process of emanation. God creates all things, and that creative power is expressed paradigmatically in the celestial intelligences, at

sive mediatum mobile : sed est infinita ad quodlibet, et immensa. Sed dicat motorem primum esse virtutem creatam a Deo, influxam primo mobili, quae virtutem motivam extendit in quodlibet mobile proportionabiliter conjunctum sibi, ut dictum est. Et haec virtus similis animae est : et propter hoc a philosophis aliquando anima est dicta, cum tamen nec sit angelus, nec anima, nec Deus."

⁴⁰⁷ Twetten, "Albert the Great, Double Truth, and Celestial Causality", p. 336.

⁴⁰⁸ Albert includes very similar arguments in *Problemata determinata*, 1, p. 47.24-63. See Twetten, "Albert's Arguments for the Existence of God", p. 685-86.

the beginning of life and motion in noble soul, in the perfect celestial power of nature, and in the processes of generation and corruption on earth.

PART II. THOMAS AQUINAS

CHAPTER 3. NOBLE SOUL AND PARTICIPATION IN THOMAS AQUINAS

In 1274-76⁴⁰⁹, Siger of Brabant writes his question-commentary on the *Liber de causis*. Very strangely, the questions devoted to Prop. 3—the proposition about “every noble soul”—do not contain a single reference to noble soul itself. Instead, Siger offers six questions on the Platonic doctrine of separate forms. After introducing Prop. 3, Siger explains that because “several propositions” are “based on the roots of Plato’s positing separate, *per se* subsisting forms” it is necessary “to inquire here about the ideas and the separate forms which Plato posited.” He then outlines a hierarchy of principles in a way that synthesizes the system of Proclus’ *Elements of Theology* with that of the *Liber de causis*:

Because several propositions of this book [the *Liber de causis*] are based on the roots of Plato, positing separate, *per se* subsisting forms of things in the first order of things, which he called Gods; and beneath this order he posited an order of intelligences who, through participation of the intelligible gods in act of themselves, become knowers in act; and beneath the order of intelligences [he posited] an order of noble souls, and beneath the order of noble souls which through motion unfold ideas in matter the order of bodies; and in the order of superior intelligences he spoke about not only intelligences, but divine intelligences, and inferior intelligences [that are] intelligences only, and likewise in the order of souls and in the order of bodies, such that by noble soul he understands here the soul [that is] superior in the order of souls, [and] such is the soul of the heaven; thus, [one] should inquire here about the ideas and the separate forms which Plato posited.⁴¹⁰

In this hierarchy, Siger identifies the gods of Proclus’ *Elements of Theology* with the separate forms of Plato, and presents it in such a way that the primary causes of the *De causis* also shine through: there are superior and inferior intelligences (as in Prop. 4), and superior and inferior souls (as in Prop. 5[4]), and for the superior soul of the heavens, Siger does not use Proclus’ name, *divine anime*,⁴¹¹ but rather that used in the *De causis*, *anima nobilis*. Moreover,

⁴⁰⁹ See A. Marlasca, “Introduction”, in *Les quaestiones super Librum de causis de Siger de Brabant* (Louvain/Paris: Publications universitaires/Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1972), p. 7-34 at p. 29.

⁴¹⁰ Siger of Brabant, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 3 (ed. Marlasca), p. 71.4-23: “Quia plures propositiones huius Libri fundatae sunt supra radices Platonis ponentes formas rerum separatas per se subsistentes in primo ordine rerum, quas deos vocabat, et sub isto ordine posuit ordinem intelligentiarum quae participatione deorum de se actu intelligibilium fiebant actu intelligentes, et sub ordine intelligentiarum ordinem animarum nobilium, et sub ordine animarum nobilium quae per motum formas ideales explicabant in materiis ordinem corporum, et in ordine intelligentiarum superiores dicebat non tantum intelligentias sed intelligentias divinas, intelligentias autem inferiores tantum intelligentias, et in ordine similiter animarum et in ordine corporum, ita quod per animam nobilem hic intelligat animam superiorem in ordine animarum, cuiusmodi est anima caeli, ideo quaerendum est hic de ideis et formis separatis quas Plato ponebat.”

⁴¹¹ See Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, Prop. 201 (ed. Boese), p. 98.

while I have translated the subject of the verbs as “he”, it could equally be “it”. What really is the subject of *ponentes*? Does Siger think the *propositiones* of the *Liber de causis* posit this hierarchy, or the *radices* of Plato?

Whatever the case may be, Siger proposes that because the propositions of the *Liber de causis* are rooted in this Platonic system, it is necessary now in the questions on Prop. 3 to discuss the Platonic doctrine of the separate, self-subsisting forms:

And about [the ideas and the separate forms] five things are inquired about: [1.] first, whether the species and genera of material things are separate from matter subsisting *per se*; [2.] second, supposing that this is so, whether from such ideas material entities are generated; [3.] third, whether each idea is some god; 4) fourth, whether there are more ideas or one; [5.] and finally fifth, whether the form separate from matter and the material form conjoined to matter, and its [matter’s] perfection, can be of the same reason and of the same species.⁴¹²

Similar as the cosmic structures of the *De causis* and the *Elements of Theology* are, however, what does the Platonic doctrine of the forms have to do with noble soul, which the *De causis* says is the cause of the motion of the heavens?—a question highlighted, again, by the fact that Siger does not mention noble soul at all in the course of these questions. This is, it seems, a commentary on Prop. 3 without noble soul.

Siger’s is not the only commentary in which noble soul’s proposition is seemingly hijacked for the sake of discussing the separate forms. Among those commentaries that have received full or partial editions, one finds similar lists of questions that are similar to Siger’s in the anonymous commentary attributed to Peter of Auvergne,⁴¹³ and the commentary by

⁴¹² Siger of Brabant, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 3 (ed. Marlasca), p. 71.4-23: “Et circa hoc quinque quaerantur : primo utrum species et genera rerum materialium sint separata a materia per se subsistentia; secundo, supposito quod sic, utrum ab huiusmodi ideis generentur entia materialia; tertio, utrum quaelibet idea sit deus aliquis; quarto, utrum sint plures ideae vel una; quinto et ultimo utrum forma separata a materia et forma materialis materiae coniuncta et eius perfectio possint esse eiusdem rationis et eiusdem speciei.”

⁴¹³ *Questiones super Librum de causis* (ed. M. Maga), p. 84-90: Questio 14. “Utrum forme rerum materialium sint separate sicut Plato posuit”; Questio 15. “Utrum positis ydeis quolibet earum esset deus”; Questio 16. “Utrum forma materialis et immaterialis possint esse eiusdem speciei”; Questio 17. “Utrum aliquid separatum possit participari ab aliquo”; Questio 18. “Utrum differatur illud quod est essentialiter tale et illud quod per participationem et in quo”; Questio 19. “Utrum esse per participationem alicuius arguat illud esse compositum.” On this commentary, see M. Maga, “Remarques sur le commentaire au *Liber de causis* attribué à Pierre d’Auvergne”, in D. Calma (ed.), *Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages. I. New Commentaries on Liber de causis (ca. 1250-1350)* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2016), p. 53-120. The commentary was probably written by a Parisian master between 1272-1279. It was previously attributed to Peter of Auvergne (+1304), an attribution denied by A. Dondaine and L.-J. Bataillon in their, “Le manuscrit Vindob. Lat. 2330 et Siger de Brabant”, in *Archivum fratrum praedicatorum* 36 (1966), p. 153-261 at 153-226.

another anonymous 14th-c. Parisian master.⁴¹⁴ From these examples, it is clear that after the late thirteenth century, the Platonic forms had become one of the standard themes to discuss in association with Prop. 3. What is the meaning of this interpretative trend?

In the exegetical tradition, the association of the Platonic forms with noble soul is thanks first of all to Thomas Aquinas, whose commentary of 1272 provided, thanks to William of Moerbeke's translation of the *Elements of Theology*, the definitive proof that the *De causis* was not an Aristotelian text, but was in fact adapted in large part from portions from Proclus.⁴¹⁵ Throughout his commentary, Moerbeke's Latin translation of the *Elements of Theology*, completed 18 May 1268, is one of Thomas' most important critical tools.⁴¹⁶ As Thomas proceeds through the *De causis*, he identifies the Proclean source material and uses the *Elements* both to elaborate on the meaning of some passages and to show how the *De causis* departs from Proclus in others.

It is over the course of this exegetical project that Thomas introduces the Platonic doctrine of the forms. In Prop. 3 of the *De causis*, Thomas identifies that this text on "every noble soul" is, in fact, based on Proclus' Prop. 201 about "every divine soul".⁴¹⁷ Determining then that "divine" is the real meaning of "noble", Thomas sets out to explain the meaning of divinity within the Platonic system, which he explicates according to Proclus' *Elements of Theology*. This is the occasion of Thomas' own summary of the four-fold cosmic order of separate forms (gods), intelligences, souls, and bodies, and it is this summary that initiates

⁴¹⁴ *Questiones Super Librum de causis expositio* (ed. I. Székely and D. Calma), p. 416-22: Questio 10. "Utrum positio de ydeis sit possibilis"; Questio 11. "Utrum corpora celestia habeant animam"; Questio 12. "Utrum anima et intelligentia sint eiusdem speciei". For the dating of this text see I. Székely and D. Calma, in "Le commentaire d'un maître parisien conservé à Erfurt", in D. Calma (ed.), *Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages. I. New Commentaries on Liber de causis (ca. 1250-1350)* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2016), p. 359-465 at p. 397; and for a comparison of this commentary to that of Thomas and Siger of Brabant see p. 367-69.

⁴¹⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prooemium, p. 3.1-10. See also Saffrey, "Introduction", xxiv-xxv; D'Ancona, "Saint Thomas lecteur du Liber de causis", p. 239-47; and Guargliardo, "Introduction", p. ix. On the relationship between Siger's and Thomas' commentaries, see D. Calma, "Siger de Brabant et Thomas d'Aquin: l'histoire d'un plagiat", in *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 50 (2003), p. 118-35. See also the recent suggestion by Anzulewicz that Albert might have already been aware of the Proclean background of the *De causis* before Thomas; see "Hat Albertus Magnus das proklische Paradigma des Liber de causis erkannt?", p. 109-34.

⁴¹⁶ Moerbeke's translation has been edited by H. Boese; see Proclus, *Elementatio theologica translata a Guillelmo de Morbecca*, ed. H. Boese (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1987). On Moerbeke's translation, see G. Verbeke, "Guillaume de Moerbeke traducteur de Proclus", in *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 51 (1953), p. 349-73.

⁴¹⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, p. 18.1-7.

that tradition of discussing the forms in the context of Prop. 3 which Siger and other commentators after the late 13th c. follow.

Thomas knew none of Plato's writings directly, but through a collection of different witnesses and sources developed a synthetic understanding of the doctrines of Plato and the Platonists.⁴¹⁸ Later in his life, Thomas learned more from Simplicius about the philosophical method of the Platonists, who proceed "from intelligible reasons", versus that of Aristotle, who "proceeds from sensible things".⁴¹⁹ And when Thomas finally reads Proclus, he treats the *Elements of Theology* as if it also disclosed the doctrines and systems of Plato himself.⁴²⁰ In the discussion that follows, such notions as "Plato's forms", "Platonism", and the "Platonists" must be understood within the horizons of Thomas' own understanding of the Platonic tradition and its place within the history of philosophy.⁴²¹

The Platonic forms play such a central role in Thomas' commentary because of their connection to another Platonic doctrine, that of participation. Participation, as Thomas illustrates in his summary of the Platonic system, orders and binds together all of reality for the Platonists; the concept appears everywhere in Proclus' *Elements*. And while the term is entirely absent from the *De causis*, the author has routinely made use of passages from Proclus' *Elements* that discuss participation, but then either adapted or translated that term into different language. One of the achievements of Thomas' *De causis* commentary is that it demonstrates that this is the case. The participatory relationships that order Proclus' cosmos are also present, invisibly and in a modified form, in the *Liber de causis*.

⁴¹⁸ On Thomas Aquinas' knowledge of an engagement with Plato and the Platonic tradition, see Henle, *Saint Thomas and Platonism*, xvi-xxiii; on the sources of Thomas' understanding of Plato and Platonism see, p. 331; and on the doctrines and subjects related to Thomas' discussion of Plato and the Platonists, see Henle's analytical index on p. 255-87.

⁴¹⁹ Thomas Aquinas, *De spiritualibus creaturis* 3, p. 40. 275-82: "Harum autem duarum opinionum diuersitas ex hoc procedit quod quidam ad inquirendam ueritatem de natura rerum processerunt ex rationibus intelligibilibus : et hoc fuit proprium Platoniorum, quidam uero ex rebus sensibilibus : et hoc fuit proprium philosophie Aristotelis, ut dicit Simplicius in Commento super Praedicamenta" (trans. Hankey, "Thomas' Neoplatonic Histories", p. 165). Thomas refers here to Simplicius, *In Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, Prologus (ed. Pattin, vol. 1) p. 8.70-85. Compare this to the way that Albert says that while Plato proceeds through "probable propositions", Aristotle proceeds through demonstration. See Albert, *Metaphysica*, XI.3.7, p. 541.21-69, quoted in Ch. 1.1.1, above.

⁴²⁰ For the significance of Simplicius and Proclus' *Elements of Theology* to Thomas' understanding of the Platonic tradition, see Hankey, "Thomas' Neoplatonic Histories"; and "The Concord of Aristotle, Proclus, the *Liber de Causis* & Blessed Dionysius".

⁴²¹ In other words, when I speak in this chapter of what is "Platonic", this does not refer to modern categories and historical paradigms, but to those of Thomas himself.

Thanks to Thomas' critical reading, Prop. 3 of the *De causis* becomes the central text in the work on the concept of participation. The opening lines of Proclus' proof for Prop. 201 reveals what has been removed by the author of the *De causis*: "for by nature they participate the things positioned above, and they are not souls simply".⁴²² Proclus reaffirms this point in its final lines, saying that while the activity by which they bestow life and motion upon bodies belongs to these souls by nature, "the others, such as intellection and providence, [they have] according to participation."⁴²³ The author of the *De causis* does not adapt these lines directly, but the structures of participation remain hidden in the proposition behind its statements about "the power" that is in nature "from the first cause" and "the impression" soul "receives of intelligence".⁴²⁴

It is to draw out the meaning of these passages that Thomas turns to the Platonic forms, and it is, perhaps, because of what this fruitfully reveals about the *Liber de causis* that later authors like Siger and others continue to return to the forms in Prop. 3.

One result of Thomas' reading is that participation becomes more the subject of Prop. 3 than noble soul and its operations. As Thomas summarizes his understanding of the purpose of the proposition in the opening of his comment:

What belongs to higher things are present in lower things according to some kind of participation. For this reason, after [the author] divided the three grades of higher beings, one above eternity, God, another with eternity, intelligence, and the third after eternity, soul, he intends now to show how the third participates both what belongs to the first and what belongs to the second [...].⁴²⁵

The purpose of Prop. 3 for Thomas, then, is not noble soul *per se*, as it is for Albert, but participation, or more precisely, the way that soul participates "what belongs to the first and

⁴²² Proclus, *Elementatio Theologica*, ed. Boese, Prop. 201, p. 98: "Quia enim naturaliter participant superpositis et sunt non anime simpliciter".

⁴²³ Proclus, *Elementatio Theologica*, ed. Boese, Prop. 201, p. 98: "alia autem secundum participationem ut intelligere et providere."

⁴²⁴ *Liber de causis*, Prop. 3: "virtute que est in ea, id est natura, a causa prima"; "anima suscipit impressionem intelligentie".

⁴²⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 3, p. 17.17: "Quia ea quae sunt superiorum, inferioribus insunt secundum aliqualem participationem, postquam divisit tres gradus superiorum entium, quorum unum est superioris aeternitate, quod est Deus, aliud autem est cum aeternitate, quod est intelligentia, tertium autem post aeternitatem, quod est anima, nunc intendit ostendere quomodo tertium participat et quod est primi et quod est secundi". Translations of Thomas' commentary are adapted from V.A. Guagliardo, C.R. Hess, and R.C. Taylor (trans), *Thomas Aquinas. Commentary on the Book of Causes* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996).

what belongs to the second", namely, the first cause and intelligence. Thomas refers here to the fact that noble soul has divine and intelligible operations together with its animate operation. In this way, noble soul does share in what belongs to the causes that precede, and is, as the text says, "an image of higher power".⁴²⁶ However, what distinguishes Thomas' comment on Prop. 3 so much from Albert's (and also from Giles', as we will see in Ch. 5) is that Thomas' interest is not in noble soul's operations themselves, but rather, he uses noble soul as an example to work out how *any substance* participates the influence of its causes. Again, as Thomas says in the opening lines of his comment, higher things are present in lower things according to "*some kind of participation*" (*aliqualem participationem*); it is Thomas' purpose to clarify what this kind of participation is.

Over the course of his comment on Prop. 3, Thomas' develops his understanding of participation in a synthetic way that draws the *Liber de causis* into connection and contrast with both Proclus' *Elements of Theology* and the Dionysian corpus. Doing so, Thomas transforms the Platonic doctrine of participation into a metaphysics of creation. In the participation of the Platonists, particulars share their perfections from self-subsisting universals, whereas for Thomas, creatures participate being only insofar as they are created by God. In this creative act, God bestows being upon the creature, and the creaturely reception of this being actualizes the perfections proper to their specific natures, these perfections being all pre-contained within the divine being. It belongs to Thomas' transformation that the Neoplatonic participatory hierarchy no longer emanates progressively through mediating causes, but rather, each substance receives everything it needs to be what it is from God, whose being contains the perfection of all things universally in itself. The Neoplatonic hierarchy of forms, however, is not abolished. By way of Dionysius, Thomas preserves it as the order in which substances share their perfections from? God, and thus, the Platonic philosophy is found to contain the most profound analysis of the metaphysical architecture of the creative act.

The plan for this chapter is as follows: 1) first we consider the literature on participation in the thought of Thomas Aquinas, which since the publications of Geiger and Fabro has brought participation to the center of Thomistic studies. 2) Second, we will ask what Thomas' justifications are for approaching Prop. 3 as a text about participation, rather

⁴²⁶ *Liber de causis*, Prop. 3: "ipsa est exemplum virtutis superioris".

than reading it more literally as a text simply about “every noble soul” (as does Albert the Great and Giles of Rome). 3) Then we will examine Thomas’ reading of Prop. 3 in two parts: first, by considering his sources, which are the critical tools he uses to draw out the doctrine of participation hidden in the *Liber de causis*, and then, by considering Thomas’ account of the true monotheistic doctrine of participation in *esse*, which he formulates through Dionysius in criticism of both the Platonists and the *De causis*. 4) In conclusion, we will confront a substantial consequence of Thomas’ reading of Prop. 3: while Thomas has been interpreting a proposition about celestial soul, for his own purposes, while discussing “soul” in Prop. 3, it becomes clear that he actually has human soul in mind.

1. The *Liber de causis* and the Literature on Participation in Thomas Aquinas

Thomas’ use of the language of participation throughout his works is multi-layered and diverse, but in Prop. 3 his principal concern is the participation of beings in *esse*. As the extensive scholarship on participation in Thomas has pointed out, participation in *esse* stands apart from other modes of participation as a distinct concept in Thomas’ thought that is profound in its implications. The classical studies of Thomas’ doctrine of Participation by Geiger and Fabro both identify (albeit differently) a distinction between the ways a subject can be said to participate a quality or form and the way that a subject is understood to participate its very existence.⁴²⁷

Geiger distinguishes between “participation by composition”, wherein a pre-existing subject participates something it receives, and “participation by similitude”, where the *esse* of a being participates a similitude of the divine being.⁴²⁸ Fabro criticizes Geiger’s too-sharp distinction; even participation in *esse* involves the composition

⁴²⁷ For L.-B Geiger, see *La participation dans la philosophie de saint Thomas d’Aquin* (Montréal: Institut d’Études Médiévales, 1942. Reprinted 1953). For C. Fabro, see *La nozione metafisica di partecipazione secondo S. Tommaso d’Aquino* (Milan: Vita et pensiero, 1939. 2nd ed. Turin: Società Editrice Internazionale, 1950); Idem, *Participation et causalité selon S. Thomas d’Aquin* (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1961); and Idem, “The Intensive Hermeneutics of Thomistic Philosophy”, (1974).

⁴²⁸ See J.F. Wippel’s discussion and comparison of Geiger’s and Fabro’s accounts of participation in Thomas Aquinas in “Participation and the Problem of the One and the Many”, in *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), p. 94-131 at p. 124-31. This essay was originally published 16 years earlier as “Aquinas and Participation” in J.F. Wippel (ed.), *Studies in Medieval Philosophy* (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1984), p. 117-58. For a comparison of Geiger, Fabro, and Wippel, see te Velde, *Participation and Substantiality*, p. 88-90 (which Wippel responds to in the 2001 version of his essay, on p. 128-29).

the *esse* and *essentia* in the creature, as Thomas explains in Props. 7 and 9 of his *De causis* commentary. But Fabro also identifies a difference in participation between what he calls “predicamental participation”, where a subject participates some quality or form that has no existence apart from the subject, and “transcendental participation”, where what is participated is shared according to likeness and by analogy, *esse* being the foremost example.

John Wippel reflects on both Geiger and Fabro’s interpretations in his essay on Participation in Aquinas, which is now a classic in its own right.⁴²⁹ Wippel differentiates in Thomas’ discussions of participation between univocal participation and analogical participation. In univocal participation, the form or quality participated has no existence in itself; it is either a logical participation (as a species shares in its genus) or something with real existence, but not apart from its subject (as form is participated by its matter, or an accidental form by its subject).⁴³⁰ Participation in *esse*, by contrast, is an analogical participation. In this case, there is no pre-existing subject to receive what is participated. To participate *esse* is to come into existence. Creatures do not possess the form “to be” in the same way that they might possess the form “human” or “intellectual”. To participate *esse* is, rather, to be an *esse*; however, each creature has *esse* differently, insofar as each is a distinct being, and thus it cannot be a univocal participation, for while in every creature being is its first act, the being of each creature is only ultimately comparable by analogy.

As will be central for our understanding of Thomas’ commentary on *De causis*, Prop. 3, Thomas actually distinguishes in each creature between two different kinds of

⁴²⁹ See note above.

⁴³⁰ These examples are drawn from Thomas’ distinction between three kinds of participation in his commentary on the *De hebdomadibus* of Boethius (See Wippel, “Participation”, p. 97-98). The first kind of participation concerns the manner in which particular things participate things more universal, as when an individual participates a species or a species participates a genus. These are cases, as Wippel puts it “where one intelligible content shares in another without exhausting it”. These are only logical participations, not ontological or real. The second concerns the manner in which a subject participates an accident, or matter participates form. The form in itself is still universal, but in the subject it has become limited. These participations are real, for the forms really do belong to the substance. The third concerns the manner in which an effect participates its cause (if it is not equal to the power of that cause). See Thomas Aquinas, *In De hebdomadibus*, p. 271.74-85: “[1.] sicut homo dicitur participare animal quia non habet rationem animalis secundum totam communitatem; et eadem ratione Sortes participat hominem. [2.] Similiter etiam subiectum participat accidens et materia formam, quia forma substantialis vel accidentalis, quae de sui ratione communis est, determinatur ad hoc vel illud subiectum. [3.] Et similiter etiam effectus dicitur participare suam causam, et praecipue quando non adaequat virtutem suae causae, puta si dicamus quod aer participat lucem solis quia non recipit eam in claritate qua est in solo.”

participations in *esse*: in *esse commune* and in *esse subsistens*.⁴³¹ *Esse commune* refers to that *esse* that is discovered by analysis to be first in every substance.⁴³² But since each creature is not simply its being, for it has a nature that does not exhaust all that being is in itself, it must therefore receive its existence from a cause which has *esse* according to itself. Each creature, then, in addition to participating the existence of their natures, must also participate *esse subsistens*,⁴³³ the divine being which is the source of all existence and from which all creatures receive their participation in *esse commune*.

The present inquiry is indebted to these classical studies of participation in Aquinas, and some of their terms and distinctions will guide our way, but our aim is ultimately different: we are not seeking a complete or systematic account of participation in the thought of Thomas Aquinas, but rather to understand his discussion of participation in his commentary on *Liber de causis* Prop. 3 and its relationship to noble soul.⁴³⁴ This is, especially, a matter of understanding Thomas' account of the Platonic doctrine of participation and its monotheistic adaptation by the *De causis*. Rudi te Velde has pointed out that Thomas' commentary on the *De causis* belongs to a series of mature reflections on the concept of participation that are formulated in conversation with texts that belong to the Platonic

⁴³¹ Wippel, "Participation", p. 103-6 and 110-24. The difference between *esse commune* and *esse subsistens* is Wippel's focus in this essay, but he also mentions a third, participation in *actus essendi* (see p. 110-24). Wippel argues at length that all three kinds of participation in *esse* must be understood according to the third kind of participation from Thomas' *De hebdomadibus* commentary (the participation of an effect in its cause), for the reason that the first two kinds seem restricted to describing univocal participations. More recently, this has been challenged by J.A. Mitchell, D.D. De Haan, and G.T. Doolan, who point out that all three kinds of participation from *In De hebdomadibus* can be used to understand both univocal and analogical participations, with the result that the difference between participation in *esse commune* and *esse subsistens* becomes much more clear: creatures participate *esse commune* like an individual participates a species, and they participate *esse subsistens* like an effect participates its cause. See especially J.A. Mitchell, "Aquinas on *esse commune* and the First Mode of Participation", *The Thomist* 82/4 (2018), p. 543-72 at 543-48; and also D.D. De Haan, "Aquinas on *actus essendi* and the Second Mode of Participation", *The Thomist* 82/4 (2018), p. 573-609; and G.T. Doolan, "Aquinas on *esse subsistens* and the Third Mode of Participation", *The Thomist* 82/4 (2018), p. 611-42.

⁴³² Mitchell points out five different places where *esse commune* appears in Thomas' commentary on the *Liber de causis* in Prop. 1, p. 6.1-4), Prop. 3 (23.17-18), Prop. 4 (p. 29.3-15), Prop. 9 (p. 64.8-65.14), and Prop. 18 (p. 101.20-22) (See Mitchell, "Aquinas on *esse commune*", p. 551-52). See sections 3.1 below.

⁴³³ As Wippel emphasizes, Being is participated "from" *esse subsistens* (Wippel, "Participation", p. 114-18). Creatures may be said to participate God in the sense that they participate in his likeness: "in participating in the *esse* which is efficiently communicated to it by God, the creature may also be said to participate in some way in God, that is, in his likeness" (p. 116).

⁴³⁴ See J. chiu yuen Ho, "La doctrine de la participation dans le commentaire de Saint Thomas d'Aquin sur le *Liber de Causis*", *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* 7 (1972), p. 360-83; te Velde, *Participation and Substantiality*, p. 257-61; and R.J. Henle, *Saint Thomas and Platonism: A Study of the Plato and Platonic Texts in the Writings of Saint Thomas* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), p. 383-84; for Henle's discussion of Thomas' encounter with Platonic participation in general, see p. 375-86.

tradition, including, especially, Proclus and the *De causis* itself, but also texts that Thomas did not know to be Platonic, like the Dionysian corpus.⁴³⁵ It is through Thomas critical engagement with these sources,⁴³⁶ te Velde argues, that he works out an understanding of participation that both draws on the doctrines of the Platonists, but is consistent with Aristotle and Dionysius.⁴³⁷ The *De causis* is paramount in this endeavor, for unlike both Proclus and Aristotle, it uses the language of creation.

This is the larger picture to which Thomas' commentary on Prop. 3 belongs. In this proposition we see Thomas engaging the Platonic doctrine of participation through the corrective of Dionysius. The result is that through the proposition's brief discussion of creation—"the first cause creates the being of soul by a mediating intelligence"—Thomas manages to bring a corrected Platonic participation into agreement with Aristotelian philosophy and the theological authority of Dionysius the Areopagite.

2. On the Subject of *Liber de causis*, Prop. 3

Thomas takes a skeptical stance to the existence of noble soul, and in his commentary does not affirm its existence or necessity as a principle.⁴³⁸ The reason, he says, is that the existence of celestial soul is not affirmed by the faith. This theme first appears in his comment on Prop. 2 where Thomas indicates that when the text speaks of soul "on the horizon of eternity" (*in horizonte aeternitatis*),⁴³⁹ the author "speaks here of the soul that

⁴³⁵ Te Velde, *Participation and Substantiality*, p. 3. Te Velde points out that the concept of participation only begins to play a large, well-articulated role in Thomas' writings from 1266 in his *Summa* onwards, pointing specifically to *De veritate* 21 (the question on the good), *Summa Theologiae* I, 5 (on the identity of 'good' and 'being'), the *Commentary on the Divine Names*, and the *Commentary on the Liber de causis*; in this list, te Velde specifically highlights the importance of Thomas' engagement with Dionysius (p. 3). See also te Velde's more recent essay on Thomas' use of Platonic sources, "Participation: Aquinas and His Neoplatonic Sources", p. 122-42. On the role of Proclus and the *De causis* in Thomas' reflections on participation, see also Fabro, "The Intensive Hermeneutics of Thomistic Philosophy", p. 451 and 469; and for the role of Platonic texts in Thomas' writings in general, see Hankey, "The Concord of Aristotle, Proclus, the *Liber de Causis* & Blessed Dionysius", (2016); Idem, "Dionysius in Albertus Magnus and his student Thomas Aquinas", (2022); and R.A. te Velde, "Aquinas's Aristotelian Science of Metaphysics and its Revised Platonism", *Nova et Vetera* 13/3 (2015), p. 743-64.

⁴³⁶ On Thomas' critical method in the *De causis* see the Introduction above.

⁴³⁷ On the modification of the doctrines of the Platonists by the *De causis* and Dionysius see W.J. Hankey, "Aquinas and the Platonists", in S. Gersh and M. Hoenen (eds), *The Platonic Tradition in the Middle Ages: A Doxographic Approach* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2002), p. 279-324 at p. 311; and R. Coughlin, "Theurgy, Prayer, Participation, and Divinization in Dionysius the Areopagite", *Dionysius* 26 (2006) p. 149-74.

⁴³⁸ See Negri, "The « Noble Soul » Between Heaven and Earth" p. 84.

⁴³⁹ *Liber de causis* (ed. Pattin), Prop. 2, p. 50.81-82.

philosophers attribute to heavenly bodies.”⁴⁴⁰ And while, Thomas continues, Dionysius affirms that soul is “the last boundary of eternity and the starting point of time”⁴⁴¹, he does not say that the heavens are moved by souls, “because the catholic faith does not assert this”.⁴⁴²

It is conspicuous, then, compared to some of his contemporaries, when Thomas turns next to Prop. 3 and grants noble soul very little attention, focusing instead on the concept of participation. In fact, while the words *participatio*, *participare*, and its cognates appear on almost every other page of Thomas’ commentary, they are not only absent from Prop. 3, but in fact appear nowhere in the *Liber de causis* at all. It seems that for Thomas Aquinas, Prop. 3 is not a text about noble soul *per se*, but rather one useful for discussing the doctrine of participation.

By contrast, Albert the Great, Giles of Rome, and Ps.-Henry of Ghent all make earnest attempts to determine in a positive way what noble soul *is*, although each of them comes to a different conclusion. Albert, for example, begins his discussion of Prop. 3 by noting that it is necessary to inquire now “about noble soul”,⁴⁴³ and then proceeds to distinguish the character of its operations, which he thinks are necessary to the order of the cosmos.⁴⁴⁴ Ps.-Henry’s commentary is also occupied with what noble soul is, although he concludes that it must be a human soul and not celestial soul.⁴⁴⁵ And while Giles follows Thomas Aquinas in some places on Prop. 3, he concludes that noble souls must exist, and that they are a kind of angel.⁴⁴⁶

⁴⁴⁰ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 2, p. 16.10-11: “Loquitur enim hic de anima quam attribuant Philosophi corpori caelesti”.

⁴⁴¹ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 2, p. 16.15-18: “Huic autem sententiae etiam Dionysius concordat X^o capitulo *De divinis nominibus*, hoc excepto quod non asserit caelum habere animam, quia hoc catholica fides non asserit”. See Ps.-Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, X.3 (*Dionysiaca* I), p. 492-93.

⁴⁴² Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 2, p. 16.17-18: “[Dionysius] non asserit caelum habere animam, quia hoc catholica fides non asserit.”

⁴⁴³ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.11, p. 73.34-5: “Quia vero anima nobilis tertia est, ideo de anima nobili quaerendum est.”

⁴⁴⁴ See Ch. 1.2, above.

⁴⁴⁵ See Ps.-Henry, *Quaestiones in Librum de causis*, Quaestio 18, p. 49: “utrum scilicet hoc intelligatur anima nobilis intelligentia movens orbem aut anima humana”, discussed above in Ch. 1, introduction.

⁴⁴⁶ See Ch. 5.2, below.

How does Thomas justify his focus on participation?⁴⁴⁷ After all, Thomas is the first Latin commentator to emphasize the significance of participation in the *Liber de causis*. Roger Bacon refers to the concept 6 times in his commentary, and none of them with reference to noble soul. Ps.-Henry also uses the concept in 6 places (with 7 specific instances), and only once in his questions on Prop. 3.⁴⁴⁸ Albert uses the concept of participation more frequently in his commentary, in 45 places (with 75 instances), but only two are found in his discussion of Prop. 3.⁴⁴⁹ Thomas, by contrast, uses the word participation and its cognates 27 times in Prop. 3 alone and 201 times in the commentary as a whole.

One reason why Thomas emphasizes a topic besides noble soul in itself is the fact already mentioned, that the existence of celestial soul is not affirmed by the faith. As Thomas explains in Prop. 3:

This position, i.e., that the motion of the heaven is due to a soul, has also not been confirmed in the faith, and Augustine leaves this in doubt in Book 2 of *On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis*. But Augustine in Book 3 of *On the Trinity* and Gregory in Book 4 of the *Dialogues* assert that [this motion] is from God directing the whole of nature and that God moves corporeal creation, with the mediation of intelligences, or angels.⁴⁵⁰

⁴⁴⁷ Readers of Thomas' commentaries on Aristotle are faced with a similar question when Thomas uses the concept of participation (which Aristotle famously criticized) to explicate Aristotle's own writings. On this topic see D. Crowell, "Thomas Aquinas' Attribution of Participation to Aristotle", *Dionysius* 37 (2019), p. 134-63.

⁴⁴⁸ Ps.-Henry asks whether a divine operation is suitable to noble soul (*Quaestiones in Librum de causis*, p. 51.2-4: "Deinde quaeritur secundo de istis tribus operationibus convenientibus animae nobili, et circa hoc primum utrum ei conveniat operatio divina.") He offers, first, an argument *contra*: since operations arise from a potency, and thus a divine operation must arise from a divine potency, but noble soul is a creature and not God; moreover, a divine power should be able to produce things from nothing, and noble soul cannot do this. But then, he ultimately concludes that, yes, noble soul can have a divine operation because "Quod participat virtutem aliquam, et operationem natam egredi a virtute. Anima nobilis participat virtutem divinam" (p. 51.12-14). This, however, is as far as Ps.-Henry takes the concept of participation relative to noble soul.

⁴⁴⁹ For Albert, the central significance of participation relative to noble soul is that noble soul participates the form of celestial motion from intelligence. See, for example, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.12, p. 74.83-85: "Anima ergo nobilis est influentiam intelligentiae participans et ad formam intelligentiae corpus mobile movens." On this theme, which is inspired by the celestial dynamics of Averroes and Alpetragius, see Ch. 1.1.2 and 1.2.1. Thomas also says in Prop. 3 that souls can be said to participate forms from intelligences, or angels, but only if this means that intelligence perfects or illumines souls. However, Thomas' reference here (as we will see below) is to the relationship between intelligence and human soul, not celestial soul, which is Albert's interest.

⁴⁵⁰ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 3, p. 25.9-14: "Haec etiam positio non est rata in fide, scilicet quod motus caeli sit ab anima; sed Augustinus hoc sub dubio relinquit in II^o *Super Genesim ad litteram*. Quod autem sit a Deo dirigente totam naturam et quod corporalis creatura moveatur a Deo mediantibus intelligentiis sive angelis, hoc asserit Augustinus in III^o *De trinitate* et Gregorius in IV^o *Dialogorum*." See Augustine, *On the Trinity*, III.4; and Gregory the Great, *Dialogues*, IV.6.

Thomas does not emphasize the Christian rejection of the concept (in, for example, the writings of John of Damascus),⁴⁵¹ but only that “Augustine leaves this in doubt” and that instead, Augustine and Gregory say that the heavens are moved by God by the mediation of angels.⁴⁵² On several other occasions in his commentary Thomas repeats his disclaimer, ensuring that his reader understands that when he speaks of celestial soul, he is merely describing the doctrine “according to those who maintain [it]”,⁴⁵³ and that “what we have said about the souls of the heavens we have said, not as though asserting them, but as merely reporting the opinions of others.”⁴⁵⁴

That the authorities of the Faith are cautious or dismissive about celestial soul does not, however, seem to be a sufficient reason to shift the meaning of a proposition about “every noble soul” to be about participation. After all, Albert and Giles are beholden to the same theological authorities, and both find their own ways to satisfy their requirements.⁴⁵⁵ Moreover, Thomas also can be seen in other writings to assimilate his understanding of the Aristotelian doctrine of celestial soul to the angelic hierarchy.⁴⁵⁶ Clearly, then, Thomas does have use for the concept of celestial soul, however skeptical a stance he presents in his *De causis* commentary. Granted that Thomas chooses to keep the doctrine at arm’s length in this case, this choice alone does not suffice to account for why participation should then be the central subject of the proposition.

One way Thomas justifies his understanding of the subject of Prop. 3 is according to his *divisio textus*. In Thomas’ division of the logical structure of the text, it is not the task of Prop. 3 to discuss soul, but rather the tasks of Props. 14(13) and 15(14). Prop. 3 belongs instead to a more structural, introductory section about the distinctions and relationships between the primary causes.

⁴⁵¹ See John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa*, 6.

⁴⁵² See also Thomas’ comments in *Quodlibet XII*, q. 5, a. 2 (ed. Leonina), p. 405-6, where he argues that since both the theologians and the philosophers do not agree on the topic of celestial soul, it is best to conclude with Augustine’s *Literal Comentary on Genesis* that “it doesn’t matter to the faith whether [the heavens are animated] or not” (*non refert ad fidem utrum sic uel aliter sit*). See Augustine, *Literal Commentary on Genesis* II.18.

⁴⁵³ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 14(13), p. 86.9-11: “Secundum illos enim qui ponunt corpora caelestia animata, anima caeli est causa omnium sensibilibium corporum”.

⁴⁵⁴ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 5(4), p. 41.27-28: “Quae autem diximus de animabus caelorum non asserendo diximus, sed aliorum opiniones recitando.”

⁴⁵⁵ See Ch. 5 below.

⁴⁵⁶ See Ch. 5 below.

The aim of the *Liber de causis* as a whole, Thomas says, “is to delineate the first causes of things”.⁴⁵⁷ The first proposition provides the fundamental principle for that task: primary causes infuse effects more powerfully than secondary causes.⁴⁵⁸ Thomas describes the broad strokes of his *divisio* in the opening lines of his comment on Prop. 2. Following the first proposition, which offers “a certain principle for the entire treatise”, the work has two primary parts. The first (Props. 2-15[14]) “treats the distinction of primary causes”, and the second (Props. 16[15]-32[31]) “treats their coordination or dependence upon one another. Crucially for our purposes, Thomas divides the first part in half again: in the first part (Props. 2-5[4]), the text “distinguishes the primary causes”, and in the second part (Props. 6[5]-15[14]) it “delineates them individually.”⁴⁵⁹ The structure of the work can be represented as follows:⁴⁶⁰

The principle of the entire work: primary causes influence their effects more powerfully than secondary causes (Prop. 1)

Part 1: the distinction of the primary causes (Props. 2-15[14])

Distinguishing the primary causes (Props. 2-5[4])

The three kinds of primary cause are the first cause, intelligences, and souls (Prop. 2)

The three primary causes are united through participation in the last (Prop. 3)

The distinction among intelligences (Prop. 4)

The distinction among souls (Prop. 5[4])

Delineating the primary causes individually (Props. 6[5]-15[14])

On the first cause (Prop. 6[5])

On intelligences (Prop. 7[6]-13[12])

On souls (Prop. 14[13]-15[14])

Part 2: the coordination and dependence of the primary causes on one another (Props. 16[15]-32[31])

⁴⁵⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prooemium, p. 3.11-12: “Intentio igitur huius libri qui *De causis* dicitur, est determinare de primis causis rerum.”

⁴⁵⁸ *Liber de causis* (ed. Pattin), Prop. 1, p. 46.1; Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prooemium, p. 3.13-15: “quasi quoddam principium totius sequentis operis, quamdam propositionem ad ordinem causarum pertinentem”.

⁴⁵⁹ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 2, p. 11.1-8: “Praemissa prima propositione sicut quodam principio ad totum tractatum sequentem, incipit hic agere de primis causis rerum. Et dividitur in partes duas: in prima agit de distinctione primarum causarum; in secunda de coordinatione sive dependentia earum ad invicem, in 16^a propositione [...]. Prima dividitur in partes duas: in prima distinguit causas primas, in secunda determinat de singulis, in 6^a propositione [...]”.

⁴⁶⁰ For the complete Thomas’ complete *divisio textus* of the *Liber de causis*, see Appendix D. See also Guagliardo, “Introduction”, p. xxxvi-xxxvii.

According to this division, even though Prop. 3 is about “every noble soul”, it does not belong to the part of the text that examines souls specifically. It is only in the second part of the first division that the primary causes are examined one by one, and in that division, soul is taken up in Props. 14(13)-15(14). The meaning of Prop. 3, instead, is ordered towards the more introductory task of distinguishing the primary causes from one another. Thomas outlines this section as follows: Prop. 2 distinguishes between the three kinds of primary causes, the first cause, intelligences, and souls. Prop. 3 shows how these three are “united through a certain participation in the last,”⁴⁶¹ that is, in soul. Prop. 4 shows the distinctions that exist in the second kind of primary cause, namely intelligences. And Prop. 5 shows the distinctions that exists in the third kind of primary cause, namely, souls.⁴⁶²

It appears, though, that the real reason why Thomas focuses so much on participation in Prop. 3 is his discovery that while this concept seems to be absent from the text, it is nevertheless central to the proposition’s primary source, Prop. 201 of Proclus’ *Elements of Theology*.⁴⁶³ We have already introduced these key passages from Prop. 201 above, but Thomas’ commentary demonstrates that the author of the *De causis* translates or obscures Proclus’ language of participation throughout the entire work.

Consider the following example from Prop. 2. Where the *De causis* says in that proposition that being is “acquired” (*acquisitum*) in eternity, Thomas shows that this depends on Prop. 88 of the *Elements of Theology*, which says something very similar, but using the language of participation. In this passage the *De causis* reads, “The indication that

⁴⁶¹ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 2, p. 11.16-17: “ostendit quomodo uniuntur per participationem quamdam in ultimo, in 3^a propositione”. Thomas describes the relationship between Props. 2 and 3 multiple times in the commentary. See also Prop. 3, p. 17.1-7, quoted above, and Prop. 4, p. 26.1-4: “Postquam auctor huius libri distinxit triplicem gradum superioris esse et ostendit quomodo participative invenitur totum in infimo eorum, nunc indendit ostendere distinctionem secundi gradus, scilicet ipsius esse quod est cum aeternitate”.

⁴⁶² Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 2, p. 11.8-18: “Causae autem universales rerum sunt rium generum, scilicet causa prima quae est Deus, intelligentiae et animae, unde circa primum tria facit: primo enim distinguit haec tria genera quorum primum est indivisum, quia causa prima est una tantum; secundo distinguit intelligentia ibi 4^a propositione [...]; in tertia distinguit animas, 5^a propositione [...]. Circa primum duo facit: primo distinguit tria praedict genera; secundo ostendit quomodo uniuntur per participationem quamdam in ultimo, in 3^a propositione [...]”

⁴⁶³ For the doctrine of participation in Proclus, see L. Sweeney, “Participation and the Structure of Being in Proclus’ *Elements of Theology*”, in *The Structure of Being: A Neoplatonic Approach* (Norfolk, VA: International Society for Neoplatonic Studies, 1981), p. 140-55 and 177-81.

the first cause is before eternity itself is that being is acquired (*acquisitum*) in it [eternity].⁴⁶⁴ Concerning this text, Thomas explains that “we should realize that this proposition is found in Proclus’ book as Proposition 88 in these words: ‘Every beingly,’ or existential, ‘being is before eternity or in eternity, or participating eternity.’⁴⁶⁵ Thomas continues to explain the meaning of Proclus’ text according to the Platonic theory of the forms,⁴⁶⁶ and then, returning to the text of the *De causis*, he works backwards through the author’s substitution of *participans* for *acquisitum*, and clarifies the meaning of the proposition through the concept of participation:

Now, first of all, the author of this book agrees to some extent with the positions just mentioned. So he explains that *the being that is before eternity is the first cause because it is the cause of eternity*. To prove this, he introduces the idea that *in it*, i.e., in eternity, *being is acquired*, i.e., participated. He proves this by arguing that things that are less common participate things that are more common. But eternity is less common than being. So he continues: *And I say that every eternity is being but not every being is eternity. Therefore, being is more common than eternity*. In this way he proves that eternity participates being.⁴⁶⁷

In another text from Prop. 2, Thomas shows that the author has translated the language of participation again, but this time by adapting it into the language of “connection” (*connexa*):

Because motion is in time, time touches the activity of the soul itself. Hence Proclus also says in Proposition 191: “Every participable soul has an eternal substance, but its activity is in time.” So the author says here that *it is connected with eternity in a lower way, connected to eternity in substance, but in a lower way because it participates eternity in a lower way than an intelligence does*.⁴⁶⁸

⁴⁶⁴ *Liber de causis*, Prop. 2: *Et significatio quod causa prima est ante aeternitatem ipsam, est quod esse in ipsa est acquisitum*.

⁴⁶⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 2, p. 13.5-8: “His igitur praemissis sciendum est quod haec propositio in libro Procli lxxxviii^a invenitur sub his verbis: ‘Omne enter vel existenter, ens aut ante aeternitatem est, aut in aeternitate, aut participans aeternitate’.” See Proclus, *Elementatio Theologica* (ed. Boese), Prop. 88, p. 46.

⁴⁶⁶ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 2, p. 13.15-18: “Proclus enim hanc propositionem inducit secundum Platoniorum suppositiones, qui, universalium abstractionem ponentes, quanto aliquid est abstractius tanto prius esse ponebant.”

⁴⁶⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 2, p. 14.5-9: “Sed huius libri auctor in primo quidem aliquantulum cum praedictis positionibus concordat. Unde exponit quod *esse quod est ante aeternitatem est causa prima, quoniam est causa aeternitati*. Et ad hoc probandum inducit quod *in ipsa*, id est aeternitate, *est esse acquisitum*, id est participatum. Et hoc probat quia ea quae sunt minus communia participant ea quae sunt magis communia; aeternitas autem est minus commune quam esse; unde subdit: *Et dico quod omnis aeternitas est esse sed non omne esse est aeternitas; ergo esse est plus commune quam aeternitas*. Sic igitur probat auctor quod aeternitas participat esse”.

⁴⁶⁸ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 2, p. 15.21-16: “Et, quia motus est in tempore, tempus attingit operationem ipsius animae; unde et Proclus dicit cxc^a propositione: ‘Omnis anima participabilis

Thomas also identifies other examples of these kinds of adaptations in the *De causis*, which are found in Props. 4,⁴⁶⁹ 6,⁴⁷⁰ 16,⁴⁷¹ and 18.⁴⁷²

The example from Prop. 4 is especially worth highlighting, because of the way it demonstrates the link between Proclus' concept of participation and the *De causis*' concept of creation:

Now what is common to all the distinct intelligences is first created being. Regarding this he presents the following proposition: *The first of created things is being, and there is nothing else created before it.* Proclus also asserts this in Proposition 138 of his book, in these words: "Being is the first and supreme of all that participate what is properly divine and of the deified."⁴⁷³

Both the *De causis* and Proclus say that "being is first", but where Proclus says that it is the "first and supreme of all that participate", the author of the *De causis* has translated this into the language of creation: "being is the first created thing". This link between "participation" in Proclus and "creation" in the *De causis* is crucial for Thomas' purposes in his commentary on Prop. 3, which is the first place in that work where the concept of creation appears.

substantiam quidem aeternalem habet, operationem autem secundum tempus.' Et ideo hic dicitur quod *connexa est cum aeternitate inferius, connexa quidem aeternitate quantum ad substantiam, sed inferius quia inferiori modo participat aeternitatem quam intelligentia*" See Proclus, *Elementatio Theologica* (ed. Boese), Prop. 191, p. 93. D'Ancona discusses this passage from Thomas' commentary in *Recherches*, p. 63.

⁴⁶⁹ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 4, p. 27.8-14. See quotation below.

⁴⁷⁰ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 6, p. 43.18-44.28: "Hanc etiam propositionem Proclus ponit cxxii^{am} sui libri, sub his verbis: 'Omne quod ens ipsum quidem propter supersubstantialem unionem indicibile est et incognoscibile omnibus secundis, a participantibus autem capabile est et cognoscibile: propter quod solum primum penitus ignotum tamquam amethectum ens'. [...] [*De causis*] ostendit subdens: 'Et non narratur nisi per causas secundas quae illuminatur lumine causae primae'; et hoc est idem ei quod Proclus dixit quod *a participantibus capabile est et cognoscibile*." See Proclus, *Elementatio Theologica* (ed. Boese), Prop. 123, p. 62.

⁴⁷¹ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 16, p. 94.2-7: "Et hoc patet ex libro Procli cuius propositio xcii^a talis est: 'Omnis multitudo infinitarum potentiarum ab una prima infinitate exorta est, quae non ut participata potentia est, neque in potentibus subsistit, sed secundum seipsam, non alicuius participantis ens potentia, sed omnium causatorum entium.'" See Proclus, *Elementatio Theologica* (ed. Boese), Prop. 92, p. 47.

⁴⁷² Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 18, p. 103.7-11: "Primum igitur in ordine cognoscentium est intellectus, et ideo oportet quod *omnes res intelligibiles, id est cognoscitivae, habeant scientiam, id est cognitionem, propter intelligentiam primam unde et in libro Procli dicitur quod 'omnia cognitiva cognitionem participant propter intellectum primum*.'" See Proclus, *Elementatio Theologica* (ed. Boese), Prop. 102, p. 52.

⁴⁷³ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 4, p. 27.8-14: "Id autem quod est commune omnibus intelligentiis distinctis est esse creatum primum, de quo quidem praemittit talem propositionem: 'Prima rerum creatarum est esse et non est ante ipsam creatum aliud. Et hanc etiam propositionem Proclus in suo libro ponit cxxviii^{am}, sub his verbis: 'Omnium participantium divina proprietate et deificatorum primum est et supremum ens.'" See Proclus, *Elementatio Theologica* (ed. Boese), Prop. 138, p. 69. On Thomas' interpretation of Prop. 4, see Porro, "The University of Paris in the Thirteenth Century", p. 284-86; and Wippel, "Participation and the Problem of the One and the Many", p. 165-66.

Thomas argues, then, that there is behind a collection of seemingly diverse relationships in the *De causis*—*acquisitum, connexa, creatarum, illuminatur*—a single concept from Proclus’ *Elements*. Through his use of the *Elements of Theology* in his commentary, Thomas gathers these diverse terms into comparison with the Platonic framework of participation. But to do so, Thomas must also give an account of that Platonic system, its structure and dynamics. This task becomes one of the purposes of his commentary on Prop. 3, which as a text in the introductory section of the work contains many distinctive marks and influences of Proclean participation. One of the principal ways the *De causis* distinguishes noble soul from the other primary causes is by its diverse relationships to superior principles: noble soul shares operations with the causes above it, it is an “image of higher power”, its being is created by the first cause, and it receives the impression of intelligence. Thomas identifies in all these attributes the influence of Platonic participation, and so it is that, following Proclus in Prop. 201, which says explicitly that “by nature [divine souls] participate the things positioned above”,⁴⁷⁴ noble soul becomes the central place in the *Liber de causis* to consider the concept of participation according to its sources and ultimately, according to the truth.

3. Thomas’ reading of Prop. 3: Noble Soul and Participation

Thomas’ central concern in Prop. 3 is the meaning of participation in *esse*. This is fundamentally a question of how things are created. Creatures participate their being from God insofar as God grants them their existence. It is no surprise then, that the thematic nucleus of Thomas’ comment on this proposition is his discussion of the first text in the *De causis* that speaks explicitly of creation: “the first cause creates the being of noble soul by the mediation of intelligence.”⁴⁷⁵

Thomas’ discussion of participation in Prop. 3 has two principal parts that correspond to two issues in the text: first, the meaning of noble soul’s “divinity”, and second, the question about how it can be said that the first cause creates the being of soul through a mediating intelligence (*mediante intelligentia*). In the first, Thomas gathers and discusses his sources and interpretive tools—Proclus’ *Elements of Theology*, the Platonic

⁴⁷⁴ Proclus, *Elementatio Theologica*, ed. Boese, Prop. 201, p. 98: “Quia enim naturaliter participant superpositis et sunt non anime simpliciter”.

⁴⁷⁵ *Liber de causis*, Prop. 3: “causa prima creavit esse anime mediante intelligentia.”

doctrines of the forms and participation, and the monotheism of Ps.-Dionysius and the *Liber de causis*—and in the second, Thomas clarifies the true doctrine of participation, using Dionysius to correct both the Platonists and, to a certain degree, the *De causis* as well.

As we will see below, relative to the first issue, Thomas explains divinity of noble soul according to the concept of participation, which he introduces by presenting the Platonic system of separate forms which is ordered in a series of participations. Then, through the corrective use of Dionysius the Areopagite, Thomas collapses that order of participated perfections into the divine being. And relative to the second issue, Thomas indicates that the *De causis* follows the Platonists too closely: it cannot be the case, as Thomas reads Prop. 3, that soul receives the perfection of its being from one principle but the perfection of its intellectuality from a second, as if it participated these aspects of what it is from different forms. Looking back to the authority of Dionysius, Thomas clarifies the true meaning of participation in *esse* that is also the true meaning of creation: created substances must receive both their nature and their being from the cause that creates them.

3.1. Thomas' Sources: Noble Soul and the Platonic Forms

As is Thomas' method in his commentary, he begins his discussion of Prop. 3 by locating the text against its sources in Proclus' *Elements of Theology*. The immediate result is that Thomas discovers "noble soul" to be a translation of Proclus' "divine soul":

We can understand what he means by "noble soul" from what Proclus says in Proposition 201: "All divine souls have activities that are threefold: some as souls, others as receptive of divine intellect, and still others as joined extrinsically to gods." From this it is evident that what [the author] calls "noble soul" is what Proclus calls "divine soul".⁴⁷⁶

Accordingly, to explain the meaning of this "divine soul" Thomas looks to the Platonic system, for which he has a profound new witness in Proclus' own text. In the context of the Platonic system that Thomas uses Proclus to summarize, the relative divinity of principles

⁴⁷⁶ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 3, p. 18.1-7: "Quae autem dicatur anima nobilis intelligi potest ex verbis Procli qui hanc propositionem ponit cci^{am}, sub his verbis: 'Omnes divinae animae triplices habent operationes: has quidem ut animae, has autem ut suscipientes intellectum divinum, has autem ut diis extraiunctae.' Ex quo patet quod anima nobilis dicitur hic anima divina." See Proclus, *Elementatio Theologica* (ed. Boese), Prop. 201, p. 98.

subsequent to the One-Good depends entirely on the orders of participation that structure the Platonic hierarchy.

To make [what “divine soul” means] clear we ought to realize that Plato maintained that the universal forms of things were separate and *per se* subsistent. Because, according to him, such universal forms have a certain universal causality over particular beings that participate them, he consequently calls all such forms subsisting in this way “gods”. For the word “god” implies a certain universal providence and causality. Moreover, among these forms he articulates this order: the more universal any form is, the more simple and prior a cause it is, for it is participated by later forms, as when we assert that animal is participated by man and life by animal and so on. But the last, which is participated by all and itself participates nothing else, is the separate one and good itself, which he calls the “highest-god” and “the first cause of all things”.⁴⁷⁷

The meaning of a thing’s “divinity” is twofold: first, there is what it participates of the divine principles above it, and second, there is the universality of its influence on those beings by which it is itself participated. The Platonists describe four levels of reality which are ordered by interlocking participatory relationships:

[1.] So Proclus also introduces Proposition 116 of his book as follows: “Every god is able to be participated,” that is, participates, “except one.” Forms of this kind, which they call “gods,” are intelligible in themselves, but an intellect becomes intelligent in act through an intelligible species.

[2.] Thus they placed below the order of gods, i.e., of the forms mentioned above, an order of intellects that participate these forms in order to be intelligent, and the ideal intellect is among these forms. But the intellects mentioned above participate these forms in an immobile way insofar as they understand them.

[3.] Thus they placed under the order of intellects a third order, that of souls, which, with the mediation of intellects, participate these forms through motion insofar as they are the principles of corporeal motions through which corporeal matter participates the higher forms.

⁴⁷⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 3, p. 18.8-21: “Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est quod Plato posuit universales rerum formas separatas per se subsistentes. Et, quia huiusmodi formae universales universalem quamdam causalitatem, secundum ipsum, habent supra particularia entia quae ipsas participant, ideo omnes huiusmodi formas sic subsistentes ‘deos’ vocabat; nam hoc nomen ‘deus’ universalem quamdam providentiam et causalitatem importat. Inter has autem formas hunc ordinem ponebat quod quanto aliqua forma est universalior, tanto est magis simplex et prior causa; participatur enim a posterioribus formis, sicut si ponamus animal participari ab homine et vitam ab animali et sic inde; ultimum autem quod ab omnibus participatur et ipsum nihil aliud participat, est ipsum unum et bonum separatum quod dicebat ‘summum deum’ et ‘primam omnium causam’.”

[4.] And so the fourth order of things is that of bodies.⁴⁷⁸

This structure of reality is composed of hierarchical structures of participation in which particulars receive their perfections from self-subsisting forms which are superior to them. These forms, the gods, fall into an order of universality. In this order, the One-Good, which is the first god, is alone unparticipated. These divine forms become the formal qualities of particulars through the successive emanation of existences, each of which participates the terms above and is participated by those below: the forms—intelligibles—are participated by intellects that think them, whose intelligible acts are perfected immovably through the forms they contemplate. By the mediation of these intelligences, souls participate the forms in a moving way, and through these souls, bodies then participate the forms, insofar as they are moved by soul in accordance with the forms. Bodies therefore participate form through soul, which participates it through intelligence, which participates it through its own intellectual act; in turn, the forms themselves each participate in the perfections of the forms above them, all the way up to the One-Good, which participates nothing and is participated by all universally.

From Thomas' summary of the Platonic system, the meaning of noble souls' "divinity" becomes clear through the two-fold participatory relationships that give shape to the entire order. The superior orders are considered more divine because they are participated by the beings beneath them, but there is also a converse relationship in the divinity of forms that is arguably more central to Thomas' purposes in this proposition: the superior forms are more divine because they themselves participate the highest God to a greater degree. Things are divine when they participate supreme realities and when they themselves are participated by things beneath them:

The higher intellects they call divine intellects. But they call the lower ones intellects,

⁴⁷⁸ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 3, p. 18.21-19.9: "Unde et in libro Procli inducitur propositio cxvi^a, talis: 'Omnis deus participabilis <est>, id est participat, except uno. Et, quia huiusmodi formae quas 'deos' dicebant sunt secundum se intelligibiles, intellectus autem fit actu intelligens per speciem intelligibilem, sub ordine deorum, id est praedictarum formarum, posuerunt ordinem intellectuum qui participant formas praedictas ad hoc quod sint intelligentes, inter quas formas est etiam intellectus idealis. Sed intellectus praedicti participant praedictas formas secundum modum immobilem, in quantum intelligunt eas. Unde sub ordine intellectuum ponebant tertium ordinem animarum quae mediantibus intellectibus participant formas praedictas secundum motum, in quantum scilicet sunt principia corporalium motum per quod superiores formae participantur in materia corporali. Et sic quartus ordo rerum est ordo corporum." See Proclus, *Elementatio Theologica* (ed. Boese), Prop. 116, p. 58.

though not divine, because the ideal intellect, which according to them is a god *per se*, is participated by the higher intellects in both ways: insofar as it is intellect and insofar as it is god. The lower intellects participate in it only insofar as it is intellect, and so they are not divine intellects. For the higher intellects gain not only their intellectual character but also their divine character. Similarly, when souls are joined to gods by mediating intellects, [which are] as it were, nearer the divine, the higher souls themselves are also divine, because of the divine intellects to which they are joined or which they participate. Lower souls, however, as joined to non-divine intellects, are not divine. Because bodies receive motion through the soul, it also follows, according to them, that higher bodies are divine, while lower bodies are not divine. So Proclus says in Proposition 129: “Every divine body is divine through a deified soul; but every soul is divine owing to a divine intellect, while every intellect is divine through a participation of divine unity.”⁴⁷⁹

The Platonic meaning, then, of noble, which is to say “divine”,⁴⁸⁰ soul is double: on the one hand, it is a god-like principle that exercises a universal power over natural bodies which participate in its influence, but on the other hand, its nobility, or divinity, is from the fact that it more perfectly participates the principles above it than do the lesser beings it governs. In other words, the first side of this participation is what participates a principle, and the second side is what that principle itself participates. Both, in the end, are relevant for understanding noble soul. According to the *De causis*, noble soul is divine for two reasons: first, because it participates the power of the divine causes which precede it—from the first cause noble soul receives its being and from intelligence it receives its intelligible operation (which point Thomas will controvert below); but noble soul is also divine because it exercises a providential power over the bodies from which they participate their life and motion.

⁴⁷⁹ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 3, p. 19.11-28: “Inter intellectus autem, superiores quidem dicebant esse divinos intellectus, inferiores autem intellectus quidem sed non divinos, quia intellectus idealis qui est per se deus, secundum eos, participatur quidem a superioribus intellectibus secundum utrumque, scilicet secundum quod est intellectus et secundum quod est deus, ab inferioribus vero intellectibus secundum quod est intellectus tantum, et ideo non sunt intellectus divini; sortiuntur enim intellectus superiores non solum quod sint intellectus sed etiam quod sint divini. Similiter etiam cum animae applicentur diis mediantibus intellectibus quasi propinquioribus, ipsae etiam animae superiores sunt divinae propter intellectus divinos quibus applicantur vel quos participant; inferiores autem animae veluti applicatae intellectibus non divinis sunt non divinae. Et, quia corpora recipiunt motum per animam, consequens etiam est ut superiora corpora sint divina, secundum eos, et inferiora corpora non divina. Unde Proclus dicit cxxix^a propositione: ‘Omne corpus divinum per animam deificatum est divinum, omnis autem anima divina propter divinum intellectum, omnis autem intellectus divinus secundum participationem divinae unitatis.’” See Proclus, *Elementatio Theologica* (ed. Boese), Prop. 129, p. 65.

⁴⁸⁰ Thomas continues the subsequent discussion to use “divina” as gloss for “nobilis”. See, for example, “anima nobilis, id est divina” (*Super Librum de causis expositio*, p. 20.25); “anima nobilissime divina” (p. 21.6); “animae nobilis seu divinae” (p. 21.18).

One finds many discussions of the Platonic forms in the writings of Thomas Aquinas, but there are only a few examples like this one that benefited from his chance to study the *Elements of Theology* in the translation of William of Moerbeke. In addition to his account of the Platonic system in the *De causis* commentary, Thomas uses Proclus as a source in similar discussions in his commentary on the *De caelo* and *De substantiis separatis*.⁴⁸¹ What sets these discussions of the forms apart from Thomas' previous summaries of that doctrine? What does Proclus add specifically to Thomas' understanding of Platonism?⁴⁸² From Thomas' discussion of the Platonic forms in his commentary on the *De divinis nominibus* of Pseudo-Dionysius, which he wrote before having read Proclus, it is clear that he understands the doctrine in that commentary to consist primarily in the fact that beings participate their perfections from separately subsisting forms that are ordered in a hierarchy beneath the One-Good.⁴⁸³ Thomas has already discerned, then, that three-fold participatory relationship which he will find affirmed in Proclus' *Elements*: participant, participated, and unparticipated. After reading Proclus, however, Thomas expands this picture into the four-fold hierarchy of reality: the forms, intelligences, souls, and bodies. This addition is significant, for while Thomas will criticize and correct that doctrine of participation, the four-fold order of reality he accepts with some adjustment.⁴⁸⁴

After introducing the Platonic meaning of participated divinity, Thomas corrects the polytheism of that system through Dionysius the Areopagite. Following Dionysius, the *De causis* departs from Proclus and formulates a more radical doctrine of participation that collapses the hierarchy of participated perfections (e.g., life, existence, beauty, goodness, understanding) into the first cause:

⁴⁸¹ See Thomas Aquinas, *De substantiis separatis* 1.7; and *In de caelo*, II.4, §334.

⁴⁸² As D'Ancona points out, before the *Elements of Theology* was available to Thomas, he only had access to the Platonic doctrine through a fragmentary tradition (D'Ancona, "L'uso della Sententia Dionysii", p. 9). Henle suggests that it is thanks to reading Proclus' *Elements of Theology* that Thomas definitively identifies the error that Dionysius describes in *On the Divine Names* (that *per se vita*, *per se esse*, and *per se sapientia* are all separate gods) as a specifically Platonic doctrine (see *Saint Thomas and Platonism*, p. 413).

⁴⁸³ Aquinas, *In Librum Beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus expositio*, V.1, 634 (ed. C. Pera) p. 235: "Platonici, quos multum in hoc opere Dionysius imitatur, ante omnia participantia compositionem, posuerunt separata per se existentia, quae a compositis participantur; sicut ante homines singulares qui participant humanitatem, composuerunt hominem separatum sine materia existentem, cuius participatione singulares homines dicuntur. Et similiter dicebant quod, ante ista viventia composita, esset quaedam vita separata, cuius participatione cuncta viventia vivunt, quam vocabant per se vitam; et similiter per se sapientiam et per se esse. Haec autem separata principia ponebant ab invicem diversa a primo principio quod nominabant per se bonum et per se unum."

⁴⁸⁴ See te Velde, *Participation and Substantiality*, p. 259.

Dionysius, however, corrects the [Platonists'] position insofar as they posit diverse separate forms, which they call "gods," ordered such that one would be goodness itself, another being itself, another life itself, and so on for the others. For it must be said that all these are essentially the first cause of all things itself, from which things participate all such perfections. In this way, we will not assert that there are many gods, but one.⁴⁸⁵

The central distinction to be made is between the Platonic assertion that each perfection is a distinct, separately subsisting form, whereas Dionysius and the *De causis* correct the Platonists' polytheism by returning every perfection of being to God, who possesses the complete perfection of being in himself. The perfections of being are not each separate gods, but rather each is a perfection that God possesses in himself:

[Dionysius] says in Chapter 5 of *On the Divine Names*, "Now it," namely, Sacred Scripture, "does not say that 'good' is one thing, 'existing' another, and 'life' or 'wisdom' another, nor that there are many causes and that there are other transcending and yet subject deities that produce other things, but that all good processions are of the One."⁴⁸⁶

How this can be he shows subsequently from the fact that, since God is being itself and the very essence of goodness, whatever belongs to the perfection of goodness and being belongs essentially to him as a whole, so that he is the essence of life, wisdom, power, and the rest. So further on he adds: "For God is not somehow existent, but he prepossesses the whole of being in himself in an absolute and uncircumscribed way."⁴⁸⁷

It is this Dionysian position that the *Liber de causis* ultimately follows:

And the author of this book follows [the position of Dionysius]. For he does not introduce a multitude of gods but constitutes unity in God and distinction in the order of intellects, souls, and bodies. In this way, *noble soul*, that is the divine soul of a heavenly body, is described after the opinion of the philosophers who say the heaven

⁴⁸⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 3, p. 20.5-11: "Hanc autem positionem corrigit Dionysius quantum ad hoc quod ponebant ordinatim diversas formas separatas quas 'deos' dicebant, ut scilicet aliud esset per se bonitas et aliud per se esse et aliud per se vita et sic de aliis. Oportet enim dicere quod omnia ista sunt essentialiter ipsa prima omnium causa a qua res participant omnes huiusmodi perfectiones, et sic non ponemus multos deos sed unum."

⁴⁸⁶ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 3, p. 20.11-15: "Et hoc est quod dicit V^o capitulo *De divinis nominibus*: Non autem aliud esse bonum dicit, scilicet Sacra Scriptura, et aliud existens et aliud vitam aut sapientiam neque multas causas et aliorum alias productivas deitates excedentes et subiectas, sed unius esse omnes bonos processus." See Ps.-Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus* V.2 (*Dionysiaca* I), p. 326-27.

⁴⁸⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 3, p. 20.15-21: "Quomodo autem hoc esse possit, ex hoc ostendit consequenter quia, cum Deus sit ipsum esse et ipsa essentia bonitatis, quidquid pertinet ad perfectionem bonitatis et esse, totum ei essentialiter convenit, ut scilicet ipse sit essentia vitae et sapientiae et virtutis et ceterorum. Unde post aliqua subdit: *Etenim Deus non quodammodo est existens, sed simpliciter et incircumscripse totum in seipso esse praecepit*." See Ps.-Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, V.4 (*Dionysiaca* I), p. 33-34.

is animated. This [celestial] soul, according to them, has a certain universal influence over things through motion, and for that reason, it is called “divine” in the same way that those who have the universal care for public affairs are called divine.⁴⁸⁸

Drawing the *De causis* into the company of Dionysius, Thomas clarifies the meaning of noble soul’s divinity. According to the Platonists and the *De causis*, noble soul is divine because it exerts a universal influence over bodies. But the Platonic system of participation has also shown that noble soul is divine thanks to its proximity to the superior causes: an intellect is divine if it participates the higher forms; a soul is divine if it participates a divine intellect; and a body is divine if it participates a divine soul. This is the reason why, Aquinas explains, the text calls noble soul “an exemplum of a higher power”; it means that noble soul is an image of *divine* power, which “it participates from the first cause”. As in the Platonists, this kind of divinity is shared through participation in a higher power, but as Dionysius corrects the Platonic position, collapsing the chain of participations into the divine being, soul’s true source of divinity is its connection to the first cause alone.

Dionysius plays a significant role in Thomas’ correction of the Platonists in his commentary on the *De causis*.⁴⁸⁹ By way of the Areopagite, he is able to not only criticize the forms, but also preserve and incorporate the Platonists’ most crucial metaphysical insights into his interpretation of the *De causis*: 1) the order of perfections participated by creatures is not composed of separately subsisting forms but is entirely contained within the divine being; 2) souls do not participate the forms they require by the mediation of intelligence, but rather from God himself. Through Dionysius, the entire order of formal participations is preserved, in the order by which creatures participate their perfections from the divine being. Thus, while it is not true that reality progressively emanates, as each level of reality depends both on God and on those beings that precede it, the Platonic system of emanation contains the most profound articulation of the creative act.⁴⁹⁰

⁴⁸⁸ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 3, p. 20.21-21.5: “Et hoc sequitur auctor huius libri. Non enim invenitur inducere aliquam multitudinem deitatis, sed unitatem in Deo constituit, distinctionem autem in ordine intellectuum et animarum et corporum. Secundum hoc igitur dicitur *anima nobilis*, id est divina anima caelestis corporis, secundum opinionem Philosophorum qui posuerunt caelum animatum; haec enim anima, secundum eos, habet aliquam influentiam universalem super res per motum, et ex hoc *divina* dicitur eo modo loquendi quo etiam apud homines qui universalem curam rei publicae habent ‘divi’ dicuntur.”

⁴⁸⁹ On the role the Dionysius plays in Thomas’ correction of the Platonists, see Henle, *Saint Thomas and Platonism*, p. 424.

⁴⁹⁰ In contrast to the successive emanation of Proclus’ *Elements of Theology* (see, for example, *Elements of Theology*, Prop. 193), see Thomas’ definition in the *Summa* that creation is the “emanation of the whole of being

The special role Dionysius plays for Thomas is evident by comparison with his use of Aristotle on the same topic. Thomas turns at different points in his *De causis* commentary to both Aristotle and Ps.-Dionysius to correct the theory of the forms, but in crucially different ways. When Thomas turns to Aristotle, it is only to point out that the Stagirite has “done away” with the order of the forms, whereas when Thomas turns to Dionysius, he goes further, using him to incorporate Platonic insights into “the truth”.

In Props. 10 and 13, Thomas corrects the Platonic forms through Aristotle by way of the argument that there are not *many* forms above the intellects, but one only.⁴⁹¹ In both cases, Thomas aligns Aristotle with the Christian faith, but all Aristotle has offered are arguments for denying the existence of separate forms. In Prop. 10, the separate forms are replaced by the single extrinsic good, the unmoved mover, and in Prop. 13, Thomas alludes to the unmoved mover again as the “first cause” which precedes the unmoved movers of the heavens.

The picture is very different where Thomas makes use of the Dionysian corrective. In Props. 3 and 4, by way of Dionysius, Thomas does not simply deny the existence of separate forms, but argues that every perfection is contained in God. In Thomas’ comment on Prop. 4, he is very clear: while Dionysius does away with the order of separate forms, he nevertheless “maintains the same order as the Platonists in the perfections that other things participate”:

According to the positions of the Platonists the reason for this is that, as was said above, [the Platonists] maintained that the more common something is the more it is separate and, as it were, in a prior way participated by what is posterior, and, thus, that it is cause of posterior things. [...] Dionysius did away with the order of separate things, as was said above, maintaining the same order as the Platonists in the perfections that other things participate from one principle, which is God.⁴⁹²

from the universal cause; *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 45, a. 1: “emanationem totius entis a causa universali, quae est Deus; et hanc quidem emanationem designamus nomine creationis”. On this text, see te Velde, “Participation: Aquinas and His Neoplatonic Sources”, p. 134-36; and Idem, *Participation and Substantiality*, p. 134-35. See also Hankey, “The Place Of Natural And Necessary Emanation in Aquinas”, (2007).

⁴⁹¹ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 10, p. 67-68; and Prop. 13, p. 82.

⁴⁹² Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 4, p. 27.15-28.13: “Cuius quidem ratio est, secundum positiones platonicas, quia, sicut supra dictum est, quanto aliquid est communius, tanto ponebant illud esse magis separatum et quasi prius a posterioribus participatum, et sic esse posteriorum causarum. [...] Dionysius autem ordinem quidem separatorum abstulit, sicut supra dictum est, ponens eundem ordinem quem et Platonici in perfectionibus quae ceterae res participant ab uno principio, quod est Deus”.

Dionysius preserves the entire Platonic order of participations by drawing the participation of every perfection into the divine being. Thomas emphasizes that Dionysius even uses the same name for this first principle; for the Platonists the highest principle is “the one and good”,⁴⁹³ and Dionysius, in *On the Divine Names*, “ranks the name of good in God as the first of all the divine names”.⁴⁹⁴

Dionysius is uniquely suited to play this corrective role because of what he shares in common with the Platonists, including the language of participation.⁴⁹⁵ As Thomas points out in his commentary on the *De divinis nominibus*, Dionysius “imitates much” of what the Platonists say about the forms, and even “agrees with them in one way”, in the sense that he too describes the divine self-subsisting perfections, but understands they are all one principle.⁴⁹⁶ Thus, where Aristotle provides a first cause which orders all things as an “extrinsic good”, through Dionysius the Platonists provide the order of perfections that all things participate from God who is “The Good”. The order of participations is internalized in the divine being, and offers an analysis of the internal structure of the creative act.

3.2. Creation *mediante intelligentia* and Participation in the Divine *esse*

⁴⁹³ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 4, p. 27.18-19: “In ordine autem eorum quae de rebus dicuntur, communissimum ponebant unum et bonum”. See also D’Ancona, “L’uso della Sententia Dionysii”, p. 9, who points to a related passage about the agreement between Aristotle and the Platonists about the first principle in Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 6, a. 4c.: “Et quamvis haec opinio irrationabilis videatur quantum ad hoc, quod ponebat species rerum naturalium separatas per se subsistentes, ut Aristoteles multipliciter probat; tamen hoc absolute verum est, quod est aliquod unum per essentiam suam bonum, quod dicimus Deum, ut ex superioribus patet. Huic etiam sententiae concordat Aristoteles.”

⁴⁹⁴ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 4, p. 28.13-14: “unde in IV^o capitulo *De divinis nominibus*, praeordinat nomen boni in Deo omnibus divinis nominibus”.

⁴⁹⁵ For an example of Dionysius using the language of participation, see the quotation of *De divinis nominibus* IV.2 below. See also te Velde, *Participation and Substantiality*, p. 128-31; and R. Coughlin, “Theurgy, Prayer, Participation”, p. 158ff.

⁴⁹⁶ See Thomas Aquinas, *In Librum Beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus expositio*, V.1, 634 (ed. C. Pera), p. 235, quoted above. There is also, of course, a crucial difference: where the Platonists posit the One-Good before being, for Dionysius (according to Thomas’ understanding), and according to “the truth”, the first cause is only “above being” in the sense that it is “infinite *esse*”. See *Super Librum de causis expositio* Prop. 6, p. 47.8-11: “Causa autem prima, secundum Platonicos quidem, est supra ens in quantum essentia bonitatis et unitatis, quae est causa prima, excedit etiam ipsum ens separatum, sicut supra dictum est. Sed secundum rei veritatem causa prima est supra ens in quantum est ipsum esse infinitum”. On this passage see Wippel, “Participation and the Problem of the One and the Many”, p. 124. On Thomas’ interpretation of Dionysius on God as *esse*, see te Velde *Participation and Substantiality*, p. 261-265; te Velde distinguishes between Dionysius’ negative-henological description of God as being, i.e. being itself as the cause of all beings and in this way above all beings, while Thomas’ is positive-ontological, i.e. being itself as the cause of *esse commune* in creatures and in this way a being that is distinct from all beings.

After Thomas draws out the Platonic doctrine of participation that is hidden in Prop. 3 and contrasts it with the doctrines of the Platonists and Dionysius the Areopagite, he moves on to discuss the controversial doctrine in the *De causis* of creation *mediante intelligentia*, in what is arguably the thematic heart of his comment on the proposition. It is in this section that Thomas formulates what belongs to a truly monotheistic understanding of participation. To do so, Thomas criticizes the *De causis* for remaining too Platonic in its understanding of how noble soul receives its intelligible operation, despite the ways it follows the monotheism of Dionysius. The passage of Prop. 3 in question reads as follows:

[T]he first cause creates the being of soul by a mediating intelligence. And for this reason, soul comes to effect a divine operation. After, therefore, the first cause creates the being of soul, it lays it as the “thatch” of intelligence, so that it effects its operations. For this reason, intelligible soul effects an intelligible operation.⁴⁹⁷

This passage involved considerable difficulties for Latin interpreters who could not grant, as it and some others in the *De causis*⁴⁹⁸ suggest, that intelligence plays a role in the creation of soul and other inferior beings.⁴⁹⁹ We have already seen Albert’s solution to this passage, where he explains that intelligence mediates in noble soul’s creation insofar as it is the medial term in its definition.⁵⁰⁰

Thomas’ fundamental concern is the unity of the creative act. As te Velde clarifies, “only a monotheistic conception of a creator-god who has the fullness of perfection can account for the substantial unity of things according to each thing’s degree of perfection.”⁵⁰¹ For this reason, in his comment on Prop. 3, Thomas turns to the Dionysian corrective once again, but this time in order to correct the *De causis*. The fundamental Dionysian insight is into the unity of divine perfection. God is not said to be one simply by denying to the Platonic forms the necessity of their participated perfections; it is rather that the divine being

⁴⁹⁷ *Liber de causis*, Prop. 3: “Quod est quia causa prima creavit esse anime mediante intelligentia. Et propter illud facta est anima efficiens operationem divinam. Postquam ergo creavit causa prima esse anime posuit eam sicut stramentum intelligentie, quod efficiat operationes suas. Propter illud ergo anima intelligibilis efficit operationem intelligibilem.”

⁴⁹⁸ Prop. 3 is not the only place where the *De causis* speaks of the mediation of intelligence in the creative act. See also Prop. 19: “Ex intelligentiis est quae est intelligentia divina, quoniam ipsa recipit ex bonitatibus primis quae procedunt ex causa prima receptione multa. Et de eis est quae est intelligentia tantum, quoniam non recipit ex bonitatibus primis nisi mediante intelligentia prima”.

⁴⁹⁹ See D’Ancona’s discussion of the sources and various medieval interpretations of this passage in “La doctrine de la création « mediante intelligentia »”, p. 73-95.

⁵⁰⁰ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.13, p. 76.15-33. Quoted in Ch. 2 above.

⁵⁰¹ te Velde, *Participation and Substantiality*, p. 256.

must possess all perfections in itself. As te Velde articulates this point, “God can be understood to be one only if it can be shown that his simple being includes all the diverse perfections of things”.⁵⁰² And this fact has an important correlative in the creature: if God contains all perfections and the unity of the creative act, then there must be a unity in created beings that imitates their creator. It must be the case that creatures participate everything they need to be what they are from God alone.

Thomas alludes first to what he considers to be a mistaken understanding of creation *mediante intelligentia*, along the lines of an Avicennian mode of procession.⁵⁰³ This understanding of procession begins from the law that “*non ex uno fit nisi unum*”; nothing but the first intelligence can proceed from the first cause, and from that first intelligence proceeds the subsequent term⁵⁰⁴:

Some, however, understand what is said here—that the first cause created the being of the soul, with the mediation of an intelligence—badly, thinking that according to the author of this book, intelligences are creative of the substance of souls.⁵⁰⁵

Thomas judges this to be an incorrect reading of the text on the grounds that it is inconsistent with the Platonic system of participation that the *De causis* depends upon:

But this is contrary to the positions of the Platonists. For they order the causalities of simple beings according to participation. [...] [T]he Platonists maintained that being itself is the cause of existing for all things, while life itself is the cause of living for everything [that lives], and intelligence itself is the cause of understanding for everything [that understands]. [...] This is how [the author] understands that the first cause created the being of the soul with the mediation of an intelligence: the first cause alone created the being of soul, but that the soul is intellectual is due to the activity of an intelligence.⁵⁰⁶

⁵⁰² te Velde, *Participation and Substantiality*, p. 256.

⁵⁰³ Thomas also associates this position with Prop. 3 and its *mediante intelligentia* in *De Potentia*, q. 3, a. 4, ad. 10, and in *De substantis separatis*, X (See Guagliardo, Hess, Taylor, *Thomas Aquinas. Commentary on the Book of Causes*, p. 24).

⁵⁰⁴ For the Avicennian precedent for this doctrine, D’Ancona points to Book 9 of Avicenna’s *Metaphysics* and to his *De causis primis et secundis* (D’Ancona, “La doctrine de la création « *mediante intelligentia* »”, p. 75). Thomas summarizes and criticizes this model of procession in *Summa Theol.* I, q. 47, a. 1.

⁵⁰⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 3, p. 22.4-7: “Hoc autem quod hic dicitur quod causa prima creavit esse animae mediante intelligentia quidam male intelligentes, existimaverunt secundum auctorem istius libri quod intelligentiae essent creatrices substantiae animarum.” Curiously, Thomas does not mention Prop. 193 from Proclus’ *Elements*, which is reminiscent of this interpretation of the *De causis*, and which he argues is incorrect: “Omnis anima proxime ab intellectu subsistit” (ed. Boese, p. 94).

⁵⁰⁶ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 3, p. 22.7-23.8: “Sed hoc est contra positiones platonicas. Huiusmodi enim causalitates simplicium entium ponebant secundum participationem [...]. Sic ergo

Thomas judges that the doctrine here is not Avicennian, but rather Platonic, as in the Platonic model of participation Thomas has just enumerated: soul participates its perfections from a series of forms, its existence through “being itself”, but its intelligence through “intelligence itself”.

In the end Thomas will only accept this text in an extremely limited way, and only after he has corrected what to his mind amounts to a failure of the monotheism of the *De causis*:

But this position too, if it is not soundly understood, is repugnant to the truth and to the opinion of Aristotle, who argues in Book 3 of the *Metaphysics* against the Platonists that hold an order of separate causes according to what is predicated of individuals.⁵⁰⁷

Whereas earlier, Thomas understood the *De causis* to be critical of its Platonic sources, in this case, the *De causis* follows the Platonists too closely. The implication, as the text of Prop. 3 goes on to say, is that noble soul only has an intelligible operation because it receives the influence of an intelligence: “After, therefore, the first cause creates the being of soul it lays it as the ‘thatch’ of intelligence, so that it effects its operations. For this reason, it effects an intelligible operation.”⁵⁰⁸ Thomas here understands the *De causis* to maintain, like the Platonists, that soul receives its perfections from different causes: being from the first cause and intelligence from an intellect.

But noble soul cannot be created by the mediation of an intelligence; it must participate every perfection that it needs to be what it is from the first cause alone. This conclusion, which runs against the grain of the *De causis*,⁵⁰⁹ is a focal point of Thomas’ interest in this proposition.

intelligit quod prima causa creavit esse animae mediante intelligentia quod causa prima sola creavit essentiam animae; sed, quod anima sit intelligibilis, hoc habet ex operatione intelligentiae.”

⁵⁰⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 3, p. 23.21-24: “Sed etiam haec positio, si non sane intelligatur, repugnant veritati et sententiae Aristotelis qui arguit in IIIo Metaphysicae contra Platonicos ponentes huiusmodi ordinem causarum separatarum secundum ea quae de individuīs praedicantur.”

⁵⁰⁸ *Liber de causis*, Prop. 3: “Postquam ergo creavit causa prima esse anime posuit eam sicut stramentum intelligentie quod efficiat operationes suas. Propter illud ergo anima intelligibilis efficit operationem intelligibilem.”

⁵⁰⁹ The *Liber de causis* speaks in multiple places about the influence of intelligence over inferior beings. In addition to those examples in Prop. 3, see (ed. Pattin), Prop. 4, p. 56.82-84: “Et intelligentiae primae influunt super intelligentias secundas bonitates quas recipiunt a causa prima”; Prop. 5(4), p. 57.81-86: “Intelligentiae superiores primae, quae sequuntur causam primam, imprimunt formas secundas, stantes, quae non destruuntur ita ut sit necessarium iterare eas vice alia. Intelligentiae autem secundae imprimunt formas declines, separabiles, sicut est anima”; and Prop. 8(7), p. 65.33-36: “intelligentia ipsa est causa rerum quae sunt sub ea per hoc quod est

Thomas is concerned about the unity of the creature and of the creative act.⁵¹⁰ Soul's "intellectual being" is not something extrinsic to what it is; rather, it is the very nature by which it is:

[S]ince intellectual being belongs to the very nature of the soul as its essential difference (*essentialis differentia*), if [the soul] had being from one thing and an intellectual nature from another, it would follow that it would not be absolutely one. Therefore, it is necessary to say that by the first cause from which [soul] has essence, [soul] also has intellectuality⁵¹¹.

Intelligence is not a mere accident of soul's nature, but rather is its *essentialis differentia*. It is impossible, then, for soul to receive this from any cause other than the cause that grants it its being, for that it has intelligence belongs to the nature of its being. The being that noble soul receives must be the being of its nature, and this is the position which "accords with the opinion of Dionysius":⁵¹² "[T]hat good itself, being itself, life itself, and wisdom itself are not different but one and the same thing, which is God, by whom it occurs in things that they are, that they live, and that they understand".⁵¹³ Intellectuality is not something soul has apart from what it is, but rather, it is the specific way in which it has any being at all. Lest it cease to be one creature, soul must receive everything proper to its existence and every perfection of its nature from the source of its being, God, who pre-contains every perfection in himself.

There is implied here a crucial difference between the divine being and the created/participated being that is at the heart of Thomas' comment on Prop. 3: all creatures have being, but no being save for God himself simply is its being. Each created being has

intelligentia".

⁵¹⁰ On the unicity of the substantial form of the human, and the controversy surrounding this doctrine, see Hankey, "The Concord of Aristotle, Proclus, the *Liber de Causis*", p. 137-42; J.F. Wippel, "Prime Matter and Substantial Form", in *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 295-375, at 327-51; and Idem, "Thomas Aquinas and the Unicity of Substantial Form", in K. Emery, R. Friedman, A. Speer (eds), *Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages. A Tribute to Stephen F. Brown* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2011), p. 117-54.

⁵¹¹ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 3, p. 24.1-5: "Unde, cum esse intelligibile pertineat ad ipsam naturam animae utpote essentialis differentia eius, si ab alio haberet esse et ab alio naturam intellectivam sequeretur quod non esset unum simpliciter; oportet ergo dicere quod, a prima causa a qua habet essentiam, habet etiam intellectualitatem."

⁵¹² Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 3, p. 24: "hoc concordat sententiae Dionysii".

⁵¹³ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 3, p. 24.7-9: "non aliud sit ipsum bonum, ipsum esse et ipsa vita et ipsa sapiential, sed unum et idem quod est Deus, a quo derivatur in res et quod sint et quod vivant et quod intelligent".

being in a certain way, that is, relative to its nature, form, or specific difference. Each creature, then, contains the composition of two elements: its being and its nature.⁵¹⁴

As Thomas expands on these themes in his commentaries on Props. 7 and 9, to be created is to have being granted to one's nature, or, to use the language of participation, for one's nature to participate *esse*. This fact is true of all created substances, corporeal and incorporeal. In Prop. 7, Thomas explains that despite their incorporeality, intelligences are nevertheless in the same class as corporeal things, in the sense that all created substances, whether separate or joined to matter, have in common that they are not identical with their *esse*:

Similarly, an intelligence also transcends the entire order of corporeal things. But because its [intelligence's] quiddity, or essence, is not its very *esse*, but is a thing that subsists in its *esse* as participated, in a certain way it thus agrees in genus with bodies, which also subsist in their own *esse*. So both are placed in the genus of substance according to logical intention. [...] Now the first cause is not a nature subsisting in its own *esse* as participated. Rather, it is *esse subsistens* itself and so it is super-substantial and absolutely indescribable.⁵¹⁵

Every created substance is a nature that participates or receives its being. Only the first cause is *ipsum esse subsistens*, free of all composition, for it alone possesses and is the entirety of its being.

In the terms of Thomas' discussion about Prop. 3, intellectuality is the essential difference of soul's nature, and it is precisely this nature that participates *esse* in the very fact of its existence. This is what it means for intellectual soul to exist, its specific way or manner of being.⁵¹⁶ From this perspective, as te Velde points out, "the essential difference of each thing is in fact a difference in respect to what they have in common, namely, being".⁵¹⁷ This

⁵¹⁴ On the difference between essence and *esse* in Thomas Aquinas, see J.F. Wippel, "Essence-*Esse* Composition and the One and the Many", in *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), p. 132-176. On the difference between *ens* and *esse* in Thomas' *Liber de causis* commentary, see Ho "La doctrine de la participation", p. 371-73.

⁵¹⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 7, p. 49.24-50.7: "Similiter etiam intelligentia transcendit totum ordinem corporalium rerum. Quia tamen sua quidditas vel essentia non est ipsum suum esse, sed est res subsistens in suo esse participato, ideo quodammodo convenit in genere cum corporibus quae etiam in suo esse subsistunt; et sic secundum logicam intentionem utrumque ponitur in genere substantiae. [...] Causa autem prima non est natura subsistens in suo esse quasi participato, sed potius est ipsum esse subsistens, et ideo est supersubstantialis et simpliciter inerrabilis."

⁵¹⁶ As Wippel puts this relationship, "The participating principle, or essence, specifies the kind of *esse* which is received, and therefore also establishes the kind of entity which results from this participation" (Wippel, "Participation and the Problem of the One and the Many", p. 109).

⁵¹⁷ te Velde, *Participation and Substantiality*, p. 261.

is why the entire order of creation can be said to proceed, but to proceed immediately from one divine cause:⁵¹⁸ “Each creation is immediately constituted in the unity of its essence, which includes a special degree of being, a unity which is intrinsically specified by the rank a thing occupies in the order of creation.”⁵¹⁹

Thomas continues developing these themes in Prop. 9, where he explains that the composition of form or nature and *esse* in created substances is a relationship of potency and activity⁵²⁰:

For intelligence has *ylia*tim, i.e., something material or in a condition like matter, for *ylia*tim is derived from *yle*, which means “matter.” How this is so he explains, adding: *because it is being and form*. For the quiddity and substance of an intelligence itself is a certain subsisting immaterial form. However, because it is not its own being but subsists in participated being, the subsisting form itself is compared to participated being as potency to act or matter to form. Likewise, the soul has *ylia*tim as well, [having] not only a subsisting form but also a body, whose form it is.⁵²¹

Every substance can be analyzed into its nature and being, and the nature of a substance is in a relationship of potency to its being.⁵²² This is because the forms of substances are understood to subsist “in participated being”. They do not have being from themselves; it is received, participated. With these insights from Props. 7 and 9, it is even more clear why Thomas must correct the *De causis* regarding the *mediante intelligentia* by which the first cause creates noble soul. While we can distinguish between the different perfections that creatures participate, they must, in the end, be one being.

The central purpose of Thomas’ commentary on Prop. 3, then, is to clarify and defend the monotheistic relationship of the divine being to each creature. As Thomas concludes his commentary on Prop. 3, soul, in the end, is divine not because of what it gives

⁵¹⁸ See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 45, a. 1, quoted in the note above.

⁵¹⁹ te Velde, *Participation and Substantiality*, p. 261.

⁵²⁰ On the relationship of essence to *esse* as potency to act see Wippel, “Participation and the Problem of the One and the Many”, p. 107-8; and Ho, “La doctrine de la participation, p. 373-77. Ho points out that Thomas’ use of the language of potency and activity here indicates the manner in which Thomas adapts the Platonic doctrine of participation into an Aristotelian framework (p. 377).

⁵²¹ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 9, p. 64.6-13: “Nam *intelligentia habet ylia*tim, id est aliquid materiale vel ad modum materiae se habensl dicitur enim *ylia*tim ab *yle*, quod est materia. Et quomodo hoc sit, exponit subdens: *Quoniam est esse et forma*. Quidditas enim et substantia ipsius intelligentiae est quaedam forma subsistens immaterialis, sed quia ipsa non est suum esse, sed est subsistens in esse participato, comparatur ipsa forma subsistens ad esse participatum sicut potentia ad actum aut materia ad formam.”

⁵²² On this theme in the context of Thomas’ commentary on *De causis*, Props. 9 and 18 see Porro, “The University of Paris in the Thirteenth Century”, p. 284-86.

to other creatures but because of what it receives from the first cause. Thomas looks again to Dionysius:

[H]e grants [to souls their] divinity in virtue of [their] connection to God, and not in virtue of [their] universal influence upon created things. For the former is more divine, because what God is in himself is greater than what he causes in other things.⁵²³

The true doctrine of participation depends on this fact, that “what God is in himself is greater than what he causes in other things”. What God is is pure *esse* in himself, and what God grants to intellectual soul is to be what it is: a soul with an intelligible nature. Intellectual soul receives its being from the first cause, but it must also receive its intellectuality in this primary participation. God is one, and so is his creative act.

The crucial distinction in Thomas’ understanding is between participation of *esse commune*—the common form of being that is found to be first in every single existing thing—and the participation of *esse subsistens*, the *ipsum esse* which is the ultimate source of existence in all created things. Thomas discusses this necessary distinction in Prop. 9, when he addresses the error of understanding the being of the first cause as the common being that is predicated of all things: “if the first cause is only being, then it seems that it is common being, which is predicated of all things, and that it is not something that is an individual being, distinct from others.”⁵²⁴ By this understanding, when a substance participates its primary act of being, it would participate it from the separate self-subsisting form, *esse*. Thomas, however, introduces the crucial distinction: every creature participates *esse commune* as the first perfection of its nature, but each creature possesses its own distinct existence that it participates from God, the *ipsum esse*, who grants to creatures that they may participate a likeness of the divine *esse* according to their *specific natures*.⁵²⁵

Esse commune is the being that all created substances share as their first act. However, this common being is not confused with the separate form, *esse*, of the Platonists. *Esse*

⁵²³ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 3, p. 25.16-24: “sed divinitatem accipit secundum coniunctionem ad Deum, non autem secundum universalem influentiam in creata. Illud enim est magis divinum, quia et in ipso Deo maius est id quod ipse est quam id quod in aliis causat.”

⁵²⁴ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 9, p. 64.28-65.2: “Posset enim aliquis dicere quod, si causa prima sit esse tantum, videtur quod sit esse commune quod de omnibus praedicatur et quod non sit aliquid individualiter ens ab aliis distinctum.” On Thomas’ distinction between *esse commune* and *esse subsistens* in this passage, see Wippel, “Participation and the Problem of the One and the Many”, p. 113-14.

⁵²⁵ On the role of Dionysius and Proclus in Thomas’ understanding of participating *esse* as participating a likeness of divine *esse*, see Doolan, “Aquinas on *esse subsistens*”, p. 619.

commune does not exist apart from each particular substance; to consider it in the abstract is to contemplate a mental concept. For the Platonists, *esse* is just first of many formal participations that beings receive from the polytheistic hierarchy. Not so for Thomas, who through Dionysius draws out from the *De causis* that creatures participate everything they need to be what they are, in a single participation of the divine being. It is still true that “to be” is the most universal form, but in distinction from the Platonists (and, in part from the *De causis* itself), for Thomas, to participate *esse* is also to receive every other perfection proper to a creature, according to the nature of its substantial form.

There is only one “being itself”, and that is the God who contains every perfection and is the source of the existence of every substance. God grants it to forms that they exist, which means that they are granted to share in the likeness of divine being, but only do so according to their own natures. The essential difference of a creature describes how a creature *is* differently from other creatures. The consequence is that while each creature is a unity, each possesses its unity with more or less perfection. As te Velde writes:

Each form [...] must be understood as a unity of perfection and measure of perfection. According to its degree each form has a certain capacity for being. A more perfect form allows a thing to participate more perfectly in being. Thus form is a measure with respect to the perfection of being [...]. Each form is essentially act; but no form except the divine form is pure act without any potentiality. Potentiality means that no form can receive in itself the whole infinite actuality of being.⁵²⁶

Participation in *esse commune* is the participation in *esse* that every created substance has in common as its first activity. It is discovered by the kind of analysis that Thomas undertakes in his commentary on Prop. 1. Of all participations, being is the most common and also the most primary, because it is clear that other formal participations depend upon it. The human being, for example, must have “to be” before it can have “to live”, and must have “to live” before it has “to think”. In all things this “to be” is first, and analyzed out in this way we can contemplate this universal, primary participation as *esse commune*.

Thomas’ monotheistic participation, then, involves a highly particular relationship between each creature and its creator. On the one hand, *esse* is something that every creature participates, but on the other hand, each creature participates its *esse* differently. That difference, moreover, is not, as Thomas reads in Prop. 3, something added onto a thing’s

⁵²⁶ te Velde, *Participation and Substantiality*, p. 251-52.

being secondarily, as if it receives *esse* from one source and its differences from another. There is no other cause capable of granting this essential distinction to each creature, and the difference that gives each creature its nature is implied in the original participation of *esse* itself.

4. Conclusion: Human Soul is the Only Noble Soul

In contrast with Albert the Great's *De causis et processu universitatis*, Thomas Aquinas' commentary on Prop. 3 brackets the question of celestial motion and its causes and explores instead how the order of reality as a whole participates its being from its divine source. Thomas, again, is agnostic, if not skeptical, about the existence of noble soul as a celestial mover. Even so, noble soul becomes useful to him because of its relationship through Proclus' *anime divine* to the Platonic metaphysics of participation on the one hand, and through its monotheistic adaptation of that Platonism reminiscent of Ps.-Dionysius on the other. By way of noble soul, Thomas Aquinas enters into the tensions between two metaphysical systems: the one emphasizing the plurality and order of self-subsisting divine perfections, and the other the unity of the supreme perfection of divine being. It is, in the end, Ps.-Dionysius who resolves this tension through the sublimation of the former into the latter: every perfection belongs finally to the being which is God himself, and creatures receive everything they require to be what they are from that one divine source. The hierarchy of participations that make creatures what they are remains, but all of these are implied within the single participation of *esse* that discloses the heart of the creative act.

The consequence is that all of creation is theophany. Creatures in their various perfections reveal what is hidden in the unity of the divine being. Creation is a procession of what God possesses in himself into the plenitude of diverse goods and beings. The central purpose of Thomas' commentary on Prop. 3 is to clarify through the philosophical tensions and sources of this text these two co-relative acts, creation on the part of God and participation on the part of creatures. These two together disclose the structure of reality in its *exitus* from the divine source.

But what role does soul play in this discussion of creation if we are not even clear that noble souls exist? It becomes clear at the conclusion of Thomas' commentary on Prop. 3 that this discussion of the creation and participation of noble soul is really, for Thomas, a

meditation on the creation and participation of the human. After Thomas corrects the *Liber de causis* on the meaning of the mediation of intelligence in soul creation, he provides another way to read this text so that it might be “true in a way”:

[What is said here about the mediation of intelligence] can be true in a way, if it refers, not to [soul’s receiving] an intellectual nature, but rather to the intelligible forms that intellectual souls receive through the operation of intelligences. For this reason, Dionysius says in Chapter 4 of *On the Divine Names* that “through angels” souls “become participants of illuminations emanating” from God.⁵²⁷

Thomas, thus, substitutes the Platonic participation he identifies in Prop. 3 for a Dionysian participation in which soul does not receive its intelligible operation from intellect, but rather, angels assist souls in participating the illuminations that originate from God himself.

What Thomas suggests here is analogous to Albert’s interpretation of Prop. 3.⁵²⁸ In Albert’s reading, the separate intelligences are the source of the perfect form that noble soul impresses on the heavens according to motion. Noble soul does not receive its intellectual operation from intelligence, but rather, moves the heavens through its desire for intellectual perfection.⁵²⁹ Thomas suggests something very similar: the mediation of intelligence in soul’s creation refers not to the reception of a nature, but “to the intelligible forms that intellectual souls receive”. There are, however, two key differences between Thomas and Albert on this point. Where Albert intends to offer a faithful interpretation of the text, Thomas on this point

⁵²⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 3, p. 24.12-17: “Aliquo tamen modo potest hoc habere veritatem, si referatur non ad naturam intellectualem, sed ad formas intelligibiles quas animae intellectivae recipiunt per operationem intelligentiarum; unde et Dionysius dicit IV^o capitulo *De divinis nominibus* quod animae per angelos fiunt participes illuminationum a Deo emanantium.” Thomas makes a very similar comment at the conclusion of his commentary on Prop. 3, p. 25.16-24: “Ei autem quod dictum est de intellectu divino et anima divina concordat sententia Dionysii qui, in IV^o capitulo *De divinis nominibus*, superiores angelos vocat divinas mentes, id est intellectus, per quos etiam animae deiformi dono participant secundum suam virtutem; sed divinitatem accipit secundum coniunctionem ad Deum, non autem secundum universalem influentiam in creata. Illud enim est magis divinum, quia et in ipso Deo maius est id quod ipse est quam id quod in aliis causat.” See Ps.-Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, IV 2 (*Dionysiaca* I), p. 154-55.

⁵²⁸ See Ch. 1 above.

⁵²⁹ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.3.2, p. 141.6-30: “Habitum enim est, quod anima et maxime anima nobilis stramentum est intelligentiae per naturam suam intellectualem, quae per modum animale est in ipsa. Anima igitur contenta ab intelligentia agente et pendens ex ipsa ita, quod nihil animae evadere possit continentiam intelligentiae, est anima tota redacta ad unum modum et uniformem influendi motum in corpus mobile. Talis enim animae intelligentia agens semper desideratum est. Et ipsa comprehensa est a forma talis intelligentiae, sicut desiderium comprehensum est a forma desiderati. [...] Relinguitur igitur, quod proxima causa infinitatis in motu anima sit dicto modo pendens ex intelligentia. Prima autem causa intelligentia agens est desiderata ab anima. Propter quod intelligentia sicut desideratum movet, anima vero sicut motor coniunctus.”

is presenting an alternative reading, and by this alternative, the proposition is “true”, but only “in a way” (*aliquo tamen modo potest hoc habere veritatem*).

The second difference between Thomas and Albert is even more decisive. Where Albert sees that the form from intellect perfects noble soul’s celestial operation, Thomas is no longer describing the operation of celestial soul at all, but rather “intellectual souls”, and as his reference to Dionysius indicates, he is thinking here of human souls, and human souls alone. Dionysius, as Thomas has already pointed out, does not have a doctrine of celestial soul,⁵³⁰ and when he speaks of the angelic illumination of soul, this is a reference to human beings. As we read in Dionysius:

[A]fter those bright and wonderful minds, souls and anything which are of souls are good on account of the good super-goodness. [...] [R]eaching toward the angelic lives, by means of them as good leaders, being conducted upward toward the principality of all goods, and thus coming to be in the participation of emanating illuminations, in their proportions.⁵³¹

It is not that souls participate their perfection from the angel-intelligences, but rather that through the angels, souls are assisted in their participation of the “divine gift” which comes from God himself. The angels illuminate soul, but soul’s divinity comes from God alone. It is clear, then, that by the end of his comment on Prop. 3, Thomas is no longer thinking about celestial souls at all, but rather about the human soul that participates divinity from its creator through the illumination of the angels.

Thomas does not state this fact explicitly in his commentary, but it is clear for him that human soul is, in the end, the only noble soul.⁵³² Thomas substitutes noble soul the celestial mover for noble soul the human being who are divine not through some influence they exercise over created things, through being “joined to God” (*coniunctionem ad Deum*). And thus, as Thomas’ conclusion implies, there is far greater nobility and divinity for the

⁵³⁰ See Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 2, p. 16.16-17.

⁵³¹ Ps.-Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, IV.2 (*Dionysiaca* I), p. 153-55: “Sed et post illas claras et admirabiles mentes, animae et quaecumque sunt bona animarum, sunt propter superbonitatem bonam [...], extensas ad angelicas vitas, per ipsas sicut bonos duces ad omnium bonorum principatum sursum agi et inde emanatum illuminationum in participatione fieri, secundum illorum proportionem”.

⁵³² See also Thomas’ use of noble soul as a human soul in his *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, q. 5, a. 9, ad 7: “et hoc dico de anima nobili, quam intelligit ille esse animam corporis coelestis vel quamlibet aliam rationalem animam”. On this passage see Negri, “The « Noble Soul » Between Heaven and Earth”, p. 85. There are also other examples of the same in his *De causis* commentary; see *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 5(4), p. 38.21-39.6; and Prop. 14(13), p. 86.9-87.3.

human being who is joined to this divine source, for “in God himself, what he is is greater than what he causes in other things”.⁵³³

⁵³³ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 3, p. 25.20-24: “sed divinitatem accipit secundum coniunctionem ad Deum, non autem secundum universalem influentiam in creata. Illud enim est magis divinum, quia et in ipso Deo maius est id quod ipse est quam id quod in aliis causat.”

PART III. GILES OF ROME

CHAPTER 4. NOBLE SOUL AND CONTRACTION IN GILES OF ROME

Giles of Rome makes a substantial use of Thomas Aquinas' integration of the Platonic forms into the exegetical tradition of the *Liber de causis*, and like Thomas, he constructs his commentary around the doctrine of creaturely participation in *esse*. Giles characterizes this kind of participation as a *contractio*.⁵³⁴ The divine *esse* is an uncontracted ocean of existence which the first cause pours over its creatures; but since each creature can only participate, or "take a part" (*partem capere*) of that infinite gift, *esse* becomes contracted in the confines each creature's essence or nature.⁵³⁵ Central to Giles' articulation of participated *esse* are the doctrines of the Platonists, and when he introduces the divine source of all participation in his commentary on Prop. 2, he does so following the pattern of Thomas' discussion and correction of the Platonic forms from his commentary on Prop. 3: while the Platonists say that perfections are participated diversely from an order of separately subsisting forms, we know that according to the truth the divine *esse* contains all perfections, and creatures receive all that they are from the one God.⁵³⁶

There is, however, an important difference between Giles' use of the Platonic forms in his *De causis* commentary and that of Thomas, and this fact becomes especially clear in Giles' own discussion of noble soul and Prop. 3. Thomas first turns to the Platonic forms in his own commentary on Prop. 3 in order to explain the meaning of noble soul's divinity, which, as he shows through a comparison of the text to its primary source, Prop. 201 of Proclus' *Elements of Theology*, describes noble soul's providential power over natural bodies

⁵³⁴ There has been one study of contraction in Giles of Rome by Catana in his *The Concept of Contractio in Giordano Bruno's Philosophy*, p 103-32. Catana also includes there a discussion of the reception of Giles' *De causis* commentary in the Renaissance. For a concept of contraction in another thinker after Giles, see J. Hopkins, *Nicholas of Cusa's Metaphysics of Contraction* (Minneapolis, MS: The Arthur J. Banning Press, 1987).

⁵³⁵ See Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 2 (P f. 8vb; V f. 8vH): "His visis dicamus quod licet non sit ordo deorum secundum ordinem abstractorum, ut posuit Plato, iuvamur tamen per hec dicta Platonis ad intelligendum aliquas veritates, propter quod sciendum quod est dare unum verum Deum qui est ipsum esse purum, non determinatum ad aliquod predicamentum, non contractum ad aliquod genus entium. Et quia illud esse est sic non limitatum sed est quoddam pelagus interminatum, in illo esse continetur omne esse et per consequens in illo esse continentur omnes perfectiones"; and Prop. 6 (P f. 21rb; V f. 23vL): "Omne autem participans esse determinatur ad specialem modum essendi, quia hoc dicit particulare quasi partem capere. Illud ergo participat esse quod non habet esse in suo pelago, sed habet esse contractum et determinatum." These texts are translated and discussed below. Citations of Giles' *Super De causis* are from the ms. Paris, BnF, 16122 [P], but I also include references to the commonly-used early modern printed edition of Giles' commentary prepared in Venice, apud Iacobum Zoppinum, 1550 [V]. At times when both P and V have faulty readings, I correct them with ms. Vat. lat. 831, which contains a 14th c. copy of Giles' commentary.

⁵³⁶ See, for example, Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 3, p. 18.8-21 and 20.5-11.

as a cause of the motions of the heavens.⁵³⁷ But, as we saw in the previous chapter, Thomas ultimately calls this understanding of noble soul's divinity into question, first, by questioning the existence of noble soul on the grounds that celestial souls are not affirmed by the faith,⁵³⁸ and second, through the correction of Ps.-Dionysius, who, Thomas says, "understands divinity only in virtue of the connection to God, not in virtue of universal influence", and judges in the end, that "the former is more properly divine".⁵³⁹ Giles, conversely, willingly takes up the Platonic meaning of noble soul's divinity and uses this to develop his central interest in Prop. 3: the hierarchy and operations of the angels who through noble soul's divine operation are the intellectual source of nature's order and governance.⁵⁴⁰

Giles' understanding that noble souls and intelligences are angels will be the focus of Ch. 5, and our focus here will be on his use of the Platonic doctrines Thomas introduces into the commentary tradition of Prop. 3 to develop his account of the hierarchical structure of the cosmos that has noble soul at its centre, mediating between the orders of intelligence and bodies. Giles' discussions of participated *esse* as *contractio* take a distinctively hierarchical character, and it is indicative of this focus that Giles shifts the subject of Prop. 3 from being about participation, as Thomas indicates in his commentary,⁵⁴¹ to being about *connexio*:

After the author distinguishes the three kinds of causes or distinguishes the three-fold superior being which he adapts to three kinds of primary causes, namely to God, intelligences, and souls, in this part he continues about all these primary causes. To understand this, it should be considered that there are four things about these primary causes to be considered at present. The first [is] *connexio*, for all these causes are connected one to another.⁵⁴²

⁵³⁷ In Prop. 201 Proclus draws an explicit link between the divine soul's divine activity and its *providere*: "omnis enim anime hic est proprius effectus, alia autem secundum participationem ut intelligere et providere" (*Elementatio theologica*, ed. Boese, p. 98.16-17).

⁵³⁸ See Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 2, p. 16.10-18 and Prop. 3, p. 25.9-14.

⁵³⁹ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 3, p. 25.20-23: "sed divinitatem [Dionysius] accipit secundum coniunctionem ad Deum, non autem secundum universalem influentiam in creata. Illud enim est magis divinum". See the discussion of this passage in Ch. 3 above.

⁵⁴⁰ C. d'Ancona outlines the differences between Giles and Thomas' uses of the Platonists and Dionysius in Props. 3, 4, and 6 in "L'uso della *Sententia Dionysii* nel commento di S. Thommaso e Egidio Romano", p. 1-42.

⁵⁴¹ See Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 3, p. 17.1-7.

⁵⁴² Giles, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P, 9va; V f. 9rA-v): "Postquam Auctor distinguit tria genera causarum vel distinxit triplex esse superius quod adaptavit ad tria genera primarum causarum, videlicet ad Deum, intelligencias, et animas, in parte ista exequitur de omnibus hiis primariis causis. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum quod circa has primarias causas quantum ad presens spectat quatuor sunt consideranda. Primo, *connexio*. Sunt

As throughout his commentary, there is evidence here that Giles has Thomas' *divisio textus* before him as he identifies that the purpose of Prop. 2 is to "*distinguit tria genera causarum vel distinxit triplex esse superius*" while Thomas says that it is to "*divisit tres gradus superiorum entium*".⁵⁴³ Both authors contrast the work of Prop. 2 as it distinguishes between the three kinds of superior beings to the work of Prop. 3 which explains how the primary beings are related to one another. For Thomas, this relationship is one of participation, and while Giles evidently wishes to emphasize a similar theme, he does so by foregrounding the language of "connection".

Giles' understanding of *connexio* also involves the concept of participation, but with a focus on the hierarchical structure of the universe.⁵⁴⁴ The universe is connected, Giles says, because superior are present in inferior things by participation".⁵⁴⁵ There is a difference here between Giles' understanding of this participation by which the universe is connected and the participated *esse* which is Thomas' principal object in Prop. 3. Participation in the *connexio universi* signifies for Giles not only the participation between creatures and their divine source—the fundamental and truest meaning of participation for Thomas in Prop. 3—but also their relationships and connections to one another. And nowhere is the participatory relationships between creatures more evident in Giles' commentary than in his discussion of noble soul as the mediator of divine providence to the world of bodies. Accordingly, where Thomas identifies the Platonic character of noble soul's divine and providential operations, but then calls these themes into question, Giles freely incorporates them into his understanding of noble soul's cosmic office as a celestial mover.

There are, then, two concepts at the heart of Giles' commentary on the *De causis* which he uses Platonic doctrine to articulate: *contractio*, and *connexio*. These two are relative

enim omnes hee cause ad invicem connexe." Compare this to Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 3, p. 17.1-7, quoted below.

⁵⁴³ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 3, p. 17.17: "Quia ea quae sunt superiorum, inferioribus insunt secundum aliqualem participationem, postquam divisit tres gradus superiorum entium, quorum unum est superius aeternitate, quod est Deus, aliud autem est cum aeternitate, quod est intelligentia, tertium autem post aeternitatem, quod est anima, nunc intendit ostendere quomodo tertium participat et quod est primi et quod est secundi". See the discussion of this passage in Ch. 3 above.

⁵⁴⁴ In his commentary on Prop. 30(29), Giles contrasts the *connexio universi* with the *ordo universi*. He says there that while the order of the universe gives an account of the series of beings and their arrangement, the connection of the universe, which is through what beings share with one another, provides the meaning of that order. See Giles, *Super De causis*, Prop. 30 (P f. 86ra-b; V f. 101rH-v); discussed further below.

⁵⁴⁵ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 9vb; V f. 9vB): "universum est conexum, quia superiora reservantur in inferioribus participative". See the more complete quotation and discussion of this passage below.

to the two aspects of the doctrine of the forms that emerge through Thomas' discussion of Prop. 3: first there is the participation by which beings share their perfections from the ordered series of separately subsisting forms,⁵⁴⁶ and second, there is the participation binding together the four-fold division of reality—bodies participate souls, which participate intelligences, which participate the intelligible forms.⁵⁴⁷ Thomas adapts the first through Ps.-Dionysius to his doctrine of participated *esse*,⁵⁴⁸ but he rejects the second, emphasizing rather the direct and primary participatory relationship of each creature to the source of its *esse* over the secondary influences and relationships of creatures to one another.⁵⁴⁹ Giles, rather, incorporates both sides of Platonic participation into his understanding of the origin and order of created beings: first, the *contractio* by which creatures participate *esse* and come to exist in a hierarchy of created substances, and second, the *connexio* which structure that order.

Giles' understanding of noble soul forges a link between these two central concepts to which this chapter's two parts are dedicated: 1) the first part on *contractio* considers the manner in which Giles' account of participated *esse* emphasizes the hierarchical dimensions of the combination of *esse* and *essentia* in creatures, 2) while the second part on *connexio*, describes the mediatory place of noble soul in that hierarchy of contractions as it participates the power of divine providence in the interconnection of the created order.

1. *Contractio*

In Giles' commentary on *De causis*, Prop. 4, he describes the multiplication of the simplicity of *esse* into a hierarchy of created beings that each take a part of the fullness of what *esse* is in itself. At the heart of this discussion is Giles' understanding of the creaturely participation of *esse* as a *contractio*.⁵⁵⁰ The divine *esse* is uncontracted, which is to say, it is

⁵⁴⁶ See Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 3, p. 18.8-21.

⁵⁴⁷ See Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 3, p. 18.21-19.9

⁵⁴⁸ See Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 3, p. 20.11-21.

⁵⁴⁹ See Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 3, p. 25.16-24.

⁵⁵⁰ For examples of Giles' use of the words *contractio*, *contrahere*, *contractus*, etc., see the discussions below of *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 2 (P f. 8vb-9ra; V f. 8vV) and Prop. 4 (P f. 15rb-va; V 16vY). Giles also uses the language of contraction to describe any example of something "higher" being received in something "lower", as for example forms received by the superior intelligences verses those same forms received by noble soul. See Prop. 10 (P f. 32rb; V f. 37rH): "Omne quod recipitur in aliquo recipitur per modum rei recipientis. Ergo que recipiuntur in intelligentiis inferioribus recipiuntur modo inferiori, et contracto, et particulari. Que vero recipiuntur in superioribus recipiuntur modo excellentiori et excellenti et universali. Intelligentie ergo secunde intelligunt per species intelligibiles inferiores, et particulares, et contractas, intelligentie vero prime per species

limited by no extrinsic nature or essence and contains no parts or passions; God, alone, simply is. By contrast, a creature is *something*; creatures do not exist simply, but according to their natures. In this way, the *esse* of a creature is contracted by the nature or *essentia* which receives it. Or, to use Giles' etymological definition of *participare*, the essence of a creature "takes a part" (*partem capere*) of what *esse* is according to itself.⁵⁵¹

It is evident, then, that Giles' account of participated *esse* necessarily involves his famous doctrine of the "real difference" between *esse* and *essentia* in creatures.⁵⁵² If what it is to be created involves both the *esse* bestowed upon them by the first cause and the *essentia* which participates and contracts that *esse*, then these elements must be really distinct if they are to enter combination. It was Giles' emphasis on this difference that provoked Henry of Ghent's criticism of him at the beginning of their public dispute with one another which we will examine further below in order to clarify Giles' position.⁵⁵³

It is on the basis of this difference and relation between *esse* and *essentia* that Giles explains the multiplication of *esse* into an ordered hierarchy of creatures in his commentary on Prop. 4. If each creature is a finite *esse*, which is to say that it takes only a part of *esse*, there must follow from the creative act a multitude of beings that are each different from one

universales et minus contractas"; and Prop. 14 (P f. 91va; V f. 47vQ): "Ymaginabimur ergo quod forme ut sunt in intelligentiis supremis sunt modo valde universali unito et simplici, ut autem sunt in rebus sensibilibus sunt modo valde particulari et contracto. Sed ut sunt in intelligentiis infimis, quas vocant celorum animas, sunt quasi modo medio". See the discussion of these passages in Ch. 5 below.

⁵⁵¹ See Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 6 (P f. 21rb; V f. 23vL), quoted above, and *Theoremata de esse et essentia*, Theorem 1, p. 2.8-13: "Nam hoc est participare quasi partem capere, secundum quod inferiora superiora participant. Nam quod est inferius et particulare secundum suum totum ambitum comprehendere non potest id quod est superius et universale. Sic etiam et materia participat perfectionem formae". See also Theorem 4, p. 17.1-27; *Quaestiones de esse et essentia*, q. 9, f. 19ra, and Porro's discussion of these passages in "Egidio Romano, la tradizione procliana", p. 319-20 and 325.

⁵⁵² For Giles of Rome's own account of the "real difference", see *Theoremata de esse et essentia*, Theorems 5, 6, 12, 16, and 19. See also Porro's history of the controversy about the Platonic character of the real difference and in the writings of Giles and Thomas Aquinas in the 20th century in "Egidio Romano, la tradizione procliana", p. 308-13. See also J.F. Wippel, "The Relationship between Essence and Existence in Late-Thirteenth-Century Thought: Giles of Rome, Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines and James of Viterbo", in P. Morewedge (ed.), *Philosophies of Existence. Ancient and Medieval* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1982), p. 131-64.

⁵⁵³ There is an extensive literature on the controversy between Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent. See especially the introduction, texts, and translations of C. König-Pralong, "Introduction", in Henri de Gand, Gilles de Rome, Godefroid de Fontaines, *Être, essence & contingence* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2006), p. 7-98. For discussions of their controversy with specific relevance to the interpretation of Prop. 4 of the *Liber de causis*, see P. Porro, "Henri de Gand, Gilles de Rome et la quatrième proposition du *De causis*"; Idem, "The University of Paris in the Thirteenth Century", p. 286-98, and Idem, "Egidio Romano, la tradizione procliana", p. 327-35. See also the collection of essays on the topic, V. Cordonier, T. Suarez-Nani (eds), *L'Aristotélisme exposé. Aspects du débat philosophique entre Henri de Gand et Gilles de Rome* (Fribourg: Academic Press Fribourg, 2014).

another insofar as each has a different part of *esse*. Moreover, this multitude of beings must fall into a hierarchy that is ordered by degree of perfection, for if each creature takes a different portion of *esse*, then each portion is more or less perfect as each nature participates more or less of what pure *esse* is in itself. For this reason, there is not only a multitude of created beings, but a hierarchy are ordered in a sequence by degree of similitude to the first cause which descends from the most perfect and simple of the intelligences down to the most divided and composite of bodies.

Giles' account of the contraction of *esse* in creatures centres, then, on his understanding of the relationship between the *esse* that is God in himself, and the *esse* that is each creature. Giles helpfully characterizes the distinction between these two according to Proclus' three modes of wholeness from the *Elements of Theology*:

It should be said that Proclus, in Prop. 67 of his book, distinguishes three kinds of wholeness, saying that "every totality is either before the parts, or is from the parts, or is in the parts." For whole *esse* according to itself is either whole as a cause, or whole as an existence, or whole as a participation.⁵⁵⁴

Esse is understood to be "whole" in three different ways, as a cause, as an existence, or as a participation. Pasquale Porro points out that Giles is also drawing here on another Proclean triad, that of the participant-participated-unparticipated, which he relates explicitly with Prop. 67 in his *Commentary on Book I of the Sentences*.⁵⁵⁵ *Esse* as a cause is the whole before the parts (*ante partes*) which is the unparticipated divine being. By contrast, *esse* as an existent is the created things (*res*) that each participates in *esse* and thus are a whole from the parts (*ex*

⁵⁵⁴ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 22 (P f. 62va; V f. 74rF): "Dicendum quod Proclus in 67 propositione sui libri distinguit triplicem totalitatem dicens quod omnis totalitas aut est ante partes aut est ex partibus aut in parte. Esse enim totum secundum ipsum, vel est [est *iter.*] totum secundum causam, vel totum secundum existentiam vel totum secundum participationem." For a complete list of the propositions of the *Elements of Theology* that Giles references in his commentary, see Battagliero, "Egidio Romano, Proclus e il *Liber de causis*", p.126-27.

⁵⁵⁵ See Proclus, *Elements of Theology*, Prop. 24 (ed. Boese), p. 16-17. Giles refers to the three modes of wholeness in terms of the triad of participation in *Ordinatio in I Sententia*, dist. 8, q. 2, art. 1 (ed. Venice, 1521), f. 54rC: "Ut ergo possimus scire quae sunt composita et quae non, sciendum est, quod est triplex totalitas, ut narrat Proclus 66. [sic] prop., scilicet ex partibus, in parte et ante partes. Haec autem sic distinguuntur: nam quaedam res participant esse, quaedam sunt ipsum esse participatum, quaedam est esse impartecipabile. Res, quae participat esse, est totum ex partibus, quia constat ex quod est et esse; esse participatum est totum in parte, quia omne quod recipitur in aliquo recipitur secundum modum rei recipientis. Cum igitur tale esse sit receptum in alio, non recipietur secundum sui totalitatem, nec secundum totum suum esse, sed recipietur secundum partem, unde si totum dicitur, non erit totum ut totum, sed totum ut pars. Totum ante partes est esse divinum, nam Deus in se totum comprehendit esse, quod esse a partibus non dependet, propter quod totum ante partes dicitur [...]." See Porro's discussion of this passage in "Egidio Romano, la tradizione procliana", p. 317.

partibus) of *esse* and *essentia*. And thus, finally, *esse* as participated is the whole in the parts (*in parte*) which is received according to an existent's nature or essence.⁵⁵⁶ To summarize, the *esse* that is each creature is a participation of the *esse* bestowed by the *esse* which is God in himself.

Giles' use of Proclus here is indicative of the distinctively Platonic character of his account of participated *esse*, a feature that has been discussed prominently in the literature.⁵⁵⁷ Contraction begins, for Giles, with an understanding of God as the unparticipated *esse* before the parts that is formulated using the Platonic doctrine of the forms. Then Giles uses the Platonic notion of participation to express how it is that particular creatures come to contract and therefore multiply the *esse* that is simple according to itself. In the discussion of contraction that follows we will consider first the uncontracted *esse* of God which contains all existence and perfection in itself. Then we will turn to Giles' account of participation to see how the simplicity of *esse* is multiplied as beings contact it within their natures, falling into an ordered hierarchy of beings.

1.1. The Divine *Pelagus*: Uncontracted *Esse*

Central to Giles' account of *contractio* is his characterization of God as a *pelagus*, a boundless ocean that contains in itself the perfection of every *esse*, of those that exist, those that could exist, and even "beyond what can exist".⁵⁵⁸ In his commentary on Prop.2, Giles

⁵⁵⁶ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 22 (P f. 62va; V f. 74rF): "Toti enim secundum causam competit totalitas ante partes. Toti autem secundum existentiam competit totalitas ex partibus, sed toti secundum participationem competit totalitas in parte. Omne enim quod est vel est participans perfectionem, vel est perfectio participata, vel est perfectio pura, perfectioni autem pure competit totalitas secundum causam, sive totalitas ante partes, participantem autem perfectionem competit totalitas secundum existentiam, sive totalitas ex partibus, sed perfectioni participate competit totalitas secundum participationem sive totalitas in parte."

⁵⁵⁷ Porro discusses the emergence of the focus on Giles' Platonism in early 20th century in "Egidio Romano, la tradizione procliana", p. 308-13. For Porro's own discussion of Giles' use of Proclus in his doctrine of participation, see p. 338-39. See also G. Trapè, "Il platonismo di Egidio Romano", in *Aquinas* 7 (1964), p. 309-44; Idem, "Il neoplatonismo di Egidio Romano", (1966); Idem, "La dottrina della partecipazione in Egidio Romano", in *Aquinas* 10 (1967), p. 170-93; Idem, "Caratteristiche dell'esse partecipato in Egidio Romano", *Lateranum* 34 (1968), p. 351-68; Idem, "L'esse partecipato e distinzione reale in Egidio Romano", *Aquinas* 12 (1969), p. 443-68; Idem, "Causalità e partecipazione in Egidio Romano", in *Augustinianum* 9/1 (1969), p. 91-117; L.M. de Rijk, "Introduction", p. xxxiii-liv. For more examples of how Giles uses Proclus both positively and critically in his *De causis* commentary, see Battagliero, "Egidio Romano, Proclus e il *Liber de causis*", p. 127-36.

⁵⁵⁸ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, see Prop. 16 (P f. 97va; V f. 55rU-X): "Alio modo dicitur infinitum quod caret termino perfectionis non propter perfectionis defectum, sed propter perfectionis excellentiam. Nam si esset aliquod quod tantum haberet de perfectione, quod non determinaretur ad aliquod genus perfectionis, sed esset quoddam pelagus substantie infinitum, et haberet in se perfectiones omnium generum, non solum que sunt, sed etiam que possunt esse et etiam, si dici potest, ultra quam esse possunt, tale quid esset infinitum, quia non haberet terminum et finem perfectionis, non propter perfectionis carentiam, sed propter perfectionis

first explains that God contains all perfection and *esse* in himself.⁵⁵⁹ Doing so, he follows Thomas Aquinas' example and introduces the notion by way of the Platonic forms, which contain for Giles an insight into the relationship between uncontracted infinity of the divine *esse* and every other perfection.

Giles understands that in the hierarchy of separate forms according to Plato, the more universal pre-contains whatever perfection is present in the more particular. Now for Giles, according to reality, the opposite is the case, for every species contains its own perfection in addition to what belongs to its genus, but not the other way around.⁵⁶⁰ For example, "human" contains its genus "animal" as well as its specific difference, "rational". This fact is true, however, in every case save one: the perfection of the divine *esse* which is both the most universal and contains in itself every other perfection, and Giles thinks that the Platonic doctrine of the forms is useful for understanding this relation:

But were such perfections to have abstract *esse*, as if there were a separate "animal", and a separate "man", and as if there were a separate "to be" and a separate "to live" that would be really different from such [separate] *esse*—which is the doctrine Plato seemed to posit—then that [separate] animal would be "man" in a more eminent way, and that separate man would be "animal" by participation. For that separate animal would have more eminently whatever was proper to man, but man would not have everything that is proper to animal, but would [only] participate animal. So also that separate *esse* would have in itself whatever is proper to being. And because every "to live" is also a certain "to be", that "to be" would more eminently have in itself whatever belongs to life, such that that "to be", by the fact that it would be every "to be", would be every "to live", but that separate "to live" would not be every "to be", but would participate "to be", because although every "to live" is

excellentiam. Tale quid infinitum est ipse deus". Giles returns to this image throughout the commentary, and in addition to the examples quoted from Props. 2, 6, and Prop. 18 quoted below see also where Giles calls God an "infinite intelligible ocean" at Prop. 19 (P f. 99ra; V f. 64rM): "Deus vero non solum plus habet de intellectualitate quam alia, sed est quoddam intelligibile pelagus infinitum, quia infinitum est suum intellectuale lumen"; and an "infinite ocean of goodness" at Prop. 22 (P f. 65ra; V f. 76vZ): "Deus est quoddam infinitum pelagus bonitatis et offert se totum cuilibet rei". The image of God as a *pelagus* of being and goodness comes from John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* I.9 (ed. Buytaert), p. 48.14-49.17: "Igitur videtur quidem omnibus principalius eorum quae in Deo dicuntur nominibus esse 'qui est' [...] 'Totum enim in seipso comprehendens habet esse, velut quoddam pelagus substantiae infinitum et indeterminatum'."

⁵⁵⁹ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 2 (P f. 8vb; V f. 8rS): "Et quia illud esse est sic non limitatum, sed est quoddam pelagus interminatum, in illo esse continetur omne esse et per consequens in illo esse continentur omnes perfectiones." See the more complete quotation of this passage below.

⁵⁶⁰ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 2 (P f. 8va; V f. 8rQ): "Et inde est quod quilibet species habundat in aliqua perfectione ultra suum genus et addit aliquam differentiam supra ipsum. Inde est etiam quod omnia genera sunt in potentia respectu specierum et habent rationem materie si ponantur in diffinitione earum. Species vero actualiter continet in se quicquid perfectionis est in ipsis generibus."

presupposed in every “to be”, every “to be” is not presupposed in every “to live”.⁵⁶¹

If the more universal forms, such as “animal” and “*esse*” were to have actual and distinct existence, then the more they would contain in themselves everything implied in the more particular forms that participate them. What “human” has, “animal” would already possess according to itself in a higher way, while “human” would only have that it is “animal” by participation. This state of affairs, for Giles, is clearly not the case. Forms have no separate existence apart from their particulars and while every living thing possesses the perfection “to live”, the abstraction of that form exists separately only in the mind. There is, for Giles, though, one exception to this criticism of the separate forms, and that is the *ipsum esse* of the first principle.

While the Platonists are incorrect to posit an order of forms according to the order of abstraction, “we are”, Giles says “nevertheless aided by this saying of Plato in understanding certain truths”, for the entire order of perfections is pre-contained in God who is “pure *esse* itself”:

With these things in view, let us say that although there is no order of gods according to the order of abstractions, as Plato posited,⁵⁶² we are nevertheless aided

⁵⁶¹ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 2 (P f. 8va-b; V f. 8rQ-S): “Sed si huiusmodi perfectiones haberent esse abstractum, ut si esset dare animal separatum, et hominem separatum, et esset dare esse separatum, et vivere separatum quod esset aliud realiter a tali esse, quam doctrinam visus est Plato ponere, illud animal esset homo excellenter, et ille homo separatus esset animal participative. Haberet enim illud animal separatum excellenter quicquid esset de ratione hominis, sed homo non haberet quicquid esset de ratione animalis, sed participaret animal. Sic etiam illud esse separatum haberet in se quicquid esset de ratione entis. Et quia omne vivere est aliquid esse, excellenter in se haberet illud esse quicquid esset de ratione vite, ita quod illud esse eo ipso quod esset, omne esse esset omne vivere, sed illud vivere separatum non esset omne esse, sed participaret esse, quia licet in omni esse claudatur omne vivere, tamen in omni vivere non clauditur omne esse.” In order to clarify the ambiguity between the words *esse* and *ens*, in this chapter, I will most often leave *esse* untranslated or will translate it as “to be” while I will translate *ens* as “being”. For the most part, then, “being” refers to an existent while *esse* to a perfection, or act.

⁵⁶² When Giles equates here the order of separate forms with the order of gods, it is clear that as in Thomas’ discussions of the forms in his *De causis* commentary, Giles is understanding of the Platonic doctrine of the forms has been elaborated through Proclus’ *Elements of Theology* which, as Henle points out, is the source that confirms that when Ps.-Dionysius criticizes the doctrine that *per se* living, *per se* wise, *per se* good, and so on are each distinct gods, this is a doctrine that belongs to the Platonic tradition (see Henle, *Saint Thomas and Platonism*, p. 413). In a passage related to the one above Giles more clearly associates Proclus and Plato on this position when, asking how it is the case that *vivere* and *intelligere* can be contained by the principle that precedes it, since as we know, “inferior things are not actually in higher things, while higher things are in lower things”, Giles explains that the *De causis* sometimes proceeds in a Platonic way since “this book was exacted from a book of Proclus, and Proclus was a complete Platonist.” See Giles of Rome, *Super de causis*, Prop. 12 (P f. 39rb; V f. 40vE): “Dubitaret forte aliquis quomodo vivere et intelligere reservantur in esse. Hoc enim non videtur verum, quia inferiora non sunt actu in superioribus, licet superiora sint in inferioribus. In esse enim non includitur vivere, licet in vivere includatur esse. Auctor tamen videtur dicere quod quodlibet in quolibet includatur. Dicendum

by these sayings of Plato in understanding certain truths. For this reason, it should be understood that there is one true God who is pure *esse* itself, not determined to any category [and] not contracted to any genus of beings. And because that *esse* is not limited in this way, but is a kind of boundless ocean, every *esse* is contained in that *esse*, and consequently, every perfection is contained in that *esse*. But these perfections are not contained there in a participative and contracted way, but in an eminent and infinite way.⁵⁶³

Because the divine *esse* is, in fact, a separately existing perfection (although Giles is not calling it a genus), in this single case, what Plato says about the relationships between superior and inferior forms is true. The pure and infinite *esse* of the first cause, without any limits or specifications of any kind, contains in itself the entire hierarchy of perfections that have no separate existence of their own. When participated in creatures, these perfections contain only a measure of the perfection of the unlimited perfection of the single divine form above them, but they are not pre-possessed in the divine *esse* according to this limitation:

Thus, God is pure *esse* itself, uncontracted, and is all perfections, not as such (*tales*) but [in a way] beyond them (*super tales*). And because eternal, just, wise, and living are beneath *esse*, these [and] the rest should be transferred to God in a certain eminence so that God is called the infinite *esse* itself. And because this is so, since just, wise, living, and eternal [each] denote a certain *esse* and are not all *esse*, God is not just, but above just, not living, but above living, not eternal, but above eternal. God, therefore, is the cause of all these, insofar as they denote a certain *esse*, and he is all these things super-eminently as they are comprehended in *esse* itself.⁵⁶⁴

quod liber iste extractus est ex libro Procli, et ille Proclus fuit totus Platonius. Propter quod multe probationes hic inducuntur per modum platonium. Si ergo esse et vivere et intelligere essent perfectiones abstracte, ut posuit Plato, quodlibet istorum reservaretur in quodlibet. Hoc enim posito, illud esse esset perfectius quam vivere, et vivere perfectius quam sapere, vel quam intelligere. Vivere ergo esset perfectius in ipso esse quam in seipso. Esset ergo vivere in esse per modum entis, idest modo excellentiori, et esset esse in vivere modo participativo. Quodlibet ergo esset in quolibet per modum cuiuslibet. Non ergo adducuntur hic ista verba ut vera sit opinio Platonis, sed ut per opinionem Platonis intelligatur hec veritas, quomodo quodlibet reservatur in quolibet. Multe enim opiniones philosophorum in se non sunt vere, que tamen iuvant intellectum nostrum ad intelligendum aliquam veritatem". See Porro's discussion of this passage in "Egidio Romano, la tradizione procliana", p. 317.

⁵⁶³ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 2 (P f. 8vb; V f. 8vR-S): "His visis dicamus quod licet non sit ordo deorum secundum ordinem abstractorum, ut posuit Plato, iuvamur tamen per hec dicta Platonis ad intelligendum aliquas veritates, propter quod sciendum quod est dare unum verum Deum qui est ipsum esse purum, non determinatum ad aliquod predicamentum, non contractum ad aliquod genus entium. Et quia illud esse est sic non limitatum sed est quoddam pelagus interminatum, in illo esse continentur omne esse et per consequens in illo esse continentur omnes perfectiones. Sed non continentur ibi perfectiones ille participative et contracte sed excellenter et infinite." See also where Giles describes God as a sea (*mare*) of perfection in his later work, *De ecclesiastica potestate*, II.2 (ed. R.W. Dyson), p. 288, where he compares the uncontracted power of the pope to the uncontracted perfection of divine *esse*. See below in Ch. 5.5.

⁵⁶⁴ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 2 (P f. 8vb-9ra; V f. 8vV): "Ideo Deus est ipsum esse purum non contractum et est omnes perfectiones non tales sed super tales. Et quia eternum, iustum, vivens, sapiens sunt infra esse, cetera talia transferenda sunt ad Deum in quadam excellentia ut dicatur deus ipsum esse infinitum. Et

Giles proceeds here in a way very similar to Thomas Aquinas' commentary on Prop. 3, where Thomas, after summarizing through Proclus his understanding of the Platonic hierarchy of separate forms, looks to Dionysius to return these perfections to the first cause: "all these [goodness, *esse*, life, etc.] are essentially the first cause of all things itself, from which things participate all such perfections."⁵⁶⁵ And thus, there are not many gods, but one, and "since God is *esse* itself and the very essence of goodness, whatever belongs to the perfection of goodness and *esse* belongs essentially to him as a whole, so that he is the essence of life, wisdom, power, and the rest."⁵⁶⁶

Like Aquinas, Giles contrasts Plato's order of separate abstracted perfections with the one true God who is *esse* itself and contains every perfection: the eternal, the just, the wise, the living, and every other perfection. However, Giles' use of Plato's doctrine *ad intelligendum aliquas veritates* exhibits a more positive use of the Platonic doctrine than that of Thomas.⁵⁶⁷ For as we saw in the previous chapter, Thomas only incorporates the structure of Platonic participation through the corrective of Dionysius, but as D'Ancona points out, this common theme — "*Plato posuit*" but "*corrigit Dionysius*" — is entirely absent from Giles' commentary.⁵⁶⁸ Of course, this fact does not imply that Giles disagrees with Thomas' criticisms (as Giles says, "there is no order of gods according to the order of abstractions"),⁵⁶⁹ but he is clearly not interested in dwelling here on the reasons why Plato's theory is

quia sic est, cum iustum, sapiens, et vivens, et eternum dicant quoddam esse et non dicant omne esse, Deus non est iustus sed super iustus, non vivens sed super vivens, non sapiens sed super sapiens, non eternus sed super eternus. Deus igitur est causa omnium istorum, ut dicunt quoddam esse, et est omnia ista super excellenter, ut comprehenduntur in ipso esse."

⁵⁶⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 3, p. 20.5-11: "Oportet enim dicere quod omnia ista sunt essentialiter ipsa prima omnium causa a qua res participant omnes huiusmodi perfectiones, et sic non ponemus multos deos sed unum." See the discussion of this passage and the next in Ch. 3 above.

⁵⁶⁶ Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 3, p. 20.15-21: "Quomodo autem hoc esse possit, ex hoc ostendit consequenter quia, cum Deus sit ipsum esse et ipsa essentia bonitatis, quidquid pertinent ad perfectionem bonitatis et esse, totum ei essentialiter convenit, ut scilicet ipse sit essentia vitae et sapientiae et virtutis et ceterorum. Unde post aliqua subdit: *Etenim Deus non quodammodo est existens, sed simpliciter et incircumscripse totum in seipso esse praecepit.*"

⁵⁶⁷ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 2 (P f. 8vb; V f. 8rS): "iuvamur tamen per hec dicta Platonis ad intelligendum aliquas veritates". See also the similar comment from Prop. 12 quoted more completely above (P f. 39rb; V f. 40vE): "Multe enim opiniones philosophorum in se non sunt vere, que tamen iuvant intellectum nostrum ad intelligendum aliquam veritatem".

⁵⁶⁸ See Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 3, p. 18.8 and p. 20.5; and D'Ancona, "L'uso della *Sententia Dionysii* nel commento di S. Thommaso e Egidio Romano", p. 6.

⁵⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

incorrect. Instead, Giles freely uses the relationship between the Platonic forms as an analogy for the relationship between participated perfections and the divine *esse*.⁵⁷⁰

1.2. The Contraction of *Esse* in *Essentia*

If God's *esse* is like an infinite *pelagus*, then the *esse* of creatures is like a small measure of that ocean contained and contracted within a small vessel. According to this image, Giles characterizes the act of creation as one in which God pours the entirety of his infinite *esse* over each creature, which, using the language of the *De causis*, can only be received in the mode of the receiver.⁵⁷¹ This means, for Giles, that each creature contracts the ocean of *esse* into the limits of its nature, "taking a part" (*partem capere*) of its fullness.⁵⁷² See, for example, Giles' use of the image in the following two passages:

Everything participating *esse* is determined to a special mode of existing because this is called "to particularize" as if to take a part (*partem capere*). Thus, that which does not have *esse* in its own ocean (*pelago*), participates *esse*, but has an *esse* [that is] contracted and determined.⁵⁷³

No caused thing is able to receive that infinite ocean (*pelagus*) of perfection. For if infinite water were to offer itself to a single small vessel, that small vessel would not be able to take (*capere*) that entire infinity of water, but would participate a certain small amount. In this way, the divine goodness offers all of itself to each effect.

⁵⁷⁰ Giles makes a similar positive use of the platonic doctrine of the forms in *Theoremata de esse et essentia*, Theorem 5 (ed. Hocedez) p. 23.4-9: "Ipsa ergo idea, secundum Platonem, erat ipsa forma separata per se existens, et ab idea fiebat generatio, prout ab ipsa forma separata participatur forma in materia, sic intellegamus Deum esse quoddam esse per se existens separatum et ab eo esse creationem rerum, prout ab illo esse separato participatur et fluit esse in essentia creaturae."

⁵⁷¹ *Liber de causis*, Prop. 9(10) (ed. Pattin), p. 72.46-9: "similiter aliqua ex rebus non recipit quod est supra eam nisi per modum secundum quem potest recipere ipsum, non per modum secundum quem est res recepta."

⁵⁷² Giles also returns frequently to the image of light, which in its brilliance contains all colours, while each specific colour is but a measure of that light, contracted, obscured, and shadowed. For one example, see Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 2 (P f. 8vb; V f. 8vS-V): "Et si bene volumus ymaginari quomodo omnes perfectiones sunt in Deo, intelligamus quomodo omnes colores sunt in luce. Lux enim dicit lucem in sua claritate, sed color dicit lucem contractam et obumbratam et opacatam. Et quia in luce clara comprehenduntur omnes gradus lucis obumbrate et oppaccate, in luce continetur omnis color, et lux est omnis color non contracte sed super excellenter. Et si vellemus colores ad lucem transferre, diceremus quod lux non est alba sed super alba, non color sed super color. Et inter ceteros autem colores album magis potest transferri ad lucem, quia magis participat de luce et minus dicit privationem lucis. Alii autem colores, propter assimilationem quam habent cum nigro cuius nomen dicitur esse impositum a privatione lucis, non sic proprie possunt transferri ad lucem. Ergo vel color generaliter sumptus vel album transferuntur ad lucem non secundum se sed super excellenter. Sicut ergo album et universiliter color dicunt lucem contractam propter quod lux non est color sed super color, lux non est alba sed super alba, sic omnis perfectio infra esse videtur dicere quoddam esse contractum."

⁵⁷³ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 6 (P f. 21rb; V f. 23vL): "Omne autem participans esse determinatur ad specialem modum essendi, quia hoc dicit particulare quasi partem capere. Illud ergo participat esse quod non habet esse in suo pelago, sed habet esse contractum et determinatum."

However, no effect is able to take that whole, but one of the effects participates from the first goodness according to one mode, [another] to a different mode, and each according to its own mode.⁵⁷⁴

One also finds this etymological definition of *participare* in Thomas' writings, as, for example, in his commentary on the *De hebdomadibus*.⁵⁷⁵ In that case, though, Thomas immediately moves from the more imagistic definition of *partem capere* to the more conceptual definition: "something received in a particular way which belongs to another in a universal way". And as we saw in the previous chapter, Thomas distinguishes this definition again into three different kinds of participation.⁵⁷⁶ By contrast, one gets the impression from Giles' constant use of the image of the *pelagus*, that to "take a part", is, to his mind, the most fundamental meaning of participation.

And if creation really does consist of the contraction of *esse* in creaturely essence, then it follows for Giles that these two elements must be really distinct from one another. Giles articulates this requirement succinctly in his *Theoremata*:

Theorem 12: Everything that is except the first is not its own *esse*, but it has an essence really distinct from *esse*, and through one [thing] it is a being (*ens*), and through another [thing], it is an existence (*existens*).⁵⁷⁷

Theorem 13: Everything that is except the first, lest there be a procession into infinity, is a being (*ens*) by its essence, but it exists (*existit*) by the *esse* added to the essence or nature.⁵⁷⁸

⁵⁷⁴ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 18 (P f. 91vb; V f. 60vG): "Nam nulla res causata potest recipere illud infinitum pelagus perfectionis. Si enim infinita aqua offeret se uni modico vasi, illud modicum vas non posset capere illam totam aquam infinitam, sed aliquid modicum de illa participaret. Sic divina bonitas tota se offert cuilibet causatorum. Nullum tamen causatum potest ipsam totam capere, sed aliquod causatorum participat de bonitate primi secundum unum modum, ad secundum alium modum, et quodlibet secundum suum modum."

⁵⁷⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *In De hebdomadibus*, p. 271.71-73: "Est autem participare quasi partem capere. Et ideo quando aliquid particulariter recipit id quod ad alterum pertinet universaliter, dicitur participare illud".

⁵⁷⁶ See Thomas Aquinas, *In De hebdomadibus*, p. 271.74-85 discussed in Ch. 3 above.

⁵⁷⁷ Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de esse et essentia*, Theorem 12 (ed. Hocedez), p. 66.13-15: "Omne quod est citra primum non est suum esse sed habet essentiam realiter differentem ab esse et per aliud est ens et per aliud existens."

⁵⁷⁸ Giles of Rome, *Theoremata de esse et essentia*, Theorem 12 (ed. Hocedez), p. 78.1-3: "Omne quod est citra primum, ne fiat processus in infinitum, est ens per essentiam suam sed existit per esse superadditum essentiae vel naturae."

It is this requirement in Giles' teaching that plays such a central role in the controversy between him and Henry of Ghent which took place between 1276-87.⁵⁷⁹ We will look now to some of Henry's criticisms to draw out further what is distinctive in Giles' position.

Henry of Ghent's first *Quodlibet* (Advent 1276) which marks the beginning of their open conflict with one another, criticizes those who by a *falsa imaginatio* understand two points: first, that the essence of creatures is a substratum somehow independent of *esse* and, second, that *esse* is a form which the creature's essence participates.⁵⁸⁰ Both of these points are central to the position Giles articulates: *essentia* is to be understood as a passive principle like matter that is informed by the active principle *esse*.⁵⁸¹ Henry's own view is that essence is not some *res* independent of being, but rather an *intentio*, a concept which is abstracted by intellect that only has existence as a formal idea in the divine mind:

But a different way of understanding that a creature participates *esse* is by understanding the essence of the creature itself as something abstracted by the intellect, indifferent to *esse* and non-*esse*, which according to itself is a certain non-being (*non ens*), yet [it] has a formal idea in God through which a certain being is in God before it becomes a being in a proper nature [...].⁵⁸²

For Henry, the essence of a creature has no separate ontological status by which it could receive *esse*. In itself, it is a non-being, in the sense that it is indifferent to existing or not existing, although it is present in the mind of God before the act of creation. In the act of creation, this essence can be said to participate *esse*, but only in the sense that it is granted by

⁵⁷⁹ For a discussion of more examples of Giles' articulations of the real difference in texts besides his commentary on the *Liber de causis*, see Porro, "Egidio Romano, la tradizione procliana", p. 316-22.

⁵⁸⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet I*, q. 9 (ed. Macken), p. 48.34-45: "Hic primo ad excludendam falsam imaginationem de participatione esse [...], sciendum quod creaturam participare esse a Deo, qui est ipsum esse purum per essentiam, potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo intelligendo ipsam creaturae essentiam ut aliquid substratum, et ipsum esse quo participat, ut aliquid in illo receptum tamquam forma quaedam essendi, qua dicitur esse ad modum quo corpus dicitur esse album, recepta in se forma albedinis. Quod videntur sonare verba Boethii, cum dicit: Quod est, accepta essendi forma est atque subsistit. Hoc modo intelligunt creaturam participare esse illi qui dicunt quod in creaturis aliud est ipsa essentia creaturae, aliud vero re ipsum esse eius". On this passage see See Porro, "Egidio Romano, la tradizione procliana", p. 314.

⁵⁸¹ See Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 4 (P f. 12vb; V f. 13vB), quoted below.

⁵⁸² Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet I*, q. 9 (ed. Macken), p. 49.53-57: "Alius vero est modus intelligendi creaturam participare esse, intelligendo ipsam essentiam creaturae ut aliquid abstractum per intellectum, indifferens ad esse et non esse, quod de se est quoddam non ens, habens tamen formalem ideam in Deo, per quam in Deo est ens quoddam antequam fiat ens in propria natura".

the *ipsum esse purum* to have an *esse* which is a similitude of God shared from God himself.⁵⁸³

In this way, the *esse* participated is the uncreated *esse* of God himself.⁵⁸⁴

In *Quodlibet* X, Henry looks to *Liber de causis*, Prop. 4 to justify his understanding, arguing there that, according to this proposition, *esse* is not “the first created thing” in the sense that it is created before or separately from essence, but in that it is first among the intentions distinguished according to the order of thought.⁵⁸⁵ *Esse* is “first created” in the sense that the resolution of a composite always ends in *esse*. As Porro points out, this ends up meaning that “being something”, or having an essence, is a trait of *esse*, and not the other way around as it is for Giles: “l’être est une participation laquelle s’ajoute – comme intention ultérieure – la nature propre de chaque chose”⁵⁸⁶.

Henry presents exactly the opposite of Giles’ interpretation of Prop. 4 which, by contrast, depends on the understanding that *essentia* is the passive principle that receives the actuality of *esse*. Giles establishes the fundamental points of his interpretation of Prop. 4 in question 12 of his *Quaestiones de esse et essentia* which he formulates as a criticism of Henry’s use of that proposition. While Henry understands the first created *esse* to be an intention separate by thought from the essences of creatures, Giles argues rather that it is not the *esse* that enters into combination with *essentia*, but *esse* understood in the most common sense, and this fact follows for Giles from the judgement that the central question of Prop. 4 is actually the origin of multiplicity in *esse*.

⁵⁸³ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* I, q. 9 (ed. Macken), p. 49.59-67: “Quod factum est, in ipso vita erat, et quod tunc fit ens in actu, quando Deus ipsum sua potentia facit ad similitudinem suae ideae formalis, quam habet in se ipso, et quod ex hoc dicitur participare esse, quod est eius similitudo expressa in effectu ab illo esse puro quod Deus est. Quae quidem similitudo cadit in ipsa essentia rei, quia ipsa essentia rei, inquantum est quidam effectus Dei, est quaedam similitudo esse Dei; non autem est ipsa similitudo Dei qua esse participat creatura, aliquid praeter essentiam ipsius creaturae, differens re ab ipsa et ei impressa”.

⁵⁸⁴ Henry expands on his criticism of Giles’ real difference in Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* X, q. 7 (ed. Macken), p. 152.59-63: “esse essentiae non proprie dicitur addi essentiae, quia non est essentia proprie nisi illo esse, sed potius dicitur addi aliquo quod est de propria ratione generis sui, quod cum ratione esse constituit essentiam compositam ex quod est et esse, quod est ipsum quo est.” See Porro, “Henri de Gand, Gilles de Rome et la quatrième proposition du *De causis*”, p. 67-71.

⁵⁸⁵ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* X, q. 7 (ed. Macken), p. 171.16-172.26: “Cum enim in eodem secundum rem sint plures intentiones, scilicet esse, vivere, sentire, intelligere et aliae huiusmodi, esse ante se nullam aliam supponit et est propinquius esse primo puro et vero secundum naturam et intellectum. Si enim fiat resolutio compositi ex pluribus intentionibus, semper stabit resolutio in esse, et ideo est primum in omnibus quae procedunt a primo, et proprie causae primae effectus per creationis actum et nihil aliud in re. Esse enim in re est primus et simplex mentis conceptus ad nihil formatus vel determinatus, nec formativus nec determinativus alicuius alterius, quia nihil ipsum praecedit, sed formabilis et in quo incipit informabilitas per ea quae educuntur ab ipso.”

⁵⁸⁶ Porro, “Henri de Gand, Gilles de Rome et la quatrième proposition du *De causis*”, p. 70.

Another fundamental difference between Giles' understanding of Prop. 4 compared to Henry's is that for Giles, the purpose of this proposition is not, in the end, to discuss the "first created *esse*" according to itself, but rather to explain its multiplication. And neither, argues Giles, is the "first created *esse*" to be understood as that *esse* which enters into combination with *essentia*. Giles establishes this fundamental point in his *Quaestiones de esse et essentia* which he formulates as a criticism of Henry's use of that proposition,⁵⁸⁷ and expands upon it in his *De causis* commentary.

1.3. The Multiplication of Contracted *Esse* and the Problem of Bodies

Because the question of Prop. 4 for Giles is how *esse* becomes multiplied, this means that the *esse* which is "first created" refers, first of all, to *esse* as the unity in which the multiplicity of beings all share.⁵⁸⁸ And again, this "first created *esse*" is not the central concern of the proposition. The author wants, rather, "to go further from the *esse* which in itself is something one to how it is multiplied in intelligences and made a diversity of intelligences".⁵⁸⁹ It is in this question about *esse*'s multiplication that the combination of *esse* and *essentia* in creatures finally arises.

In his commentary on Prop. 4, Giles works from the multiplication of intelligences and down through the multiplications of souls and bodies into a hierarchy of beings that is

⁵⁸⁷ Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones de esse et essentia*, q. 12 (ed. Venice, 1503), f. 29ra: "Igitur Auctor De causis non accipit esse ut distinguitur contra essentiam, vel ut distinguitur contra quodcumque, sed accipit esse in omnimodi latitudine prout omnia comprehenduntur sub esse. Et sic exponendo quod prima rerum creaturarum est esse non habet locum de esse quod distinguitur ab essentia, secundum quod dicimus omnes res creatas esse compositas ex essentia et esse. Habita igitur intentione auctoris ratio est omnino praeter propositum." See Porro 2014, "Henri de Gand, Gilles de Rome et la quatrième proposition du *De causis*", p. 72-75. For a discussion of Henry's response to Giles in his *Quodlibet XI*, question 3, and the way that he argues Giles has misunderstood his real meaning, see Porro, "Henri de Gand, Gilles de Rome et la quatrième proposition du *De causis*", p. 75-77.

⁵⁸⁸ For Giles, this is to seek to understand that unity in which, following the principle of the first proposition of Proclus' *Elements of Theology*, the multiplicity of beings are unified. See Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 4 (P f. 12vb; V f. 13rA-v): "sciendum quod *omnis multitudo participat aequaliter uno*, ut dicit Proclus in prima propositione libri sui. Ex unitate ergo progressa est multitudo. Si ergo volumus determinare de multitudine, oportet nos videre in quo illa multitudo unitur, et quomodo aliquid unum sit plurificatum et facta sit multitudo. Et quia in esse uniuntur omnia entia et ex esse plurificato in entibus facta est multitudo entium, ideo Auctor volens determinare de multitudine entium, et specialiter de multitudine entium primorum, cuiusmodi sunt intelligentie, que tenent primum gradum in genere entium causatorum, incipit ab esse et proponit propositionem quod esse sit primum inter causata." See Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, Prop. 1 (ed. Boese), p. 3.

⁵⁸⁹ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 4 (P f. 12vb; V f. 13vA): "Tamen non videtur esse sua intentio principalis hic determinare de esse, sed ex esse, quod in se est quid unum, vult descendere, quomodo plurificatum est in intelligentiis et facta est diversitas intelligentiarum."

ordered according to the perfection of each creature's *essentia*. This multiplication begins among the intelligences in whom *esse* becomes multiple through its composition "*ex finito et infinito*"⁵⁹⁰:

Someone might doubt how it is that being is only multiplied through a composition of finite with infinite. It must be said that intelligences are composed from finite and infinite, that is, they are composed from form and *esse*, or nature and *esse*. For the nature that is in them is infinite, while the *esse* is finite.⁵⁹¹

Giles understands this to mean that created beings are composed of *esse* and *essentia*, where by analogy with form and matter, *esse* is the active and finite element and *essentia* is the passive and infinite. Intelligences are not *esse* simply, for they receive their *esse* into a passive principle like matter receives its form, and this material principle in beings is *essentia* or *natura*:

It must be said that just as every that can is subject to generation has two terms, namely matter and form, so everything that is created has two limits, a potency and an act, that is, *essentia* and *esse*. And everything that is from another is in potency to *esse*, and if it is in potency to *esse*, it is not *ipsum esse*, but is understood to participate *esse*. Everything participating *esse*, moreover, is of two sorts: into participating and participated, [that is] into the *essentia* which participates *esse*, and the *esse* which is participated by *essentia*. But although these two terms, namely *essentia* and *esse*, are in each thing subject to creation, the most important cause of any production is taken from act rather than from potency. Because something is produced and caused insofar as it receives *esse*.⁵⁹²

Esse, then, is multiplied insofar as it is participated, and it is participated insofar as it is received in the essence of each creature.

⁵⁹⁰ *Liber de causis*, Prop. 4 (ed. Pattin), p. 54.47-49: "Et esse creatum quamvis sit unum tamen multiplicabitur, scilicet quia ipsum recipit multipliciter. Et ipsum quidem non est factum multa nisi quia ipsum, quamvis sit simplex et non sit in creatis simplicius eo, tamen est compositum ex finito et infinito."

⁵⁹¹ Giles of Rome, *In De causis*, Prop. 4 (P f. 14rb; V f. 15rM): "Dubitaret forte aliquis quomodo non multiplicatur esse nisi per compositum finiti cum infinito. Dicendum quod intelligentie sunt composite ex finito et infinito idest sunt composite ex forma et esse, sive ex natura et esse. Natura enim in eis est infinita, esse vero finitum."

⁵⁹² Prop. 4 (P f. 12vb; V f. 13vB): "Dicendum quod sicut omne generabile habet duos terminos, scilicet materia et formam, sic omne creabile et omne creatum habet duos terminos, potentiam scilicet et actum, essentiam scilicet et esse. Nam omne quod est ab alio est in potentia ad esse, et si est in potentia ad esse, non est ipsum esse, sed intelligitur participare esse. Omne autem participans esse dividitur in duo: in participans et in participatum, in essentia quidem que participat esse, et in esse quod participatur ab essentia. Sed licet sint hii duo termini, essentia scilicet et esse, in quolibet creabili, principalior tamen ratio cuiuslibet productionis sumitur ex actu quam potentia ex, quia in tantum aliquid producit et causatur in quantum accipit esse."

This combination of *esse* and *essentia* in intelligences implies a multiplicity because while each intelligence has a nature that is perfect and complete in the sense that it lacks nothing to be what it is, no intelligence exhausts all of what *esse* is in itself. The participation of *esse* in the nature of intelligence must therefore involve a multiplicity of intelligences insofar as each has a distinct measure of *esse* contracted within its distinct nature:

It must be said that because the *esse* of intelligences is finite, limited, and particular, and because no intelligence has all of *esse* in itself, from this *esse* itself, as far as it is according to itself, it is simple and one, and in particular ways and not in its complete way is it received in intelligences. Thus, [*esse*] is multiplied in them because, in this way, when given in a more perfect mode, it is received in this superior intelligence, [and] in a less perfect in an inferior, and in an even less perfect in the most inferior. And in this way, proceeding by degrees from the first being, *esse* is multiplied in intelligences and in this way a multiplicity of intelligences comes to be.⁵⁹³

Thus, intelligences participate a measure of *esse* that is more or less perfect in accordance with the perfection of their natures, or essences, and from this fact Giles understands not only the diversification of *esse*'s simplicity, but also the fact that intelligences fall into a hierarchy ordered according that same perfection:

Thus, forms are like numbers, for just as there are no two formally different numbers that are equally distant from unity or that have equal unity, so there are no two forms that have different species of equal perfection. In this way, therefore, forms are determined according to themselves to a certain genus and to a certain species, and to such a mode of perfection so that they are determined according to their natures as they receive *esse* in this way or that, since, because a different mode of perfection is in one species than another, being is received according to a different mode of perfection in one form than in another, and thus, from form and *esse* is made the first multiplicity of beings, indeed, from the form requiring such a mode of perfection and from *esse* received in the form according to that mode.⁵⁹⁴

⁵⁹³ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 4 (P f. 14va; V f. 15vO): "Dicendum quod, quia esse intelligentiis est finitum, limitatum, et particulatum, et quia nulla intelligentia habet in se totum esse, ex hoc ipsum esse quantum est de se est simplex et unum et secundum particulares modos non secundum suum totalem modum recipitur intelligentiis. Ideo plurificatur in ipsis, quia secundum hanc modum, ut puta secundum modum perfectiorem recipitur in hac intelligentia superiori, secundum minus perfectum in inferiori, et adhuc secundum minus perfectum in magis inferiori. Et sic gradatim procedendo ab uno ente primo multiplicatur esse in intelligentiis, et sic facta est multitudo intelligentiarum."

⁵⁹⁴ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 4 (P f. 14va-b; f. V 15vP-Q): "Et ideo forme sunt sicut numeri, nam sicut non sunt duo numeri formaliter differentes eque distantes ab unitate vel habentes equales unitates, ita non sunt due forme species differentes habentes equales perfectiones. Sic ergo forme de se determinantur ad certum genus, et ad certam speciem, et ad talem modum perfectionis, ita de sui natura determinantur ut recipiant esse hoc modo vel illo, ut quia alius modus perfectionis est in una specie quam in alia, secundum alium modum

Like a series of numbers, this hierarchy of creatures must also be complete, containing each degree of perfection beginning from the first down to the last and least perfect of the separate substances (which, as we will see below, are the noble souls). To this point, Giles compares the order of intelligences to the order of numbers which must proceed in a series from the simplicity of *unum* through each numerical degree. And this fact is true not only for intelligences, but for all of creation.

The numerical character of this order structures the differing degrees of perfection among intelligences, but it also ultimately includes the orders of souls and bodies, which must follow after the series of intelligences as the composite follows the simple:

It must be also noted that the multiplicity of beings proceeds from one being just as a multitude of numbers proceed from unity. Just as, therefore, there would never be a procession from unity to numbers truly distant and truly composite unless the procession from unity to numbers that are near and less composite were possible, and as there would never be a procession from unity to one hundred which is a number exceedingly composite unless the procession from unity to medial numbers which are less composite were possible, in the same way, unless the multiplication in intelligences were possible, and unless the procession from the one first being to a multiplicity of intelligences which are less composite and which are closer to the first were possible, then the procession to a multitude of souls and to a multitude of bodies which are more composite and more distant from the first would not be possible.⁵⁹⁵

In this way, Giles shows first that the orders of souls and bodies depend on the sequence of intelligences just like numbers that are more distant from unity require those that are more simple to precede them.

However, this introduction of souls and bodies into the multiplication of beings also introduces a new problem: while the existence of intelligences consists of a simple combination of *esse* and *essentia*, this is not the case for bodies, for a bodily nature also

perfectionis recipitur esse in una forma quam in alia, et ideo ex forma et esse facta est prima multiplicitas entium, ex forma quidem requirente talem modum perfectionis et ex esse recepto in forma secundum illum modum."

⁵⁹⁵ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 4 (P f. 13vb-14ra; V f. 15rK): "Notandum etiam quod multitudo entium procedit ab uno ente sicut multitudo numerorum procedit ab unitate. Sicut ergo nunquam fieret processus ab unitate ad numeros valde distantes et valde compositos nisi esset possibilis processus ab unitate ad numeros propinquos et minus compositos, ut nunquam esset processus ab unitate ad centenarium, qui est numerus multum compositus, nisi esset possibilis processus ab unitate ad numeros medios, qui sunt minus compositi, sic nisi esset possibilis plurificatio in intelligentiis et nisi esset possibilis processus ab uno primo ente ad multitudinem intelligentiarum, que sunt minus composite et sunt propinquiores primo, non esset possibilis processus ad multitudinem animarum et ad multitudinem corporum, que sunt magis composita et sunt remotiora a primo." V omits "ad numeros medios [...] intelligentiarum" from P.

requires its matter. Thus, while intelligences are contracted in a single limitation, embodied substances have a *duplex limitatio*:

It should be said that a double finitude or double limitation can belong to the created thing, one part from form, and if it is a material thing, another limitation and another contraction can belong to it from the part of matter. For from the form the created thing has that it is a finite being, but if it is material, it has from matter that it has a finite form, so that, as was said before, if colours were abstract, white from its species would have that it is a finite being, but from the fact that it is received in matter white would have that it is a finite form.⁵⁹⁶

If it is from form that a creature's *esse* is made a finite being, for embodied substances, it is only through matter that the form itself is made particular, but what is the relationship between these two contractions?

In his discussion of Prop. 4, Giles says that the question of how the multiplication of *esse* in *essentia* relates to the multiplication of forms in matter ultimately goes beyond the subject of the present inquiry:

Moreover, whether in addition to multiplication from *esse* and nature according to itself there is a multiplication from form and matter, or [whether] there is a multiplication from *esse* and form that is not according to itself but from *esse* and form in order to be received in matter, and whether the first multiplication makes the single diversity of species while the second makes a numerical distinction, what one should suppose about these things the present discussion does not include because it would go further than the work undertaken requires.⁵⁹⁷

Even so, Giles' commentary does provide a way of understanding how the simple contraction of *esse* relates to the double contraction of form, and that becomes clear through the concept of *connexio* in his commentary on noble soul and Prop. 3.

2. *Connexio*

⁵⁹⁶ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 4 (P f. 15rb-va; V f. 16vY): "Dicendum quod rei create potest competere duplex finitas sive duplex limitatio, una ex parte forme; et si sit illa res materialis, potest ei competere alia limitatio et alia contractio ex parte materie. Ex forma quidem habet res creata quod sit finitum ens; sed si sit materialis habet ex materia quod habeat finitam formam, ut, sicut dicebatur, si colores essent abstracti, albedo ex sua specie haberet quod esset finitum ens, sed ex eo quod recipitur in materia habet albedo quod sit finita forma."

⁵⁹⁷ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 4 (P f. 14vb; V f. 15vQ): "Utrum autem preter multiplicationem ex esse et natura secundum se sit multiplicatio ex forma et materia, vel sit multiplicatio ex esse et forma non secundum se sed ex esse et forma ut recipitur in materia, et utrum prima multiplicatio faciat solam diversitatem speciei, secunda vero distinctionem faciat numeralem, quid de his censendum sit, presens speculatio non admittit, quia hoc esset ulterius procedere quam requirat susceptum opus."

The distinction between the simple contraction of intelligences and the *duplex finitas* of bodies involves considerable difficulty in Giles' account of the multiplication of *esse*. While multiplicity in the order of intelligences can be understood through the simple combination of *esse* and *essentia*, it is clear that something more is required for the production of an embodied substance. The nature of a human being, for example, is an embodied nature that comes to be through generation, and this generation requires the arrangement and disposition of the body that becomes ensouled.⁵⁹⁸ It appears, then, that the creative production of a human being requires something in addition to participation in *esse*. How does the body of a generated creature arise, and how does this not threaten the unity of the created act?

The answer to this question is that the creation of generated substances also involves the influence and information of causes that are secondary to the first, and this fact, for Giles, especially involves noble soul, the class of intelligences responsible for moving the celestial spheres. It is the influence of the heavens and the intellectual powers that guide them which is responsible for arranging the matter which receives the generated forms of composite beings. See, for example, how Giles understands that noble souls are like artists that inform the matter of the sublunar world through the heavens which are their instruments:

For the knowledge in the souls of the heavens, according to this author, is like a kind of art by which are produced these inferior things, like the artifacts of that art. For this author imagines that just as art induces in matter the form of the art by the mode of the instrument, so knowledge in the soul of the heaven which is like a kind of art, through the motion of the heaven which is the instrument of that art, induces sensible forms in this inferior matter.⁵⁹⁹

The generation of sensible substances depends, then, on the artistry of the order of intelligences. In this way, Giles' hierarchical account of participation as *contractio* leads to the understanding that while participated *esse* falls into a series of existing essences that are ordered according to perfection, this order of creatures does not arise entirely and simply

⁵⁹⁸ See Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 5(4) (P f. 18rb-18va; V f. 20rH), quoted and discussed further below.

⁵⁹⁹ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 14 (P f. 90rb; V f. 46rH-v): "Scientia enim in animabus celorum, secundum intentionem huius Auctoris, est quasi quedam ars per quam producuntur hec inferiora quasi artificialia illius artis. Ymaginatur enim Auctor iste quod sicut ars per modum instrumenti inducit in materiam formam artis, ita scientia in anima celi, que est quasi quedam ars per motum celi, qui est instrumentum illius artis, inducit formas sensibiles in hanc materiam inferiorem."

from the direct relationship between pure *esse* itself and the beings which share its likeness, for the order of bodies depends upon the causal activity of the order of intelligences as it orders the motions of the heavens.

2.1. Noble Soul and the *connexio universi*

If the order of creatures must proceed like the series of numbers from the perfect to the imperfect and from the simple to the composite, and if this distinction ultimately consists of the distinction between the orders of simple intelligence on the one hand, and the *duplex limitatio* of generated beings on the other, then there is a relationship of dependence between these two. The complex existence of bodies depends on the simple existence of intelligences insofar as all bodily existence comes about by the power of intelligences through the heavens they move. Giles calls this relationship of dependence *connexio*, and it is, for him, the subject of Prop. 3 of the *Liber de causis*. In the opening of his comment on Prop. 3, Giles explains that “After the author distinguishes three kinds of causes or a triple superior being which is adapted to the three kinds of primary causes, namely to God, intelligences, and souls,” in Prop. 2, the next thing to consider is “connection, for all these causes are connected to one another:”⁶⁰⁰

It should be known from this that the universe is connected, because superior things are preserved in the inferior things in a participative manner, but the inferior [are preserved] in the superior in a more eminent way. And because the superior are in the inferior and the inferior are in the superior, all things are in all things, and in this way the whole universe is connected.⁶⁰¹

Giles clearly takes inspiration from Thomas’ summary of this proposition’s purpose, where he says that what belongs to the higher is present in the lower according to participation,⁶⁰²

⁶⁰⁰ Giles, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 9va; V f. 9rA-v): “Postquam Auctor distinguit tria genera causarum, vel distinxit triplex esse superius quod adaptavit ad tria genera primarum causarum, videlicet ad Deum, intelligentias, et animas, in parte ista exequitur de omnibus hiis primariis causis. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum quod circa has primarias causas quantum ad praesens spectat, quatuor sunt consideranda. Primo, *connexio*; sunt enim omnes hee cause ad invicem connexe”; see also, Prop. 4 (P f. 12va-vb; V f. 13r): “Postquam auctor determinavit de connexione primarum causarum, in parte ista determinat de earum distinctione”.

⁶⁰¹ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 9vb; V f. 9vB): “sciendum quod ex hoc universum est connexum, quia superiora reservantur in inferioribus participative, inferiora vero in superioribus excellenter. Et quia superiora sunt in inferioribus et inferiora in superioribus, omnia sunt in omnibus, et sic est totum universum connexum.”

⁶⁰² See Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 3, p. 17.17.

however, he has subordinated Thomas' interest in participation to the broader concern in *connexio*.

What is the significance of this term? In his commentary on Prop. 30(29), Giles contrasts the meaning of *connexio* to the meaning of the term *ordo*. In that proposition, the *De causis* discusses a theme of relevance to noble soul concluding that between all eternal substances and all substances created in time, there must be something medial between them.⁶⁰³ Giles explains that the necessary existence of these medial substances can be proved from two concepts, the *ordo* and *connexio* of the universe.⁶⁰⁴ And while both concepts give an account of the structure of the hierarchy of creatures, it is through *connexio* that the meaning of that structure can be understood.

Giles first compares the order of the universe to a sequence of numbers and argues, as we saw above, that if the first cause is like the number one, then "all created substances are like certain numbers descending from the first".⁶⁰⁵ The order of complexity in creation is like the order of numbers in which it is necessary, for example, that the number three be medial to the numbers two and four, lest the numerical order be incomplete:

For if, immediately after the separate substances which are eternal and immobile, there were these inferior substances which are neither eternal nor immovable without the medial supercelestial bodies, then the proper sequence and proportion of the universe would be destroyed.⁶⁰⁶

According to the order of the universe the bodies that follow after the separate substances must be organized in their proper sequence, first the eternal, celestial bodies, followed by those sub-lunar bodies that pass away. In gradually increasing complexity, each degree must have its proper place.

⁶⁰³ *Liber de causis*, Prop. 30(29) (ed. Pattin), p. 106.80-107.87: "Non est ergo possibile ut continuentur substantiae creatae in quibusdam horis temporis cum substantiis sempiternis, quoniam non assimilantur eis omnino. Substantiae ergo sempiternae in tempore sunt illae quae continuantur cum substantiis sempiternis, et sunt mediae inter substantias fixas et inter substantias sectas in tempore."

⁶⁰⁴ Giles, *Super De causis*, Prop. 30 (P f. 85vb; V f. 101rG): "Dubitaret forte aliquis quomodo oportet dare sic substantias medias. Dicendum quod et ex ordine rerum et ex connexione universi possumus hoc arguere."

⁶⁰⁵ Giles, *Super De causis*, Prop. 30 (P f. 85vb; V f. 101rG): "Ex ordine quidem rerum nam omnis substantie create sunt quasi quidam numeri pendentes a primo tamquam ab unitate."

⁶⁰⁶ Giles, *Super De causis*, Prop. 30 (P f. 85vb; V f. 101rG): "Si enim statim post substantias separatas que sunt sempiternae et immobiles esset dare has substantias inferiores que nec sunt sempiternae nec immobiles absque corporibus supercelestibus mediis, tolleretur congrua melodia et proportio universi."

Giles argues next, however, that there is a better reason for the necessity of the medial substances which Prop. 30(29) describes, and that is “connection”. The difference between order and connection is that, whereas order merely describes the sequence of entities, connection involves “sharing something in common”. Giles uses the example of the order of the elements. Earth, which is cold and dry, can only be connected to air, which is hot and humid through a third which shares qualities with both, and this medial term is water, which is cold like earth, but humid like air. The elements in this way are connected by virtue of the qualities they share in a certain order (not earth to air nor water to fire, but earth to water to air to fire which is connected to earth again): “But if air were removed between fire and water, these two elements would be severed, and if water were removed between air and earth, there would be a dissolution of the universe.”⁶⁰⁷ The same must be true, Giles argues, in the order of substances:

As in Proposition [30], the abstract substances are eternal and immobile, and the inferior substances are neither eternal nor immobile. The universe would therefore be dissolved if there were not other medial substances connecting the other two. And thus, there are medial celestial bodies that share eternity with the separate substances and mobility with these inferior things. The whole universe, therefore, is connected according to a certain concordance and assimilation because separate substances are connected to the supercelestial bodies by reason of “sempiternal”, and the supercelestial bodies [are connected] to these inferior things by reason of “mobility”.⁶⁰⁸

Substances do not merely fall into a sequence without a reason; each belongs to its station according to the connection it shares with the terms that precede and follow it. In this interlocking connection of higher and lower substances, each shares something of what comes before and pre-possesses the perfection of what follows after. While in this case Giles uses the heavenly bodies as an example, this is also the reason for the necessity of celestial soul. Between the unmoving, eternal intelligences and the moving, temporal bodies there

⁶⁰⁷ Giles, *Super De causis*, Prop. 30 (P f. 86ra; V f. 101rH-v): “Sed si removeretur aer inter ignem et aquam erunt illa duo elementa dissuta, et si removeretur aqua inter aerem et terram; esset dissolutio universi.”

⁶⁰⁸ Giles, *Super De causis*, Prop. 30 (P f. 86ra; V f. 101vH): “Sic et in propositio, substantie abstracte sunt sempiternae et immobiles, istae autem substantie inferiores, nec sempiternae, nec immobiles sunt. Dissolutum ergo esset universum si non essent aliquae substantie medie connectentes utraque haec. Ideo sunt media corpora supercelestia, que cum substantiis separatis conveniunt in sempiternitate, cum istis inferioribus in mobilitate. Totum ergo universum est connexum secundum quandam convenientiam et assimilationem, quia substantie separate connectuntur supercelestibus corporibus ratione sempiternitatis, supercelestia corpora istis inferioribus ratione mobilitatis”.

must be something with an eternal substance but a temporal operation, and this is celestial soul.

To speak of the order of the universe, then, is to describe the structure of the cosmos in an external way, but to speak of its connection is to understand the relationships that bind the powers of each term together with the next. Giles emphasizes this distinction further in his commentary on the second book of the *Sentences*. The difference, he says there, is between the “superficial” contact of bodies in an *ordo* versus the “virtual” contact (that is, contact by means of power) in a *connexio*. Giles is considering, in this case, the influence of the empyrean heaven upon lesser spheres which cannot, he argues, be accounted for by appealing to the order of the universe—as Thomas Aquinas does in his *Summa*.⁶⁰⁹

And this [the influence of the empyrean heaven] is not because of the order of the universe, as some have said, but rather because of the connection of the parts of the universe, for the [first] is a superficial contact of bodies, but the other is a contact as an action, as if by power (*quasi virtualis*), because they act in a way that concerns power (*agunt virtualiter*). And because connection is more perfect according to the whole body rather than according to the superficial, therefore we posit that the empyrean heaven is ordered towards other bodies, touching it through power (*tangendo virtualiter*) according to the whole. And this can not be unless it acted because of this [connection], etc.⁶¹⁰

⁶⁰⁹ As Sorokina points out in her *Les sphères, les astres et les théologiens: l'influence céleste entre science et foi dans les commentaires des Sentences* (v. 1220-v. 1340) (Turnhout: Brepols, 2021), vol. 1, p. 156-57, Giles is responding here to a position described by Thomas Aquinas in his *Summa*. See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 66, a. 3, objection 2 (ed. Leonine, vol. 5), p. 160a: “Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in III *De Trinitate*, quod inferiora corpora per superiora quodam ordine reguntur. Si ergo caelum empyreum est quoddam supremum corpus, oportet quod habeat aliquam influentiam in haec inferiora corpora. Sed hoc non videtur, praesertim si ponatur immobile, cum nullum corpus moveat nisi motum. Non est ergo caelum empyreum materiae informi concreatum.” The problem, for Thomas, is that while, on the one hand, it would seem (following Augustine) that the empyrean must influence the spheres beneath it by reason of its superiority, while on the other hand, it seems that the empyrean heaven can not influence the spheres beneath it because it is unmoving, “for one body cannot move another unless itself also be moved.” In his reply to this objection, Thomas says that while it may be possible that the empyrean heaven does not influence lower bodies, it is more like that it does and that while it does not produce movement as the lower spheres do, it might produce another kind of effect: *ibid.* arg. 2, p. 161a: “Probabilius tamen videtur dicendum quod, sicut supremi angeli, qui assistunt, habent influentiam super medios et ultimos, qui mittuntur, quamvis ipsi non mittantur, secundum Dionysium, ita caelum empyreum habet influentiam super corpora quae moventur, licet ipsum non moveatur. Et propter hoc potest dici quod influit in primum caelum quod movetur, non aliquid transiens et adveniens per motum, sed aliquid fixum et stabile; puta virtutem continendi et causandi, vel aliquid huiusmodi ad dignitatem pertinens.”

⁶¹⁰ Giles of Rome, *Reportatio in II Sententia*, q. 14, d. 2 (ed. Luna), p. 214: “Nec est hoc propter ordinem universi, sicut dixerunt quidam, sed propter connexionem partium universi, quia quidam est contactus corporum superficialis, alius est contactus, ut actio, quasi virtualis, cum agunt virtualiter. Et quia perfectior est connexio secundum totum corpus quam secundum superficiem, ideo ponimus quod celum empyreum ordinatur ad alia corpora, tangendo virtualiter secundum totum. Et hoc non esset, nisi ageret, propter hoc etc”. See

The difference, then, between the *ordo* and *connexio* of the universe is that while the first involves the superficial and corporeal contact of bodies (Giles is thinking here of the celestial spheres in particular), *connexio* involves a contact *virtualiter*, that is, a contact of power. While in the heavens, the superior spheres influence the inferior according to their proper order, that is, by means of a superficial contact; the superior sphere actually touches a part of the sphere beneath it and thereby influences its movement. But, the influence of the empyrean heaven on the lesser spheres is different. The empyrean is an unmoving sphere and thus its influence could not be according to motion at all. It must instead be through “acting” and “touching” the bodies beneath it virtually, that is, according to a power that entirely infuses the bodies beneath it.⁶¹¹

Part of the basis of Giles’ distinction between “order” and “connection”, then, involves the difference between corporeal influence and immaterial influence. All bodies, including the heavens, influence one another through the contact of a part to a part. The immaterial, angelic powers of the empyrean heaven, however, influence their effects through connection with them by means of an infusion of power.

In this *connexio universi*, noble soul plays a necessary role at the nexus of the immaterial power of intelligences and the world of bodies. According to the Dionysian *lex divinitatis*, “inferior things are led to superior things through a medium” and “God so orders the universe that the lowest of the high things is connected to the highest of the low things.”⁶¹² It is through noble soul as celestial mover that the “bottom of the top” (that is, the last in the order of intelligences) is joined to the “top of the bottom” (the first in the order of bodies, that is, the celestial spheres).

Noble soul, then, is at the centre point of the cosmic connection; it is that by which through a “contact of power” the lower things come to participate in higher things. This fact

Sorokina, *Les sphères, les astres et les théologiens*, vol 1. p. 156-57. Giles discusses the connection of the universe further at *Ordinatio in II Sententia*, d. 2, q. 2, a. 4 (ed. Venice, 1581), p. 154a-b.

⁶¹¹ For another example of Giles using the concept of *connexio*, see Bettina Elena Holstein, “A Commentary on the *De predestinatione et prescientia*”, p. 133-34.

⁶¹² Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 10vb; V f. 10vM): “Dicendum quod lex divinitatis est reducere infima in suprema per media, sic enim Deus colligavit universum quod semper infima supremorum coniunxit supremis infimorum.” See Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, VII.6, trans. Serazzin (*Dionysiaca* vol 2), p. 407-8: “ipsa enim est, secundum eloquium quae est omnium effectiva et semper omnia concordans, et indissolubilis omnium concordationis et ordinis causa, et semper fines priorum conjungens principleis seeundorum, et unam omnis conspirationem et harmoniam pulchre operans.” For more on the *lex divinitatis* in Giles’ understanding of noble soul, see Ch. 5.3.

is evident first in noble soul's own operations, which Giles says it possesses through participation:

But about how the superior things are in the inferior things in a participative way someone might doubt. Thus, the author, supposing the connections of the first causes as the perfections of the inferior preserved in the superior things in a more eminent way talks about the connection of such causes as the superior are preserved in the inferior by participation.⁶¹³

In order for noble soul to fulfill its medial role in the connection of higher and lower things in the universe, it must participate the power of those causes that precede it, namely the first cause and intelligence. In noble soul the first cause and intelligence are preserved in its three operations, one that belongs to itself, and two which involve participations in the causes above it:

But the lowest among the primary causes which he speaks about here are the souls of the heavens, for he only intends [to speak] here about these three, namely, God, intelligences, and souls of the spheres. These, therefore, are connected and in this way all the highest are preserved in the lowest because in these souls which here hold the lowest level, there are present a divine operation and an intelligible operation. There will be, therefore, a triple operation in these souls: one which belongs to them according to themselves, and this is the animate operation, that is the operation belonging to them insofar as they are souls; another is the intelligible operation which belongs to them as they are connected to intelligences; and another is the divine operation which belongs to them because of the connection which they have to the first cause. Behold, then, how great is the connection in these primary causes, because in the lowest of them, all are connected and all are present because all these operations are present in these souls.⁶¹⁴

⁶¹³ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 9vb; V 9vB): "Sed quomodo superiora sunt in inferioribus participative, de hoc posset aliquis dubitare; ideo Auctor supponens connexiones primarum causarum prout perfectiones inferiorum reservantur in superioribus excellenter, agit de connexione talium causarum, prout superiora reservantur in inferioribus participative."

⁶¹⁴ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 9vb; V f. 9vB-C): "Infima autem inter primarias causas de quibus hic agitur sunt anime celorum. Non enim hic intenditur nisi de tribus, videlicet de Deo, de intelligentiis, et de animabus orbium. Ista ergo sic connectuntur et sic omnia suprema reservantur in infimis, quia in ipsis animabus, que hic tenent gradum infimum, reservatur operatio divina et operatio intelligentie. Erit ergo in huiusmodi animabus triplex operatio: una que competit eis secundum se et hec est operatio animalis, id est operatio competens eis in eo quod sunt anime; alia est operatio intelligibilis que competit eis ut connectuntur intelligentiis; tertia est operatio divina que competit eis propter connexionem quam habent ad causam primam. Ecce ergo quanta est connexio in hiis primariis causis, quia etiam in ipsis infimis omnia connectuntur et omnia reservantur, quia omnes huius operationes in ipsis animabus reservantur." On Giles' understanding that noble soul's ultimately do not have an animate operation proper to their natures, see Ch. 5.

The fundamental question for noble soul in the *connexio universi*, then, is what it participates from the first cause and what it receives from intelligence. In both cases, this will be a matter of noble soul's operations. From intelligence, noble soul receives the perfection and illumination of its intelligible operation, which is necessary for it to move the heavens, and from the first cause, noble soul participates its divine influence over bodies as the proximate cause of the celestial motions. We will not be able to fully appreciate noble soul's participation of intelligence until Ch. 5.4, but will turn now to consider its participation of its divine and providential operation in the heavens.

2.2. The Procession of Creation and the Errors of the Philosophers

God does not simply bring material things into existence lest secondary causes contribute no meaningful activity. It is rather that God brings material things into existence through secondary causes in whose secondary activity God's primary act of creation is presupposed. On this point, Giles distinguishes between making something "immediately whole" (*immediate totam*) versus making something in an "immediately complete way" (*immediate totaliter*). To be made immediately whole is to be granted *esse*. This creative act is *immediate totam* because *esse* contains in itself every other perfection. Everything that belongs to the whole of the creature is already present in that *esse*. However, this does not mean that created things are made *immediate totaliter*, which is to say in isolation from the order of secondary causes which are mediators of God's creative power:

[...] for this reason, God makes each thing immediately whole because whatever is in the thing is reduced to being or to *esse*. However, God does not make each thing immediately fully, because if He were to make each thing immediately whole and immediately fully, then secondary agents would be superfluous and would contribute nothing to the first cause. However, just as God can make each thing immediately whole, so he could make it immediately fully, but so that the works of his wisdom are not empty and so that secondary causes are not idle and empty he has communicated to them the power to act so that whatever is produced in each thing God works through the mediation of other causes and works through other causes. But since God is the universal cause according to that mode of the effect produced by God by the mediation of other causes, it is said to proceed from God in whom all causes communicate. And because every cause is granted *esse*, God who works in every cause is most powerfully called the cause of things since they have

esse and participate *esse*.⁶¹⁵

God does not create material things immediately as totalities, but brings them into existence through secondary causes. This is not to say that God could not create things immediately and completely, but rather that in His wisdom, God choose to work through the mediation of other causes. Neither does this mean that secondary causes become creative causes in themselves, for the fact that each secondary cause participates *esse* from God who is the source of all *esse* demonstrates that God is at work in the activity of all secondary things.

But Giles also points out that this should not be understood according to the errors of the philosophers and the doctrine of “procession”. When the philosophers speak about procession in the sense that what proceeds from the first cause prior is necessary to what emanates later, they depart from the truth:

It should be noted that that many among philosophers, in speaking about the procession and multiplication of beings from the first have departed from the truth in two ways, because first they have believed that God could not make things that are remote from Himself nor could he make the bodies which are highly composed, unless He first made them in His proximity or [unless He] first made the intelligences which are simple substances. Second, they have erred believing that by the mediation of substances near to Himself, He produced the more remote and composite substances. And because the author, seems at first glance and because of his way of speaking, to fall into these opinions, thus he speaks about the multiplication of intelligences.⁶¹⁶

⁶¹⁵ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 4 (P f. 13va; V f. 14vG-H; T f. 13ra): “propter quod Deus facit quamlibet rem immediate totam, quia quicquid est in re reducitur ad ens vel ad esse. Non tamen Deus facit quamlibet rem immediate totaliter, quia si faceret quamlibet rem immediate totam et immediate totaliter; tunc superfluent secunda agentia et nihil cooperantur cause prime; [posset tamen] Deus sicut facere rem quamlibet immediate totam, sic posset eam facere immediate totaliter; sed ut non essent supervacua opera sapientie sue et ut secunde cause non essent ociose et supervacue, communicavit eis virtutem agendi, ita quod in qualibet re producta mediantibus aliis causis operatur Deus, et operantur alie cause. Sed cum Deus sit universalis causa secundum illum modum, effectus productus a Deo mediantibus aliis causis, dicitur a Deo procedere, in quo communicant omnes cause. Et quia omnium causarum est dare esse, Deus, qui operatur in omnibus causis, dicitur potissime causa rerum, ut habent esse et ut participant esse.” The text in square brackets is from the ms. Vat. lat. 831, f. 13ra. That portion of the text in both P and V are faulty. P has “post sed cum”. At “tunc...totaliter” V reads “tunc secundaria agentia non concurrerent ad alicuius effectus productionem”.

⁶¹⁶ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 4 (P f. 14ra-b; V f. 15rL): “Notandum etiam quod multi philosophorum in loquendo de processu et multiplicatione entium a primo dupliciter a veritate defecerunt, primo quia crediderunt quod Deus non posset facere remota a se, neque posset facere corpora que sunt valde composita, nisi prius fecisset propinque sibi vel prius nisi fecisset intelligentias que sunt substantie simplices. Secundo, erraverunt credentes quod mediantibus substantiis sibi propinquis produxisset substantias remotiores et compositiores. Et quia auctor secundum superficiem littere et secundum suum modum loquendi videtur in has sententias ruere, ideo loquitur de multiplicatione intelligentiarum.”

It would be an error to suggest first that God is unable to create bodies without first creating intelligences as if the secondary causality of intelligences provides something in the creative act that God lacks in himself. And second, it is an error to say that God makes things that are composite through the mediation of things that are simple.

The first error Giles clearly deals with in the passage above. While God may in his wisdom choose to work through secondary agents, this does not imply that He is unable to bring them about *immediate totaliter* by his own power. Moreover, as Giles makes clear, while the author of the *De causis* does speak in a way that is similar to the philosophers, his purpose is not to imply that the actual procession of souls presupposes the actual procession of intelligences, but rather that when we understand how it is that the procession of intelligences is possible (that is, through the contraction of *esse* in *essentia*), we can thereby understand the possibility of the procession of souls as well.⁶¹⁷

The second error of the philosophers, however, seems very similar to the position Giles himself supports in the same passage above. It is, apparently, an error to say that God “produced” (*produxisset*) composite creatures through simple creatures, but nevertheless, according to the divine wisdom, “whatever is produced in each thing, God works (*operatur*) by the mediation of other causes”.⁶¹⁸ What is the difference between these positions and how does one explain the fact that material substances appear to depend in their double contraction on the more simple *causes* that precede them without falling into the error of implying that these substances mediate the act of creation? Giles’ solution lies in the fact that while secondary agents like noble soul are not necessary to God’s creative activity, they nevertheless come to participate in the providential and divine acts that order the sensible world insofar as they participate in the *connexio universi*.

⁶¹⁷ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 4 (P f. 14ra; V f. 15rK): “Non tamen sic est hoc intelligendum quod in talibus actualis processus de necessitate presupponat processum actuale, ut quod Deus non potuisset facere animas vel corpora nisi prius actu fecisset intelligentias, ac si Deus indigeret intelligentiis ad productionem corporum. Sed processus possibilis distantium a primo arguit processum possibilem propinquorum primo, quia nisi esset possibilis processus propinquorum a primo, nunquam esset possibilis processus remotorum.”

⁶¹⁸ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 4 (P f. 13va; V f. 14vH): “in qualibet re producta mediantibus aliis causis operatur Deus”. See the complete quotation above.

2.3. The Divine Operation of Noble Soul

In his commentary on Prop. 3, Giles endeavors to explain how it is that noble soul can be said to be divine and to have a divine operation without being a god in itself, and this question ultimately ends up being a matter of explaining how noble soul participates in God's providential activities. To this end, Giles uses Thomas Aquinas' discussions of the Platonic doctrines from his commentary on Prop. 3 extensively. Giles first takes over Thomas' insight that noble soul means divine soul. While Giles does not supply the source for the relationship between *nobilis* and *divina* from Proclus' *Elements of Theology*, Prop. 201, he does provide another proof as it appears in *Elements of Theology* Prop. 60: celestial souls are divine through their connection to divine intelligences, and these intelligences should be called divine because of the providence they exercise through their universal influence over the principles beneath them.⁶¹⁹ Because, however, these divine intelligences only exercise their providential power by the mediation of celestial souls, thus, these souls are also providentially divine, and the same is true by extension for the heavenly bodies themselves. This order of participation is the structure of the *connexio universi*: the meaning of noble soul's divinity is to be found in its connection to higher and more divine causes whose providence it mediates.

Noble souls are divine for Giles because of their connection to the divine intelligences above them, and this is the same reason that Thomas provides in his commentary on Prop. 3. However, it is indicative of Giles' intention to emphasize noble soul's cosmic mediation as the mover of the heavens that he begins his discussion of noble soul's divinity with a reference to *Metaphysics* XII in which Aristotle joins the notions of divinity and nobility to the first mover of the heavens:

It should be said that the Author calls [the] divine souls "noble souls" for, as it is said in *Metaphysics* 12, "God is one eternal at the limit of nobility." If, therefore, God is noble in the limit of nobility, whatever is divine in so far as it is His, it is noble indeed. And because, as will now be evident, celestial souls ought to be called divine souls, they are equally called noble⁶²⁰.

⁶¹⁹ See Giles' quotation of Proclus, *Elements of Theology*, Prop. 60, below.

⁶²⁰ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 10ra; V f. 9vD): "Dicendum quod animas nobiles appellat hic animas divinas, nam ut dicitur in XII *Metaphysice*, 'Deus est unus eternus in fine nobilitatis'. Si ergo Deus est nobilis in fine nobilitatis, quicquid est divinum secundum quod huius est valde nobile. Et quia ut patebit anime celorum debent dici anime divine, congrue anime ille vocate sunt nobiles."

Giles joins here the Proclean meaning of divine as it is provided in Thomas' commentary (providential vis-a-vis the forms) to the ultimate Aristotelian instance of nobility, the divine principle whose self-thinking thought is the unmoved mover of the outermost sphere. Thus, where Thomas uses Proclus to explain that noble soul's "nobility" means "divinity" understood as "providential", Giles works backward to say that the source of this "divine providence" should ultimately be identified with the nobility of Aristotle's first principle whose providence is exercised exclusively through the motions of the heavens:

In order that we understand why these souls are called divine, it should be known that there is a difference between our intellect and the intelligences themselves. For as is commonly established, it is communicated to our intellects that they are intelligible, but it is not communicated to them that they are divine because they do not have a universal influence and a universal providence over any thing. For the name "God" is understood to be something that has a universal influence and a universal providence over things. But to the intelligences themselves, and much more to those which have caused the motion of the spheres and by consequence have a universal influence into all these inferior things, it is communicated not only that they are intelligible, but also that they are divine because of the universal rule which is communicated about them. Therefore, intelligences are divine because of the connection which they have to the divine, and because a universal rule is communicated to them.⁶²¹

And since these intelligences are divine by virtue of their universal providence by way of the influence of the spheres which they move, Giles argues by extension that the celestial souls which mediate this intellectual power to the heavens are divine as well:

Therefore, since, according to the mind of this author, between intelligences and the heavens there are mediating souls of the heavens, in so far as intelligences move the heavens by means of mediating souls, these souls ought to be called divine through the connection they have to these intelligences which are divine. The celestial bodies also ought to be called divine through the connection they have to their souls. Therefore, the celestial bodies are divine because of soul, souls because of intelligences, and intelligences because of God. This is, thus, what Proclus says in Prop. 60 of his book: "Every body is divine because of soul, while every soul because

⁶²¹ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 10ra; V f. 9vD-10r): "Ut autem intelligamus quare ille anime divine dicuntur, sciendum est quod est differentia inter intellectus nostros et ipsas intelligentias. Nam nostris intellectibus, ut communiter ponitur, sic communicatum est quod sint intelligibiles, quod non est communicatum eis quod sint divini, quia non habent universalem influentiam super aliquod, hec enim intelligitur nomine Dei aliquid quod habeat universalem influentiam et universalem providentiam rerum, sed ipsis intelligentiis et maxime illis que habent causare motum orbium et per consequens habent universaliter influere in omnia hec inferiora; communicatum est non solum ut sint intelligibiles sed etiam ut sint divine, propter universale regnum quod communicatum est. Ergo intelligentie sunt divine propter connexionem quam habent ad divina quo communicatum est eis universale regimen."

of divine intellect, and every intellect is divine because of participation in divine mind." Following him, the intention of these things [is that], since it is fitting that the celestial bodies, the souls of the heavens, and the intelligences all have a certain universal influence, all such things can be called divine. And because all are divine, they ought to be called noble.⁶²²

In conclusion, then, Giles returns to his first point: noble soul's divinity is based in an Aristotelian concept of nobility from the celestial metaphysics of *Metaphysics* XII. The unmoved movers of the heavens are divine and most noble because they are the source of the providential power of the heavenly motions, and this is the source of noble soul's divinity too because they are proximate source of that motion and the link between the heavens and the order of intelligences.

From this understanding of the connection of noble soul's divinity and nobility to its office as a celestial mover, Giles turns to discuss what Prop. 3 calls noble soul's "divine operation", which, the text says, consists in that noble soul "prepares nature."⁶²³ Giles begins by returning to Thomas' explanation that according to the Platonists, divine means providential:

It should be said that by the name of "God" they [the Platonists] understand a certain universal influence over things. For this reason, on account of their universal influence and the causality which they have over these inferior things, the Platonists call the separate ideas gods, positing the order of gods according to the order of abstracted substances.⁶²⁴

This point about the analogy between divine providence and the providence of noble soul over the bodies it moves is as far as Thomas takes the point since, as we have seen, he

⁶²² Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 10ra-b; V f. 10rE): "Cum ergo secundum mentem huius Auctoris inter intelligentias et celos sunt medie anime celorum, ita quod intelligentie movent celos mediantibus animabus, ipse anime propter connexionem quam habent ad intelligentias illas, que sunt divine, divine dici debent; etiam ipsa corpora celestia, propter connexionem quam habent ad suas animas que sunt divine, divina dici possunt. Corpora ergo celestia sunt divina propter animas, anime propter intelligentias, intelligentie propter Deum. Hoc est ergo quod Proclus dicit 129 propositione: "Omne corpus divinum est divinum per animam; omnis autem anima propter divinum intellectum; omnes autem intellectus divinus secundum participationem divine virtutis". Sequendo enim intentionem istorum cum tam corporibus celestibus quam animabus celorum, quam etiam intelligentiis conveniat habere quandam universalem influentiam, omnia talia divina dici possunt, et quia omne divinum nobile, nobilia appellari debent."

⁶²³ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 11ra; V f. 11rQ): "Dubitaret forte aliquis quomodo anima celi dicatur habere operationem divinam prout naturam preparat."

⁶²⁴ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 11ra; V f. 11rQ): "Dicendum quod omnes nomine Dei intelligent aliquid quod habent universalem influentiam supra rebus et universalem providentiam rerum. Unde et Platonici ideas illas separatas, propter universalem influentiam et causalitatem quam habebant super hec inferiora, vocabant deos ponentes ordinem deorum secundum ordinem abstractorum."

ultimately calls this meaning of divinity for noble soul into question. By contrast, Giles expands the notion of providence as universal influence into three distinct concepts:

We understand, therefore, [1.] that God is being itself, the universal cause of things, [2.] and according to his way, preserves all things in *esse*, [3.] and thirdly, leads all things into their ends as their nature and their being require. We understand that these three are in the order that [1.] firstly, a thing is produced and receives *esse*, [2.] secondly, that it is present in that *esse*, [3.] and thirdly, according to that *esse*, it is led to its end.⁶²⁵

God's power as a universal cause of all things consists of these three providential activities: first to bestow *esse* upon them, second, to preserve their ongoing existence, and third, to bring that existence to its completion. In other words, God's providence consists in the production, preservation, and perfection of beings.

These three operations, Giles explains, belong to God, but any other cause that participates them can also be said to have a "divine operation":

And because these three are in things universally according to the mode of their nature's necessity, to God, who is the universal cause of things, and through which we understand a certain universal cause, these are to be attributed [to others]; and other agents insofar as they participate these, are said to have a divine operation.⁶²⁶

Noble soul, then, has a divine operation in that it participates the providential power of the first cause which is exercised in the production, preservation, and perfection of beings. In nature, these three divine activities are accomplished through the motion of the heavens, and this motion is the responsibility of noble soul:

And because the author here calls "to prepare nature", that is to say, to rule and to arrange, or here calls "to prepare nature", [that is to say] "to produce natural things in *esse* by the motion of the heaven according to the necessity of their natures, conserving them in being, and leading and helping them in their actions, since these are principally to be attributed to God, and in so far as other agents participate them,

⁶²⁵ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 11rb-a; V f. 11rQ): "Intelligemus ergo Deum esse ipsum esse, et ideo facit ad universale esse rerum; et secundum modum sui omnia conservat in esse; et tertio omnia dirigit in suos fines prout requirit eorum natura et eorum esse. Intelligemus enim hec tria se habere per ordinem quod primo res producitur et accipit esse; secundo in illo esse conservatur; et tertio secundum illud esse in suum finem dirigitur."

⁶²⁶ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 11ra; V f. 11rQ): "Et quia hec tria sunt universaliter in rebus secundum modum exigentie nature sue, Deo, qui est universalis causa rerum, et per quem intelligimus quandam universalem causam, hec sunt attribuenda; et alia agentia in quantum hec participant dicuntur divinam operationem habere." See also Prop. 3 (P f. 12rb; V f. 13rAA): "Notandum autem quod anima celestis habet virtutem divinam et virtutem intelligentie participative in quantum participat operationem divinam influendo universaliter in totam naturam".

so far do they participate a divine operation, and so far to they participate something of the universal influence which is principally to be attributed to God. It is well said that the souls of the heavens have a divine operation insofar as they prepare nature by the virtue which they have from the first cause. For although everything that they have they have from the first, the divine operation shines out in them much more in participating the universal causality than in others, and to this existent they are said to have a divine operation.⁶²⁷

The reason, then, why noble soul can be said to participate the first cause and exercise a divine operation is because it plays a necessary role in the hierarchy of intellectual powers that are, all together, the instrument of divine providence.

As an example of the way that noble soul mediates divine providence to bodies, Giles uses what the *De causis* says in Prop. 5(4) about the influence of superior souls over inferior souls to discuss the fact that the generation of human souls in their bodies in fact depends on the influence of the movers of the heavens.

Perhaps someone may doubt whether our soul comes from the impression of the secondary intelligence or from the impression of the soul of the heavens. It should be said that in the impression of our soul, one must consider the soul itself which is impressed and the body on which it is impressed. But the impression of our soul is not from secondary intelligence or from noble soul as regards its substance which is impressed, but this kind of impression is good as regards the body on which it is impressed. For the soul of the heavens has a causality over our body and over its organization, and because our soul is only impressed on the body which is disposed and organized, thus the impression of our soul is said to be by the soul of the heaven.⁶²⁸

As pointed out above, because a human being is not a contraction of *esse* in essence only, but also a contraction of form in matter, the causes that dispose the matter of the human body to

⁶²⁷ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 11rb; V f. 11rQ-R): “Et quia Auctor hic appellat *preparare naturam* videlicet eam regere et disponere, vel hic appellat *preparare naturam* res naturales per motum celi in esse producere, eas secundum exigentiam nature sue in esse conservare, et ipsas in suis actionibus dirigere et adiuvere. Cum hec sint attribuenda Deo, et in intantum alia agentia hec participant, inquantum participant operationem divinam et inquantum participant aliquid de universalitate influentie que principaliter attribuenda est Deo, bene dictum est, quod anime celorum habent operationem divinam inquantum preparant naturam propter virtutem quam habent a prima causa.”

⁶²⁸ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 5(4) (P f. 18rb-18va; V f. 20rH): “Dubitaret forte aliquis utrum anima nostra sit ex impressione intelligentie secunde, sive ex impressione animae celi. Dicendum quod in impressione anime nostre est considerare ipsam animam quae imprimitur et ipsum corpus cui imprimitur. Non est autem impressio anime nostre ex intelligentia secunda sive ex anima celi quantum ad substantiam suam quae imprimitur, sed bene est huiusmodi impressio quantum ad corpus cui imprimitur. Nam supra corpus nostrum et super organizationem eius causalitatem habet anima celi, et quia non imprimitur anima nostra nisi corpori dispositio et organizato, ideo dicitur impressio anime nostre esse ab anima celi.”

receive its soul are participants in the divine acts of producing, preserving, and perfecting the human being.⁶²⁹ In this sense, to participate divine power is to *participate in* the hierarchy by which God orders creation. Noble soul exercises a divine and providential power over bodies, but everything noble soul has is from the first whose power in noble soul “shines out much more in participating the universal causality than in others”.

2.4. The Two Causes of Beings: Intelligence and Nature

We can summarize, finally, Giles’ understanding of the relationships of participation that structure the *connexio universi* through the distinction the *Liber de causis* itself makes between primary and secondary causality. Early in the commentary, Giles indicates that he understands that primary causality refers to the intellectual causes (including noble soul) that govern the heavens, while secondary causality refers to nature and to the causal influence of the heavens over natural bodies. In his commentary on Prop. 2, Giles explains that the primary causes are those which have superior being,⁶³⁰ and that this includes God, intelligences, and celestial souls. The fact that each of these has superior being is evident, he argues, through their relationship to eternity: God is above eternity, intelligence with eternity, and noble soul participates eternity even while it is beneath it.

Implicitly referencing Albert the Great’s inclusion of nature among the primary causes,⁶³¹ Giles asks next why nature should not be included, since, after all, nature is also a universal cause. Giles points here to the *Physics*, where Aristotle says that there are two causes of beings, intellect, and nature.⁶³² Giles then expands Aristotle’s distinction explaining that “intellect” refers to all three intellectual causes: God, intelligence, and noble soul: *causae*

⁶²⁹ It is evident that the *De causis* goes further than Giles does himself in terms of the causal power of noble soul over human soul, for he goes on to explain that according to the author of the *De causis*, it is the case that the human receives not only its body but also its intelligence through the mediation of the souls of the heavens. See Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 5(4) (P f. 19vb-20ra; V f. 21vT): “Notandum autem quod virtus intelligentie, secundum istum auctorem, immediate attingit animam celestem, sed animam nostram non attingit immediate sed mediante anima celi. Anima ergo celi recipit virtutem ab intelligentia immediate. Sed virtus intelligentie est in anima nostra ex ea, idest mediante ea, hoc est mediante anima celi.”

⁶³⁰ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 2 (P f. 7ra; V f. 6vD).

⁶³¹ See Ch. 1 above.

⁶³² Aristotle, *Physics* II.6, 198a.

intellectuales universales sunt in triplici gradu. Nature, however, is universal, but not intellectual.⁶³³

Earlier in the commentary, Giles asks how it is that the activity of primary causes is assumed in the activity of universal secondary causes. He explains there that “the primary causes” refers here to God, intelligence, and celestial soul, while the universal secondary cause is nature.⁶³⁴ Having made this distinction, Giles provides the following illustrations:

Since, therefore, this is so, we will imagine that a secondary cause, or nature, acts on nothing which God, intelligences, and the movers of the spheres do not act upon, just as no specific principles derive no conclusion which universal principles do not conclude, and just as inferior agents here produce nothing which the power of the sun does not produce. The power of the sun, therefore, as it is received in the olive is made particular and contracted to the production of the olive so that a mediating olive and the mediation of the seed of the olive produces an olive, just as a mediating lion and by the mediation of the seed of a lion produces a lion.⁶³⁵

In these examples, the primary causes are present in the power of the sun while the causal power of nature is present in the olive or lion and their seeds. By means of the natural power of the olive, lion, and their seeds, a new olive or lion is particularized and contracted from the power of the sun. The *virtus solis* stands, in Giles’ illustrations, for the collected power of the primary causes, the creative power of God, the paradigmatic power of intelligence, and

⁶³³ See Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 2 (P f. 7ra-b; V f. 6vB): “Dicendum quod, ut patuit, quatuor posuimus esse causas rerum, sequendo mentem huius Auctoris, et etiam sequendo mentem philosophorum communiter, videlicet Deum, intelligentias, animas celorum, et naturam. Que distinctio super hoc fundari potest, quia secundum Philosophum II *Physicorum*, ‘due sunt cause entium, intellectus et natura’, extendendo ergo intellectum prout anime celorum dicuntur intellectuales, cause intellectuales universales sunt in triplici gradu, nam Deus et intelligentie et anime orbium sunt huiusmodi cause.” While human soul is intellectual, Giles points out that it is not included among the primary causes because it is not also universal: “magis sunt rationales quam intellectuales quia plura cognoscunt cum discursu quam simplici intuitu”. Moreover, just as there are two causes of beings (intellect and nature), beings have two measures: eternity and time. Eternity is the measure of perfect being (*esse*), while time the measure of *motus*, that is, of imperfect being.

⁶³⁴ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 1 (P f. 5va; V f. 4vAA): “Dubitaret forte aliquis utrum omne illud quod efficit causa secunda efficiat causa prima. Dicendum quod istud omne vel potest referri ad rem productam vel ad modum producendi. Si referatur ad rem productam cum per causam secundam intelligatur hic natura, per causam vero primam intelligatur ipse Deus vel intelligentie a quibus movetur anima orbis ad movendum orbem, vel per causam primam possit intelligi ipsa anima orbis movens orbem. Quelibet enim istarum est causa primaria respectu nature, et natura in actione sua dependet ab omnibus his causis.”

⁶³⁵ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 1 (P f. 5va; V f. 4vAA): “Cum ergo sic sit, ymaginabimur quod nullam rem agit causa secunda sive natura quam non agat ipse Deus, intelligentie, et motores orbium, sicut nullam conclusionem concludunt principia propria quam non concludant principia universalia, et sicut nullam rem producant agentia hic inferius quam non producat virtus solis. Virtus ergo solis recepta in oliva particulatur et contrahitur ad productionem olive, ita quod mediante oliva et mediante semine olive producit olivam, sicut mediante leone et mediante semine leonis producit leonem.”

the moving power of noble soul. Thus, taking inspiration from Aristotle's dictum that "man is generated by man and by the sun",⁶³⁶ Giles distinguishes between what is primary on the side of the sun and what is secondary on the side of man, or nature.⁶³⁷

Conclusion

We have shown that Giles, like Thomas, makes use of the Platonic forms to explore the meaning of a monotheistic participation in *esse* that is the creaturely relation that corresponds to the divine act of creation. But Giles' discussion of the contraction of participated *esse* takes on a distinctly hierarchical dimension that is far less pronounced in the commentary of Thomas. Thomas emphasizes more the direct participatory relationship between each creature and God. For Giles, by contrast, as all beings contract the infinite divine *esse* through participation, they fall into a hierarchy of created beings ordered according to their perfection, simplicity, and likeness to the first cause. But within that created order, it becomes clear that creatures too are bound in their order to one another by another kind of participation insofar as the first causes uses intelligible creatures as instruments and mediators of his providential power. The result is that noble soul, who is the last of the separate substances and the mover of the heavens, stands between the orders of intellect and body and participates in the creative power of God over the world of generation.

There are three distinct ways Giles uses the Platonic doctrine of the forms to develop his understanding of participated *esse* and its hierarchy of essences. 1) First, in Giles' understanding of the infinity of the *ipsum esse*, he uses the Platonic doctrine of the forms wherein the higher are more universal and contain the perfections of the lower to describe how the divine *esse* contains super-eminently in itself every being and every perfection. 2)

⁶³⁶ Aristotle, *Physics* II.2, 194b.

⁶³⁷ See also Giles' description of how the intelligences produce natural forms by means of the heavens, their instruments in *Ordinatio in II Sententia*, d. 14, q. 3, dub. 3 lat. (ed. Venice 1581), p. 613a: "Soluta difficultate secunda, forte dubitaret aliquis utrum species immateriales, quae sunt in intelligentiis moventibus orbes, aliquid faciant ad generationem istorum materialium, vel (quod idem est) utrum ex istis formis immaterialibus procedant et producantur istae formae materiales. Sciendum quod ex duobus, quae videmus hic inferius, possumus declarare veritatem quaesiti. Videmus enim hic inferius quod a forma, quae est immaterialiter in mente artificis, habet esse forma artificiati in materia exteriori, ut hoc modo in talibus fiat conveniens ex convenienti, ut a domo, quae est in anima, fiat domus in materia, et ab arca, quae est in anima, fiat arca in materia, ut parere potest in pluribus locis per Philosophum et Commentatorem", quoted in Sorokina, *Les sphères, les astres et les théologiens*, vol. 1, p. 191.

Second, as the inferior forms in the Platonic hierarchy are understood to participate the more universal, Giles understands that created perfections participate the infinite perfection of the divine *esse*. Along similar lines, the basis of this participation of created perfection in the divine *esse* is the participation of the particular natures of creatures in their created *esse*, which is granted to them as a likeness of the divine *esse*. Giles uses Proclus' distinctions between participant, participated, and unparticipated together with his three modes of wholeness (before the parts, in the parts, and of the parts) to explain the relationships between creaturely nature, created *esse*, and the divine *esse*. 3) Third, Giles explains the mediatory role that noble soul plays in the hierarchy of being through the Platonic notion of the divine and providential power of superior principles over the inferior beings that they influence.

The difference between Giles' use of his Platonic sources and Thomas' discussion of them before him centres around the relationship each establishes between the Platonic doctrines and the system they find in the *De causis* itself. For Thomas, the Platonists are present as a critical and historical tool which he uses to clarify the meaning of the *De causis* through a discussion of its relationship to its sources. In this process, Thomas is very careful to draw out the errors of the Platonists and to measure them against the truth as expounded by Aristotle and Ps.-Dionysius. The situation, as D'Ancona has argued, is different for Giles who spends very little time critically evaluating the doctrines of Platonists and focuses instead on using concepts drawn from the Platonic doctrine to develop his understanding of participation and the connection of the universe.⁶³⁸

In both of his accounts of *contractio* and *connexio* Giles takes up the Platonic themes Thomas has drawn into the *De causis* commentary tradition and uses them in his formulation of the fundamental metaphysical constituents of his understanding of the origin of the universe and its structure. Giles, of course, does not think that the Platonic doctrine of the forms is true in itself, but rather, he makes use of what Pasquale Porro calls "hermeneutical charity", using the doctrine "to understand certain truths".⁶³⁹ Porro argues

⁶³⁸ See D'Ancona, "L'uso della *Sententia Dionysii* nel commento di S. Thommaso e Egidio Romano".

⁶³⁹ See Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 2 (P f. 8vb; V f. 8vS) and Prop. 12 (P f. 39rb; V f. 40vE), both quoted above. Porro judges that Giles' use of Proclus in his formulation of the "real difference" involves a conspicuous and significant integration of Proclean themes and that these themes have a large influence on other thinkers to the extent that Giles in this doctrine influences many later Thomists: "Credo che si possa dire, a parziale integrazione, che Egidio Romano costituisce in realtà a questo proposito una vistosa e significativa

that Giles' use of the Platonic forms in this way to develop his understanding of the relationship between *esse* and *essentia*, represents one of the most conscious and shrewd uses of what was known about Plato in the 13th c.⁶⁴⁰ Our purpose has been to show that Giles' clever use of the Platonic forms goes even further than his understanding of the real difference of *esse* and *essentia* to involve noble soul and the metaphysics of the celestial motions.

eccezione: la metafisica procliana gioca un ruolo fondamentale nella costituzione di quella che è forse la dottrina egidiana più peculiare e nota, la distinzione reale di essere ed essenza. Da qui l'influenza procliana, per quanto ormai inavvertita in quanto tale, sarebbe poi passata in tutti quei tomisti che hanno interpretato la distinzione reale di Tommaso nei termini di quella egidiana (o in modo simile)" ("Egidio Romano, la tradizione procliana", p. 336).

⁶⁴⁰ Porro, "Egidio Romano, la tradizione procliana", p. 323: "L'applicazione del principio di carità ermeneutica al caso delle Forme platoniche rappresenta forse il caso più consapevole e smalzato dell'impiego, nel XIII secolo, di quel che allora si poteva conoscere di Platone."

CHAPTER 5. NOBLE SOUL AND THE ANGELIC HIERARCHY IN GILES OF ROME

It is a presupposition for Giles of Rome's commentary on the *Liber de causis* that the separate intelligences described by the philosophers are "what we call by the common name 'angels'".⁶⁴¹ And because Giles understands that noble souls are also separate intelligences and identifies them with the secondary intelligences that are said in Prop. 4 of the *De causis* to fall under the influence of primary intelligences,⁶⁴² these noble souls are also angels. Giles explains in Prop. 3 of his commentary that just as there are superior bodies and inferior bodies, the bodies of the heavenly spheres and bodies on earth, so too intelligences are distinguished, "because some are superior and some inferior."⁶⁴³ "Thus", Giles concludes, "in addition to superior angels, inferior angels are posited to whom are assigned the administration of bodies".⁶⁴⁴

By this reasoning, Giles assimilates the primary causes of the *Liber de causis*, intelligences and noble soul, to the angelic hierarchies of the Christian faith. Giles is not original in this synthesis of Aristotelian separate substances and angels,⁶⁴⁵ but his is the first

⁶⁴¹ See Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 21 (P f. 61va; V f. 72vS): "intelligentias, quas communi nomine vocamus angelos"; and Prop. 30 (P f. 86vb; V f. 102r M): "Habent enim ipsae intelligentiae quas communi nomine appellamus angelos".

⁶⁴² *Liber de causis*, Prop. 4 (ed. Pattin), p. 56.82-85: "Et intelligentiae primae influunt super intelligentias secundas bonitates quas recipiunt a causa prima, et intendunt bonitates in eis usquequo." See also Prop. 5(4), p. 57.86-93: "Intelligentiae superiores primae, quae sequuntur causam primam, imprimunt formas secundas, stantes, quae non destruuntur ita ut sit necessarium iterare eas vice alia. Intelligentiae autem secundae imprimunt formas declines, separabiles, sicut est anima. Ipsa namque est ex impressione intelligentiae secundae quae sequitur esse creaturum inferius."

⁶⁴³ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 10vb; V f. 10vN): "Dicemus ergo etiam secundum sanctorum sententiam quod corporalis creatura dividitur in corpora suprema, cuiusmodi sunt celi, et in corpora infima, cuiusmodi sunt corpora existentia in sphaera activorum et passivorum. Sic et ipse intelligentie distinguuntur, quia quedam sunt superiores, quedam inferiores. Inconveniens enim esset quod intelligentie superiores que sunt proximiores primo et magis attingunt ipsum immediate connecterentur corporibus tanquam eorum motores."

⁶⁴⁴ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 10vb; V f. 10vN-O): "Ideo preter angelos superiores est dare angelos inferiores quibus commissa est administratio corporum. Si ergo hos angelos inferiores administrantes corpora celestia volunt vocare animas, angelos superiores vero excellentiores illis volunt vocare intelligentias."

⁶⁴⁵ Albert the Great attributes the identification of intelligences and angels with Jewish thinkers in *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.8, p. 58.19-23: "Ordines autem intelligentiarum, quas nos determinavimus, quidam dicunt esse ordines angelorum et intelligentias vocant angelos. Et hoc quidem dicunt Isaac et Rabbi Moyses et ceteri philosophi Iudaeorum." Latin authors also frequently attribute this identification of angels with intelligences to Arabic thinkers. See, for example, the references to various Latin authors who make this claim in Suarez-Nani, *Connaissance et langage des anges*, p. 15. For an example of Avicenna's identification of intelligences and celestial souls with angels see *Liber de anima seu sextus de naturalibus*, VI.2 (ed. Van Reit), p. 28.83-86. On Avicenna's angelology see H. Corbin, *Avicenna and the Visionary Recital*, trans. W.R. Trask (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 46-122. See also Algazel, who summarizes Avicenna in *Metaphysics*, I.4 (ed.

De causis commentary to justify and undertake an angelological reading of this text.⁶⁴⁶ As we saw in the previous chapter, Thomas Aquinas does venture to articulate in texts besides his *De causis* commentary a system of celestial dynamics that includes inferior angels who act as the efficient causes of the heavenly motions and superior angels that act as their ends.⁶⁴⁷ However, Thomas does not assimilate noble soul and angels in his *De causis* commentary, and neither does he use his commentary as an opportunity to discuss celestial metaphysics at any meaningful length. Giles' commentary is very different. The angelological system of celestial dynamics he works out in his commentary, especially in his treatments of noble soul and Prop. 3, are central to the work.⁶⁴⁸ He begins in Prop. 3 by demonstrating the necessity of celestial soul and proceeds to argue for the harmony of this doctrine (when properly understood) with Christian teachings about angelic movers. Then, by means of this synthesis, Giles produces a distinctly angelological reading of the *Liber de causis* which uses Dionysian concepts to interpret and adapt that text's system of primary causality to a theology of the celestial hierarchy whose power governs and directs the entire order of nature.

Giles' discussions of separate substances in his *De causis* commentary are connected to a larger, decades-long effort he undertakes across multiple texts on the angels. These include four disputed questions on angels, the *Quaestiones de cognitione angelorum* (c. 1287-88),⁶⁴⁹ *De mensura angelorum* (c. 1288-89),⁶⁵⁰ *De compositione angelorum* (c. 1287-90),⁶⁵¹ and *De*

Muckle), p. 90.14-17; and Moses Maimonides, *Dux perplexorum*, II.5 (ed. Paris, 1520), f. 42v: "Et erunt ipse intelligentie abstracte angeli propria quibus mediantibus moventur celi."

⁶⁴⁶ On the angelological focuses and features of Giles' *De causis* commentary, see Suarez-Nani, *La connaissance angélique*, p. 79-81; Battagliero, "Egidio Romano, Proclus, e il *Liber de causis*", p. 130-36; and D'Ancona, "L'uso della *Sententia Dionysii* nel commento di S. Thommaso e Egidio Romano", (1981).

⁶⁴⁷ See Thomas Aquinas, *In II Sententia*, d. 14, a. 3c; and *Summa contra gentiles*, II.70.

⁶⁴⁸ D'Ancona highlights the distinct angelological focus of Giles' commentary in "L'uso della *Sententia Dionysii* nel commento di S. Thommaso e Egidio Romano", p. 18-19.

⁶⁴⁹ Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones de cognitione angelorum*, in *De esse et essentia, De mensura angelorum, et De cognitione angelorum* (Venice, 1503), f. 76r-119r. On this work see T. Suarez-Nani, *Connaissance et langage des anges selon Thomas d'Aquin et Gilles de Rome*, *Etudes de philosophie médiévale* 85 (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 2002); B. Faes de Mottoni, *Voci, "alfabeto" e altri segni degli angeli nella quaestio 12 del De cognitione angelorum di Egidio Romano*, in *Medioevo*, XIV (1988), p. 71-105; G. Pini, "Cognition", in C.F. Briggs and P.S. Eardly (eds), *A Companion to Giles of Rome* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2016), p. 150-72; and I. Rosier-Catach, "Gilles de Rome et les modes de parole angélique", in *Quaestio* 20 (2020), p. 29-54.

⁶⁵⁰ Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones de mensura angelorum*, in *De esse et essentia, De mensura angelorum, et De cognitione angelorum* (Venice, 1503), f. 35v-76r. See B. Faes de Mottoni, "Mensura im Werk 'De mensura angelorum' des Aegidius Romanus", in *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 16/1 (1983), p. 86-102; Eadem, "Un aspetto dell'universo angelologico di Egidio Romano: 'Utrum sit unum aevum omnium aeviternorum'", in C. Wenin (ed.), *L'homme et son univers au Moyen-Age* (Leuven: Louvain-la-Neuve, 1986), p. 911-20.

⁶⁵¹ There is no edition of the *Quaestiones de compositione angelorum*. D. Trapp includes some transcriptions

motu angelorum (1288/9-1295).⁶⁵² Giles wrote these works in the years around and preceding the completion of his *De causis* commentary,⁶⁵³ and they were part of the preparatory work involved in finishing the text that contains his most mature and extensive discussions of angels, the *Ordinatio* of his commentary on Book II of Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, which he finally completed as Archbishop of Borges around 1309. It is clear from the ways in which Giles cross-references all of these texts within one another that they contribute to a larger train of thought. In addition to the references the *Quaestiones* make to one another,⁶⁵⁴ Giles often points out that themes are treated "more diffusely" in those works while commenting on the *De causis*,⁶⁵⁵ and the topics covered in all of these works frequently reappear in the course of his commentary on Book II of the *Sentences*.⁶⁵⁶

In Giles' commentary on Prop. 3 of the *Liber de causis*, one sees him at work carefully clarifying a specific part of this larger project, and this is, as we have said, the identification of the philosophers' doctrine of celestial soul, or noble soul, with the lowest order inferior rank of angels which, according to the Dionysian principle of mediation, is necessary so that the "bottom of the top might be joined to the top of the bottom", that is, angels and bodies, so that the two might comprise a "a single universal harmony".⁶⁵⁷ Giles turns frequently to

of the text in his "Aegidii Romani de doctrina modorum", in *Angelicum* 12/4 (1935), p. 449-501. R. Cross makes use of D. Trapp's transcriptions in his *The Metaphysics of the Incarnation: Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

⁶⁵² Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones de motu angelorum*, ed. G. Bruni, in *Analecta Augustiniana* 17 (1939), p. 22-66.

⁶⁵³ The dates of these works are cited from C.F. Briggs and P.S. Eardly (eds), *A Companion to Giles of Rome*, p. 276. Their list of dates is compiled with reference to S. Donati, "Studi per una cronologia delle opere di Egidio Romano. I: Le opere prima del 1285. I commenti aristotelici", *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 1/1 (1990), p. 1-111 and "Studi per una cronologia delle opere di Egidio Romano: II. Note sull'evoluzione della struttura e dello stile dei commenti", *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 2/1 (1991), p. 1-74.

⁶⁵⁴ B. Faes de Mottoni discusses the relationships of the *Quaestiones* on angels to one other in "Mensura im Werk", p. 86-87; and for their relationship to Giles' *Quodlibeta* see G. Pini, "Giles of Rome", in C. Schabel (ed.), *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2006), p. 233-86 at p. 240-47.

⁶⁵⁵ See Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 11va; V 11vV): "In questionibus tamen nostris quas disputavimus *De cognitione angelorum* de hac materia diffusius diximus"; Prop. 15 (P f. 93va; V f. 50rN): "ut in questionibus nostris de angelis diffusius diximus"; Prop. 31 (P f. 88rb; V f. 106rZ): "Sed de hac materia in questionibus nostris *De evo* et *De angelorum mensura* diffusius loquuti sumus"; Prop. 31 (P f. 90ra; V f. 106rH): "ut in questionibus nostri theologicis *De mensura angelorum* diffusius diximus"; and Prop. 32 (P f. 92ra; V f. 108v C): "in questionibus nostris *De angelorum mensura* diffusius diximus".

⁶⁵⁶ See, for example, the return to the subject of *De mensura angelorum* in *Ordinatio in II Sententia*, p. 1, d. II, qu. 1, a. 2 (Venice, 1581), p. 107-13. On this text see B. Faes de Mottoni, "Un aspetto dell'universo angelologico", p. 912.

⁶⁵⁷ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 10vb; V f. 10vM): "Unde Dionysius VII *De divinis nominibus* loquens de ordine universi ait quod: 'divina virtus omnia concordans est omnis ordinis causa et semper fines primorum coniungens principiis secundorum, unam omnis armoniam pulchre operans'. Ex hoc

the Dionysian corpus throughout his commentary, and especially to the *De caelestis hierarchia*, or the *De anglice hierarchia* as he often calls it, referencing this text eight times, which is more often than either Albert or Thomas.⁶⁵⁸ In particular, Giles makes extensive use of the Dionysian *lex divinitatis*, the principle that higher things must be joined to lower things through a medium.⁶⁵⁹ This principle provides the fundamental logic which Giles uses to establish the necessity of noble souls, and it is the law which provides the pattern by which he incorporates noble soul into the celestial hierarchy. As we will see further below, Giles also uses the *lex divinitatis* to explain the meaning of the relationships of illumination and perfection shared within the angelic hierarchy, as well as in the operations and order of the ecclesiastical hierarchy as it imitates the rule of the angels over nature in its own rule over the secular human community.

The present chapter has five tasks. 1) First, it considers Giles' understanding of the doctrine of celestial animation and its necessity. 2) Second, it sees how he unites this doctrine to the angelic hierarchies through the Dionysian *lex divinitatis*, comparing this conclusion to the arguments of Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, who present reasonings that both support and are opposed to Giles' synthesis. 3) Third, it examines how Giles' consequently Dionysian approach to the primary causes of the *De causis* provides him with new resources in his interpretation of the "*mediante intelligentia*" in noble soul's creation according to the Dionysian operations of illumination and perfection. 4) Finally, it looks to see how this angelological approach to celestial animation provides the theological and cosmological framework in which Giles articulates some of his later political ideas on the order and authority of the church.

ergo Deus pulchre operatur unam universalem armoniam sive consonantiam omnis universi, quia quoddam ordine omnia coniungit". See Ps.-Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, VII.6 (*Dionysiaca* vol. 2), p. 407-8.

⁶⁵⁸ Albert the Great refers twice to the doctrine from *De caelestis hierarchias* IV that "bonum est sui communicativum et diffusivum" (*De causis et processu universitatis*, II.3.15, p. 152.5-9; and II.4.5, p. 159.42-46). Thomas Aquinas makes a more varied use of the work than Albert, referencing the doctrine from *De caelestis hierarchias* II.3 that with respect to divine things, negations are true in Prop. 6 (p. 43.16-18); from *De caelestis hierarchias* XII.2 and XV.3 that higher angels participate a higher wisdom than lower beings in Prop. 10 (p. 69.11-13 and p. 72.5-8), and from *De caelestis hierarchias* VII.2 that more superior angels are "in the vestibule" of the divine in Prop. 19 (p. 107.6-9).

⁶⁵⁹ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 10vb; V f. 10vM): "Dicendum quod lex divinitatis est reducere infima in suprema per media". On the *lex divinitatis* in Giles' thought, see D. Luscombe, "The 'Lex Divinitatis' in the Bull 'Unum Sanctam' of Pope Boniface VIII", in C.N.L. Brooke, D.E. Luscombe, G.H. Martin, and D. Owen (eds), *Church and Government in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 205-21. For the origin and sources of the *lex divinitatis* and its literature see the discussion below.

1. On the Necessity of Celestial Soul according to the Philosophers

Giles sets out on his purpose of incorporating the doctrine of celestial animation into a system of angelic causes by exploring first the reasons why the *Liber de causis* makes a distinction between celestial soul and intelligences: “Someone might doubt what could move this author and other philosophers to posit these souls of the heavens [that are] different from intelligences”.⁶⁶⁰ While it is a presupposition for Giles that the separate intelligences of the Aristotelian tradition should be identified with angels, the same identification is less obvious in the case of celestial soul. If one understands that the heavens are moved through angels, why should souls of the spheres be necessary in addition to the intelligences? Would not these celestial souls be superfluous?⁶⁶¹ Giles determines that the distinction made between the intelligences and celestial souls in the *Liber de causis* and, as he puts it, by “other philosophers”, is necessary through two suppositions: first, each heaven requires its own proper mover which they call its “soul”, and second, that these proper movers cannot be intelligences.

The first supposition is based in two arguments, one from Aristotle’s *Physics* (by comparing, as Giles puts it “the heaven to these inferior things”) and the other from the *Metaphysics* (by comparing the heaven “to the prime mover”).⁶⁶² In the first case, according to Giles’ use of *Physics* VIII, seeing that the heavens are self-moved, it follows that they each must have a mover that is proper to themselves:

The first way is clear as follows, for among inferior things there are found some which are not moved from themselves but by something generative, such as the elements and all inanimate moved things. Others, however, are moved from themselves and are divisible into two [groups], the first of which is moving *per se*, and the second is moved *per se*, such as things that are animated, and the first are more noble than the second. And if something is moved from itself, it is fitting that

⁶⁶⁰ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 10rb; V f. 10rF): “Ulterius forte dubitaret aliquis quid potuit movere Auctorem istum et alios philosophos ut darent ipsis celis animas alias ab intelligentiis.”

⁶⁶¹ For more on the relationship between intelligences and angels in theories of medieval celestial motion, see Grant, *Planets, Stars, and Orbs*, p. 523-45. And on the question of whether celestial souls are also required, p. 545-47.

⁶⁶² Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 10rb; V f. 10rF): “Dicendum quod secundum eos due suppositiones sunt supponende quas declarabimus sequendo philosophorum dicta. Una est quod quodlibet celum habet aliquem motorem appropriatum, qui dicitur eius anima. Alia suppositio est quod immediati motores celorum non possunt esse intelligentie. Hiis duobus suppositis coguntur dare ipsis celis animas preter intelligentias. Prima autem suppositio, videlicet ‘quodlibet celorum habere motorem appropriatum qui dicitur eius anima’, ex dictis philosophorum declaratur dupliciter, primo prout celum comparatur ad hec inferiora, secundo prout comparatur ad motorem primum.”

the the first mobile things, such as the celestial bodies, would be moved moved from themselves. They are, therefore, animated and they each have proper movers which are called their souls. And the Philosopher touches upon this way in *Physics* VIII and the same is proved in the *Liber caeli et mundi*.⁶⁶³

This line of thinking, which is based on *Physics* VIII.5, argues that every motion requires both something moved and something unmoved, and thus in something that is self-moved there must be two parts, one that is moved and another that is unmoved.⁶⁶⁴ Variations of this argument appear throughout Albert's commentaries on Aristotle and, like Giles, he frequently cites *Physics* VIII, which he understands to provide an account of the unmoved causes of motion in each of the heavens.⁶⁶⁵

That the proper movers of the heavens must be souls Giles demonstrates through the conclusion of *Metaphysics* VII that the heavens are moved through love and desire:

If, then, God moves the heaven as something desired and loved, the heaven will be moved as desiring and loving. Thus, the heaven has a soul which [through] desiring and longing to be assimilated to the first cause moves the heavens. And this seems to be the meaning of the Philosopher's argument in *Metaphysics* XII, in that chapter: "It moves as something desired and understood", where the Commentator says that it is clear from this that the heaven has soul and has the desiderative and intellective [faculties] from the powers of the soul.⁶⁶⁶

This characterization of the proximate mover of the heavens as a soul with the power of desire who acts as an efficient cause relative to the end of celestial motion, the prime mover, also appears in both Albert's and Thomas' writings on celestial dynamics.⁶⁶⁷ As Giles

⁶⁶³ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 10rb-va; V f. 10rF-G): "Prima via sic patet, nam in hiis inferioribus inveniuntur aliqua que non moventur ex se sed a generante, ut elementa et omnia mixta inanimata; alique vero moventur ex se et sunt divisibilia in talia duo, quorum unum est per se movens et aliud est per se motum, ut animata, et hec sunt nobiliora aliis. Et si aliqua moventur ex se, dignum est quod prima mobilia, cuiusmodi sunt corpora celestia, moveantur ex se, erunt ergo illa animata et habebunt motores aliquos appropriatos qui dicentur eorum anime. Et hanc viam tangit Philosophus in VIII *Physicorum*, et *Libro celi et mundi* probatur hoc idem."

⁶⁶⁴ See Aristotle, *Physics*, VIII.5, 256b-257a.

⁶⁶⁵ See, for example, Albert, *Physica*, I.3.11, p. 59.16-52, which is quoted and discussed in Twetten, "Albert the Great, Double Truth", p. 287-94, who also gives many more examples in that essay of Albert's use of *Physics* VIII to discuss the intellectual movers of the heavens.

⁶⁶⁶ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 10rb-va; V f. 10rH): "Si ergo Deus movet celum ut desideratum et amatum, celum movebitur ut desiderans et amans. Habet ergo celum animam que desiderans et amans assimilari prime cause movet celum. Et ista videtur esse sententia Philosophi in XII *Methaphysice* in illo capitulo, 'movet autem sicut desideratum et intellectum', ubi Commentator ait: ex hoc manifestum esse celum habere animam et habere de virtutibus anime desiderativam et intellectivam."

⁶⁶⁷ For this argument in Albert, see *Problemata determinata*, 2, p. 50.24-37, which is discussed by Twetten "Albert the Great, Double Truth", p. 332; see also *De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa* (ed. Borgnet,

indicates, this argument is made explicit by Averroes in his *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics*.⁶⁶⁸

The second supposition of positing celestial souls in addition to intelligence is that the proximate, desiring mover of the heavens, cannot, according to the philosophers, be an intelligence. Again, Giles provides two arguments. The first reasons from the immobility of intelligence, and the second from its immateriality. The proper operation of intelligence is *intelligere*, and in this operation intelligences are completely immobile and completely immaterial. Thus it seems necessary to posit additional separate substances that are inferior to intelligence in that they not only think, but move,⁶⁶⁹ and which are, thus, less immaterial in the sense that they are inclined towards the bodies they influence.⁶⁷⁰

We already encountered a version of these arguments in Albert's presentation of the Avicennian arguments for celestial soul in Ch. 1,⁶⁷¹ but Giles also emphasizes something here

1891), Lib.II, tract.2, cap.2, p.481b-82a: "Sic intelligentia lumine intellectibili primae causae constituta, activa est intellectuum, hoc est, formarum quae sunt intellectus rei cuiuslibet, cuius formae sunt : hujus enim lumen fluit in animam, et per animam in sphaeram, et per motum sphaerae in calidum et frigidum et humidum et siccum, ita quod omnia movent et moventur formata lumine intelligentiae moventis, quae movet sicut desideratum movet desiderium : desideratum enim non movet desiderium nisi desiderium concipiat formam desiderati, vel per apprehensionem, vel per influxionem." For the argument in Thomas, see Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia super Metaphysicam*, XII.8, 2536 (ed. Marietti, 1964), p. 593a: "Hic philosophus comparat primum quod movet sicut intelligibile et desiderabile, ad id quod intelligit et desiderat ipsum: necesse est enim, si primum movens movet sicut primum intellectum et desideratum, quod primum mobile desideret et intelligat ipsum. Et hoc quidem verum est secundum opinionem Aristotelis, inquantum caelum ponitur animatum anima intelligente et desiderante."

⁶⁶⁸ See Averroes, *Commentaria in libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, XII (ed. Venentiis, 1562), f. 310rD: "Dicit et similiter intendit per intellectum primum movens corpora celestia et per desiderium animam, quae est in corporibus celestibus et utrunque; istorum est alteri propinquum;" and f. 318r F-318vH: "Et cum primum movens movet et non movetur, neque secundum accidens, neque secundum seipsum, sicut movetur anima, quae est in corpore, necesse est ut iste motor moveat, quemadmodum desideratum et affectatum movent nos. [...] Et videtur de istis principiis quae sunt in corporibus celestibus quod desideratum in eis idem est cum intellectu. [...] Hoc igitur est dicere, quod voluptuosum et intellectum est idem in eis. Et ex hoc quidem apparet bene hec corpora esse animata et quod non habent de virtutibus anime nisi intellectum et virtutem desiderativam, quae movet in loco."

⁶⁶⁹ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 10va; V f. 10vH): "Cum ergo Deus sit omnino immobilis, non videtur convenienter posse stare quod intelligentie quae immediate se habent ad Deum omnino immobiles habeant ipsum movere tanquam operationem propriam. Sed preter intelligentias quarum propria operatio est intelligere, oportuit dare aliquas inferiores substantias quarum propria operatio esse movere celum, et illas vocaverunt celorum animas."

⁶⁷⁰ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 10va; V f. 10vK): "Quod ergo intelligentie quae immediate se habent ad Deum, qui est omnino immaterialis et actus purus immediate attingat corpora quae habent materiam partem sui vel quae sunt materialia, videbatur indecens. Et quia in tanto negocio, sicut est celorum dispositio per quos hic totius orbis gubernatur, minima inordinatio est valde inconveniens. Ideo preter intelligentias posuerunt quasdam alias substantias quas vocabant celorum animas."

⁶⁷¹ Summarizing the position of Avicenna and others who argue that intelligence cannot move the sphere directly, Albert explains that an "intelligence can be the act of no body": *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.7, p. 53.36-39: "Quarta ratio est, quod motus corporis oportet, quod efficienter sit ab eo quod est actus

that is distinct. In both cases, he attributes the great degree of immobility and immateriality to the intelligences because they are near to God who is *omnino immobiles* and *omnino immateriales*: intelligences possess these attributes because of their nearness to the complete immobility and immateriality which is only the true possession of God himself. Giles, in other words, argues not from what intelligences *are* (as do Albert the Great and Avicenna), but from their *station*. The reason why intelligences do not move any bodies is not because they would be unable to do so but rather because this would seem *indecereis*; it would be improper for creatures that are so near to God's immobility and immateriality to move and mix with bodies in the manner required by the proximate mover of the heavens.

This distinction matters because where Albert the Great argues for the distinction between intelligences and noble souls on the basis of the impossibility arising from their natures that intelligences move bodies directly, Giles, ultimately concludes that noble soul is also an intelligence, only one of a lower rank. Thus, for Giles, it cannot be the case that intelligences are incapable of moving bodies, a conclusion that follows for him from his understanding that they are angels which, according to theology, possess attributes and capacities that are often thought according to Aristotle's conclusions in *Metaphysics* XII, to be impossible. We will discuss these further at the conclusion of the next section.

2. The Doctrine of Celestial Animation and the Faith

According to the arguments of the philosophers reviewed above, it appears that celestial souls must exist, and Giles considers next how this position can be made to agree with the faith. As he asks, "Someone might doubt whether this opinion of the philosophers [about noble soul] can in some way concord with the faith or be reduced to the faith."⁶⁷²

Giles raises two concerns here. The first involves what the philosophers' doctrine of celestial

corporis. Intelligentia autem nullius corporis est actus. Ab intelligentia ergo non potest esse motus corporis localis;" see also II.2.1, p. 92.56-60. For this argument in Avicenna, see *Liber de philosophia prima*, IX.2 (ed. Van Riet), p. 453.75-54.85, and for the consequence that it must be moved by a soul, see p. 454.89-95. Similarly, Thomas Aquinas explains in his *Summa contra gentiles* why intellectual substances cannot in their universality be united with bodies at III.80 (ed. Leonina), p. 232a: "Quia etiam quanto aliqua substantia est superior, tanto virtus eius est universalior; virtus vero intellectualis substantiae est universalior virtute corporis: superiores quidem inter intellectuales substantias habent virtutes non explicabiles per aliquam virtutem corpoream, et ideo non sunt corporibus unitae; inferiores vero habent virtutes particulatas explicabiles per aliqua corporea instrumenta, et ideo oportet quod corporibus uniantur."

⁶⁷² Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 10va; V f. 10vL): "Uterius forte dubitaret aliquis utrum hec opinio philosophorum possit aliquo modo concordare cum fide vel possit reduci ad fidem."

animation seems to imply: that the heaven and its soul make up a single substance — an understanding that Giles believes to be false. The second concern involves the unequivocal denial of celestial animation from John of Damascus, who, as Giles quotes him, says that “*Nullus autem animatos celos vel luminaria existimet, inanimati enim sunt*”.⁶⁷³ Giles concludes that this denial is indeed necessary if one understands (incorrectly) that celestial souls form a single substance where their bodies are like the souls and bodies of human beings. This is not, however, what Giles thinks the philosophers have in mind when they speak about celestial souls, which are not called souls because they are one in substance with their bodies, but rather because they are principles of celestial life. For this reason, then, Giles argues that the doctrine of celestial animation can be reduced to that of the faith and that the celestial movers of the philosophers are, in the end, no different from angels.

2.1. Giles and the Earlier Albert the Great on the Conciliation of Celestial Souls and Angels

Before looking any closer at Giles’ arguments in this case, it is useful to look back to Albert the Great, who around twenty-five years before writing his *De causis* commentary presents in his Parisian work, the *De IV coaequaevis* (1241-45) a conclusion very similar to that of Giles. This text belongs to a collection of writings known as the *Summa Parisiensis*, and in these, Albert seeks to forge an agreement between the theological authorities of the Christian faith and the newly emerging philosophical learning of the Arabs and the Greeks.⁶⁷⁴

According to this conciliatory aim, which is crucially different from the one he articulates later in his career, Albert argues that while John of Damascus denies the existence of celestial soul, if this concept (which he says is affirmed by Aristotle, Averroes, Avicenna, and Moses Maimonides⁶⁷⁵) is properly understood, there is no difference between it and the understanding that the heavens are moved by angels. Albert introduces these matters in his discussion of the third “coeval”, the heavens, asking “whether the [celestial] mover which is

⁶⁷³ See John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa*, 6, quoted in Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 10va-b; V f. 10vL); see Giles’ citation of this text below. See also *Ordinatio in II Sententia*, p. 1, d. 14, a. 4 (ed. Venice, 1581), p. 616bD.

⁶⁷⁴ See Krause and Anzulewicz, “From Content to Method”, p. 190; and Weisheipl, “The Life and Works of St. Albert the Great”, p. 23.

⁶⁷⁵ Albert the Great, *De IV coaequaevis*, tract. 3, q. 16, art. 2 (ed. Borgnet), p. 439a-40b.

intrinsic and indivisible from the quantity of the mobile is a soul or not.”⁶⁷⁶ This intrinsic mover of the heavens is the second of three causes of heavenly motion that Albert describes in that work: an “external mover” (*motor extra*),⁶⁷⁷ a “form conjoined to the heaven” (*forma conjuncta coelo*),⁶⁷⁸ and a “material form” (*forma materialis*).⁶⁷⁹ The external mover, Albert explains, is God, who according to Ptolemy, Moses Maimonides, Aristotle, and Boethius is the first and unmoved cause.⁶⁸⁰ The conjoined mover is the mover that is proportionate to the mobile although it remains separate from it in substance (here Albert cites Moses Maimonides, Averroes’ *De caelo* commentary, and Alpetragius’ *Astrologia*). The material form, finally, is the natural form of the sphere which is the source of the inclination in the sphere for circular motion: “just as there is heaviness in earth and lightness in fire which are the potencies for upwards motion and downwards motion”.⁶⁸¹

There are both similarities and differences between the three celestial movers here and the four primary causes of Albert’s *De causis et processu universitatis*. We have in both cases extrinsic, intrinsic, and natural movers of the spheres;⁶⁸² however, in the *De IV coaequavis*, the external mover is not intelligence, but God. There is, moreover, the crucial difference that Albert at this point in his career believes the proximate movers of the heavens to be identical with the angels of the Christian faith.

⁶⁷⁶ Albert the Great, *De IV coaequavis*, tract. 3, q. 16, art. 2 (ed. Borgnet), p. 439b: “Utrum motor ille qui est intra, et non est divisibilis secundum quantitatem mobilis, sit anima coeli, vel non.”

⁶⁷⁷ Albert the Great, *De IV coaequavis*, tract. 3, q. 16, art. 2 (ed. Borgnet), p. 438a: “Dicendum, quod si velimus loqui secundum philosophos, ponemus in coelo triplicem motorem, scilicet Deum qui est motor extra, non proportionatus mobili”.

⁶⁷⁸ Albert the Great, *De IV coaequavis*, tract. 3, q. 16, art. 2 (ed. Borgnet), p. 438b: “Secundus motor est forma conjuncta coelo non divisibilis divisione coeli : et isti motori convenit, quod sit mobilis per accidens”.

⁶⁷⁹ Albert the Great, *De IV coaequavis*, tract. 3, q. 16, art. 2 (ed. Borgnet), p. 438b: “Tertius motor est forma materialis divisibilis secundum divisionem coeli.”

⁶⁸⁰ Albert the Great, *De IV coaequavis*, tract. 3, q. 16, art. 2 (ed. Borgnet), p. 438a-b: “et hoc attendit Ptolemaeus qui dicit, quod nihil movet coelum nisi solus Deus, et Rahbi Moyses qui probat multis rationibus, quod motor coeli est extrinsecus extra ipsum, neque corpus, neque virtus in corpore existens, neque divisibilis, neque indivisibilis secundum corpus. Et ille motor videtur etiam innui in XI *Metaphysicae* [...] : et isti soli motori convenit, quod non moveatur per se, neque per accidens : et de hoc etiam intelligitur dictum Boetii in libro de *Consolatione philosophiae*.”

⁶⁸¹ Albert the Great, *De IV coaequavis*, tract. 3, q. 16, art. 2 (ed. Borgnet), p. 438b: “Sicut ut enim est grave in terra, et leve in igne, quae sunt potentiae ad motum sursum et ad motum deorsum, ita est quaedam forma in coelo quae est potentia ad motum circularem”. On the natural form of the heavens, Albert cites the familiar passage from *De caelo* II.2, 285a.29-30 (see also, II.12, 292b.1-1) and Averroes’ *De substantia orbis*, 1 (ed. Venice, 1562), p. 5vH-6rF.

⁶⁸² These three also correspond to the divisions in his discussion of the problem of celestial animation in *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.7, discussed above in Ch. 1.1.2.

He next asks if the proximate movers of the heavens are souls. While this is the position of many philosophers, Albert explains that some theologians, and specifically, John of Damascus, reject the existence of celestial souls in no uncertain terms.⁶⁸³ Albert, however, argues that it is possible to reconcile the doctrine of the philosophers with the Christian faith if it is properly understood:

We confess with the saints that the heavens do not have souls, nor are they living beings, if “soul” is taken according to its proper meaning. But if we wanted to bring the philosophers to the same [conclusion] as the saints, we would say that there are certain intelligences in the spheres that serve, first of all, in the motion of the spheres, and these intelligences are called the souls of the spheres, and [this is] not [said] univocally with the intelligences of humans insofar as they are not led into act through abstracting from phantasms, but [rather], they are converted upon their essence and [are converted] through essence upon another by a complete return. For just as it is said in the *Liber de causis*, Prop. 12, “For every intelligence knows its essence”, and again in Prop. 13, “Every knower who knows its essence, returns upon its essence in a complete return.”⁶⁸⁴

One will note here the major difference between Albert’s use of the *De causis* to discuss proximate celestial movers here and his insistence in the *De causis et processu universitatis* that intelligences and celestial souls are distinct from one another in operation and substance.

In this case, the final cause of celestial motion is God himself, while the efficient causes are intelligences called celestial souls.⁶⁸⁵ The upshot of this difference for Albert’s conciliatory purposes here is that if celestial souls are intelligences assigned to be the conjoined movers of the spheres under God’s direction, then there should be no difficulty in recognizing that these souls perform the same role that some of the saints ascribe to angels:

We said all these things following the philosophers, who do not contradict

⁶⁸³ See John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa*, 6, which Giles quotes above.

⁶⁸⁴ Albert the Great, *De IV coaequaevis*, tract. 3, q. 16, art. 2 (ed. Borgnet), p. 443a-b: “Nos cum sanctis confitemur coelos non habere animas, nec esse animalia, si anima secundum propriam rationem sumatur. Sed si vellemus philosophos ad idem reducere cum sanctis, dicemus quod quaedam intelligentiae sunt in orbibus deservientes primo in motus orbium, et intelligentiae illae dicuntur *animae orbium*, et non univoce cum intelligentiis hominum, eo quod non egrediuntur in actum per abstractionem a phantasmatis, sed ipsae revertuntur super essentiam suam et per essentiam super aliud reditione completa : sicut enim dicitur in *Libro de causis*, in propositione 12 : ‘Omnis enim intelligentia intelligit essentiam suam.’ Et iterum in propositione 13 : ‘Omnis sciens qui scit essentiam suam, est rediens ad essentiam suam reditione completa.’”

⁶⁸⁵ See also Albert the Great, *De IV coaequaevis*, tract. 3, q. 16, art. 2 (ed. Borgnet), p. 443b: “Operatur autem ad corpus ut natura ad navem, hoc est, secundum rationem movendi ipsum et regendi, sicut dicitur in libro de *Anima*, et in propositione 2 libri de *Causis* : ‘Omnis intelligentia divina scit res per hoc quod est intelligentia, et regit eas per hoc quod est divina.’ Et dicitur *divina intelligentia* ibi participans omnes bonitates divinas a primo motore qui est Deus.”

those saints who deny that the heavens have soul save *in name alone*; [these saints] abhor the name 'souls', but agree that certain intelligences or Angels move the heaven by the decree of God. Just as we hold in the Catholic faith that some angels do miraculous things and yet concur with the laws of nature, so it is not contrary to the faith that some angels assist nature in moving and governing the spheres of the heavens, [and] such moving Angels or intelligences the philosophers call souls.⁶⁸⁶

Albert concludes, then, that when those saints who, like John Damascene, deny that the heavens have souls, they deny it "in name alone", for what the philosophers call celestial souls are in reality intelligences, and these are the same as what are called angels according to the faith.

When Giles of Rome argues in his commentary on Book II of the *Sentences* that noble souls are angels, he does so following a reasoning that is similar to Albert's, but develops further the crucial point that celestial souls, for the philosophers, are not "one according to being" with their spheres.⁶⁸⁷ As Giles explains, when a body and its soul are made one according to *esse*, the power of that soul to move its body must be an organic power, for being joined to the body, it is only through the body that soul can influence the body. This, however, could not account for the perpetuity of the celestial motions since all organic powers experience fatigue. The heavens, then, must be moved by an immaterial and non-organic power, and if that is the case, their souls cannot be joined in substance to their bodies.⁶⁸⁸ It is clear to Giles by this reasoning, that when the philosophers posit souls in the heavens to be the causes of their perpetual motions, these souls remain separate from their bodies and only move them by a non-organic, intellectual power.

⁶⁸⁶ Albert the Great, *De IV Coaequaevis*, tract. 3, q. 16, art. 2, p. 445b: "Ista omnia diximus secundum philosophos qui non contradicunt quibusdam sanctis negantibus coelum animam habere, nisi in nomine solo, qui abhorrent nomen *animae*, et tamen bene concedunt quod intelligentiae quaedam sive Angeli movent coelum jussu Dei. Sicut ponimus secundum Catholicam fidem quosdam angelos miraculosa facere, et legibus naturae concurrere : ita non est contrarium fidei quosdam angelos juvare naturam in movendo et gubernando sphaeras coelorum, quos angelos moventes sive intelligentias philosophi dicunt *animas*" (emphasis added).

⁶⁸⁷ See Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio in II Sententia*, p. 1, d. 14, a. 4 (ed. Venice, 1581), p. 617bff.

⁶⁸⁸ Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio in II Sententia*, p. 1, d. 14, a. 4 (ed. Venice, 1581), p. 617bB-C: "Sciendum ergo quod si motor celi sic moveret celum quod fieret unum secundum esse ex motore et celo, ut supra tengebamus, accideret motori cel lassitudo et non posset perpetuari motus celi, nam cum in motore celi sua essentia et sua potentia habeant quendam ordinem, et maxime loquendo de potentia non organica, que fundatur in ipsa essentia, ergo essentia motoris celis iungetur essentie celi et fiet ex eis unum secundum esse. Et tunc potentia illius motoris non organica non immediate attinget corpus celi, nec poterit immediate per talem potentiam movere celum, sed oportebit dare aliquam virtutem organicam per quam movebitur celum, sicut apparet in nobis, quia anima nostra facit cum corpore unum secundum esse, et ideo potentie non organice fundate in essentia anime non immediate attingunt corpus, nec potest anima per eas immediate movere corpus."

It follows, then, in a similar way as for Albert, that the apparent problem of a theological authority like John of Damascus denying celestial motion can be easily resolved by understanding that what Damascene really rejected is the false doctrine that celestial souls and bodies are united in substance. And this false doctrine, Giles believes, is not what the philosophers really mean when they speak about souls in the heavens. As Albert says in his *De causis* commentary,

It should be said that as far as the thing itself is concerned, there is almost no difference between the theologians and the philosophers on the animation of the heavens. For the philosophers did not wish to say that from the soul of the heaven and the heaven there would arise something [that is] one according to *esse*; rather, according to the philosophers, the heavens are animated and they live, and the movers of the heavens are said to animate and vivify the heavens, only insofar as they infuse motion into them – which motion is a certain work of life.⁶⁸⁹

By this reasoning, Giles concludes that the meaning of the word “soul” should not pose any problems for the faith: the proximate cause of the motions of the heavens are called souls because they are causes of life, not because they are joined to their bodies in substance. The life of the heavens consists in their motions, and their souls are the causes of that motion. “Life”, as Giles clarifies, means the same thing as when one calls flowing waters “living” and unmoving waters “dead” – a fact about celestial motion that, as Giles argues, the theologians who also speak about the immaterial causes of that motion should be able to grant.⁶⁹⁰ And even while John of Damascus patently rejects celestial animation, Giles concludes: “I grant, further, that the heavens can be called animated and living in this way because they have their own movers infusing them with motion which is indeed the work of life.”⁶⁹¹

⁶⁸⁹ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 10va; V f. 10vL): “Dicendum quod quantum ad rem quasi non est differentia inter philosophos et theologos de animatione celorum. Nam neque philosophi voluerunt quod ex anima celi et celo fieret unum secundum esse, sed pro tanto secundum philosophos celi sunt animati et vivificant, et pro tanto motores celorum dicunt celos animare et vivere inquantum influunt eis motum, qui motus est quoddam opus vite.”

⁶⁹⁰ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 10va; V f. 10vL): “Nam et aque fluentes dicuntur aque vive, manentes vero immobiles dicuntur mortue. Hoc et theologi concederent, dicerent enim quod motores celorum influunt celis motum.”

⁶⁹¹ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 10va-b; V f. 10vL): “Modus tamen loquendi valde est varius, non enim utimur hoc genere loquutionis ut dicamus celos animatos, immo Damascenus in sua *Compilatione theologica* II, capite 6, plane negat celos animatos esse dicens: ‘Nullus autem animatos celos vel luminaria existimet, inanimati enim sunt’. Ulterius autem dico quod celi possunt dici hoc modo animati et vivere, quia habent motores appropriatos influentes eis motum qui est quiddam opus vite.” Giles returns to this argument in *Ordinatio in II Sententia*, p. 1, d. 14, a. 4 (ed. Venice, 1581), p. 617a: “Decentes ergo coelos inanimatos intelligunt

Giles clarifies this conclusion in his commentary on Book II of the *Sentences*, explaining that to say the heavens are animate or inanimate really amounts to a difference in name. If what is meant by “celestial animation” is properly understood, both those that affirm the doctrine and those that deny it will be found to say the same thing: “there are certain intelligences appropriated to the orbs moving the orbs.”⁶⁹² What the philosophers call “celestial souls” are simply the intelligences appropriated to the spheres, and there is, therefore, no mover of the heavens joined to it *per essentiam*, but rather one that is joined to it immediately “by its non-organic power” — *non organicam* because it is intellectual, by which “it is joined to the heaven immediately”⁶⁹³.

Giles even concludes in this case that we can recognize in these intellectual causes of celestial life a fifth grade of soul that one can add to the four others described in the *De anima*: vegetative, sensitive, locomotive, and intellective.⁶⁹⁴ The fourth, intellective, kind of soul, Giles suggests, can be divided into two types: on the one hand the kind that is *minus nobilis* in human beings and another kind that is *magis nobilis* in the heavens.⁶⁹⁵ Giles makes reference here again to the noble soul of the *Liber de causis*, concluding that the difference between intellective soul in the human and in the heaven consists in the fact that while human soul and its body are made one according to *esse*, celestial soul and its body are “one according to operation and motion”.⁶⁹⁶

quod ex motoribus illis et coelis non sit unum secundum esse, sicut sit ex anima humana et corpore. Dicentes ante coelos animatos intelligunt hoc idem quod non fiat unum secundum esse ex corpore coeli et eius anima fine eius motore, sed dicuntur animati et dicuntur vivere inquantum motores eorum influunt eis motum qui est quoddam opus vitae.”

⁶⁹² Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio in II Sententia*, p. 1, d. 14, a. 4 (ed. Venice, 1581), p. 617aA: “Respondeo dicendum quod apud sapientes ponere coelestia animata vel inanimata est disputatio ad nomen. Secundum veritatem autem idem est unum quod aliud, nam omnes recte sententias concedunt esse aliquas intelligencias appropriatas orbibus moventes orbis.”

⁶⁹³ Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio in II Sententia*, p. 1, d. 14, a. 4 (ed. Venice, 1581), p. 617bD: “Cogimur ergo ponere, quod motor coeli non coniungitur immediate coelo per essentiam, nec facit cum eo unum secundum esse, sed immediate coniungitur per potentiam suam non organicam, et per eam attingit coelum immediate.”

⁶⁹⁴ Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio in II Sententia*, p. 1, d. 14, a. 4 (ed. Venice, 1581), p. 617bD: “Accipiendo ergo large animatum, prout coeli dicuntur animati, distinguere quinque gradus animatorum”.

⁶⁹⁵ Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio in II Sententia*, p. 1, d. 14, a. 4 (ed. Venice, 1581), p. 618aA-B: “Supra autem secundum locum motiva sunt animata per animam intellectivam, ubi est assignare duos gradus: prout anima intellectiva potest esse minus nobilis, ut anima, vel magis nobilis ut anima coeli, unde et in *Libro de causis* animae coelorum vocantur animae nobiles.”

⁶⁹⁶ Giles of Rome, *Ordinatio in II Sententia*, p. 1, d. 14, a. 4 (ed. Venice, 1581), p. 618aB: “Propter quod tertia propositio *De causis* loquens de animabus coelorum ait ‘Omnis anima nobilis’ etc. Animae ergo humanae ex quibus cum corporibus sit unum secundum esse faciunt quartum gradum animatorum, animae vero coelestes ex quibus cum suis corporibus sit unum secundum operationem et motum sunt in quinto gradum animatorum.”

2.2. Intelligences and Celestial Souls as Superior and Inferior Ranks of Celestial Hierarchies in Giles of Rome and Thomas Aquinas

Having concluded that what the philosophers call celestial soul is, in the end, an intellectual separate substance, it is a simple thing to add next that these “souls”, in addition to what the *De causis* calls “intelligences”, are also angels. Giles performs this equivocation by suggesting that we should understand the difference between intelligence and noble soul in the *Liber de causis* according to the distinction made by the faith between superior and inferior angels:

We also say, therefore, according to the teaching of the saints, that the corporeal creature is divided into superior bodies, such as the heavens, and inferior bodies, such as the bodies that exist in the sphere of the active and passive. These intelligences are distinguished in the same way because some are superior and some inferior, for it would be improper for the superior intelligences which are closer to the first [cause] and touch it more immediately to be connected to bodies as their movers. Thus, in addition to superior angels there are inferior angels, who are entrusted with the administration of bodies. If, therefore, they want to call these inferior angels administering the celestial bodies “souls,” surely they want to call the superior and more excellent angels “intelligences”.⁶⁹⁷

By this reasoning, the two orders of separate substances in the *Liber de causis* correspond to two orders of angels, and Giles accordingly joins the system of primary causes to the celestial hierarchies of the faith.

As we saw in Ch. 3, Thomas Aquinas takes a consistently skeptical stance towards the existence of noble souls, and from his *De causis* commentary alone, it might appear that Giles’ assimilation of intelligences and noble souls to the angelic hierarchies does not depend on Thomas’ writings. However, it is clear from Thomas’ other writings that he not only recognizes the distinct activities of separate intelligences and celestial souls as the final and the efficient movers of the spheres in Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, but also replicates these roles in accounts of angelic motion in his theological writings.

⁶⁹⁷ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 10vb; V f. 10vO): “Dicemus ergo etiam secundum sanctorum sententiam quod corporalis creatura dividitur in corpora suprema, cuiusmodi sunt celi, et in corpora infima, cuiusmodi sunt corpora existentia in sphaera activorum et passivorum. Sic et ipse intelligentie distinguuntur, quia quedam sunt superiores, quedam inferiores. Inconveniens enim esset quod intelligentie superiores que sunt proximiores primo et magis attingunt ipsum immediate connecterentur corporibus tanquam eorum motores. Ideo preter angelos superiores est dare angelos inferiores quibus commissa est administratio corporum. Si ergo hos angelos inferiores administrantes corpora celestia volunt vocare animas, angelos superiores vero excellentiores illis volunt vocare intelligentias.”

Thomas Aquinas formulates a two-mover interpretation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* that bears much in common with Albert's two-mover interpretation of the *Liber de causis*, however, for Thomas, this doctrine has nothing to do with the *De causis* as he understands it when he writes his commentary. As Twetten argues, the *De causis* is decisive in Albert's conclusions about Aristotelian celestial metaphysics and the conclusion that there are indeed both intelligences and noble souls of the spheres.⁶⁹⁸ Thomas Aquinas, however, had use of textual resources that were unavailable to Albert, including Simplicius' *De caelo* commentary which makes it clear that there are more precedents in the Aristotelian tradition for discussing both psychic and intellectual movers of the heavens than Albert had been aware of.⁶⁹⁹ Accordingly, in his *Metaphysics* commentary, Thomas provides arguments that can also be found in Simplicius for the necessity that there be two orders of celestial movers, one of unmoved movers and the other of moved movers:

Here the Philosopher compares the first thing that moves as intelligible and desirable to that which thinks and desires it. For it is necessary, if the first mover moves as the first thing thought and desired, that the first mobile desire and think it. And this, indeed, is true according to the opinion of Aristotle insofar as he considered the heaven to be animated by a thinking and desiring soul.⁷⁰⁰

Thomas describes a similar argument in his *De caelo* commentary which references Simplicius explicitly. Simplicius' commentary describes the ancient Peripatetic controversy about the souls of the spheres, and in particular the difference between Alexander of Aphrodesias and himself,⁷⁰¹ and Thomas concludes there, following Simplicius, that the souls of the spheres are separate from their natures like Simplicius:

That the heaven is animated he supposes from what is proved in *Physics* VIII, that every mobile must be reduced to one first which is self moving, and possesses the active principle of its motion in itself and not the passive principle only, as some

⁶⁹⁸ Twetten, "Albert the Great, Double Truth", p. 316ff.

⁶⁹⁹ See Ch. 1.1.2.

⁷⁰⁰ Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia super Metaphysicam*, XII.8, 2536 (ed. Marietti), p. 594: "Hic Philosophus comparat primum quod movet sicut intelligibile et desiderabile, ad id quod intelligit et desiderat ipsum: necesse est enim, si primum movens movet sicut primum intellectum et desideratum, quod primum mobile desideret et intelligat ipsum. Et hoc quidem verum est secundum opinionem Aristotelis, inquantum caelum ponitur animatum anima intelligente et desiderante." This argument is also similar, with crucial differences, to Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima*, IX.2 (ed. Van Riet), p. 448.68-84 and 454.89-95; and Averroes, *Sermo de substantia orbis*, 1 (ed. Venice, 1562), p. 5vH-I; and *Metaphysica* (ed. Venice, 1562), p. 318rH-vK, which are discussed further in Ch. 1.1.2.

⁷⁰¹ See Simplicius, *In De caelo*, II.2 (ed. Heiberg), p. 388.16-19. See also Wolfson, "The Problem of the Souls of the Spheres", p. 71ff.

would claim. As Simplicius says, they claimed Aristotle says the heaven is animated, not because it has rational soul, but because it has a kind of life implanted in the body such that the soul which is in it is no different from the nature of such a body. This is clearly shown to be false from what Aristotle says in *Metaphysics* XII, that the first mover which is completely immobile moves the heaven as something desired and understood, and so it follows that according to his opinion, the heaven desires and thinks according to its soul.⁷⁰²

In the end, then, while Thomas is vocally ambivalent about noble soul in his *De causis* commentary since the faith does not support that doctrine, there is, nevertheless, a concept of celestial soul necessary to his interpretation of Aristotle, and this interpretation, which benefits from his knowledge of Simplicius, also has a family resemblance with Albert's interpretation of noble soul in the *De causis et processu universitatis*.⁷⁰³

Very much unlike Albert, however, Thomas adapts this two-mover model to the angelic hierarchies in his *Sentences* commentary. He envisions there that the unmoved rank of movers can be identified among the first triad of Dionysius' celestial hierarchy (Seraphim, Cherubim, and Thrones), while he identifies the moved movers with either the ministering angels, or with the Virtues of the second triad.⁷⁰⁴

⁷⁰² Thomas Aquinas, *In De caelo*, II.3 (ed. Leonina), p. 130a-b: "Quod autem caelum sit animatum, supponit ex eo quod probatum est in VIII *Physic.*, quod omnia mobilia necesse est reducere in unum primum, quod est movens seipsum, et habet in se principium motus activum, et non solum principium passivum, sicut quidam posuerunt, ut Simplicius refert qui posuerunt Aristotelem dicere caelum animatum, non quia haberet animam rationalem, sed ita quod haberet quandam vitam complantatam corpori, ita quod in eo nihil est aliud anima quam natura talis corporis. Quod manifeste ostenditur esse falsum ex hoc quod Aristoteles in XII *Metaphs.* dicit, quod primum movens, quod est omnino immobile, movet caelum sicut desideratum et intellectum: et sic sequitur quod secundum opinionem eius, caelum est secundum suam animam appetens et intelligens. Et secundum hoc motus caeli est et a natura et ab anima eius: sed a natura quidem sicut a principio secundario et passivo, inquantum scilicet tale corpus est aptum natum sic moveri; ab anima vero sicut a principio principali et activo motus." See also Wolfson, "The Problem of the Souls of the Spheres", p. 87.

⁷⁰³ See, for example, Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.2.1, p. 92.48-93.10, discussed in Ch. 1.2.

⁷⁰⁴ See Thomas Aquinas, *In II Sententia*, dist. XIV, art. 3 (ed. Mandonnet), p. 353: "Et ideo angelos, qui movent orbes proxime, possumus motores dicere, non formas, vel animas. [...] Unde etiam Avicenna dicit quod intelligentiae apud Philosophos sunt qui lege vocantur superiores Angeli, ut cherubim et seraphim; animae vero orbium dicunt inferiores, qui dicuntur Angeli ministerii"; and *Summa contra gentiles*, III, 80 (ed. Leonina), p. 232: "Cum autem corporalia per spiritualia regantur, ut ostensum est, corporalium autem est quidam ordo: oportet quod superiora corpora per superiores intellectuales substantias regantur, inferiora vero per inferiores. Quia etiam quanto aliqua substantia est superior, tanto virtus eius est universalior; virtus vero intellectualis substantiae est universalior virtute corporis: superiores quidem inter intellectuales substantias habent virtutes non explicabiles per aliquam virtutem corpoream, et ideo non sunt corporibus unitae; inferiores vero habent virtutes particulatas explicabiles per aliqua corporea instrumenta, et ideo oportet quod corporibus uniantur"; and *Ibid.*, p. 234: "Unde videtur quod ad hunc ordinem pertineat motus caelestium corporum, ex quibus, sicut ex quibusdam universalibus causis, consequuntur particulares effectus in natura: et ideo virtutes caelorum nominantur Luc. 21-26, ubi dicitur: virtutes caelorum movebuntur." See also Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones de spiritualibus creaturis*, Articulus 6; and Wolfson, "The Problem of the Souls of the Spheres", p. 89.

But while Thomas can be seen conflating the role of Aristotle's celestial souls with the angelic virtues, he is still frequently ambivalent towards the concept of celestial soul, both in his *De causis* commentary's discussion of noble soul and in other writings.⁷⁰⁵ Nevertheless, in his late work, the *De substantiis separatis*, Thomas implies that if the celestial souls of the Platonic hierarchy (together with all of its other orders) were to exist, then all of these would be angels.⁷⁰⁶ Thomas thereby provides a way to understand noble soul as an angelic cause, although he does not make this synthesis explicit in any of his writings. It is this additional step that Giles of Rome takes freely, formulating an account of celestial dynamics that benefits from arguments for the necessity of two movers that are familiar from Albert, and also from Thomas Aquinas' movement towards synthesizing those ideas with his angelology.

2.3. Giles and the Later Albert on the Differences between Angels and Separate Intelligences

As Giles draws the separate substances of philosophy together with the angels of the faith, he nevertheless acknowledges that this synthesis is not a perfect one. While "this saying of the philosophers may be drawn somewhat (*aliqua liter*) to that which the faith posits", it remains that "the meaning of the philosophers will never be completely drawn to the meaning of the faith".⁷⁰⁷ The point of tension Giles raises immediately is that while the philosophers only posit as many intelligences and celestial souls as there are orbs, according to the faith there are myriads of angels, and as Dionysius says in *On the Celestial Hierarchy*, there are many more supercelestial intelligences than there are material things here below.⁷⁰⁸

⁷⁰⁵ See, for example, Thomas' comments in *Quodlibet XII*, q. 5, a. 2 (ed. Leonina), p. 405-6, where he says, following Augustine, that concerning the question of celestial animation, "non refert ad fidem utrum sic uel aliter sit".

⁷⁰⁶ Thomas Aquinas, *De substantiis separatis*, 1.7 (ed. Leonina), p. 43.184-93: "Sic igitur patet quod inter nos et summum Deum quatuor ordines ponebant, scilicet deorum secundorum, intellectuum separatorum, animarum caelestium, et daemonum bonorum seu malorum. Quae si vera essent, omnes huiusmodi medii ordines apud nos angelorum nomine censerentur, nam et daemones in sacra Scriptura angeli nominantur; ipsae etiam animae caelestium corporum, si tamen sint animata, inter angelos sunt connumerandae, ut Augustinus definit in *Enchiridion*."

⁷⁰⁷ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 10vb; V f. 10vO): "Trahetur hoc philosophicum dictum aliqua liter ad id quod fides ponit, plene tamen nunquam philosophorum sententia trahetur ad sententiam fidei, quia ipsi tot posuerunt intelligentias et tot animas quot sunt orbes."

⁷⁰⁸ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 10vb-11ra; V f. 10v-11rO): "Nos tamen tenemus quod milia milium ministrant ei et decies milities milesies centena milium assistunt. Inconueniens enim esset quod corpora essent in tanto magno numero et nobilissima pars universi esset in tanto modico numero, unde Dionysius XIV *Angelice hierarchie* ait quod: 'multe sunt bene militie supercelestium intellectuum superantes

This tension between the doctrines of the philosophers and the faith is, in reality, only the first of a series of issues that Giles raises in his *De causis* commentary and his *Quaestiones* on angels. It is clear that Giles wishes to incorporate the primary causality of the *De causis* into the celestial hierarchies, but to do so he must make a number of corrections to the philosophers' doctrines about separate substances.

The heart of the tension is that the necessary attributes of the unmoved intelligences according to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and its interpreters seem to make the various ministries of angels as they are disclosed in the scriptures impossible. According to *Metaphysics* XII, the intelligences which are the prime movers of each sphere must be pure actuality, without location, unmoved, and unmoving.⁷⁰⁹ In his writings on angels, Giles controverts each of these points arguing instead that separate intelligences can know particulars,⁷¹⁰ and that, moreover, they can be identified in a location that is commensurate with their operation.⁷¹¹ Moreover, as we saw in Ch. 4, Giles does not think that angels are pure activity, but rather, that they are composed of *esse* and *essentia*,⁷¹² from which fact he also thinks they are

infimam et coartatam materialium multitudinem'. Videtur enim omnino velle Dionysius quod plures sunt species angelorum quam corporalium rerum. Rursus deviat hec positio a fide, quia intelligentias non ponit nisi propter motus orbium." See also Prop. 21 (P f. 61va; V f. 72vS): "Advertendum tamen quod cum dicimus intelligentias, quas communi nomine vocamus angelos, non immediate administrare vel movere corpora, loquimur secundum modum philosophorum, nam preter animas celorum et preter motores orbium est dare aliquas intelligentias sive aliquos angelos datos ad custodiam hominum. Propter quod oportet huiusmodi intelligentias sive huiusmodi angelos aliquam administrationem habere circa corporalia." See also *Ordinatio in II Sententia*, p. 1, d. 3, q. 2, a. 2, dub. 1 (ed. Venice, 1581), p. 188b-89a.

⁷⁰⁹ See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XII.7, 1072a: "there is a mover which moves without being moved"; 1072b: "But since there is something which moves while itself is unmoved, existing actually, this can in no way be otherwise than as it is"; 1073a: "But it is also clear that it is impassive and unalterable; for all other changes are posterior to change of place"; and 1073a: "The first principle or primary being is not movable either in itself or accidentally". That these attributes of the first unmoved mover are shared likewise by the unmoved movers of each sphere, see XII.8, 1073a: "there are other spatial movements—those of the planets—which are eternal [...] each of these movements also must be caused by a substance unmovable in itself and eternal" (trans. W.D. Ross, *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation*). On Aristotle's argument here and its medieval interpretations, see H.A. Wolfson, "The Plurality of Immovable Movers in Aristotle and Averroes", in *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 63 (1958), p. 233-53.

⁷¹⁰ See Giles of Rome, *De compositione angelorum*, VIII and IX; and *Ordinatio in II Sententia*, p. 1, d. 3, q. 2, a. 4 (ed. Venice, 1581), p. 253a-57b. See also Suarez-Nani, *Connaissance et langage des anges*, p. 149-53.

⁷¹¹ Giles says in the *Reportatio* of his commentary on *Sentences* II that "angelus est in loco per operationem", *Reportatio in I Sententia*, d. 37 q. 1 (ed. Luna), p. 169. See also Giles of Rome, *De motu angelorum* V. On Thomas Aquinas' understanding of angelic location, which Giles follows and expands upon, see *Summa Theologiae* I, 1. 52, a. 3: "Angelus dicatur esse in loco per hoc quod virtus eius immediate contingit locum per modum continentis perfecti". See Suarez-Nani, *Les anges et la philosophie*, p. 87-90; and Eadem, "Angels, Space, and Place", p. 90-92. For more on angelic location, see H. Wels, "Late Medieval Debates on the Location of Angels after the Condemnation of 1277", in I. Iribarren and M. Lenz (eds), *Angels in Medieval Philosophical Inquiry: Their Function and Significance* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2008), p. 113-27.

⁷¹² See especially Giles' commentary on *Liber de causis*, Prop. 4, discussed above, and his *De compositione angelorum*. On Giles' theory of the composition of the angels, see J. Wippel, "Metaphysical composition of angels

destructible.⁷¹³ Giles also naturally holds according to Christian doctrine that there are fallen angels and that separate intelligences must therefore be capable of error.⁷¹⁴ And finally, as the possibility that angels are sent as messengers requires, they must also be capable of moving bodies and of being themselves moved.⁷¹⁵

Thus, Giles synthesizes the Christian doctrine of angels with the separate substances of the philosophers, but only by transforming the nature of Aristotle's separate intelligences considerably. We looked earlier to the efforts of some of Albert's Parisian writings to synthesize angels and separate intelligences in a similar way, but Albert too recognizes the difficulties this equivocation involves later in his career. Albert, however, rather than choosing to modify the meaning of one side or the other, determines that these two orders of separate substances must be carefully distinguished from one another.

For example, in his commentary on Book II of the *Sentences*, Albert asserts that "we shall never fall into the error of saying that angels are necessary for the motion of the

in Bonaventure, Aquinas, and Godfrey of Fontaines", in T. Hoffmann (ed.), *A Companion to Angels in Medieval Philosophy* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2012), p. 45-78 at p. 65-67.

⁷¹³ *Liber de causis*, Prop. 26, says that "Omnis substantia stans per seipsam est non cadens sub corruptione" (ed. Pattin, p. 10.83-4), implying that the existence of intelligences is permanent and indissoluble. Responding to this proposition as well as to Prop. 46 of Proclus' *Elements of Theology*, which is its source, Giles asserts to the contrary that this doctrine is one of "great poison", as it implies that separate intelligences have a necessity that is of themselves, when in reality their existence is received from the first cause and thus through the will of the first, they can also be "dissolved and annihilated". See Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 26 (P f. 77ra-va; V f. 90v T-91r X): "Sed in hiis verbis maximum venenum latet. Voluerunt enim isti philosophi quod substantie immateriales essent necesse esse simpliciter et haberent necessitatem a seipsis, ita quod essent causa sue necessitatis, ut plane dicit hic Auctor et Proclus. [...] Ut ergo his involuionibus respondeamus dicendum quod impossibile est aliquod simplex causatum esse. [...] Et quia [intelligentia] non est ipsum esse poterit separari ab huius esse et poterit talem rationalem perdere, secutum itaque nature cursum intelligentia est indissolubilis, voluntate tamen primi posset dissolvi et adnichilari." See Battagliero's discussion of Giles' criticism of Proclus and the *Liber de causis* in "Egidio Romano, Proclus, e il *Liber de causis*", p. 130-36.

⁷¹⁴ See *Ordinatio in II Sententia*, p. 1, d. 3, q. 1 (ed. Venice, 1581), p. 213aff. On angelic sin according to Giles, see T. Hoffmann, *Free Will and the Rebel Angels in Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), p. 235-38; and Idem, "Theories of Angelic Sin from Aquinas to Ockham", in T. Hoffman (ed.), *A Companion to Angels in Medieval Philosophy* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2012), p. 283-316 at p. 293-98.

⁷¹⁵ Giles argues that inferior angels both move and are moved, and for superior angels, it is possible that they do, but more fitting that they do not. See *Super De causis*, Prop. 7 (P f. 29rb; V f. 27rN): "Ulterius forte dubitaret aliquis utrum intelligentia moveatur, ita quod dividatur motu. Dicendum quod secundum intentionem huius Auctoris intelligentia neque movetur neque movet, anima autem coeli movet sed non movetur, quia motores coelorum movent immobiles secundum sententiam philosophorum, coelum autem movet et movetur. Et cum dicimus quod intelligentia non movet, non est intelligendum quia non possit movere, quia quod potest virtus inferior potest superior, tamen non est decens quod moveat." For more on angelic motion see R. Cross, "Angelic Time and Motion: Bonaventure to Duns Scotus", in T. Hoffman (ed.), *A Companion to Angels in Medieval Philosophy* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2012), p. 117-48. Giles' treatment of the question of whether or not superior angels can move bodies is taken up in the next section.

heavens".⁷¹⁶ Albert explains earlier in the commentary, that when he had argued in earlier works that angels and celestial souls were the same thing, he was following then "what certain masters of theology said, who wished to reduce the opinions of the natural [sciences] to theology".⁷¹⁷ By contrast, Albert articulates his revised understanding that there is a distinction between the operations of separate substances according to philosophy and those of the angels according to the faith that must be maintained. Referring to the *De causis* specifically, he says,

Those things, however, that are presented in the *Liber de causis* must be considered carefully, because the philosophers who speak of the intelligences posit them to be causes. For intelligence, full of forms able to be unfolded through the motion of its orb, insofar as it is full of forms, is desired by the moving orb, and it moves itself as the desirable [moves] the one who desires. And thus, intelligence of the first order has more universal and simple forms which are unfolded through the single and simple first motion in a single and simple mobile. [...] But we think this is ridiculous, because we do not speak in this way about angels, but rather we consider them to be separate substances not determined to any mobile. And thus we say that they have forms which the Creator gave them to know the things of this world, each in its own nature and in common, as they wish.⁷¹⁸

As Albert points out here, both the unmoved movers of Aristotle and the angels of the faith are said to be "full of forms", but in each case that means something very different.

Intelligences are full of forms which through the celestial motions are unfolded in nature.

Angels, by contrast, are full of forms so that they can have knowledge of things in this world and by that knowledge act according to their own volition, a thing much unlike the unmoved necessity of Aristotle's prime movers.

⁷¹⁶ Albert the Great, *II Sententiarum* 3.1. ad sc 1 (ed. Borgnet), p. 61b: "Ad aliud autem dicendum, quod insania est: quia nos numquam declinabimus in hunc errorem, quod dicimus Angelos esse necessarios ad motum orbium: licet non negemus quin possint movere: sed numerus et ratio creationis non dependet ex illo."

⁷¹⁷ Albert the Great, *II Sententiarum* 14.6 (ed. Borgnet), p. 266b: "Alibi etiam disputatum est de ista materia multum et prolixè: et ibi secuti sumus dicta quorundam Magistrorum theologiae, qui voluerunt opiniones naturalium ad theologiam reducere."

⁷¹⁸ Albert the Great, *II Sententiarum* 3.15 (ed. Borgnet), p. 92a–b: "Ad id autem quod objicitur *De libro causarum* cavendum est: quia philosophi loquentes de intelligentiis posuerunt eas esse causas: intelligentia enim plena formis explicabilibus per motum alicujus orbis, in quantum est plena formis, desideratur a motore orbis, et movet ipsum sicut desideratum desiderans: et ideo intelligentia primi ordinis habet formas magis universales et simplices, quae explicantur per motum primum unum et simplicem in mobili uno et simplici. [...] Sed hoc nos ridiculum reputamus: quia non loquimur sic de Angelis, sed potius ponimus eos substantias separatas, non determinatas ad mobile aliquod: et ideo dicimus eos habere formas quas Creator indidit eis ad cognoscendum res hujus mundi, unumquodque in propria natura, et communi, sicut volunt." For more on Albert's understanding of the intelligences of the philosophers in this work, see *In II Sententia*, 14.6, p. 265b–66a. See also Krause and Anzulewicz, "From Content to Method", p. 198.

In his *De causis et processu universitatis*, Albert is clear again to distinguish between the primary causes of the *Liber de causis* and the angels of the Christian faith. After summarizing his adaptation of three-fold emanation systems of Avicenna in which form flows from the first cause through intelligences, celestial souls, and into their spheres,⁷¹⁹ Albert raises an important concern:

These orders of intelligences which we have described, some say are the orders of angels, and they call intelligences “angels”. And this is what Isaac [Israeli], Rabbi Moses, and other philosophers of the Jews say. But we do not believe this is true.⁷²⁰

There are many examples of authors who call the separate intelligences of philosophy angels, including, in addition to those he lists, others of the Peripatetics, like Avicenna, and Algazel,⁷²¹ but Albert carefully distinguishes his own view. While angels and intelligences are both separate substances, they have very different operations and attributes, and these differences must be maintained on the grounds that they are the objects of different sciences which is pursued according to different methods:

The substance of angels is said to be intellectual. For the theologians say that angels are sent to earth, and pass from place to place, that they assume bodies or the species of bodies, [and] that they are distinguished by illumination. And although the position of the [theologians] agrees exceedingly with reason, it is not undertaken that they be explained by us in this work [on the *Liber de causis*]. For we defend here the definition of the Peripatetics, who deny that intelligence can be defined by place, saying that every intelligence is everywhere and always such that there is no change of place or time implied in their definition.⁷²²

⁷¹⁹ On this system of emanation, see Ch. 2.2.

⁷²⁰ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, I.4.8, 58.19-23: “Ordines autem intelligentiarum, quas nos determinavimus, quidam dicunt esse ordines angelorum et intelligentias vocant angelos. Et hoc quidem dicunt Isaac et Rabbi Moyses et ceteri philosophi Iudaeorum. Sed nos hoc verum esse non credimus.”

⁷²¹ See the examples cited in this chapter’s introduction.

⁷²² Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.2.1, p. 92.23-34: “Angelus autem substantia dicitur esse intellectualis. Angelos enim theologi dicunt de caelo mitti ad terram et de loco transire ad locum, species corporum vel corpora assumere, illuminationibus distingui, quorum positio, quamvis multum consona sit rationi, tamen in hoc opere non est a nobis suscepta ad explanandum. Peripateticorum enim hic rationem defendimus, qui negant intelligentiam loco diffiniri dicentes omnem intelligentiam esse ubique et semper per hoc quod nec differentiam loci nec temporis concernit in ratione sua.” See also Albert’s comments on the same theme at the conclusion of his commentary, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.5.24, p. 191.24-92.7: “Scimus autem, quod quidam corpora caelestia animata esse non dicunt, quorum contradictionem nec approbamus nec improbamus. Sed hoc dicimus pro certo, quod nec cum Epicureis nec cum Stoicis nec cum Peripateticis dicta eorum conveniunt. Scimus etiam, quod quidam contendunt spiritus, qui vulgariter angeli vocantur, intelligentias esse. Sed hoc certum est, quod angeli intellectuales substantiae sunt secundum ministeria gratiae distributae. Sed quod hoc modo intelligentiae sint, quo intelligentiae a Peripateticis ponuntur, scilicet quod immobiles sint loco et

As Giles' list of corrections above makes clear, according to the philosophers, intelligences must be unmoved and universal; they are "everywhere and always", and they are only discovered as causes of observable motions. Angels, on the other hand, move from place to place, associate with bodies, and belong to different orders and ranks according to their illumination. It is clear, then, that angels and intelligences differ with respect to their properties (the one changes places while the other is unmoving), they are discovered by different means (the one through revelation and the other through philosophy), and thus while both can be considered rationally, they are investigated according to different authorities, with different methods, and belong each to a different discourse.

As we saw above, Giles of Rome is not any less conscious of these differences than is Albert. Even so, Giles determines that these two orders of intellectual substances should nevertheless be assimilated. But it is also clear that this assimilation is, for Giles, not simply equivocation of one with the other. To be more precise, it is a subordination of the separate substances of the philosophers to the angelology of the Christian theologies (and especially, as we will see, to Ps.-Dionysius). This means that the determinations of Aristotle and his interpreters that intelligences are unmoved, unmoving, without place, unerring, indestructible, without knowledge of particulars, and always and everywhere exactly the same must each be controverted and reinterpreted according to what is known about the angels through revelation.

Provided that these crucial corrections are made, Giles proceeds to develop and embrace in his own thinking much of the system of primary causality he finds in the *Liber de causis*. Through his assimilation of the orders of angels and separate substances, he justifies an angelological reading of the *De causis* which draws on the writings of Thomas Aquinas, understands the operations of intelligence and noble soul through to the laws and structure of Dionysian hierarchy. In the following sections we will look at two examples of this Dionysian reading of the *De causis* at work: 1) Giles uses the Dionysian *lex divinitatis* as the ultimate reason why it is noble souls that move the heavens rather than intelligences, and 2) Giles reinterprets the meaning of the influence of intelligence over noble soul according to the likewise Dionysian notions of purification and illumination.

operatione, penitus absurdum est et non convenit cum dictis eorum qui de motibus et apparitionibus et operationibus angelorum locuti sunt. Eligat ergo unusquisque, quod vult."

3. Celestial Motion and the *Lex divinitatis*

Giles' concern about the doctrine that separate intelligences are incapable of moving bodies directly requires a more extended discussion, for this premise bears precisely upon his understanding of noble souls as angels who move the heavenly bodies. As we have pointed out, it is clear from Aristotle's arguments in *Metaphysics* XII that the intelligences which move the heavens do not move the heavens directly, but only as objects of love and desire, and according to many of his commentators, this is the reason why celestial souls are thought to be necessary in addition to the unmoved movers. Giles, however, does not believe this to be true:

[The philosophers] intend that because it is not fitting that intelligences, on account of their excellence, should have action in bodies, thus between the intelligences and heavens they posit souls, saying that intelligences move the heavens by means of mediating souls. This also does not taste of the way faith, for we do not posit intelligences in order to move bodies, but rather to contemplate God himself. The philosophers, then, murmur something of the truth, but they do not understand it fully and in many places they deviate from the truth.⁷²³

Giles alludes here to the fact that Aristotle only posits separate intelligences to be the unmoved movers of observable motions, a fact, as we have noted, which clearly does not agree with the understanding that separate intelligences are angels whose first purpose, according to the faith, is to enjoy the presence of God. But recall from Ch. 1, that it is precisely because of the "excellence" of intelligence which Giles mentions here that Albert the Great discerns the necessity of noble souls. Albert emphasizes that noble souls must be different from intelligences, and that it is from this difference that they become the proximate, efficient causes of celestial motion.⁷²⁴ But for Giles, of course, noble souls are not different in this way from intelligences, for both are angels, which is to say that both are separate intelligences.

The question then is how Giles maintains the distinction between noble soul and intelligence. For again, if in Albert's understanding, the distinct operations of noble soul

⁷²³ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 11ra; V f. 11rO): "Volunt quidem quod quia intelligentie propter sui excellentiam non decet quod habeant actionem in corpora, ideo inter intelligentias et celos ponunt animas dicentes quod intelligentie movent celos mediantibus animabus. Quod etiam non sapit modum fidei, quia non propter movere corpora tamen, sed propter contemplari ipsum Deum intelligentias ponimus. Aliquid ergo mussitabant philosophi circa veritatem, sed eam plene non intellexerunt et in multis a veritate deviaverunt".

⁷²⁴ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.2, p. 62.21-49.

(who moves the sphere) and intelligence (who is the end of that motion) depend on a difference in what they are, and if Giles abolishes this difference through assimilating both causes to the angelic hierarchies, then how does Giles account for the fact that noble soul and not intelligence is the proximate mover of the heavens? The answer, for Giles, lies in the principles and structure of the Dionysian account of the celestial hierarchy. All intelligences are capable of moving bodies, but this specific task belongs to noble soul because the Dionysian principle of mediation requires that they, the lowest of the intelligences, join the angelic hierarchies to the order of bodies.

According to Giles, the only difference in substance between intelligences and noble souls is the perfection of the measure of *esse* which they participate. As we saw in Ch. 4, every intelligence is a combination of *esse* and *essentia*, and the difference between each intelligence consists in the perfection by which their essence receives the *esse* bestowed upon them in the creative act. Intelligences are more universal and contain more universal forms because their natures contain more of what *esse* is in itself, and this is true even while intelligences and noble souls both possess everything that intellectual nature requires to be itself.

For this reason, if inferior intelligences can move bodies, it is necessary that superior intelligences are capable of doing so as well, even if, in reality, they do not engage in this activity. By this reasoning, Giles concedes that when the philosophers describe the unmoving excellence of the superior intelligences, this may be a true description of their activities, but it is not because they are somehow incapable of doing otherwise:

For these philosophers imagine that a superior intelligence cannot move an inferior orb, and that it cannot move one stone existing here below. But this is a false thing to think. For when they act by free choice or by will, if they can do more, they can also do less. For if fire were the lord of its actions and acted through free choice, if it could burn more, it could also burn less. But if it is understood not from necessity but from what is fitting, it has some truth. For it is fitting that the lowest among intelligences are the movers of bodies, and it is fitting that corporeal nature be administered by inferior intelligences and not by supreme ones, which altogether agrees with the sayings of the saints.⁷²⁵

⁷²⁵ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 14 (P f. 41va; V f. 47vQ): “Immaginantur enim philosophi ipsi quod intelligentia superior non possit movere orbem inferiorem, et quod non possit movere unum lapidem hic inferius existentem. Sed istud est falsum cogitare. Nam cum agunt per liberum arbitrium et per voluntatem, si possunt maius, possunt et minus. Nam si ignis esset dominus sue actionis et ageret per liberum arbitrium, si

The reason, then, why superior intelligences are immobile—both in the sense that they do not move bodies and in the sense that they do not depart from the presence of God—is because it is more fitting for them to be so on account of their closeness to the complete immobility of God, not because they must be by necessity. Thus, unlike the philosophers who conclude that intelligences are immobile because of what they are, Giles concludes that they, the most superior of intelligences, are immobile because of their rank and order in the angelic orders. In other words, the difference between intelligences on the one hand, and noble souls on the other, lies in the principles of the angelic hierarchy.

Compare this again to the understanding of Albert the Great for whom the entire system of celestial dynamics depends on the fact that intelligence and noble soul are really different from one another in operation, nature, and substance:

Intelligence is a substance, which from itself and not from acquisition or possession, is intellectual or an intellectual substance. Its intellectual light is desired by all things that move and are moved. And thus, motionless, it moves all that is just as an object of desire moves desire in an unmoving way. [...] And thus, the Peripatetics say that the heavens are moved by soul and that each heaven has its own soul. This soul, desiring the light of intelligence, moves the heaven towards intelligence by a motion which is everywhere and always according to place so that the light of intelligence might unfold its influence through the motion of the heaven and bring it into effect. For intelligence considered according to itself as intelligence cannot be a conjoined mover.⁷²⁶

An intelligence cannot on its own produce the eternal motions of the heavens because being immediately attached to a body would compromise the perfection of its intelligibility. There must be a proximate mover of the spheres that is different from intelligence in that it, a) has

posset calefacere multum, posset et parum. Sed si intelligatur non de necessario sed de congruo, habet aliquam veritatem. Congruum enim est quod infimae inter intelligentias sunt motores corporum, et congruum est quod natura corporalis administretur per intelligentias inferiores non per supremas quod omnino concordat cum dictis sanctorum.”

⁷²⁶ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.2, p. 62.21-49: “Intelligentia vero est substantia, quae ex se et non ex acquisitione vel possessione, intellectus est sive substantia intellectualis, cuius lumen intellectuale ab omnibus moventibus et motis desideratum est. Et ideo movet immobilis omne quod est, sicut desideratum immobile movet desiderium. [...] Et ideo dixerunt Peripatetici caelos ab anima moveri et unumquodque caelum propriam habere animam. Haec autem anima lumen intelligentiae desiderans ad intelligentiam movet caelum motu, qui secundum situm ubique est et semper, ut lumen intelligentiae sibi influxum per motum caeli explicet et producat ad effectum. Intelligentia enim ut intelligentia secundum seipsam accepta motor coniunctus esse non potest.” See also Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.2.1, p. 92.48–93.10, quoted and discussed previously in Ch. 1.

an inferior intellectual operation which is through its desire for the intelligence above it,⁷²⁷ and b) has an animate operation proper to its nature through which it can be the principle of life and motion in the heavens.⁷²⁸

By contrast, Giles' understanding of the difference between noble souls and intelligences only consists in their rank according to their relative perfection, which is to say, in terms of where they belong in the angelic orders. For Giles, it is the structure of these hierarchies that determine the offices and operations of the different angelic ranks. Thus, where Albert's understanding of the arrangement and nature of the causes necessary to move each heaven arises from reflection on the requirements of each perpetual motion, Giles subordinates these philosophical conclusions to the theology of the celestial hierarchies which, for him, provides the ultimate basis for understanding the identity of the celestial movers.

The fundamental principle which provides the ordering logic of these hierarchies for Giles is the Dionysian *lex divinitatis*, and it is according to this that Giles articulates the distinction between noble soul and intelligence:

It should be said that the law of divinity (*lex divinitatis*) is lead low things back to the high things through things that are medial. For God so joins the universe together that the lowest of the high things is always joined to the highest of the low things. For which reason Dionysius, speaking about the order of the universe in *On the Divine Names* VII, says that "divine power, making all things agree, is the cause of every order, and [it] always joins the ends of first things to the principles of secondary things, beautifully working in a single harmony of all". From this, therefore, God beautifully works one universal harmony or consonance of every universe, because he joins all things by a certain order. It would be inappropriate, then, if the supreme intelligences were connected to bodies as their proper movers.⁷²⁹

⁷²⁷ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.2, p. 62.43-47: "Haec autem anima lumen intelligentiae desiderans ad intelligentiam move caelum motu, qui secundum situm ubique est et semper, ut lumen intelligentiae sibi influxum per motum Caeli explicet et producat ad effectum."

⁷²⁸ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.13, p. 76.11-18: "Anima enim secundum quod anima principium et causa motus est in eo quod movetur a seipso. Non autem principium motus est nisi forma determinante et proportionante ipsam ad mobile. Oportet igitur, quod differentia ultima finiens et determinans esse nobilis animae sit ad mobile circulariter inclination et proportionem."

⁷²⁹ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 10vb; V f. 10vM-N): "Dicendum quod lex divinitatis est reducere infima in suprema per media, sic enim Deus colligavit universum quod semper infima supremorum coniunxit suppremis infimorum. Unde Dionysius VII *De divinis nominibus* loquens de ordine universi ait quod: 'divina virtus omnia concordans est omnis ordinis causa et semper fines primorum coniungens principiis secundorum, unam omnis armoniam pulchre operans'. Ex hoc ergo Deus pulchre operatur vel unam universalem armoniam sive consonantiam omnis universi, quia quoddam ordine omnia coniungit. Indignum

This formulation of the *lex divinitatis* appears in very similar forms in Thomas Aquinas,⁷³⁰ Bonaventure,⁷³¹ and Albert the Great,⁷³² and was likely originally adapted from Hugh of St. Victor.⁷³³ The law does not appear in these exact words in Ps.-Dionysius himself, but there are several references to a divine law in the *Dionysian* corpus and its meaning can be discerned in numerous places, including that passage cited by Giles above: God “always joins the ends of first things to the beginning of secondary things, working all in a single harmony of beauty”.⁷³⁴

ergo esset si supreme intelligentie annexerentur corporibus tanquam proprii motores eorum.” See Ps.-Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, VII.6, trans. Serazzin (*Dionysiaca* II), p. 407-8: “ipsa enim est, secundum eloquium quae est omnium effectiva et semper omnia concordans, et indissolubilis omnium concordationis et ordinis causa, et semper fines priorum conjungens principiis secundorum, et unam omnis eonspirationem et harmoniam pulehre operans.” Giles articulates this principle again later in Prop. 14 (P f. 41rb; V f. 47vO): “Per intelligentias vero intelligimus substantias separatas quarum non est immediate movere corpora. Oportet ergo quod anime que attingunt corpora celestia que sunt prima infimorum sicut in fine supremorum, unde anime celorum intelliguntur esse quedam infime intelligentie. Habent ergo sic se anime ad intelligentias, sicut intelligentie inferiores se habent ad superiores.”

⁷³⁰ See, for example, where Thomas Aquinas says that the *lex divinitatis* can be found in Dionysius “in many places”, *In II Sententia*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 3, ag. 4 (ed. Mandonet), p. 21: “Sed secundum Dionysium in pluribus locis, lex divinitatis est ut nunquam ultima reducatur in finem nisi per media.” On many more examples of Thomas’ use of the *lex divinitatis*, see W.J. Hankey, “‘Dionysius dixit, Lex divinitatis est ultima per media reducere’: Aquinas hierocracy and the ‘augustinisme politique’”, in *Medioevo* 18 (1992), p. 119-50.

⁷³¹ See, for example, Bonaventure, *In II Sententia*, d. 11, q. 1, a. 1 (Quaracchi II, 1885), p. 277a: “*lex universitatis* hoc exigit, ut media reducatur per prima, et postrema per media ad suum principium; et hoc confirmatur per illud quod dici Dionysius in libro de *Anglica Hierarchia*: ‘Lex divinitatis est in nullo negligere ordinem, sed per prima media, et per media postrema reducere’”. On the *lex divinitatis* in Bonaventure see Luscombe, “The ‘Lex Divinitatis’”, p. 208-12; Z. Hayes, “The Meaning of ‘Convenientia’ in the Metaphysics of St. Bonaventure”, in *Franciscan Studies* 34 (1974), p. 74-100, at p. 88 and 97; and L. Togni, “A Sweet Influence: St. Bonaventure’s Franciscan Reception of Dionysian Hierarchy”, Dissertation (Marquette University, May 2019), p. 227 and 232.

⁷³² See, for example, Albert the Great, *De sacrificio missae*, III.6.9 (ed. Borgnet), p. 103-4: “sicut dicit beatus Dionysius: ‘Lex Divinitatis est per prima media, et per media ultima reducere.’ Talis autem reductio ultimorum ad media et mediorum ad prima non potest esse nisi in ordine ad unum primum. Sic igitur Divinitatis lex sicut est descensus illuminationum et charismatum ab uno, sic reductio est ad unum.” See M. Burger, “Lex divinitatis — Albertus Magnus kommentiert Dionysius Areopagita”, in G. Guldentrops and A. Speer (eds), *Das Gesetz - The Law - La Loi* (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2014), p. 316-33; and Eadem, “Albert the Great—Mariology”, in I.M. Resnick (ed.), *A Companion to Albert the Great: Theology, Philosophy, and the Sciences* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2013), p. 105-36, at p. 119.

⁷³³ Hugh of St. Victor, *Commentaria in Hierarchiam coelestem S. Dionysii Areopagitae* (Patrologia Latina 175), p. 1014b: “Cum enim divina lex primum a Deo in angelos, ac deinde per angelos in homines processisse perhibetur, manifeste ostenditur quod per prima et superiora, secunda et inferiora ad divinam cognitionem reducuntur.” See M. Burger, “Lex divinitatis — Albertus Magnus”, p. 317; See also L. Togni, *A Sweet Influence*, p. 171, who explains that what Hugh articulates here is “thoroughly serial” in his commentary, a structure in which “not only are the angels led by God, men by angels, lower angels by the higher, and lower men by the higher”.

⁷³⁴ See, for example, Ps.-Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, IV.1, trans. Sarrazin (*Dionysiaca* I), p. 149-50: “Et mansionem ex bonitate habent, et collocatio ipsis inde est et continentia et custodia et cibus bonorum, et ipsam desiderantes, et esse et bene esse habent, (sicut est possibile) figuratae, et boniformes sunt, et sequentibus communicant (sicut divina lex inducit) dona ad ipsas ex bono venientia;” *De caelesti hierarchia* VIII, trans.

This divine law of mediation means, for Giles, that wherever something lower is drawn up to something higher, this is accomplished through a medium.⁷³⁵ It is by the *lex divinitatis* that Giles understand noble soul to be the mover of the heavens. Noble soul must be the celestial mover because as the lowest intelligence it is the medial term between the hierarchies of angels and the orders of created bodies. Through noble soul “the ends of first things” are joined “to the beginning of secondary things”, that is, the last class of intelligences is joined to the celestial spheres.

The significance of Giles’ use of the *lex divinitatis* can be drawn out further here by comparing his understanding of how it is that noble soul is the principle of celestial life to that of Albert. For Albert, as we mentioned above, noble soul moves the heavens because an animate operation belongs properly to what it is, and it is this animate operation that distinguishes it from the separate intelligences. When Giles first discusses noble soul’s animate operation, he grants that something very much like Albert’s understanding seems to be the author’s meaning.⁷³⁶ In this summary, especially where Giles says that, according to the author, “this operation is proper (*propria*) to the soul of the heaven”, Giles may be nodding to Albert’s own paraphrase of the proposition, where also he says that noble soul’s animate operation is its “*propria*”.⁷³⁷ However, while Giles acknowledges that this may be the author’s meaning, he is very careful to distinguish his own understanding from the position that one finds in Albert’s commentary.

It is impossible, according to Giles, for noble soul to have an animate operation that it possesses “according to its essence” and as an essential property, for if this were the case, then the angels that move the heavens would perpetually require the presence of the bodies

Eriugena (*Dionysiaca* III), p. 881-2: “Hoc enim est omnino divina taxiarchia divinitus promulgatum per prima secunda divinis participare illuminationibus”; and *De ecclesiastica hierarchia* V, trans. Eriugena (*Dionysiaca* IV), p. 1330: “Lex quidem haec est Divinitatis sacratissima: per prima secunda ad divinissimam suam reducere lucem”.

⁷³⁵ For an example of the presence of this doctrine in Proclus, see *Elementatio theologica*, Prop. 148 (ed. Boese), p. 73.2-1: “Omnis divinis ordo sibi ipsi counitus et tripliciter: a summitate sui ipsius et a medietate et a fine.”

⁷³⁶ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P. f. 11rb-12va; V. 13rZ): “Notandum autem quod anima celestis habet virtutem divinam et virtutem intelligentie participative inquantum participat operationem divinam influendo universaliter in totam naturam, et inquantum intelligendo participat operationem intelligentie, sed hoc est ei magis proprium secundum hunc Auctorem habere operationem animalem que est vivere celeste corpus influendo sibi motum, et quia hec operatio sit anime celi propria, dicit quod est secundum essentiam eius, id est ei per se et essentialis, id est propria.”

⁷³⁷ Albert the Great, *De causis et processu universitatis*, II.1.16, p. 79.51-53: “Nam de numero operationum eius est operatio animalis, ab ‘anima’ et non ab ‘animali’ denominate. Et haec est sibi propria.”

they move in order to be what they are. However, as the faith teaches, the motions of the heavens one day will cease:

Someone might doubt whether to move bodies is an essential operation of the soul of the heaven, and it seems that it is not. For, if it is understood that it is their essential operation because it follows immediately from their essence, this cannot be thought, for every operation follows from the essence by a mediating power. If, moreover, it is understood to be essential, that is, proper and inseparable, then according to our faith this is also false, since at some point the motion of the heaven will cease.⁷³⁸

Giles proposes, therefore, a different understanding of noble soul's animate operation: noble soul is "animate" not because this follows directly from what it is, but because according to what it is, it belongs to its specific celestial rank. Noble soul is the last of the intelligences and thus must be that which moves the first of the bodies:

We say that it is the property of the souls of the heavens to move the heavens, and this belongs to them according to their essence because insofar as these substances move the heavens (because they are lowest in the order of celestial spirits, and because they are lowest in the kind of spirits on account of the order of the universe which God established), they [the souls of the heavens] touch the highest among bodies, and move above the celestial bodies. And because the property of these substances is to be lowest in this way, and it belongs to no other, and also because according to essence and nature it belongs to them that they are lowest in this way, thus, it is said that it belongs to them by their essence, and not because this operation follows from essence without power. But because they have, in this way, the lowest essence, therefore, this office belongs to them, that is, to administrate bodies.⁷³⁹

⁷³⁸ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 12va; V f. 13rBB): "Dubitaret forte aliquis utrum movere corpora sit operatio essentialis anime celi, et videtur quod non, quia si intelligitur quod sit eius operatio essentialis, quia immediate egreditur ab essentia eius, talem intellectum habere non potest, quia omnis operatio egreditur ab essentia mediante virtute. Si autem intelligatur essentialis, id est propria et inseparabilis, sic secundum fidem nostram est etiam falsa, quia aliquando cessabit motus celi." Giles goes on to explain further that the doctrine of the eternity of the world is the primary reason why the philosophers err about celestial animation when claiming that the heavens will eternally be conjoined with their movers; *Ibid.*: "Et quia hoc est de ratione anime, ut semper habeant in se corpori quamdiu durat corpus eius, cum illa corpora sint perpetua ut perpetuarent celorum motum, dixerunt motores illos esse celorum animas. Nos autem ne in hunc laqueum incidamus. Multotiens abhorremus hunc modum loquendi, ut motores celorum vocemus eorum animas."

⁷³⁹ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 12va; V f. 13rCC): "Dicemus quidem proprium esse animarum celorum movere celos, et hoc competere eis secundum essentiam suam, quia pro tanto ille substantie movent celos, quia in ordine celestium spirituum sunt infime. Et quia sunt infime in genere spirituum propter ordinem universi quem Deus statuit, attingunt suprema in corporibus et movent super celestia corpora, et quia proprium est illarum substantiarum habere esse sic infimum, et nullis aliis hic sic competit, et etiam quia secundum essentiam et naturam competit eis quod sint hoc modo infime, ideo dicitur hoc eis competere per essentiam suam, non quia hec operatio egrediatur ab essentia sine virtute, sed quia habent essentiam sic infimam, ideo competit eis hoc officium, scilicet administrare corpora."

To say, then, that the ultimate reason for Giles why noble soul moves the heavens lies in the *lex divinitatis* and its rank in the celestial hierarchy means that noble soul's celestial office does not follow immediately from what it is, but from the place where it is established in the order of creation according to divine providence. Noble soul does not move the heavens because it is the only principle in nature capable of doing so. Superior intelligences could move the heavens and other bodies in the sense that they are capable of doing so, however, they remain immobile because such would not be fitting for them according to the harmony and consonance by which God orders his creation. By the same reasoning, noble souls move the heavens because it is fitting for them to do so since they are the lowest of the intelligences and the "nearest" to the highest bodies, the heavens. In this way Giles subordinates the kind of reasoning that begins from natural principles, as we see in Albert's interpretation of the *De causis*, to a theological vision of the hierarchy of celestial powers which mediates God's creative power to the world of bodies.

4. The Illumination and the Perfection of Noble Soul

Giles' theological understanding of the primary causes of the *De causis* extends further to his interpretation of the influence of intelligence over noble soul. The influence of intelligence is a persistent theme in the *De causis*, especially in Prop. 3 which as we have seen contains the controversial claim that "the first cause creates the being of soul by a mediating intelligence".⁷⁴⁰

As we saw in Ch. 3, after he criticizes these doctrines carefully, Thomas Aquinas suggests that the meaning of the *mediante intelligentia* can be "true in a way" if one understands it through Ps.-Dionysius in *On the Divine Names*: intelligence influences souls in the sense that souls are illuminated and uplifted by angels.⁷⁴¹ Giles takes up this suggestion in his own commentary, and, as is the pattern of his use of Thomas' text, both modifies and expands the notions of his teacher. The first conspicuous feature of Giles' discussion of the influence of intelligence is that where the criticism and correction of this theme is a central feature of Thomas' discussion of Prop. 3, Giles' concerns are much less explicit.

⁷⁴⁰ *Liber de causis*, Prop. 3: "Quod est quia causa prima creavit esse anime mediante intelligentia." From Prop. 3, see also: "Et quia anima suscipit inpressionem intelligentie, facta est inferioris operationis quam ipsa inpressionem sua in id quod est sub ipsa."

⁷⁴¹ See Thomas Aquinas, *Super Librum de causis expositio*, Prop. 3, p. 24.12-17, discussed in Ch. 3.

Giles begins by reproducing what he understands to be the author's meaning—that noble soul receives its intellectual faculty but not its substance from intelligence.⁷⁴² But he does not then proceed to controvert this claim in a *dubium*, a somewhat surprising fact considering the difficulties the doctrine must entail for his understanding that intelligence and noble soul are both angels which equally receive everything implied in their existence as intelligences from the first cause alone. This, however, is not because he agrees that noble souls receive their intellectual faculties from intelligence, but because, as he says in Prop. 14, while his “opinion as to the impression of celestial souls is not simply the same as the opinion of this author”, he has sought, nevertheless, to explain the doctrine so that we can “bring it more to the truth”.⁷⁴³

Giles refers here to his use of the Dionysian reading of the influence of intelligence in Prop. 3. In his commentary on the proposition, Giles takes up what Thomas suggests about angelic illumination and perfection and makes a crucial shift: where Thomas spoke of the angelic illumination of human souls, Giles speaks now of the illumination of a superior class of angels over inferior ones. The meaning of this illumination for Giles is made much more clear, as we will see below, in his *Quaestiones de cognitione angelorum*, where we can see more clearly the profoundly theological framework to which noble soul's celestial operations ultimately belong in Giles' thinking. Giles explains there that the illumination of noble souls ultimately means that this inferior class of angels receives from intelligences the power to see more clearly the secret purposes of God according to the operations of divine grace.⁷⁴⁴

When Giles approaches these themes in Prop. 3, he begins in a way similar to Thomas Aquinas by denying that they imply that the first cause creates the “substance of soul” by a mediating intelligence. If the first cause really is first and is, as Giles understands, *ipsum esse*, then all things must receive being from it and from it alone, for “God is the cause of all beings”. Even so, Giles grants, that “as for other perfections and other goodnesses, intelligences can cooperate as inferior causes”.⁷⁴⁵ Thus, when the *De*

⁷⁴² See Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 11vb-12ra; V f. 12rZ), quoted further below.

⁷⁴³ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 5 (P f. 18va; V f. 20r I): “Ideo sententia nostra quantum ad impressionem animarum celestium non est simpliciter cum hoc Auctoris exponendo, etiam ipsam ut exposuimus secundum quod modum exponendi magis trahimus ipsam ad veritatem.”

⁷⁴⁴ Giles discusses this theme in *De cognitione angelorum* XIV, which is discussed further below.

⁷⁴⁵ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 11vb; V f. 12rY-Z): “Ipse ergo Deus, quia est primum ens, et quia est ipsum esse, est causa omnium entium [...] sed quantum ad alias perfectiones et quantum ad alias bonitates possunt cooperari intelligentie, tanquam inferiores cause.”

causis says that “the first cause creates the soul of the heaven by a mediating intelligence”, this means that “with respect to [its] substance, God creates soul by himself alone, but with respect to the intelligible operation of this soul, [God] made it such that [soul] has this from intelligence”:⁷⁴⁶

Therefore, it is understood that God first created the substance of soul and then subjects it to the operation of intelligence such that it might have an intelligible operation through it [the intelligence]. In this way, then, according to the teaching of this author, God created soul by a mediating intelligence because the intelligence has causality over the soul [which is] created by God, not as regards its substance, but as regards its operation.⁷⁴⁷

As Giles summarizes the doctrine in a later proposition, this impression of intelligence over noble soul in terms of its operation means that when they move the heavens, “they move them through intellect”, and that “they receive this from the intelligences, from which they have that they think”.⁷⁴⁸

Giles’ own understanding of the influence of intelligence depends on clarifying that while intelligence influences noble soul’s intellectual operation, it is neither the source of this faculty nor of the intelligible forms necessary to its activity. If noble souls are intelligences as much as those whom the *De causis* call intelligences by name, then it must follow for Giles that they both receive their intellectual faculty and all their forms from the first cause directly:

For God can through himself impress intelligible species into each intelligence and into each soul of the heavens. The souls of the heavens, therefore, understand these intelligences through knowledge that is caused, and by species infused into them by another. But it is not necessary that those species that are in the souls of the heavens

⁷⁴⁶ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 11vb; V f. 12rZ): “Anima ergo celi dicit quandam substantiam intellectualem habentem intelligibilem operationem.”

⁷⁴⁷ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 11vb-12ra; V f. 12rZ): “Ergo prius intelligitur Deus creasse substantiam anime, et postea supposuisse eam operationem intelligentie, ut haberet operationem intelligibilem per ipsam. Hoc ergo modo, secundum huius Auctoris sententiam, Deus creavit animam mediante intelligentia, quia super animam a Deo creatam intelligentia habet causalitatem non quantum ad substantiam sed quantum ad operationem.”

⁷⁴⁸ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 5 (P f. 18va; V f. 20rH-I): “Nam impressio animarum celestium non est ab intelligentiis, quod intelligentie habeant causalitatem super substantiam animarum celestium, neque huius impressio est ab intelligentis quod intelligentie sint productione celorum vel habeant causalitatem super substantiam celi. Sed si aliquo modo dici poterit quod anime sint impresse celi ab intelligentiis sequendo hunc Auctorem, hoc erit quantum ad operationem. Nam cum dicantur anime impresse celis prout existentes in celis celos movent, cum moveant eos per intellectum, dicuntur hoc habere ab intelligentiis a quibus habent quod intelligant.”

be derived from the intelligences, but they are derived from the first cause.⁷⁴⁹

It is clear, then, as Giles says in his commentary on Prop. 5(4), and as we read above, that his “opinion as to the impression of celestial souls is not simply the same as the opinion of this author”. But Giles also indicates there that he has sought, nevertheless, to explain the doctrine so that we can “bring it more to the truth”.⁷⁵⁰ As Giles clarifies the matter in his commentary on Prop. 14, “whenever we say that the soul is caused by intelligences, this does not refer to the substance of soul, but to certain goodnesses which soul acquires from intelligences.”⁷⁵¹

Giles refers here to his angelological understanding of the influence of intelligences through the Dionysian concept of illumination. Intelligence does not, by this understanding, bestow either an intellectual faculty or intelligible forms upon noble soul, but it does through the perfecting illumination that is proper to its hierarchical function infuse what is beneath it with light:

It should be said that by souls of the heavens we understand the inferior angels, or inferior separate substances to whom are appointed the administration of bodies. Now, as much as a separate substance is superior, by that much more does it participate in intellectual light. Hence, also according to the teachings of the saints, superior angels, being so much more illuminated, illuminate and perfect inferior [angels]. By such illumination of the superior, many things are made known to the inferior. Therefore, as we can also say according to the mode of the faith that souls, that is, inferior spiritual substances, have an intelligible operation and know things by the power of the intelligences, that is, by the power of superior spirits by whom they are illuminated and perfected.⁷⁵²

⁷⁴⁹ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 14 (P f. 39rb; V f. 45vE): “Potest enim Deus per se ipsum imprimere species intelligibiles in quamlibet intelligentiam, et in quamlibet animam celorum. Intelligunt ergo anime celorum ipsas intelligentias per scientiam causatam, et per species influxas sibi ab alio, sed non oportet quod species ille in animabus celorum sint derivate ab intelligentiis, sed sunt derivate a causa prima.”

⁷⁵⁰ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 50 (P f. 18va; V f. 20rI); the text is cited above.

⁷⁵¹ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 14 (P f. 40ra; V f. 46rF): “Notandum autem quod quandocumque dicimus anima causatam esse ab intelligentiis, non est hoc referendum ad ipsam substantiam anime, sed ad aliquas bonitates quas acquirit anima ex intelligentiis.”

⁷⁵² Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 11rb; V f. 11vS-T): “Dicendum quod per animas celorum intelligimus inferiores angelos vel inferiores substantias separatas quibus commissa est administratio corporum. Nunc autem est ita quod quanto substantia separata est superior, tanto plus participat de intellectuali lumine. Unde etiam secundum sanctorum sententias angeli superiores tanquam magis illuminati illuminant et perficiunt inferiores, per talem illuminationem superiorum fiunt multe res note inferioribus. Ergo etiam secundum modum fidei dicere possumus quod anime, id est substantie spirituales inferiores, habent operationem intelligibilem et sciunt res per virtutem intelligentiarum, id est per virtutem superiorum spirituum a quibus illuminantur et perficiuntur.”

Intelligences, then, illuminate and perfect the noble souls beneath insofar as they who receive a more perfect measure of the divine *esse* are more luminous, and this light overflows upon the beings beneath them. In the background of these ideas is Ps.-Dionysius, *On the Divine Names*, IV.1-2, who compares the Good to a super-essential sun that emits the rays of its goodness upon all that are able to receive it. These rays are the cause of angel intelligences, and crucially, for Giles' purposes, the angelic minds also seek to imitate their source and they, likewise, emit their own light to "communicate" with those below them the goodness they have received.⁷⁵³

In this way, Giles reinterprets what is said in Prop. 3: noble soul's intellectual operation is influenced by intelligence insofar as it is drawn up to a greater knowledge by means of its perfecting light. Giles is careful to clarify, however, that this knowledge made available through intelligence does not involve imparting new forms:

This author, however, seems to mean more, for it seems that he means that the intelligible species in the souls of the heavens themselves are derived from intelligences. For we would say according to the mind of this author that intelligible species, as they are in the intelligences, are in a greater actuality, and we would say that the souls of the heavens themselves are in potency with respect to receiving the similitudes of these species, not in as much actuality or in as much purity as are in the intelligences. And because each agent acts according to the constraint of its form (as we participate an intelligible operation only to the extent that we have the intelligible species with us), therefore the souls of the heavens, according to this author's meaning, having intelligible species that are derived into them from intelligences, are said to have an intelligible operation by the power of intelligences through which they know things and through which they receive intelligible species. The teachings of the saints and theologians, however, do not altogether agree with this opinion. For we grant that many things can be known by the inferior separate substances through the power of the superior intelligences, not because the latter infuse the former with new species, but because they illuminate and perfect them, which the present speculation does not allow [us] to make clear. However, in the *Quaestiones* which we disputed, *De cognitione angelorum*, we have spoken about this material at length.⁷⁵⁴

⁷⁵³ See Ps.-Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, IV.1, trans. Serazzin (*Dionysiaca* I), p. 147: "ita quidem et bonum, super solem sicut super obscuram imaginem segregate archetypum, per ipsam essentiam omnibus existentibus proportionaliter immittit totius bonitatis radios. Propter ipsos substiterunt intelligibiles et intellectuales omnes et substantiae et virtutes et operationes"; and p. 148-50: "et sicut mentes supermundane intelligunt, et exsistentium proprie illuminatur rationibus, et rursus ad cognata propria deferunt. Et mansionem ex bonitate habent, et collocatio ipsis inde est et continentia et custodia et cibus bonorum, et ipsam desiderantes, et esse et bene esse habent, (sicut est possibile) figuratae, et boniformes sunt, et sequentibus communicant (sicut divina lex inducit) dona ad ipsas ex bono venientia."

⁷⁵⁴ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 3 (P f. 11rb-va; V f. 11vT): "Auctor tamen iste plus videtur

This concern about whether or not noble soul receives new intelligible species from intelligence is the focal point of the tension between the *De causis* and the theologians on this issue. In Prop. 5(4), the *Liber de causis* says explicitly that the primary intelligences infuse forms over secondary intelligences.⁷⁵⁵ In Giles' Dionysian reading, by contrast, the superior angels do not infuse the inferior with new forms, but the higher does draw the lower into a greater intellectual actuality.

But even if the influence of intelligence is restricted to drawing noble soul into a greater intellectual actuality, Giles still speaks of this in terms of a new knowledge that is imparted to noble soul: "many things can be known by the inferior separate substances through the power of the superior". Moreover, in other places, Giles also makes use of Ps.-Dionysius' interpretation of the image of angelic teeth which, Giles explains, refers metaphorically to the manner in which superior angels chew up more simple forms which are passed on to the inferior angels beneath them in a more divided form.⁷⁵⁶ If this

sentire, quia videtur velle quod species ipse intelligibiles deriventur in animas celorum ab intelligentiis. Dicemus enim secundum mentem huius Auctoris species intelligibiles, ut sunt in intelligentiis, esse in magna actualitate, et dicemus ipsas animas celorum esse in potentia ad suscipiendum similitudines illarum specierum non in tanta actualitate nec in tanta puritate in quanta sunt in intelligentiis. Et quia unumquodque agens agit secundum exigentiam sue forme, ut in tantum participamus operationem intelligibilem in quantum habemus species intelligibiles apud nos, anime ergo celorum secundum huius Auctoris sententiam habentes species intelligibiles derivatas in eas ab intelligentiis dicuntur habere operationem intelligibilem per virtutem intelligentiarum per quas sciunt res et per quas suscipiunt intelligibiles species. Sententia tamen sanctorum et theologorum non omnino est huic opinioni conformis, concedimus enim quod multa possunt sciri a substantiis separatis inferiorum per virtutem superiorum intelligentiarum, non quia ille istis influant novas species, sed quia eas illuminant et perficiunt que declarare presens speculatio non patitur. In questionibus tamen nostris quas disputavimus *De cognitione angelorum*, de hac materia diffusius diximus."

⁷⁵⁵ *Liber de causis* (ed. Pattin), p.57.86-89: "Intelligentiae superiores primae, quae sequuntur causam primam, imprimunt formas secundas, stantes, quae non destruuntur ita ut sit necessarium iterare eas vice alia."

⁷⁵⁶ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 10 (P f. 33va; V f. 38vS-T): "Notandum etiam quod Dionysius, III [sic] *De angelica hierarchia*, in istam eandem sententiam incidit cum Auctore libri huius, volens quod angeli metaphorice habeant dentes, id est habeant quandam virtutem divisivam qua dividunt et frangunt species intelligibiles, sicut enim nutrix dividit et masticat cibum ad hoc quod puer possit ipsum recipere, sic intelligentie superiores dividunt et frangunt species quas habent apud se ad hoc quod intelligentie inferiores possint conceptus earum intelligere. Istud enim frangere et istud dividerem, nihil est aliud quam quod intelligenti superiores intelligunt per unam speciem et per unum conceptum ostendunt inferioribus per multas species et per multos conceptus;" and Prop. 4 (P f. 15vb-16ra; V f. 17rZ-AA): "Dicendum quod intelligentie superiores perspicaciores sunt quam inferiores, quia plus habent de actualitate, et minus de potentialitate [...] Intelligentie ergo perspicaciores et superiores non indigent tot speciebus quot indigent inferiores et quia non pauciora, immo plura cognoscunt intelligentie superiores quam inferiores, oportet illas species esse universales, et latiores, et plurium representativas, et oportet eas esse vehementiores, quia vehementiorem, id est, maiorem, et clariorem cognitionem faciunt. Unde Dionysius hoc idem sentit propter quod in XV capitulo *Angelice hierarchie* loquens metaphorice et similitudinarie dicit quod angeli habent dentes, id est habent virtutem divisivam, nam angeli superiores que intelligunt uno conceptu ostendunt inferioribus in multis conceptibus." See Ps.-Dionysius, *De caelestis hierarchias* 15, trans. Eriugena (*Dionysiaca*, vol. 3), p. 1006-7: "Dentes autem, divisivum inditae nutrientis perfectionis; unaquaeque enim essentia intellectualis donatam sibi a diviniore uniformem intelligentiam provida vertute dividit et multiplicat ad inferioris ductricem analogiam."

knowledge does not involve the reception of new species, what then does it consist of? As Giles concludes the passage above, he points to his *De cognitione angelorum*, where, he says, he has spoken about this thing's *diffusius*, and the question as to what knowledge superior angels make possible in the inferior is one of its central themes.

Giles explains there that the content of this knowledge consists of the efficacy to attain more of the *scientia divina* than they are able by their own power. The superior angels, by means of their greater illumination, see realities in God that the inferior are not able to understand on their own. But through the light of the superior, the inferior are drawn into a more perfect vision of these mysteries.⁷⁵⁷

For this reason, it should be understood that God alone has a perfect cognition of things in every way. [...] Thus, an angel falls short from entirely perfect cognition such that it does not immediately know every effect in the cause, and most of all, in the first cause. [...] We say, therefore, that although each angel sees the whole of God, none, however, sees him wholly so that none comprehends him. But according to [how they] see him to a greater or lesser extent by the light of glory, they are able to understand a greater or lesser number of things there. For everything there shines out, but each [angel] does not comprehend everything that shines out there. Superior angels, therefore, because they have more of the light of glory see certain things shining out there and they know there certain future things that the inferior do not know there.⁷⁵⁸

In this work of illumination, the superior communicate light which fortifies the intellect of the inferior so that they can see more perfectly than according to their own power. To illuminate is, in this way, to give to another a greater means of actuality, to transmit an intellectual force which permits more perfect knowledge.⁷⁵⁹

⁷⁵⁷ See Suarez-Nani, *Connaissance et langage des anges*, p. 245.

⁷⁵⁸ Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum*, XIV, f. 118ra: "Propter quod sciendum quod solus Deus habet per omnem modum perfectam cognitionem de rebus. [...] Ita angelus deficit ab omnimoda perfecta cognitione ita quod non statim in causa et potissime in causa prima cognoscit omnem effectum. [...] Dicemus ergo quod licet quodlibet angelus videat totum Deum, nullus tamen videt ipsum totaliter ita quod nullus comprehendit ipsum. Sed secundum quod videntes eum magis vel minus de lumine glorie plura vel pauciora possunt ibi cognoscere. Omnia enim ibi relucent, sed non omnia ibi relucencia quilibet comprehendit. Angeli ergo superiores, quia plus habent de lumine glorie aliqua vident ibi relucere et aliqua futura ibi cognoscunt que non possunt ibi cognoscere inferiores."

⁷⁵⁹ Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum*, XIV, f. 119ra: "[...] illuminare non est proprie et directe augmentare lumen, sed magis est augmentare operationem luminis. Nam unire lumen est fortificare ipsum quod possit fortius agere." See Suarez-Nani, *Connaissance et langage des anges*, p. 246.

But what is the particular object that the superior enable the inferior to see in God? The answer, Giles explains, is the future contingent events which relate to the order of divine grace:

If, therefore, superior angels were to illuminate inferior ones concerning certain effects and if the inferior ones did not see those effects in God, then the superior would only be teaching the inferior because the inferior would believe them, not because they saw in God himself and in that cause those very same effects which the superior see. Again, this also cannot stand, for the illumination in angels is of certain future contingents pertaining to the order of grace. Such future things, moreover, since they are contingent, are determined in no cause other than in God alone.⁷⁶⁰

It is these future contingents determined by God alone that ultimately comprise the knowledge made available to inferior angels through the superior. These future contingent events pertain specifically to the order of grace and knowledge of them are a *divina scientia* into which the higher draw the lower into with more clarity and power than they would be capable of on their own, and is, thus, to receive a greater measure of “divine science”.⁷⁶¹

In this way, angelic illumination is, as Suarez-Nani highlights, a *reductio in Deum*⁷⁶²: “Illumination, as it is commonly put, is a certain motion and a certain reduction into God. The superior, therefore, illuminate the inferior because they reduce them into God, making them know other effects which they could not previously know.”⁷⁶³ This *reductio* is accomplished according to the same *lex divinitatis* that structures and explains the celestial office of noble soul.⁷⁶⁴ The superior angels are medial between the angels of inferior rank and

⁷⁶⁰ Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum*, XIV, f. 118rb: “Si ergo angeli superiores inferiores illuminarent de aliquibus effectibus et illos effectus non viderent inferiores in Deo, tunc superiores non docerent inferiores nisi quia inferiores eis crederent, non quod viderent in ipso Deo et in ipsa causa illos eosdem effectus quos superiores vident. Rursus hoc etiam stare non potest, quia illuminatio in angelis est de aliquibus futuris contingentibus pertinentibus ad ordinem gratie. Talia autem futura, cum sint contingentia, in nulla causa sunt determinata nisi in solo Deo.”

⁷⁶¹ Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum*, XIV, f. 118va: “Quod omnino conformatur verbis Dionysius, 7 caput *Celestis hierarchias*, but vult quod purgatio et perfectio et illuminatio in angelis est divine scientie assumptio. Illa ergo eadem que sunt determinata in divina scientia et in ipso deo incipiunt videre inferiores illuminati a superioribus. Illuminatio ergo est acceptio divine scientie: quia est acceptio scientie in ipso deo incipiunt videre inferiores illuminati a superioribus.”

⁷⁶² Suarez-Nani, *Connaissance et langage des anges*, p. 246.

⁷⁶³ Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum*, XIV, 118va: “illuminatio, ut communiter ponitur, est quidam motus et quedam reductio in Deum. Superiores ergo illuminant inferiores quia reducant ipsos in deum, faciendo ibi aliquos effectus cognoscere quos ipsos prius non cognoscebant.” See also (*Ibid.*): “Sic etiam in proposito angeli superiores propter nimis perspicat lumin glorie dicuntur illuminari immediate ab ipso Deo, quia ipsi per lumen quod habent vident multes effectus futuros in ipso deo quod angeli inferiores et per lumen quod habent debilius videre non possunt. Angeli ergo inferiores illuminantur per superiores et reducuntur in deum per eos.”

⁷⁶⁴ Giles of Rome, *De cognitione angelorum*, XIV, f. 118va: “nam superiores angeli sunt medii inter

God himself, and thus it is through the higher that the lower are incorporated more completely into the hidden purposes of divine grace.

With Giles' account of the illumination and perfection of inferior angels in the background of his commentary on the *Liber de causis* it is even more clear how his understanding of the primary causality of intelligences and noble souls belongs for him to a theological system that is ultimately subordinated entirely to *scientia divina*. As we read above, Giles emphasizes in his commentary on Prop. 5(4), that when noble souls move the heavens, "they move them through intellect", and that "they receive this from the intelligences, from which they have that they think".⁷⁶⁵ According to Giles' Dionysian understanding, this must mean that noble soul moves the heavens through an intellectual activity that is drawn by intelligences into a more perfect vision of God, and this means a more perfect vision of the future contingents related to God's work of grace. How does this knowledge inform the manner in which noble soul guides and directs the world of bodies? Giles does not shed light on this question, but through these considerations we can see more clearly how his understanding of the entire system of the intellectual causes of natures is embedded in a theological framework: the superior angels illumine and perfect the inferior angels so that they can see the providential purposes of God more clearly, while the inferior angels illumine and perfect the bodies they move drawing creatures to their proper created ends.

5. On the Unity of the Angelic, Natural, and Ecclesiastical Hierarchies

What Giles articulates in Prop. 3 is a part of a larger picture insofar as his identification of the separate substances which govern the order of nature with the angelic powers confessed by faith works out an inherent unity between the celestial hierarchies and the hierarchy of nature. The order of nature depends on the orders of angels that participate in its production, preservation, and perfection. And as Giles describes the unity of these two hierarchies in his commentary on Prop. 3, he is working out metaphysical principles that will reappear in his writings on a third hierarchy—that of the church. The system of

inferiores et deum, et lex divinitatis est secundum Dionysium inferiora in suprema per media reducere quod ergo deus sic agit et hanc legem feruat non est ex sui indigentia: quia posset preter hanc legem facere."

⁷⁶⁵ Giles of Rome, *Super De causis*, Prop. 5 (P f. 18va; V f. 20rH-I): "Nam cum dicantur anime impressae celis prout existentes in celis celos movent, cum moveant eos per intellectum, dicuntur hoc habere ab intelligentiis a quibus habent quod intelligant."

mediations in which noble soul plays a central role extends as far as the human community. Giles explains in his *De ecclesiastica potestate* that the church with the Pope as its head must imitate the celestial hierarchy's authority over nature as it exercises its own authority over the secular community. The ecclesiastical hierarchy must, by this comparison, be organized after the pattern of nature through the imitation of nature's angelic principles. In this work, Giles compares the authority of the church explicitly to the intelligences that move the spheres,⁷⁶⁶ and it is clear that he assumes the cosmic system in which noble soul is the necessary medial term as the fundamental framework within which he makes sense of the structures of ecclesial power.

On the subject of the metaphysical basis of Giles' political thought, it is worth noting that he dedicates his *De causis* commentary to Benedict Caetani, the future Pope Boniface VIII, in support of whom, ten years later, Giles writes the *De ecclesiastica potestate*.⁷⁶⁷ The occasion of the work was the conflict that developed between Pope Boniface and King Philip "the fair" between 1296-1303 concerning issues of clerical exemption from taxation and secular jurisdiction. Giles argues at length in the *De ecclesiastica potestate* for the supremacy of the spiritual power of the Pope and the church over the secular power of the king.⁷⁶⁸ To do so, Giles explicitly uses the metaphysics of contraction and hierarchy which he had articulated in his *De causis* commentary a decade earlier to formulate a theory of papal and ecclesiastical power as a constituent part of the order that governs all of creation.⁷⁶⁹

⁷⁶⁶ See, for example, Giles of Rome, *De ecclesiastica potestate*, I.5 (ed. R.W. Dyson), p. 26: "ipsi celi, qui sunt supremi inter corporalia et qui habent influenciam super omnia corpora, gubernantur per spirituales substantias, ut per intelligentias moventes eos, sic inter ipsos fideles universi domini temporales et universa potestas terrena debet regi et gubernari per potestatem spiritualem et ecclesiasticam, et specialiter per Summum Pontificem".

⁷⁶⁷ On the friendship between Giles and Benedict Caetani see *High Way to Heaven*, p. 16-28. Donati suggests that it was after Caetani came to Paris in November 1290 to intervene in a controversy concerning the mendicant orders, and especially the still very new Order of Augustinian Hermits, that Giles dedicated his *De causis* commentary to him, "Studi per una cronologia delle opere di Egidio Romano. I" p. 67-69. Notably, Giles was Benedict's confessor and after being elected Pope, Boniface VIII made Giles Archbishop of Borge, after which time Giles spent considerable amounts of time at the papal curia; see Briggs, "Life, Works, and Legacy", p. 15ff. and F. Del Punta, S. Donati, and C. Luna, "Egidio Romano", p. 319-41.

⁷⁶⁸ See Dyson, "Introduction", p. xii ff.

⁷⁶⁹ Giles makes a very similar argument in his *Contra exempticos*. See, for example, where he compares the celestial and ecclesial hierarchies at Ch. 20, which asks "Quod si comparemus hierarchiam et ordines ecclesiasticos ad coelestes, quantum ad aliquid inveniemus rationem et causam, magis evitandam esse exemptionem in personis ecclesiasticis quam coelestibus" (ed. Rome, 1555, f. 15va). Giles compares God's rule of the world through angels to the Pope's rule of the church through the *personas ecclesiasticas*: "Si ergo comparamus Deum regentem mundum per angelos suos ad summum Pontificem suum Vicarium regentem Ecclesiam per personas ecclesiasticas, dicemus quod Vicarius debet in quantum potest imitari eum cuius est Vicarius" (f. 15vb). On the *Contra exempticos*, see Lamberini, "Political Thought", p. 273-74.

Moreover, as scholars have often noted, Boniface VIII's famous bull *Unam Sanctam* of 18 November 1302, with its reference to the *lex divinitatis* and argument for the hierarchical relationship between spiritual and secular authority,⁷⁷⁰ depends both on Giles' *De ecclesiastica potestate*, and by extension on the *De causis* commentary which bears the future Pope's name in the dedication.

There are three principal points of comparison between the *De ecclesiastica potestate* and Giles' *Super De causis*: First, just as God is a plenitude of *esse* which is participated in the order of angels, so the Pope possess a plenitude of power that flows out from him and is participated by the various members of the church. Second, Giles compares the power of the church in its authority over the secular power of the King to the power of angels over the world of natural bodies. And third, the organizational logic of the ecclesiastical hierarchy is found to be the same as that in the celestial, for in both cases the power of the spiritual over the corporeal is ordered according to the *lex divinitatis*.⁷⁷¹

Giles' work *De ecclesiastica potestate* contains, as Saak puts it, a vision of human society in which "the reign of God, the reign of Christ, imbued all levels and aspects of temporal life."⁷⁷² Power is participated by the church in a way that follows the pattern of the metaphysics of contraction in Giles' *De causis* commentary that were outlined in Ch. 4. Divine power imbues all things equally, but all things do not receive that power equally. In the church, the first principle of this order is the *plenitudinem potestatis* in the Pope who, like the plenitude of perfection in the divine *esse*, bestows that power on those beneath him that would participate in his divine authority:

Just as, therefore, one must think about God as he governs the whole world according to a common law, so also one must think about the vicar of God as he governs, saturates, and irrigates the whole church according to a common law. Because according to this, he [the Pope] can be likened to a kind of sea or a kind of font from which are every other river and every other power, to each of which he presents his whole self, but none of which contains the whole.⁷⁷³

⁷⁷⁰ See Dyson, "Introduction", p. xvii. On the *lex divinitatis* in Boniface VIII's *Unam Sanctam* see Luscombe, "The 'Lex Divinitatis'" p. 205-7; and M. Burger, "Lex divinitatis — Albertus Magnus", p. 316.

⁷⁷¹ For Giles' use of the *lex divinitatis* in his political thought, see Luscombe, "The 'Lex Divinitatis'", p. 206ff; and Hankey "Dionysius dixit", p. 125ff. Hankey also discusses the relation between the *De ecclesiastica potestate* to the writings of Thomas Aquinas.

⁷⁷² See Saak, *High Way to Heaven*, p. 31.

⁷⁷³ Giles of Rome, *De ecclesiastica potestate*, III.2 (ed. R.W. Dyson), p. 290: "Sicut ergo censendum est de Deo, prout secundum legem communem gubernat totum mundum, sic etiam censendum est de vicario Dei,

The Pope, then, governs the church like the government of God over all creation.⁷⁷⁴ Just as God is like an infinite ocean of *esse* which he pours on all creatures, the pope, as an image of God, “waters and irrigates” the whole church “according to a common law”.⁷⁷⁵ The ecclesiastical hierarchy, by this understanding stands as an image of the celestial hierarchy. Both have at their head a principle of plenitude whose power flows through its order, and in both cases, the power and authority of that order is participated from its first principle.

The *De ecclesiastica potestate*, however, is not just an account of authority within the order of the church, but of the place of the church in the entire order of reality. Moral order in human life is determined by the relationship between soul and body — flesh must not govern the spirit, and the corporeal must remain obedient to the immaterial principles of nature.⁷⁷⁶ This same relationship in human beings, as Saak points out, is only so ordered because it ultimately “reflects the order of the universe itself”.⁷⁷⁷ Giles writes:

And we see, moreover, in the government of the universe that the whole of corporeal substance is ruled by the spiritual. Indeed, inferior bodies are ruled by the superior, and the more gross by the more subtle, and the less power by the more powerful. Yet, the whole of corporeal substance is ruled by the spiritual, and the universe of spiritual substance by the Supreme Spirit, that is, by God.⁷⁷⁸

prout secundum communem legem totam Ecclesiam gubernat et inebriat et rigat. Quia secundum hoc assimilari potest cuidam mari vel cuidam fonti, a quo sunt omnes alii rivuli et omnes alie potencie, qui se totum cuilibet exhibet, sed nulla res ipsum totum capit. Hoc mare vel hic fons, prout secundum legem communem gubernat Ecclesiam, se habet uniformiter ad omnia, sed omnia non se habent uniformiter ad ipsum.” See also III.2, p. 294: “Bene itaque dictum est quod Deus in regimine totius mundi, et vicarius Dei sub Deo quantum ad regimen fidelium, est quidam fons et quoddam mare virtutis et potencie, a quo omnes alie potencie derivantur et in quod omnes reducuntur et ordinantur. Qui Dei vicarius, prout secundum communem legem Ecclesiam gubernat et regit, se habet uniformiter ad omnia, quia quoslibet sinit suos cursus peragere et nullum vult in suo officio impedire.” Translations of the *De ecclesiastic potestate* are modified from R.W. Dyson’s translation that accompanies his edition of the text.

⁷⁷⁴ Giles of Rome, *De ecclesiastica potestate*, III.2 (ed. R.W. Dyson), p. 296: “Et sicut Deus hoc agit in regimine omnium creaturarum, ita Summus Pontifex, Dei vicarius, hoc agit in gubernacione Ecclesie et in regiminie fidelium.”

⁷⁷⁵ Giles of Rome, *De ecclesiastica potestate*, III.2 (ed. R.W. Dyson), p. 286: “Potest itaque Deus, qui communi lege gubernat mundum, assimilari mari ad quod si diversa vasa portentur, ipsum quidem mare cuilibet vasi se totum exhibebit, sed nullum vas ipsum totum capiet. Accipiet tamen de aqua maris plus unum vas quam aliud, prout unum est maius alio; sed nullum vas poterit de mari conqueri, quia tantum de aqua maris accipiet quantum de ea poterit capere.”

⁷⁷⁶ Giles of Rome, *De ecclesiastica potestate*, I.7 (ed. R.W. Dyson), p. 23-24.

⁷⁷⁷ See Saak, *High Way to Heaven*, p. 33.

⁷⁷⁸ Giles of Rome, *De ecclesiastica potestate*, I.5 (ed. R.W. Dyson), p. 24-26: “Videmus autem in gubernacione universi, quod tota corporalis substancia per spiritualem gubernatur. Reguntur quidem inferiora corpora per superiora et grossiora per subtiliora et minus potencia per potenciora. Tota tamen corporalis substancia regitur per spiritualem, et universa spiritualis substancia per summum spiritum, videlicet per Deum.” For the image of the divine *esse* as an infinite and uncontracted *pelagus*, see *Super De causis*, Prop. 2 (P f. 8vb; V f. 8r S), and other examples discussed in Ch. 4 above.

This, indeed, is the cosmos as Giles finds it ordered and described in the *Liber de causis*.

Within that order, whatever receives a greater measure of divine power is superior to those that receive less, and according to Giles' Dionysian principles of hierarchy, the inferior are illumined and perfected by what is above it. In the political sphere, then, it follows that:

Because no one doubts that the divine is more perfect than the human and the heavenly than the earthly and the spiritual than the corporeal, therefore, nothing is more consistent than that royal power, which is a human and earthly power and over bodies, should be subject to and ordered towards the service of the priestly power, and especially the power of the Supreme Pontiff, which is in some measure a divine and heavenly power and over spiritual things.⁷⁷⁹

The church, as it participates the power of the Pope, governs the secular human powers in a way that imitates the angelic government of nature. Just as spiritual things rule corporeal things in nature, so must the spiritual power of the pope rule over earthly power:

And just as in the universe itself, the whole of corporeal substance is ruled by the spiritual, because the heavens themselves, which are supreme among bodies and have an influence over everybody are governed by spiritual substances, as by the intelligences moving them. In the same way, among the faithful themselves, all temporal lords and every earthly power must be ruled and governed through the spiritual and ecclesiastical power, and especially through the Supreme Pontiff, who holds the supreme and highest rank in the Church and in spiritual power.⁷⁸⁰

In this way, the church also finds its necessary place in creation according to the *lex divinitatis*, which Giles also mentions in this case,⁷⁸¹ as lower things are united to higher

⁷⁷⁹ Giles of Rome, *De ecclesiastica potestate*, II.4 (ed. R.W. Dyson), p. 96-98: "Et quia nullus dubitat, quin divina sint perfectiora humanis et celestia terrenis et spiritualia corporalibus, ergo nil conveniencius, quam quod potestas regia, que est potestas humana et terrena et super corporalia, subsit et sit ordinata in obsequium potestatis sacerdotalis et potissime potestatis summi pontificis, que est potestas quodammodo divina et celestis et super spiritualia."

⁷⁸⁰ Giles of Rome, *De ecclesiastica potestate*, I.5 (ed. R.W. Dyson), p. 26: "Et sicut in ipso universo tota corporalis substantia regitur per spiritualement, quia ipsi celi, qui sunt supremi inter corporalia et qui habent influenciam super omnia corpora, gubernantur per spirituales substantias, ut per intelligentias moventes eos, sic inter ipsos fideles universi domini temporales et universa potestas terrena debet regi et gubernari per potestatem spiritualement et ecclesiasticam, et specialiter per Summum Pontificem, qui in Ecclesia et in spirituali potestate tenet apicem et supremum gradum."

⁷⁸¹ Giles of Rome, *De ecclesiastica potestate*, I.4 (ed. R.W. Dyson), p. 18: "Nam secundum Dionysium in *De angelica hierarchia*, lex divinitatis est infima in suprema per media reducere. Hoc ergo requirit ordo universi: ut infima in suprema per media reducatur. Si enim eque immediate infima reducerentur in suprema sicut et media, non esset universum recte ordinatum. [...] ut dictum est per Dionysium, hoc requirit lex divinitatis quam Deus dedit universis rebus creatis: id est, hoc requirit ordo universi, id est universarum creaturarum, ut non omnia eque immediate reducatur in suprema, sed infima per media et inferiora per superiora. Gladius ergo temporalis, tamquam inferior, reducendus est per spiritualement tamquam per superiorem, et unus ordinandus est sub alio tamquam inferior sub superiori."

things through a mean. Giles explicitly likens the church to the angels and their influence over bodies. Just as it is not fitting for superior angels to move bodies, it is not fitting for the church to wield the “material sword” proper to the secular powers.⁷⁸² The church itself is the mediator between the secular human community which is only restored to God through obedience to the church from which it receives illumination and perfection.

Conclusion

As we have seen, Giles understands that the hierarchy of intelligences which emerges through the participation of intelligible natures in the *esse* which flows into them from the uncontracted divine ocean of perfection corresponds exactly to the celestial hierarchies described by the Dionysian corpus and by the tradition of its interpretation. And insofar as this hierarchy of angelic intelligences is the source of nature’s life and motions, then through this act of equivocation Giles understands there to be a fundamental unity shared by the celestial hierarchies and by what we might call the hierarchy of nature—that order of created bodies which is organized according to perfection from highest bodies in the heavens to lowest on earth. As we have seen, the production, preservation, and perfection of natural beings depends on the order of intelligences which participate the operations of divine providence and express their own divine operations through the motions of the heavens. And since that order of intelligences can be located within the angelic orders described by Dionysius, the celestial hierarchy of angels is found to be the source of order and power in the entire natural world and thus the hierarchies of heaven and of nature belong to a single, integrated order.

In Giles’ commentary on Prop. 3 where he makes this equivocation of the intelligences and angels explicit, he provides an account of reality that is both theological and natural. Giles characterizes there the operations, order, and offices of those intelligences that move the heavens and order the natural world according to the Dionysian concepts of

⁷⁸² Giles of Rome, *De ecclesiastica potestate*, I.9 (ed. R.W. Dyson), p. 58: “Quia secundum Dionysium in libro *De divinis nominibus*, capitulo VII, per suprema infimorum attinguntur ultima supremorum, ut, si spiritus sunt supra corporalia, ultimi spiritus habent movere suprema corpora. Angeli enim et spirituales substantie habentes exercitium immediate super corporalia sunt inferiores aliis angelis qui non mittuntur ad hoc corporalia et inferiora; non decet enim superiores spiritus habere immediatum exercitium super hec corporalia. Sic non decet spirituale potestatem tamquam superiorem et excellentem habere immediatum exercitium super materiale gladium; nec decet eam habere huiusmodi gladium ad usum, sed ad nutum.”

illumination and perfection, and the principle that lower things are returned to higher things through a medium. In the celestial hierarchy of angelic intelligences to which noble soul belongs, the superior angels illuminate and perfect the inferior, drawing them into a more perfect union with God even as noble souls draw the world of generated natures into its proper order and towards its proper end through the motions of the heavens. Moreover, as Giles makes clear in his political works, this single created order also includes the hierarchy of the church whose structure and authority over the entire political world depends on its submission to and imitation of the hierarchy of nature over which noble soul's celestial ministry presides.

CONCLUSION: MEDIATIONS AND TRANSFORMATIONS

Cosmological, human, and theological: these three themes modulate and transform through the 13th-c. history of noble soul in the Latin west. The *Liber de causis*, as it emerges from the world of 9th-c. Baghdad and mingles the systematic theology of Proclus with the metaphysics of Plotinus, incorporates these Neoplatonic philosophies with the structures of Abrahamic monotheism and offers its Latin readers a text that yields generatively to diverse approaches and interpretations. For readers of the *De causis*, noble soul is a prism that refracts the exegetical hypotheses of its readers and as the approaches of its Latin adaptors shift, so does its meaning and resonance. And still, moving through the commentaries of Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, and Giles of Rome, the significance of noble soul gathers around these three themes:

1. Noble soul is cosmological. As an adaptation from the undescended and divine souls of Proclus' *Elements of Theology* noble soul belongs in the *De causis* to the superior and intellectual class of beings that as primary causes govern from their celestial station the world of natural bodies. Noble soul finds its place in Albert's summative account of Peripatetic celestial metaphysics as a mediating principle necessary to the structure of reality. Thomas' commentary remains agnostic about the cosmological significance of noble soul, but nevertheless locates it against its Proclean background and within the Platonic account of reality that is structured by its orders of participation in the separate forms. Giles, finally, unites noble soul with the angelic hierarchies of Ps.-Dionysius the Areopagite which mediate the divine providence that governs nature and its order.

2. Noble soul is human. Incorporating the Plotinian ambiguity between human and the noetic life of the heavens that characterizes the *Theology of Aristotle* and the writings of al-Kindī, Prop. 3 invites its readers to recognize the human in the attributes of noble soul: it is "an image of higher power", it "effects an intelligible operation", it "receives the impression of intelligence", it "imprints in things through motion", it "vivifies bodies", and it "leads them" to their "right operation".⁷⁸³ This human side of noble soul dominates the early Latin reception of the *De causis*, but fades to the background in our three authors. Thomas Aquinas, however, is the notable exception, concluding his reflections on Prop. 3 by

⁷⁸³ *Liber de causis*, Prop 3: "ipsa est exemplum virtutis superioris"; "suscipit inpressionem intelligentie"; "inprimit in res nisi per motum"; "vivificet corpora"; "directe producit eam ad operationem rectam".

bracketing the concept of celestial soul and turning to mediate instead on the relationship between human life and the angels. The human is also present in different ways in Albert and Giles' commentaries which both establish the life of the heavens as a model the human might imitate, something particularly evident in Giles' writings on ecclesial authority.

3. Noble soul is theological. When Prop. 3 says that "the first cause created the being of soul",⁷⁸⁴ the *Liber de causis* introduces a notion that is entirely absent from Proclus and Plotinus and presents one of the very first syntheses of Neoplatonic metaphysics with the Abrahamic faiths in the Arabic world. This theological side of noble soul becomes profoundly generative in the commentaries of Latin authors. Albert, Thomas, and Giles each offer an interpretation of noble soul that belongs to a larger account of the origin of reality from its divine source. In Albert, this is the emanative creationism of *fluxus*, in Thomas it is the doctrine of participation he adapts from the Platonists, and in Giles it is *contractio*, another account of participation but one with a greater emphasis on hierarchy and in which noble soul becomes the mediator of God's creative power.

1. Noble Soul and the Transformations of Celestial Life in the 13th c.

Noble soul, Prop. 3 says, is animate, intelligible, and divine, and our authors have understood these three aspects within different frameworks and for different purposes. As their approaches to the text shift, so do their interpretations of noble soul. However, it is also clear that Albert, Thomas, and Giles each describe a metaphysics of celestial life.

The significance of this celestial life is most clear in Albert the Great's commentary, where noble soul, in its contribution to his efforts to clarify and synthesize the history of Peripatetic metaphysics, becomes the "principle of life and motion in the heavens" that is necessary to mediate intelligible form to corporeal existence. However, far from merely providing an account of how the heavens are moved, for Albert, the existence and operations of noble soul belong to his understanding of how the universe proceeds from the first cause through the procession of a single, first-created form. The source of corporeality is the mixture of that form with the darkness of the nothingness into which it proceeds. Noble soul comes to vivify, move, and order that material being as the procession of the first form acquires the power to move matter back towards intelligible source through its distance

⁷⁸⁴ *Liber de causis*, Prop. 3: "creavit prima causa esse anime".

from its source. The flow of the first created form, which is mingled with the influence of intelligence, becomes the being of noble soul, the principle of that celestial motion which is the divine instruments by which the world of sensible reality is formed.

The celestial life of noble soul undergoes a transformation in the commentary of Thomas Aquinas, who is less interested in the question of noble soul's celestial operation and dwells instead on the participatory structures of creation. Thomas uses the concept of noble soul to engage the Platonic doctrine of the forms and the relationships of participation that structure its order—doctrines which he discloses are implicated in the *De causis* through its use of Proclus' *Elements of Theology* as its primary source. By means of Ps.-Dionysius, Thomas clarifies the way that the *Liber de causis* adapts its Platonic sources, drawing the multiplicity of formal principles into a single first cause. It cannot be the case that creatures participate their perfections from a diverse order of formal principles. They must rather receive everything they require for their existence from the single act of being they participate from the first cause that possesses all in itself. While Thomas explores these tensions, he maintains a sceptical distance from noble soul as a celestial mover, but in the process highlights the celestial life of soul understood in a different way. In the end, soul—and Thomas means human soul—is divine through its direct participatory connection to God. In this connection, soul is illuminated and perfected by the celestial (which is to say heavenly) hosts of angels that draw the soul back into the reality of its divine source.

Giles of Rome, finally, joins the metaphysics of Thomas' meditations on participation to the cosmology of Albert's Peripatetics and incorporates the celestial life of the heavens into the ministries of the celestial hierarchies. Giles understands that the intelligences and noble souls of the *De causis* are two orders of angels and that these two angelic orders perform their celestial activities as necessary parts of intelligible order which draws under its power the entire world of nature. The structure of that creation with its hierarchies of both intelligible and corporeal creatures unfolds as creatures each contract the infinity of the divine being in the limits of their natures and fall into an order of perfection. Noble soul emerges within this created order as the principle which unites the "the top of the bottom with the bottom of the top" and draws the world of bodies into the *connexio universi* by which God providentially governs the universe. This celestial life, moreover, becomes the paradigm of the life of the church as it exercises its ministry in the world. Just as the angels

participate the providential powers of God through their celestial office, the church must embody that celestial authority on earth.

Through the *Liber de causis* commentaries of these authors, the celestial life of noble soul undergoes a transformation, finding its place in the emanative Peripatetic metaphysics of Albert the Great in the Platonic and Dionysian metaphysics of participation of Thomas Aquinas and in the angelology of Giles of Rome. These shifting interpretations of noble soul witness to a development in the relationship of 13th-c. Latin readers to the new learning of Greek and Arabic metaphysics. Albert's encyclopaedic and unified vision of the Peripatetic science of first philosophy is complicated through Thomas' distinction between the Platonic and Aristotelian (and Dionysian) elements of the *De causis*, and Giles of Rome articulates a more complete subordination of both Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysics to Christian theology (even if, as we would recognize, his primary tool in this sublimation is that collection of texts with its own complex relationship to the Platonic tradition, the Dionysian corpus). There is also a transforming relationship of noble soul to the human being. Albert establishes noble soul as the example of perfect life that the human might imitate, while in Thomas, noble soul becomes the opportunity to describe the creation and illumination of the soul that belongs to human beings, and then for Giles, noble soul as an angel is both a cause of human life through celestial influence and that which the ecclesial hierarchy must imitate on earth.

2. The Birth and Ascent of Noble Soul in Dante's *Convivio*

Contrary to what the preceding might suggest, the modulations and transformations of noble soul in the commentaries of Albert, Thomas, and Giles do not belong to some kind of linear development that continues in the *De causis* commentaries written after them. These interpretations of noble soul represent the distinct philosophical, historical, and exegetical projects of their authors, and each of these approaches are present in distinct ways in the tradition of reading the *Liber de causis* that continues after them. By way of conclusion, we can look again to one use of noble soul which incorporates something of all three of our authors composed not long after Giles writes his commentary, and that is Dante's *Convivio* (1304-7). Dante dedicates Book IV of that work to the concept nobility and endeavours there to contrast what it means to be "noble" or "well-born" (that is, to a wealthy and

distinguished family) with what it means to possess nobility that consists in virtue not inherited from any human parentage, but rather, from the heavens.

As the verses which open Book IV say, virtue does not necessarily follow noble birth just as not every part of the heaven contains a bright luminary:

The noble is where virtue is: don't claim
that virtue's everywhere
it is; likewise, the sky's where there's a star,
but the converse isn't so.⁷⁸⁵

Nobility is present wherever there is virtue, however, the opposite is not true. Being noble by birth is not the same as being virtuous, while possessing virtue is to really be noble.⁷⁸⁶ Similarly, the divinity of the heavens is not from the sky itself, but rather from the luminaries which dwell there.

As Dante's account of nobility develops, it becomes clear that this relationship between human life and the stars is not merely metaphorical, for true human nobility has a heavenly source, for it is bestowed upon the individual by God:

God places nobility in the soul which is well-disposed, that to *some of us*, that is to those who understand, who are few, it is evident that human nobility is none other than the "seed of happiness," [placed by God] in the ready soul, that is, the soul whose body is perfectly disposed throughout.⁷⁸⁷

The divine source of nobility, however, has a celestial means, for the processes by which God grants this seed to the ready soul unfolds by means of celestial influence. Dante expounds this influence by making an analogy between the individual who receives the seed of nobility and a stone that receives a virtue from a "supremely noble celestial body"⁷⁸⁸ The human must be disposed to receive the divine infusion in the same way that stone only

⁷⁸⁵ Dante, *Convivio*, IV, *Le dolci rime*, ll. 101-4 (trans. Frisardi), p. 213.

⁷⁸⁶ Dante, *Convivio*, IV.xx, 5 (trans. Frisardi), p. 309: "Therefore, no member of the Uberti family of Florence should say, nor anyone from the Visconti family of Milan: 'Since I am from this particular lineage, I am noble.' For the divine seed does not fall on a lineage, that is on a family stock, it falls on individual persons; and, as will be demonstrated below, the stock does not make individuals noble; rather, individuals make the stock noble."

⁷⁸⁷ Dante, *Convivio*, IV.xx, 9 (trans. Frisardi), p. 309. See also *Paradiso* VIII.127-35, where Charles Martel explains that the differences in nobility between people come from the heavens and not the family line. See Frisardi, "Notes", p. 575.

⁷⁸⁸ Dante, *Convivio*, IV.xx.11 (trans. Frisardi), p. 310: "And so we now have a definition of this excellence of ours, which descends into us from a supreme and spiritual power, like virtue into a stone from a supremely noble celestial body".

acquires celestial power if it is well-placed and receptive.⁷⁸⁹ Dante's embryology elaborates on Aristotle's dictum that "man is generated by man and the sun". The formative power of the human seed is received by a human receptacle, that is, the uterus, and comes to life through the combined powers of generative soul, celestial influence, and their mixture.⁷⁹⁰

Within this account of how human life comes about through the influence of the heavens, Dante explains how it is that some souls also come to possess the divine virtue of true nobility, and this is where Prop. 3 of the *Liber de causis* appears in the discourse. Noble soul, Dante says, descends from the heavens into the human being that is receptive of its divine and celestial excellence at birth, and it is this context that determines the meaning of noble soul's three operations:

And this is consistent with the view of Tully in his book *On Old Age*, where, speaking in the persona of Cato, he says: "Indeed a celestial soul descended into us, coming from the highest abode to a place which is contrary to the divine nature and eternity." And within such a soul there exists its own proper power, as well as in the intellectual power and the divine—the influx, that is, which has been mentioned. And so it is written in the *Book of Causes*: "Every noble soul has three activities, namely vital, intellectual, and divine."⁷⁹¹

Noble soul is received in the human that is receptive of that divine seed, and its descent involves all three of Prop. 3's operations. There is the animate operation of the parents who beget the child and the vivifying power of the soul itself. There is also the intellectual operation of the celestial movers who contemplate this most noble form of the human. And there is the divine operation of creative "influx" which is the soul's ultimate source and is present in each of the other causal moments.

⁷⁸⁹ Dante, *Convivio*, IV.xx.7 (trans. Frisardi), p. 309: [A]s the Philosopher states in the second book of *On the Soul*, things have to be well disposed to their agents if they are to receive their acts. Thus, if the soul is imperfectly placed, it will not be disposed to receive this blessed and divine infusion; similar to how, if a precious stone is ill-disposed or imperfect, it cannot receive celestial power.

⁷⁹⁰ Dante, *Convivio*, IV.xxi.4-5 (trans. Frisardi), p. 311: "Therefore, I say that when human seed falls into its receptacle, that is into the uterus, it is accompanied by the power of the generative soul and the power of heaven and the power of the combined elements, that is, the complexion; and the seed prepares and disposes the menstrual matter for the formative power, which the soul of the generative source provided and the formative power prepares the organs for the celestial power, which produces the living soul from the potentiality of the seed. This soul, as soon as it is created, receives from the power of the celestial Mover the possible intellect, which bears within itself, in potential, the universal forms as they exist in its creator, less so the further removed it is from the primal Intelligence." Dante draws his embryology here from Albert's *De natura et origine animae* as he also does for Statius' discourse at *Purgatorio* XXV.39-67ff. See Frisardi, "Notes", p. 573.

⁷⁹¹ Dante, *Convivio*, IV.xxi.9 (trans. Frisardi), p. 313.

Dante has to this point in the work been preparing a carefully developed association between the essence of nobility which is embodied in the person of *Philosophia*, and the divine and celestial origin of this perfection which is united to the divine wisdom of the God-head and contemplated perfectly by the celestial intelligences.⁷⁹² In *Convivio* III, Dante characterizes *Philosophia* as a most noble form that is the exemplar of the human essence.⁷⁹³ This essence is contemplated by the angelic intelligences who “create with heaven the things here below”, the very same intellects who inspire the human seed at conception with its nobility. Philosophy is the essence of the human soul in that the “love of wisdom” is its true form. In this love, moreover, the human soul belongs to a hierarchy: Philosophy is possessed most perfectly in the Godhead, is possessed less perfectly in the intelligences, and descends more imperfectly still into human soul. These are the orders through which the essence of the human soul descends. Moreover, that seed of nobility, once it has become incarnate in the life of a human being, grows up into the human embodiment of the divine and celestial qualities of its source, and ultimately returns again through the heavens to be reunited with God in its death.

Dante’s use of noble soul and the *Liber de causis* here goes beyond the commentaries of Albert, Thomas, and Giles, but it is also clear that he incorporates elements that can be found in each of them. The substitution of noble soul as a celestial mover for human soul is suggested by the conclusion of Thomas’ interpretation of Prop. 3 which leaves the doctrine of celestial soul behind in order to reflect on the Dionysian relationship of illumination and perfection between the angels and the human being. However, the influence of the angelic celestial intelligences on the human being is present much more explicitly in Giles’ explanations of how noble soul is the cause of the generation of the human through the influence of the celestial motions. And even if noble soul, for Dante, is human soul, this does not preclude for him the celestial origin of its noble life, which is most clearly developed by Albert’s account that soul is the principle of life and motion of the heavens. I do not mean to suggest here that Dante took these various elements precisely from these commentators, but

⁷⁹² Dante, *Convivio*, III.vi.6 (trans. Frisardi), p. 155: “Therefore, when I say, ‘She [Philosophia] holds each heavenly Intellect in thrall,’ I simply mean that she is made thus as the intentional exemplar of the human essence in the divine mind, and, therefore, in all the others, most of all in those angelic minds which create with heaven the things here below.” This passage is the conclusion of a longer line of explanation about how *Philosophia* “holds each heavenly intellect in thrall”.

⁷⁹³ *Ibid.*

rather to indicate that the distinct approaches and perspectives present in each live on and mingle in new and generative ways. Moreover, Dante's noble soul is just one example of where one might look further to see how the history of noble soul develops after Albert, Thomas, and Giles.

3. Avenues for Further Research

Dante's use of noble soul contributes to the tradition of understanding that principle in human terms which we have already witnessed in the 12th and early 13th-c. reception of the *De causis*, in the commentary of Ps.-Henry of Ghent, and in a more oblique way, Thomas Aquinas' commentary as well. To this list we can also add the appearances of Prop. 3 in the writings of Maester Eckhart, who also uses noble soul to describe human life.⁷⁹⁴ The impact of these interpretations of noble soul through the human on later Latin literature remains to be seen. How does the legacy of noble soul as a human being relate to the cosmological interpretation of the concept beginning with Albert the Great? Do these two ways of understanding noble soul continue to mingle as they do in Dante, or are they two separate streams culminating in different ways of relating to Peripatetic and Platonic psychologies? For example, we see on the one hand the cosmology of Marsilio Ficino's *Platonic Theology* (1482) which reflects Albert the Great's interpretation of noble soul in its understanding that celestial souls are cosmic mediators,⁷⁹⁵ while on the other hand there are references to *anima nobilis* as a human being in the writings of Giordano Bruno (1548-1600).⁷⁹⁶

To understand the complete history of noble soul in Latin literature it is necessary to explore this concept in the unstudied and unedited commentaries on the *Liber de causis*, which promise to clarify the legacy of this concept. There are three trends that are already apparent from the commentaries in this corpus that have received full or partial editions.

⁷⁹⁴ See Meister Eckhart, *Liber parabolarum Genesis*, 3, p. 609.7-13; and *Expositio Sancti Evangelii secundum Iohannem*, Cap. 1, v. 48, 265, p. 220.9-11. See Beccarisi, "Proclus and the *Liber de causis* in Meister Eckhart", in D. Calma (ed.), *Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes. Volume 2. Translations and Acculturations*. p. 340-75.

⁷⁹⁵ See Marsilio Ficino, *Platonic Theology*, 1.1.2; 4.1.5; and 4.1.30; and D.J.-J. Robichaud, "Ficino and the *nodus divinus*: Timaeon and Iamblican Mean Terms and the Soul in *Platonic Theology* 1-4", in *Bruniana & Campanelliana* 2 (2020), p. 379-402 at p. 390-400.

⁷⁹⁶ Giordano Bruno, *Sigillus*, i 45, p. 189.6-14: "Plane enim constat, haec nobilioribus animis ingeniisque felicioribus et actum imaginationis supra phantasticum obiectum reflectere potentibus esse impossibilia. Haec etenim (sicut et altera proxime referenda) non ex temperationis melancholiae diviniore ingenii subserviente materia, supra quam per cogitationis fortitudinem attolluntur, sed per quandam rationis imbecillitatem in gremium materiae crassioris immersi supprimuntur" (referenced from the quotation in Catana, *The Concept of Contraction in Giordano Bruno's Philosophy*, p. 19).

1. Celestial animation. Following the example of Thomas Aquinas, who discusses celestial animation for the first time in the conclusion of his commentary on Prop. 2, there are examples of question-commentaries on the *Liber de causis* that in like fashion dedicate the final question of that proposition to whether the heavens are animated. Siger is likely the first to follow Thomas in this way, asking in Question 13, “Utrum caelum sunt animatum”,⁷⁹⁷ concluding that the heavens are animated by intellectual souls that desire a separate intelligence which they seek to imitate.⁷⁹⁸ Similarly, Question 13 in the commentary attributed to Peter of Auvergne asks “Utrum corpora celestia sint animata”,⁷⁹⁹ concluding that the heavens must be moved by something with the power of thought and appetite, and that this belongs to soul.⁸⁰⁰ The anonymous commentary preserved at Erfford asks in its questions about Prop. 3, “Utrum corpora celestia habeant animam”.⁸⁰¹ And the commentary by Radulphus Brito asks “Utrum corpora celestia sint animata et quomodo, scilicet utrum sint animata anima perficiente ipsa”.⁸⁰² This recurring theme when taken together with the legacy of Albert’s and Giles’ discussions of celestial animation in their commentaries promises to bear witness to the history of how Latin authors made sense of the Greek and Arabic doctrines of celestial animation. Is noble soul incorporated into two-mover models of celestial motion like Albert? Does Thomas’ scepticism about the concept reappear in later commentaries? Are there other examples of joining noble soul to angels as in Giles?

2. The Platonic Forms. As we saw in Ch. 3, there is a tradition of discussing the Platonic forms in commentaries on *De causis*, Prop. 3 following Thomas Aquinas’ discussions of the Platonic forms and participation in that context. In addition to Giles of Rome’s extensive use of Thomas’ discussions of the Platonic forms in his *De causis* commentary,⁸⁰³ as we saw in Ch. 1, Siger dedicates all of his questions on Prop. 3 to the Platonic theory of separate forms. After Siger there are examples of similar questions on Prop. 3 in the commentary attributed to Peter of Auvergne,⁸⁰⁴ and the anonymous commentary preserved

⁷⁹⁷ Siger of Brabant, *Super Librum de causis*, Prop. 2 (ed. Marlasca), p. 67.2.

⁷⁹⁸ Siger of Brabant, *Super Librum de causis*, Prop. 2 (ed. Marlasca), p. 68.36ff.

⁷⁹⁹ *Questiones super Librum de causis*, Questio 13 (ed. M. Maga), p. 83.26.

⁸⁰⁰ *Questiones super Librum de causis*, Questio 13 (ed. M. Maga), p. 85.2-5.

⁸⁰¹ *Questiones Super Librum de causis expositio*, Questio 11 (ed. I. Székely and D. Calma), p. 418.12ff.

⁸⁰² Radulphus Brito (?), *Questiones Super Librum de causis*, Questio 10 (ed. I. Costa and M. Borgo), p. 324.6ff.

⁸⁰³ See Ch. 4.1.

⁸⁰⁴ *Questiones super Librum de causis* (ed. M. Magda), p. 84-90.

at Erford.⁸⁰⁵ How does this trend develop? Does Thomas Aquinas' identification of noble soul's Proclean source lead to any further engagements with the Platonic tradition?

3. The creative power of intelligences. Because of the reference in Prop. 3 to the *mediante intelligentia* which is operative in noble soul's creation, interpretations of noble soul also become an opportunity to discuss the creative power of secondary causes, and in particular, of intelligences. As we saw in Chs 2, 3, and 5, this theme plays a large role in the commentaries of Albert, Thomas, and Giles, each of which resolve its tensions according to different strategies. There are, moreover, further examples of later commentaries raising similar questions about intelligence and creation. The commentary attributed to Peter of Auvergne asks, "Utrum anima nobilis sit ex impressione intelligentie".⁸⁰⁶ Jean of Mallinges asks "Utrum intelligentia possit creare res alia" and "Utrum anima nobilis sit creata mediante intelligentia".⁸⁰⁷ And using language reminiscent of Giles of Rome's commentary on Prop. 5, the commentary attributed to Johannes Wenck asks "Utrum anime nobiles multiplicentur ad multiplicacionem intelligenciarum".⁸⁰⁸ In this way, interpretations of noble soul and Prop. 3 promise to continue addressing those questions that appear in Albert, Thomas, and Giles: How do created principles contribute to or participate in the creative power of the first cause? If noble soul is created by the first cause alone, what does intelligence contribute to the existence of noble soul? How do inferior principles relate to those before them?

It is likely that these trends which are already evident in the *De causis* commentaries which have received editions will develop further and in surprising ways through the unstudied corpus. It will be fruitful to examine noble soul in the unstudied commentaries using what this dissertation has outlined from Albert, Thomas, and Giles as tools for considering how the exegetical tradition converges and departs on this one concept. It is also probable that the unstudied commentaries will prove to contain new trends and common threads that do not trace back to Albert, Thomas, or Giles. Numerous questions suggest themselves: are there any specific trends in the interpretations of noble soul that belong to

⁸⁰⁵ *Questiones super Librum de causis* (ed. I. Székely and D. Calma), p. 416-22. See the introduction of Ch. 3 for a list of the questions on the forms from this commentary and the one cited in the preceding note.

⁸⁰⁶ *Questiones super Librum de causis* Questio 27 (ed. M. Magda), p. 96.11ff.

⁸⁰⁷ Jean of Mallinges, *Reportationes De causis*, *Questiones* 19-20 (ed. A. Baneu and D. Calma), p. 244.26-247.31.

⁸⁰⁸ *Questiones super Librum de causis*, Quesito 5 (ed. M. Meliadori), p. 232-33.

commentaries written by masters at the University of Paris? What of commentaries written specifically by those of the Dominican order, like Albert and Thomas? Moreover, the ways that Giles uses the ideas he formulates in his *De causis* commentary to support his arguments for the supremacy of papal power also suggests that noble soul and the *Liber de causis* might continue to play a role in the order of Augustinian Hermits who become increasingly known for their dedication to ecclesial hierarchy and papal authority.⁸⁰⁹ Through these investigations, the transformation of noble soul across multiple commentaries would indicate the contours of the larger tradition, and it would become more possible to see how noble soul becomes incorporated into different frameworks and with different concepts moving into the Renaissance.

On the question of noble soul's significance amongst the German Dominicans, it has already been shown that this concept plays a central role in discussions of celestial dynamics from Albert to Berthold of Moosburg. Ulrich of Strassburg takes up Albert's discussions of celestial dynamics in the *De causis et processu universitatis*, but where Albert is careful to distinguish between the different separate substances, Ulrich is more comfortable conflating them.⁸¹⁰ Despite this modification of Albert's approach, Ulrich uses Albert's commentary on *De causis*, Prop. 3 extensively in his discussion of celestial motion, often quoting from it directly.⁸¹¹ By contrast, Dietrich of Freiberg, in his *De animatione caeli*, expands on Albert's arguments that there must be two orders of celestial movers, intelligences and celestial souls, and that these separate substances cannot be angels.⁸¹² Sturlese also points out that Henry of Lubeck wrote two *Quodlibets* on the animation of the heavens, dated 1323 and 1325, which were discussed at the *sudium* in Cologne.⁸¹³

⁸⁰⁹ See Saak, *The High Way to Heaven*, p. 31ff

⁸¹⁰ See, for example, in Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, IV.3.1, where he argues "Quod primus motor non sit causa prima, et quod motores orbium sunt intelligentiae, et quod ipsae sunt angeli, qui in quantum motores sunt, vocantur anima nobilis, et de anima nobili sic sumpta" (ed. Palazzo), p. 3.6-8.

⁸¹¹ See Ulrich of Strassburg, *De summo bono*, IV.3.1 (ed. Palazzo), p. 14.300ff; and IV.3.1, p. 13.282-87: "Sunt ergo hic tres diversae rationes eiusdem rei, quae secundum suam naturam in se intelligentia est et secundum proportionem eius ad mobile anima est, quae propter supra habitam elevationem sui super omne illud, quod est actus corporis, vocatur in *Libro de causis* 'anima nobilis', et secundum comparisonem sui ad formationem, qua, ut dicit Augustinus I libro *Super Genesim*, formatur conversione ad creatorem, angelus est."

⁸¹² In the course of this discussion, Dietrich references *De causis*, Prop. 3 at *De animatione caeli*, 7, p. 18.65-66; see also *Ibid.*, 27, p. 35.50-52; and L. Sturlese, "Il *De Animatione Caeli* Di Teodorico Di Freiberg", in R. Creytens and P. Künzle (eds), *Xenia Medii Aevi Historiam Illustrantia, Oblata Thomae Kaemppeli O.P.*, 2 vols (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1978), vol. 1, p. 175-247.

⁸¹³ Henry of Lubeck, *Quodlibet I*, 15: "Utrum ex intelligentia movente celum et celo moto fiat unum essentialiter"; and III.7 "Utrum celum sit animatum". Referenced from the quotations in Sturlese, "Il *De*

Berthold of Moosburg, as Sturlese points out, uses Dietrich's arguments to correct Ulrich. Berthold references *De causis*, Prop. 3 and noble soul in his commentary on Proclus' *Elements of Theology* in multiple places, drawing on Thomas Aquinas' indication that noble soul is adapted from Proclus' divine souls of *Elements*, Prop. 201.⁸¹⁴ In Berthold's commentary on *Elements*, Props 184-85, he frequently refers back to anima nobilis of the *De causis* in his discussions of Proclus' *anime divine*, often taking directly from Ulrich's *De summo bono*, IV.3.1, and contrasting what Ulrich says with Dietrich's *De animatione celi*.⁸¹⁵

Further study of this Dominican tradition through the concept of noble soul would clarify, for example, the meaning of noble soul's appearance in the writings of Nicholas of Cusa. Nicholas uses the language of the *De causis* in a way reminiscent of Albert's adaptation of Avicenna's emanation system in his *De docta ignorantia* where he argues that the universe springs into existence in a single procession, criticizing the "Avicennian" understanding that the universe emerges successively: "first an intelligence, then a noble soul, and then nature".⁸¹⁶ In other places, Nicholas of Cusa uses the term "noble soul" synonymously with "world soul" in a way that suggests Albert gestures to the relationship between them in his *De sex principiis*.⁸¹⁷ Cusa's conflation of noble soul with the concept of *anima mundi* suggests a

Animatione Caeli Di Teodorico Di Freiberg", p. 179-80.

⁸¹⁴ See Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli*, Prop. 15 B, p. 16.64-66; Prop. 16 E, p. 29.190-91. For a reference to noble soul as the highest kind of soul in a way that is similar to Albert, see Prop. 17 D, p. 38.190-93. Berthold quotes from Albert's discussions of noble soul at Prop. 57 B, p. 150-81-83, and uses them tacitly at Prop. 182 F, p. 231.144-46.

⁸¹⁵ See, for example, Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli*, Prop. 184 A, which opens with a meditation on the nobility which establishes the connection between *De causis*, Prop. 3 and Proclus' propositions on soul. See L. Sturlese, "Vortwort", in Berthold of Moosburg, *Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 184-211*, ed. L. Sturlese and A. Punzi (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2014), p. ix-xi at p. x.

⁸¹⁶ See Nicholas of Cusa, *De docta ignorantia*, II.4 (ed. Hoffmann and Klibansky), p. 75.25-76.4: "Quoniam vero dictum est universum esse principium contractum tantum atque in hoc maximum, patet, quomodo per simplicem emanationem maximi contracti a maximo absolute totum universum prodiit in esse. Omnia autem entia, quae sunt partes universi, sine quibus universum—cum sit contractum—unum, totum et perfectum esse non posset, simul cum universe in esse prodierunt, et non prius intelligentia, einde anima nobilis, einde natura, et voluit Avicenna et alii philosophi."

⁸¹⁷ Nicholas of Cusa, *De beryllo*, 36-37 (ed. Senger and Bormann), p. 40.6-41.10: "Et hunc essendi modum tertium animam mundi nominavit Aristoteles, licet non utatur terminis illis. Idem videtur dicere quoad deum, scilicet quod omnia apud ipsum sin tut in causa unitrina quodque omnes formae sint in intelligentia mortice Caeli et in motu animato anima nobili." Cf. Albert, *De sex principiis*, 1.2, p. 6.8-19: "De mundi enim anima quid sit et qualiter longum et difficile est determinare et pertinet ad primum philosophum secundum eam partem in qua de causis primariis et universalibus determinatur. Breviter tamen dicimus quod non est causa prima nec est aliqua intelligentia sed motor mobilis primi quod est sibi principium vitae et motus secundum locum et secundum hunc motum est causa vitae et motus in omnibus, sicut dicitur in *Libro de causis*."

link with Berthold in particular who incorporates noble soul into his discussions of the Platonic system of the *Elements of Theology*.

4. Noble Soul, Mediator

In conclusion, I think again about noble soul's office as cosmic mediator. As Prop. 31(30) of the *De causis* says, between that which has a substance and act "in the moment of eternity" and that which has a substance and act "in the moment of time", there must be a mediator "whose substance is from the moment of eternity and activity from the moment of time."⁸¹⁸ This medial substance that gathers both time and eternity into itself is noble soul. But as noble soul mediates between intelligence and body, we can see that it also mediates for its Latin readers between diverse doctrines, languages, texts, and traditions. Noble soul stands between the Aristotelian philosophy to which it adheres through its original title (*The Book of the Exposition of Aristotle on the Pure Good*), and the Neoplatonism of its primary sources. It stands between the Latin tradition of its commentators and the Arabic background of that circle in Baghdad which brought it to being. It stands, moreover, between the Pagan polytheism of its source material and the theology of the Abrahamic faiths which guided its adaptor. And as it gathers these diverse parts in itself, it becomes a crucible in which Latin authors test their historical, metaphysical, and interpretive hypotheses, a mediator in the very practice of philosophy, an object that through contemplation leads beyond itself.

⁸¹⁸ *Liber de causis*, Prop. 31(30) (ed. Pattin), p. 110.44-48: "Inter rem cuius substantia et action sunt in momento aeternitatis et inter rem cuius substantia et action sunt in momento temporis existens est medium, et est illud cuius substantia est ex momento aeternitatis et operatio ex momento temporis."

APPENDIX A. *LIBER DE CAUSIS*, PROP. 3: THE MAJORITY READING OF 13TH-C. MSS

1. The Manuscripts and Edition¹

Manuscript	Description
A = Aosta, Biblioteca del Seminario Maggiore MS. 71, f. 30ra-33ra	copied in Italy, around 1230 (first 1/4 of the 13 th c.)
B = Assisi, Biblioteca comunale Ms. 298, f. 333r-340v	copied in Paris (?), between 1240-60
C = Cava dei Tirreni, Biblioteca del Monumento Nazionale dell' Abazia della S.S. Trinita Ms. 31, f. 280r-290v	copied in Northern (?) Italy, between 1225-50
D = Basel, Universitätsbibliothek Ms; F IV 23, f. 30r-35v	copied in Paris, around 1250
E = Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek Ms. CA 2° 19, f. 94r-101v	copied in Italy, between 1250-75
F = Bologna, Biblioteca universitaria Ms. Lat. 2344, f. 334r-342v	copied in England (?), between 1225-50
G = Genève-Cologny, Bibliotheca Bodmeriana Ms. 10, f. 63r-69v	copied in Paris, 1275-80
H = Bologna, Biblioteca comunale del Archiginnasio Ms. A 127, f. 270va-277va	copied in Paris, 1270-80.
I = Brugge, Stadsbibliotheek Ms. 463, f. 299v-305vb	
J = Brugge, Groot Seminarie Ms. 102/105	copied in Paris, between 1260-80
L = Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek Ms. 1382, f. 196vb-201vb	copied in Paris, between 1265-75
M = München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek Ms. Clm. 527, f. 1r-5r	copied at Oxford, 1260-1270
N = Milano; Biblioteca Ambrosiana Ms. P. 208 Sup., f. 253r-258r	dated btw. 1201-50 (first half of the 13 th c.)
O = Oxford, Bodleian Library Ms. Selden Supra 24, f. 76r-83v	copied at Oxford, first 1/4 of the 13 th c., maybe between 1220-25

¹ This list of manuscripts with their descriptions was generously provided by Iulia Székely. For the rationale and method by which this text was prepared, see Introduction, pt. 4.

P ₁ =	Paris, BnF lat 8802, f. 47r-60v	early 13 th = c.
W =	Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek Ms. Vindob. Pal. 113, f. 85v-88v	copied at Northern Italy (maybe Bologna), third 1/4 of the 13 th c. (1250-75).

Editions

a =	Albert the Great, <i>De causis et processu universitatis</i> , ed. W. Fauser, Opera Omnia Vol. XVII/2, Editio Coloniensis, Münster: Aschendorff, 1993.
t =	Thomas Aquinas, <i>Super Librum de causis expositio</i> , ed. H.D. Saffrey, Paris: Vrin, 2002.
g =	Giles of Rome, <i>Super De causis</i> , Prop. 3, Appendix B
p =	A. Pattin, "Le Liber de causis. Édition établie à l'aide de 90 manuscrits", in <i>Tijdschrift voor Philosophie</i> 28 (1966), p. 90-203; repr. in A. Pattin, <i>Miscellanea. I. Liber de causis</i> (Leuven: Bibliotheek van de Faculteit der Godgeleerdheid, 2000).

3. Text and Translation

1. PROP. 3: <i>Omnis anima nobilis tres habet operationes. Nam ex operationibus² eius est operatio animalis et operatio intelligibilis et operatio divina.</i>	PROP. 3: <i>Every noble soul has three operations. For among its operations there is an animate operation, an intelligible operation, and a divine operation.</i>
2. <i>Operatio autem divina est quoniam ipsa preparat naturam cum virtute³ que est in ea⁴, id est natura⁵, a causa prima⁶.</i>	There is a divine operation since it prepares nature with a power which is in it (that is, in nature) from the first cause.
3. <i>Eius autem operatio intelligibilis est quoniam ipsa scit⁷ res per virtutem intelligentie que est in ipsa.</i>	It has an intelligible operation since it knows things through the power of intelligence which is in it.
4. <i>Operatio autem⁸ animalis est quoniam ipsa movet⁹ corpus primum et omnia corpora naturalia, quoniam ipsa est causa motus corporum et causa operationis nature¹⁰.</i>	There is an animate operation since it moves the first body and all bodily natures, since it is the cause of the motion of bodies and the cause of the operations of nature.

² operationibus] operibus pg

³ cum virtute] per virtutem gt

⁴ in ea] vita L; in ipsa p

⁵ id est natura om. BDJELGP1pgt; add. in marg. AO

⁶ cum...prima om. a

⁷ ipsa] add. a causa prima B

⁸ autem] add. eius p

⁹ movet] movent J

¹⁰ nature] nisi HI

5. Et non efficit anima has operationes¹¹ nisi quoniam ipsa est exemplum virtutis superioris.

Soul only effects these operations because it is an image of higher power.

6. Quod est quia causa prima creavit esse anime¹² mediante intelligentia¹³. Et propter illud facta¹⁴ est anima efficiens operationem divinam.

This is because the first cause created the being of soul by a mediating intelligence. And for this reason, soul is made to effect a divine operation.

7. Postquam ergo creavit causa prima esse anime¹⁵ posuit eam sicut stramentum¹⁶ intelligentie¹⁷, quod¹⁸ efficiat operationes suas. Propter illud ergo anima intelligibilis efficit operationem intelligibilem¹⁹.

After, therefore, the first cause created the being of soul, it laid it as the “thatch” of intelligence so that it effects its operations. Because of this, therefore, intelligible soul effects an intelligible operation.

8. Et quia²⁰ anima suscipit inpressionem intelligentie²¹, facta est inferioris²² operationis quam ipsa²³ impressione²⁴ sua²⁵ in id quod est sub²⁶ ipsa²⁷.

And because soul receives the impression of intelligence, it is made an operation more inferior than that of its impression on that which is under it.

9. Quod est quia non inprimit in res²⁸ nisi per motum, scilicet quia non recipit quod est sub ea operationem²⁹ eius nisi ipsa moveat³⁰ ipsum³¹. Propter hanc ergo causam fit quod anima movet corpora³².

This is because it only imprints in things through motion, which is because what is beneath it does not receive its operation unless it moves it. It is because of this reason, then, that soul moves bodies.

10. De proprietate namque anime est ut vivificet corpora, quando influit super eam³³ virtutem suam et directe producit eam³⁴ ad operationem rectam.

It from the character of soul, then, that it vivifies bodies since it infuses its power over them and directly leads them to right operation.

11. Manifestum est igitur nunc quod anima

It is now clear, therefore, that soul has three

¹¹ anima has operationes] animales operationes FHIM

¹² esse anime] animam g

¹³ intelligentia] *add.* alachil A; alachic id est intelligentia C; alachh O; et alaty a

¹⁴ facta] dictum FHIM

¹⁵ esse anime] animam g

¹⁶ stramentum] instrumentum: BFIJCELW

¹⁷ intelligentie] *add.* aclihi A

¹⁸ quod] id est quod MW; quo D; in quod Gp; ita quod C; per quod E

¹⁹ intelligibilem *om.* FHI

²⁰ quia *om.* FHI

²¹ intelligentie] *add.* alacih A

²² inferioris] *add.* virtutis g

²³ ipsa] ipsam FHI; ipsum M

²⁴ impressione] in impressiones AGP1; impressionem M

²⁵ sua] *add.* facit B

²⁶ ipsa...sub *om.* FHIM

²⁷ sub ipsa] sub ea operatione eius nisi ipsa moveat ipsum FHIM

²⁸ in res] vires LWG

²⁹ operationem] operatione FHIG

³⁰ moveat] movent I

³¹ ipsum] ipsam HJ; ipso A; ipsam ipsum P

³² corpora] corpus BFL

³³ super eam] super ea Apg; *om.* L

³⁴ eam] ea ACOGpag; ad ea B

habet operationes tres, quoniam habet
virtutes tres: virtutem divinam, et virtutem
intelligibilem³⁵, et virtutem essentie eius
secundum quod narravimus et ostendimus.

operations, since it has three powers: a
divine power, an intelligible power, and the
power of its essence, as we have described
and demonstrated.

³⁵ intelligibilem] intelligibile BJLp

APPENDIX B. GILES OF ROME, *SUPER DE CAUSIS*, PROP. 3

Paris, BnF, 16122 = P

Vat. lat. 831 = Vat

ed. Venice, apud Iacobum Zoppinum, 1550 = V

<Prop. 3>

|P 9^{va}; V 9^r; T 9^{rb}| *Omnis anima nobilis* etc.

Postquam Auctor distinguit¹ tria genera² causarum, vel distinxit triplex esse superius quod adaptavit ad tria genera primarum causarum, videlicet ad Deum, intelligentias, et animas, in parte ista exequitur de omnibus hiis primariis causis. Ad cuius eviden³ |V 9^v| tiam sciendum quod circa has primarias causas quantum ad presens spectat, quatuor sunt considerata.

Primo, connexio; sunt enim omnes hee cause ad invicem connexe.

Secundo, considerata est inter eas distinctio, quia, licet prima causa sit indivisa³, quia non est dare plures causas primas nec plures deos, inter⁴ intelligentias et animas celorum est ordo et distinctio.

Tertio, considerandum est quid sit unaquaque istarum causarum⁵ secundum se.

Quarto autem et ultimo, videndum est quoniam⁶ comparisonem habeant adinvicem.

Auctor ergo volens determinare⁷ de primis causis quatuor facit, quia primo determinat de earum connexione, secundo de earum distinctione, tertio determinat de unaquaque secundum se, et quarto de earum comparisonem adinvicem. Secunda ibi: *prima rerum creaturarum est esse*, in principio IV propositionis. Tertia ibi: *causa prima superior est*, in principio propositionis VI⁸. Quarta |P 9^{vb}| ibi: *omnes virtutes quibus non est finis*, in principio XVI propositionis. Ad evidentiam autem⁹ prime partis sciendum quod ex hoc universum est connexum, quia superiora reservantur in inferioribus participative¹⁰, inferiora vero in superioribus excellenter. Et quia superiora sunt in inferioribus et inferiora¹¹ in superioribus, omnia sunt in omnibus, et sic est totum universum connexum. Et quod veritatem habet in toto universo, multo magis |T 9^{va}| veritatem habet in primariis causis, sed¹² quod¹³ perfectiones inferiorum causarum reserventur in superioribus causis excellenter. Hoc non habet dubium, quia planum est superiora perfectiora esse inferioribus¹⁴.

<*Dubium 1. Quomodo superiora sunt in inferioribus participative.*>

Sed quomodo superiora sunt¹⁵ in inferioribus participative¹⁶, de hoc posset aliquis dubitare; ideo Auctor supponens connexiones primarum causarum prout perfectiones inferiorum

¹ distinguit] distinxit V

² genera] primarum *add.* V

³ indivisa] sic *add.* V

⁴ nec...inter] tamen inter ipsam et V

⁵ causarum] primarum *add.* VatV

⁶ quoniam] quam V

⁷ determinare] declarare V

⁸ sexte *corr. ex secunde a manu* P

⁹ autem *om.* V

¹⁰ participative] participatione Vat

¹¹ inferiora] sunt *add.* V

¹² sed *om.* V

¹³ quod] autem *add.* V

¹⁴ inferioribus] in inferioribus PV

¹⁵ sunt] sint V

¹⁶ participatione] participative Vat

reservantur in superioribus¹⁷ excellenter, agit de connexione talium causarum, prout superiora reservantur in inferioribus participative¹⁸. Infima autem inter primarias causas de quibus hic¹⁹ agitur sunt²⁰ anime celorum. Non enim hic intenditur nisi de tribus²¹, videlicet de Deo, de intelligentiis, et de animabus orbium. Ista ergo sic connectuntur et sic omnia
 30 suprema reservantur in infimis, quia in ipsis animabus, que hic tenent gradum infimum, reservatur operatio divina et operatio intelligentie. Erit ergo in huiusmodi animabus triplex operatio: una que competit eis secundum se et hec est operatio animalis, id est operatio²² competens eis in eo quod sunt anime; alia est operatio intelligibilis que competit eis ut
 35 connectuntur intelligentiis; tertia est operatio divina que competit eis propter connexionem quam habent ad causam primam. Ecce ergo quanta est connexio in hiis primariis causis²³, quia etiam in ipsis infimis omnia connectuntur et omnia reservantur, quia omnes huiusmodi operationes in ipsis animabus reservantur²⁴.

Auctor ergo in hac propositione volendo determinare de connexione harum causarum tria
 40 facit, quia primo premitit hanc propositionem quod in animabus²⁵ hee tres operationes reservantur et connectuntur; secundo huiusmodi propositionem exponit; et tertio eam probat. Secunda ibi: *operatio autem divina*. Tertia ibi: *quod est quia causa prima*. Dicit ergo quod²⁶ *omnis anima nobilis*, id est celestis, *tres habet operationes*²⁷, id est connectit in se operationes trium primarum causarum et subiungit que sunt²⁸ iste²⁹ tres operationes dicens:
 45 *nam* | P 10^{ra} | *ex operibus eius est*³⁰ *operatio animalis*, id est operatio³¹ que competit illis animabus, ut anime sunt³², *operatio intelligibilis* que competit eis³³ ex connexione ad intelligentias, *et operatio divina* que competit eis ex connexione ad Deum.

Notandum autem quod cum tres sint³⁴ cause primarie³⁵, anime et intelligentie et Deus, triplex erit operatio primarum causarum³⁶, animalis et intelligibilis et divina. Et quia omnes
 50 iste tres operationes etiam in ipsis animabus reservantur, patet magnam connexionem esse inter has primarias causas.

<Dubium 2. Quid appellat hic Auctor animas nobiles.>

Dubitaret forte aliquis quid appellat hic Auctor animas nobiles.

Dicendum quod animas nobiles appellat hic animas divinas, nam ut dicitur in XII
 55 *Methaphysice*, | T 9^{vb} | "Deus est unus eternus³⁷ in fine nobilitatis"³⁸ⁱ. Si ergo Deus³⁹ est nobilis in fine nobilitatis⁴⁰, quicquid est divinum secundum quod huiusmodi est valde⁴¹ nobile. Et quia ut patebit anime celorum⁴² debent dici anime divine, congrue anime ille vocate sunt nobiles. Ut autem intelligamus quare ille anime divine dicuntur, sciendum est quod est

¹⁷ in superioribus] inferioribus Vat

¹⁸ participative] participatione P

¹⁹ hic *om.* V

²⁰ cause *scrip. sed del.* P

²¹ tribus] rebus in materialibus V

²² operatio *om.* V

²³ causis] et *add.* V

²⁴ quia omnes...reservantur *om.* Vat

²⁵ in animabus *om.* Vat

²⁶ quod *om.* V

²⁷ operationes] dispositiones Vat

²⁸ sunt] sint V

²⁹ iste] ille VatV

³⁰ est] quod est Vat

³¹ id est operatio *om.* V

³² sunt] et *add.* V

³³ eis] illis V

³⁴ sint *corr. ex sunt* P] sunt Vat

³⁵ primarie] videlicet *add.* V

³⁶ causarum] videlicet *add.* V

³⁷ eternus] nobilis *add sup. lin. a manu* Vat

³⁸ nobilitatis] eternitatis V

³⁹ deus *om.* V

⁴⁰ si...nobilitatis *om. per hom.* Vat

⁴¹ valde *om.* V

⁴² celorum] celestes V

differentia inter intellectus |V 10^r| nostros et ipsas intelligentias. Nam nostris intellectibus, ut
60 communiter ponitur, sic communicatum est quod sint intelligibiles, quod non est
communicatum eis⁴³ quod sint divini, quia non habent universalem influentiam super
aliquod⁴⁴, hoc enim intelligitur nomine Dei aliquid quod habeat universalem influentiam⁴⁵ et
universalem providentiam rerum, sed ipsis intelligentiis et maxime illis⁴⁶ que habent causare
motum orbium et per consequens habent universaliter influere in omnia hec inferiora;
65 communicatum est non solum ut sint intelligibiles sed etiam ut sint divine, propter
universale regnum quod communicatum est⁴⁷. Ergo intelligentie sunt divine propter
connexionem quam habent ad divina quo⁴⁸ communicatum est eis universale regimen. Cum
ergo secundum mentem huius Auctoris inter intelligentias et celos sunt medie anime
celorum⁴⁹, ita quod intelligentie movent celos mediantibus animabus, ipse anime⁵⁰ propter
70 connexionem quam habent ad intelligentias illas, que sunt divine⁵¹, divine dici debent⁵²;
etiam ipsa corpora celestia, propter connexionem quam habent ad suas animas que sunt
divine, divina dici possunt⁵³. Corpora ergo celestia sunt⁵⁴ divina propter animas, anime
propter intelligentias, intelligentie propter Deum. Hoc⁵⁵ est ergo quod Proclus dicit 129⁵⁶
propositione⁵⁷: “Omne corpus divinum est divinum⁵⁸ per⁵⁹ animam; omnis autem anima
75 propter divinum intellectum⁶⁰; omnis autem intellectus divinus secundum participationem
divine virtutis⁶¹”.ⁱⁱ Sequendo enim intentionem⁶² istorum, cum tam corporibus celestibus,
quam animabus celorum, quam⁶³ etiam intelligentiis conveniat |P 10^{rb}| habere quandam
universalem influentiam, omnia talia divina dici possunt, et quia⁶⁴ omne divinum nobile,
nobilis appellari debent.

80 <Dubium 3: Quid potuit movere Auctorem istum et alios philosophos ut darent ipsis celis animas
alias ab intelligentiis>

Ulterius forte dubitaret aliquis quid potuit⁶⁵ movere Auctorem istum et alios philosophos ut
darent ipsis⁶⁶ celis animas alias ab intelligentiis.

Dicendum quod secundum eos due suppositiones sunt supponende quas declarabimus
85 sequendo⁶⁷ philosophorum dicta. Una est quod⁶⁸ quodlibet celum⁶⁹ habet aliquem motorem
appropriatum, qui dicitur eius anima. Alia⁷⁰ suppositio est quod⁷¹ immediati motores

⁴³ communicatum eis] eis communicatum V

⁴⁴ super aliquod *om.* Vat

⁴⁵ super aliquod hec enim intelligitur nomine dei
aliud quos habeat universalitatem influentiam *add.*
infra paginam P; *om.* V

⁴⁶ illis] his V

⁴⁷ est] eis *add.* V

⁴⁸ quo] et quia V

⁴⁹ anime celorum] celorum anime V

⁵⁰ anime] divine *add.* V

⁵¹ divine *add. in marg. a manu* P; *add. in marg. a manu*
Vat

⁵² propter...debent] dici debent propter
connexionem quam habent ad intelligentias illas
que sunt divine V

⁵³ etiam...possunt] debent dici etiam ipsa corpora
celestia propter connexionem quam habent ad suas
animas que sunt divine divina V

⁵⁴ sunt] dicuntur (?) Vat

⁵⁵ hoc] hec Vat

⁵⁶ 129a *corr. ex 63 in marg.* P; 60 V

⁵⁷ propositione] sui libri *add.* V

⁵⁸ est divinum] divinum est V

⁵⁹ per] propter VatV

⁶⁰ intellectum] intellectus Vat

⁶¹ virtutis] mentis V

⁶² intentionem] Philosophi *add.* Vat

⁶³ animabus celorum quam *om.* Vat

⁶⁴ quia *om.* Vat

⁶⁵ potuit] potuerit V

⁶⁶ ipsis] illis V

⁶⁷ sequendo] supponendo V

⁶⁸ quod] quia P

⁶⁹ quodlibet celum] celum quodlibet V

⁷⁰ alia] altera V

⁷¹ quod] quia P

celorum non possunt esse intelligentie. Hiis duobus suppositis coguntur dare ipsis celis animas preter intelligentias. Prima autem suppositio, videlicet⁷² “quodlibet celorum habere motorem appropriatum⁷³ qui dicitur eius anima”, ex dictis philosophorum declaratur dupliciter, | T 10^{ra} | primo prout celum comparatur ad hec inferiora, secundo prout⁷⁴ comparatur ad motorem primum⁷⁵.

Prima via sic patet, nam in hiis inferioribus inveniuntur⁷⁶ aliqua que non moventur ex se sed a generante, ut elementa et omnia mixta⁷⁷ inanimata; aliqua⁷⁸ vero moventur ex se et sunt divisibilia in talia duo, quorum unum est per se movens⁷⁹ et aliud est per se motum, ut animata; et hec sunt nobiliora aliis. Et⁸⁰ si aliqua moventur ex se, dignum est quod⁸¹ prima mobilia, cuiusmodi sunt corpora celestia, moveantur ex se, erunt ergo⁸² illa animata et habebunt motores aliquos appropriatos qui dicentur eorum anime. Et hanc viam tangit Philosophus in VIII *Physicorum*ⁱⁱⁱ, et *Libro celi et mundi*^{iv} probatur hoc idem.

Secunda via sic patet, nam ut corpus celeste comparatur ad Deum, Deus⁸³ dicitur movere ipsum ut desideratum et amatum⁸⁴, ymaginamur enim quod Deus moveat immobiliter. Movere autem immobiliter potissime competit⁸⁵ desiderato et amato⁸⁶, sicut pomum in se immobiliter manens movet desiderantem et amantem. Immo si pomum ipsum moveretur, non sic traheret⁸⁷ desiderantes et amantes, ut moverentur ad ipsum, sicut⁸⁸ trahit immobiliter stans. Si ergo Deus movet celum ut desideratum et amatum⁸⁹, celum movebitur ut desiderans et amans. Habet ergo celum animam que desiderans et amans assimilari prime cause movet celum. Et ista videtur esse⁹⁰ sententia Philosophi in XII *Methaphysice* in illo capitulo, “moveret autem sicut desideratum et intellectum”^v, ubi Commentator ait: ex hoc manifestum esse celum habere animam et habere de | P 10^{va} | virtutibus anime desiderativam et intellectivam^{vi}.

Viso quod celum habet animam, id est habet motorem appropriatum qui dicitur eius anima, restat ostendere⁹¹ quomodo immediatus motor celi sequendo philosophorum dicta non sit intelligentia, quod duplici⁹² via declarari potest: quarum una sumitur ex immobilitate⁹³ ipsius primi, alia⁹⁴ ex materialitate ipsius⁹⁵ orbis.

Prima via sic patet: ymaginantur enim⁹⁶ philosophi quod propria | V 10^v | operatio motoris appropriati celi sit movere, aliter enim motor ille non meretur⁹⁷ dici anima celi; vel, si hoc non diceremus, sequeretur quod motor celi aliquando desisteret a movendo, quia a non propria operatione contingit aliquem⁹⁸ desistere⁹⁹. Propter ergo continuum motum celi

⁷² videlicet] quod *add. in marg. a manu* Vat

⁷³ habere...appropriatum] celorum motorem appropriatum habere V

⁷⁴ prout *add. in marg. a manu* P

⁷⁵ primum] quia *add.* Vat

⁷⁶ inveniuntur] invenimus V

⁷⁷ mixta] mota V

⁷⁸ aliqua] alia V

⁷⁹ movens *add. in marg.* Vat

⁸⁰ et] quia Vat

⁸¹ quod] ut V

⁸² ergo illa] autem V

⁸³ Deus *om.* Vat

⁸⁴ dicitur...amatum] movere ipsum dicitur ut amatum et desideratum V

⁸⁵ competit] convenit V

⁸⁶ movere...amato] quod potissime convenit amato et desiderato V

⁸⁷ traheret] traherentur Vat

⁸⁸ sicut] sic Vat

⁸⁹ desideratum et amatum] desideratus et amatus V

⁹⁰ esse *add. in marg.* P

⁹¹ ostendere] videre Vat

⁹² dupliciter] etiam *add.* V

⁹³ immobilitate] mobilitate Vat

⁹⁴ alia] vero *add.* V

⁹⁵ ipsius *om.* V

⁹⁶ enim *om.* V

⁹⁷ meretur] mereretur V

⁹⁸ aliquem] aliquando V

⁹⁹ desistere] deficere V

possunt¹⁰⁰ philosophi propriam operationem motoris appropriati eius esse¹⁰¹ movere. Cum ergo Deus sit omnino immobilis¹⁰², non videtur convenienter posse stare quod intelligentie que immediate se habent ad Deum | T 10^{rb} | omnino immobiles¹⁰³ habeant ipsum¹⁰⁴ movere tanquam operationem propriam¹⁰⁵. Sed preter intelligentias quarum propria operatio est intelligere¹⁰⁶, oportuit¹⁰⁷ dare aliquas¹⁰⁸ inferiores substantias¹⁰⁹ quarum propria operatio¹¹⁰ esse¹¹¹ movere celum, et illas vocaverunt celorum animas¹¹².

Secunda via ad hoc idem sumitur ex materialitate orbis. Nam corpora quantumcumque suprema sunt valde materialia respectu substantiarum separatarum que non habent partem materiam¹¹³ sui. Quod ergo intelligentie que immediate se habent ad Deum, qui est omnino immaterialis et actus purus, immediate¹¹⁴ attingant¹¹⁵ corpora que habent materiam partem sui vel que sunt materialia, videbatur indecens¹¹⁶. Et quia in tanto negotio, sicut est celorum¹¹⁷ dispositio per quos¹¹⁸ hic totus¹¹⁹ orbis gubernatur, minima inordinatio est valde inconveniens. Ideo, preter intelligentias posuerunt quasdam alias substantias¹²⁰ quas vocabant celorum animas.

<Dubium 4. Utrum hec philosophorum opinio possit aliquo modo cum fide concorare, vel possit reduci ad fidem.>

Ulterius forte dubitaret aliquis utrum hec opinio philosophorum¹²¹ possit aliquo modo concordare cum fide¹²² vel possit reduci ad fidem.

Dicendum quod quantum ad rem quasi non est¹²³ differentia inter philosophos et theologos¹²⁴ de animatione celorum. Nam neque philosophi voluerunt quod ex anima celi et celo fieret unum secundum esse, sed pro tanto secundum philosophos celi sunt animati et vivificant¹²⁵, et pro tanto¹²⁶ motores celorum dicunt¹²⁷ celos animare et vivere¹²⁸ in quantum influunt eis motum, qui motus est quoddam opus vite. Nam et aque fluentes dicuntur aque¹²⁹ vive, manentes vero immobiles¹³⁰ dicuntur¹³¹ mortue¹³². Hoc et theologo concederent, dicerent¹³³ enim quod motores celorum influunt¹³⁴ celis¹³⁵ motum¹³⁶. Modus tamen loquendi valde est | P 10^{vb} | varius, non enim utimur hoc genere locutionis ut dicamus celos animatos,

¹⁰⁰ possunt] posuerunt V

¹⁰¹ eius esse] esse eius V

¹⁰² immobilis *add. in marg. a manu P*

¹⁰³ immobiles] immobilem V

¹⁰⁴ ipsum] celum *add. V*

¹⁰⁵ operationem propriam] propriam operationem V

¹⁰⁶ intelligentias...intelligere] has intelligentias superiores V

¹⁰⁷ oportuit] operavit V

¹⁰⁸ aliquas *om. V*

¹⁰⁹ substantias *om. V*

¹¹⁰ est intelligere...operatio *add. in marg. P*

¹¹¹ esse] sit V

¹¹² illas... animas] huiusmodi celorum animas vocari oportet V

¹¹³ partem materiam] materiam partem V; materiam *add. in marg. a manu P*

¹¹⁴ immediate *om. V*

¹¹⁵ attingant] attingat PVat

¹¹⁶ indecens] inconveniens (?) Vat

¹¹⁷ celorum *corr. ex elementorum in marg. a manu P*

¹¹⁸ quos] quam V

¹¹⁹ hic totus] totus hic V

¹²⁰ substantias] spirituales *add. V*

¹²¹ opinio philosophorum] philosophorum opinio V

¹²² concordare...fide] cum fide concordare V

¹²³ quasi non est] non est quasi V

¹²⁴ philosophos et theologos] philosophos et theologos VatV

¹²⁵ vivificant] vivificati V; vivisit (sic!) P

¹²⁶ secundum...tanto *add. in marg. P; om. V*

¹²⁷ dicunt] dicuntur V

¹²⁸ vivere] vivificare V

¹²⁹ aque *add. in marg. P*

¹³⁰ immobiles *om. Vat*

¹³¹ dicuntur] aqua *add. Vat*

¹³² mortue] quia mobiles [lege: immobiles] Vat

¹³³ dicerent] dixerunt V

¹³⁴ influunt] influerent V

¹³⁵ celis] celum Vat

¹³⁶ motum] motus V

145 immo Damascenus¹³⁷ in sua *Compilatione theologica* II, capite 6, plane negat celos animatos esse dicens: “Nullus autem animatos celos vel luminaria existimet, inanimati enim sunt”^{vii}.

Ulterius autem dico quod celi possunt¹³⁸ dici hoc modo animati et vivere, quia habent motores appropriatos influentes eis motum, qui est quoddam¹³⁹ opus vite.

<Dubium 5. Utrum possit ad modum fidei trahi quod ponantur anime celorum preter intelligentias.>

150 Dubitaret forte aliquis utrum possit ad modum fidei trahi quod ponantur anime celorum preter intelligentias.

Dicendum quod lex divinitatis est reducere infima¹⁴⁰ in suprema per media^{viii}, sic enim Deus colligavit universum quod semper infima supremorum coniunxit¹⁴¹ supremis infimorum. Unde Dionysius VII *De divinis nominibus* loquens de ordine¹⁴² universi ait quod: “divina virtus omnia concordans est omnis ordinis causa et semper fines primorum coniungens
155 principiis secundorum, unam omnis armoniam | T 10^{va} | pulchre operans”^{ix}. Ex hoc ergo Deus pulchre operatur¹⁴³ vel¹⁴⁴ unam universalem armoniam¹⁴⁵ sive consonantiam omnis universi, quia quoddam ordine omnia coniungit¹⁴⁶. Indignum ergo esset si¹⁴⁷ supreme intelligentie annecterentur¹⁴⁸ corporibus tanquam¹⁴⁹ proprii motores eorum¹⁵⁰. Dicemus ergo etiam secundum sanctorum sententiam quod corporalis creatura¹⁵¹ dividitur in corpora suprema,
160 cuiusmodi sunt celi, et in corpora¹⁵² infima, cuiusmodi sunt corpora¹⁵³ existentia in sphaera activorum et passivorum. Sic et ipse intelligentie distinguuntur, quia quedam sunt superiores, quedam¹⁵⁴ inferiores. Inconveniens enim esset quod intelligentie superiores que sunt proximiores primo et magis attingunt¹⁵⁵ ipsum immediate connecterentur corporibus tanquam eorum motores. Ideo preter angelos superiores est dare angelos inferiores¹⁵⁶ quibus
165 commissa est administratio corporum. Si ergo hos angelos inferiores administrantes corpora celestia¹⁵⁷ volunt vocare animas, angelos superiores vero¹⁵⁸ excellentiores illis volunt vocare intelligentias. Trahetur¹⁵⁹ hoc philosophicum¹⁶⁰ dictum aliquantulum ad id quod fides ponit; plene tamen nunquam philosophorum sententia trahetur ad sententiam fidei, quia ipsi tot posuerunt intelligentias et tot animas¹⁶¹ quot sunt¹⁶² orbes. Nos tamen¹⁶³ tenemus quod milia
170 milium ministrant ei¹⁶⁴ et decies milites milesies centena milium assistunt^{165x}. Inconveniens¹⁶⁶ | P 11^{ra} | enim esset quod corpora essent | V 11^r | in tanto¹⁶⁷ magno¹⁶⁸ numero et nobilissima pars universi esset in tanto¹⁶⁹ modico numero, unde Dionysius XIV *Angelice*

¹³⁷ immo damascenus] damascenus enim V

¹³⁸ possunt] possint V

¹³⁹ quoddam] quiddam V

¹⁴⁰ infima] ultima Vat

¹⁴¹ coniunxit] ammixit Vat

¹⁴² ordine] ordinatione V

¹⁴³ operatur *corr. ex operatus* P

¹⁴⁴ vel *add. sup. lin. P; om.* VatV

¹⁴⁵ pulchre... armoniam *om. per hom.* Vat

¹⁴⁶ coniungit] coniunxit Vat

¹⁴⁷ si] ut Vat

¹⁴⁸ annecterentur] connecterentur cum V

¹⁴⁹ tanquam *om.* Vat

¹⁵⁰ eorum] ergo Vat

¹⁵¹ corporalis creatura] corpora vel creatura corporea V

¹⁵² et in corpora *om.* Vat

¹⁵³ corpora *om.* Vat

¹⁵⁴ quedam] vero *add.* V

¹⁵⁵ attingunt] attingat Vat

¹⁵⁶ inferiores] inferior ea V

¹⁵⁷ corpora celestia] corporibus celestibus V

¹⁵⁸ superiores vero] vero superiores V

¹⁵⁹ trahetur] trahitur V

¹⁶⁰ hoc philosophicum *om.* Vat

¹⁶¹ et *add. sed del.* P

¹⁶² sunt *om.* Vat

¹⁶³ tamen] autem V

¹⁶⁴ ei] deo V

¹⁶⁵ assistunt] ei *add.* VatV

¹⁶⁶ inconveniens] et conveniens Vat

¹⁶⁷ tanto] tam V

¹⁶⁸ magno] *om.* Vat

¹⁶⁹ tanto] tam PV

175 *hierarchie* ait quod: “multe sunt bene¹⁷⁰ militie supercelestium intellectuum superantes
 infimam et coartatam materialium multitudinem”^{xi}. Videtur enim omnino velle Dionysius
 quod plures sunt¹⁷¹ species angelorum quam corporalium rerum.
 Rursus deviat hec positio a fide, quia intelligentias non ponit nisi propter motus orbium.
 Volunt¹⁷² quidem¹⁷³ quod quia intelligentie¹⁷⁴ propter sui excellentiam non decet quod
 habeant actionem in corpora¹⁷⁵; ideo inter intelligentias et celos ponunt animas dicentes
 180 quod intelligentie movent celos mediantibus animabus. Quod etiam non sapit modum fidei,
 quia non propter movere corpora tamen, sed propter contemplari ipsum Deum intelligentias
 ponimus. Aliquid ergo mussitabant¹⁷⁶ philosophi circa veritatem, sed eam plene non
 intellexerunt et in multis a veritate deviaverunt.
 Deinde cum dicit, *operatio autem divina*, exponit propositionem¹⁷⁷ propositam circa quod tria
 185 facit, quia primo exponit quomodo anime habent operationem divinam, secundo quomodo
 intelligibilem, tertio quomodo animalem. Secunda ibi: *Eius autem est operatio videlicet*¹⁷⁸.
 Tertia ibi: *operatio autem animalis*. Dicit ergo¹⁷⁹, *operatio*¹⁸⁰ *divina est supra*¹⁸¹, competens ipsi
 anime nobili, *quoniam ipsa anima nobilis preparat naturam per virtutem que est in ea a prima*
causa.
 Notandum autem quod preparare proprie est agentium inferiorum, |T 10^{vb}| videmus enim
 190 cementarios inferiores preparare materiam architectoribus in illa arte¹⁸². Ut ergo Auctor det
 intelligere animas celorum non¹⁸³ habere operationem divinam modo supremo et principali
 sicut habet ipse¹⁸⁴ Deus, sed quia habent huiusmodi operationem modo inferiori et
 instrumentali. Ideo talem operationem divinam¹⁸⁵ prout participatur ab anima celi¹⁸⁶ vocat¹⁸⁷
 preparationem nature¹⁸⁸.
 195 <Dubium 6. Quomodo anima celi dicatur habere operationem divinam prout naturam preparat.>
 Dubitaret forte aliquis quomodo anima celi dicatur habere operationem divinam prout
 naturam preparat.
 Dicendum quod omnes nomine Dei intelligunt aliquid quod habet¹⁸⁹ universalem¹⁹⁰
 influentiam super rebus et universalem providentiam rerum. Unde et¹⁹² Platonici¹⁹³ ideas
 200 illas separatas, propter universalem influentiam et causalitatem quam habebant super hec
 inferiora, vocabant deos ponentes ordinem deorum secundum ordinem abstractorum.
 Intelligemus ergo Deum esse ipsum esse, et ideo facit ad universale esse¹⁹⁴ rerum; et
 secundum modum sui omnia conservat in esse; et tertio¹⁹⁵ omnia dirigit¹⁹⁶ in suos fines prout

¹⁷⁰ sunt bene] bone sunt V

¹⁷¹ sunt] sint V

¹⁷² volunt] voluit Vat

¹⁷³ quidem] enim V

¹⁷⁴ intelligentie] intelligentias V

¹⁷⁵ corpora] corporibus V

¹⁷⁶ mussitabant] loquebantur V

¹⁷⁷ propositionem *add. in marg. a manu* PVat

¹⁷⁸ videlicet] intelligibilis V

¹⁷⁹ ergo] quod *add.* Vat

¹⁸⁰ operatio] autem *add.* V; sunt *add.* Vat

¹⁸¹ supra] supple V

¹⁸² illa arte] arte illa V

¹⁸³ non *om.* V

¹⁸⁴ ipse] est *add. sed del.* PVat

¹⁸⁵ modo...divinam *om.* V

¹⁸⁶ anima celi] eis V

¹⁸⁷ vocat] dicit V

¹⁸⁸ preparationem nature] preparare naturam V

¹⁸⁹ habet *corr. ex* habent P.

¹⁹⁰ aliquid...habet *om.* V

¹⁹¹ universalem] aliquam *add.* V

¹⁹² et *om.* V

¹⁹³ Platonici] ponentes *add. in marg. a. manu* Vat

¹⁹⁴ et...esse] universale causam V

¹⁹⁵ omnes *scrip. sed del.* P

¹⁹⁶ dirigit] dirigere V

205 requirit |P 11^{rb}| eorum natura et eorum esse. Intelligemus enim¹⁹⁷ hec tria se habere per
ordinem quod primo res producitur et accipit esse; secundo in illo esse conservatur; et tertio
secundum illud esse in suum finem dirigitur¹⁹⁸. Et quia hec tria sunt universaliter in rebus
secundum modum exigentie nature sue¹⁹⁹, Deo, qui est universalis causa rerum et per quem
intelligimus quandam universalem causam, hec sunt attribuenda; et alia agentia inquantum
hec participant dicuntur divinam operationem habere. Et quia Auctor hec²⁰⁰ appellat
210 *preparare naturam*, videlicet eam regere et disponere, vel hec appellat *preparare naturam*²⁰¹ res
naturales per motum celi in esse producere²⁰², eas secundum exigentiam nature sue in esse
conservare, et ipsas in suis actionibus dirigere et adiuvare. Cum hec sint²⁰³ attribuenda Deo,
et in tantum alia agentia hec participant, inquantum participant²⁰⁴ operationem divinam et
inquantum participant aliquid de universalitate influentie que principaliter attribuenda est
215 Deo, bene dictum est, quod anime celorum habent operationem divinam inquantum
preparant naturam per virtutem quam habent a prima causa. Nam licet totum quod habent
habeant²⁰⁵ a primo, tamen magis relucet²⁰⁶ in eis operatio divina in participando
universalitatem causalitatis quam in aliis, et magis quantum ad hoc dicuntur operationem
divinam habere.

220 Deinde cum dicit, *eius autem operatio*, |V 11^v| ostendit quomodo²⁰⁷ anima nobilis habeat²⁰⁸
operationem intelligibilem dicens quod *eius autem*, id est ipsius anime nobilis, *est operatio*
*intelligibilis, quoniam ipsa scit*²⁰⁹ *res per virtutem intelligentie, que est in ipsa*.

<Dubium 7. Quomodo anima celi sciat res per virtutem intelligentie existentis in ea.>

225 Dubitaret forte aliquis quomodo anima celi sciat res per |T 11^{ra}| virtutem intelligentie
existentis in ea.

Dicendum quod per animas celorum intelligimus inferiores angelos vel²¹⁰ inferiores
substantias separatas quibus commissa est administratio corporum. Nunc autem est ita
quod quanto substantia separata est superior, tanto plus participat de intellectuali lumine.
Unde etiam secundum sanctorum sententias angeli superiores tanquam magis illuminati
230 illuminant et perficiunt inferiores²¹¹, per talem illuminationem superiorum fiunt multe²¹² res
note inferioribus. Ergo etiam secundum modum fidei dicere possumus quod anime, id est
substantie spirituales inferiores, habent operationem intelligibilem et sciunt res per virtutem
intelligentiarum, id est per virtutem superiorum spirituum a quibus illuminantur et
perficiuntur. Auctor tamen iste plus videtur sentire, quia²¹³ videtur velle quod species ipse
235 intelligibiles deriventur in animas celorum ab intelligentiis. Dicemus enim secundum
mentem huius²¹⁴ Auctoris species intelligibiles, |P 11^{va}| ut sunt in intelligentiis, esse in
magna actualitate, et dicemus ipsas animas celorum esse in potentia ad suscipiendum
similitudines illarum specierum non in tanta actualitate nec in tanta puritate in quanta sunt

¹⁹⁷ enim] autem V

¹⁹⁸ in suum finem *scrip. sed del. P*

¹⁹⁹ sue *om. Vat*

²⁰⁰ hec] hic V

²⁰¹ videlicet...naturam *om. V*

²⁰² in esse producer *scrip. sed del. P*

²⁰³ sint] principaliter *add. V*

²⁰⁴ participant] participans V

²⁰⁵ habeant *om. Vat*

²⁰⁶ relucet] resultet Vat

²⁰⁷ quomodo] hec *add. V*

²⁰⁸ habeat] habet V

²⁰⁹ *p. corr. in marg. ex sit P; sit Vat*

²¹⁰ angelos vel *om. V*

²¹¹ inferiores] ita quod *add. V*

²¹² multe *om. V*

²¹³ quia] nam V

²¹⁴ huius *om. V*

- in intelligentiis. Et²¹⁵ quia unumquodque agens agit secundum exigentiam sue forme, ut²¹⁶ in
240 tantum participamus operationem intelligibilem inquantum habemus species²¹⁷ intelligibiles
apud nos, anime ergo celorum secundum huius Auctoris sententiam habentes species
intelligibiles derviatas in eas ab intelligentiis dicuntur habere operationem intelligibilem²¹⁸
per virtutem intelligentiarum per quas sciunt res et per quas suscipiunt intelligibiles species.
Sententia tamen sanctorum et theologorum non omnino est huic opinioni conformis,
245 concedimus enim quod multa possunt sciri a substantiis separatis inferiorum²¹⁹ per
virtutem superiorum intelligentiarum, non quia ille istis influant novas species, sed quia eas
illuminant et perficiunt que²²⁰ declarare presens speculatio non patitur. In questionibus
tamen nostris quas²²¹ disputavimus *De cognitione angelorum*, de hac materia diffusius
diximus^{222xii}.
- 250 Deinde cum dicit, *operatio autem animalis*, ostendit quomodo in anima celi sit operatio
animalis dicens: *operatio autem animalis* est supra in anima²²³ celi²²⁴, *quoniam ipsa movet corpus*
primum, id est celum, et movendo celum²²⁵ movet²²⁶ cetera corpora naturalia, *quoniam ipsa est*
causa motus corporum, id est causa quare moventur corpora celestia et alia corpora; *et est*
causa operationis nature. Et²²⁷ subdit quod non²²⁸ efficit anima has operationes nisi quoniam ipsa est
255 *exemplum virtutis superioris*, quod²²⁹ dicit quod anima non efficit has operationes²³⁰
principaliter et ex se, sed magis efficit eas instrumentaliter prout est quoddam organum, et
prout²³¹ est quid²³² extractum et causatum a virtutibus superioribus.
- Notandum autem quod anima | T 11^{rb} | ut anima²³³ habet corpus vivificare, et quia, ut dictum
est, vivificatio corporis celestis est motus ei influxus ab anima sua, qui motus est quoddam
260 opus vite, quia²³⁴ distinguimus animatum ab inanimato motu et sensu, ut dicitur in *Libro de*
anima,^{xiii} et ideo, si ipsum movere superceleste corpus est ipsum vivificare²³⁵ et animare, bene
dictum est quod anime celesti competit operatio animalis, id est competit ei operatio²³⁶
anime secundum quod huiusmodi, vel competit ei²³⁷ operatio animationis prout movet
corpus primum, per cuius motum movet naturam totam.
- 265 Deinde cum dicit, | V 12^r | *quod est quia prima causa*, in parte ista probat que dixerat²³⁸, nam
postquam propositionem proposuit et dedit eam nobis²³⁹ intelligere, hic vult eam probare
circa quod duo facit, quia²⁴⁰ primo facit | P 11^{vb} | quod dictum est; secundo epilogat circa
determinata ibi²⁴¹: *manifestum igitur est nunc*. Circa primum tria facit, quia primo probat

²¹⁵ et om. V

²¹⁶ ut] unde V

²¹⁷ intelligibilem inquantum habemus species *add. in marg.* P

²¹⁸ dicuntur habere operationem intelligibilem *scrip. sed del.* P

²¹⁹ inferiorum] inferioribus V

²²⁰ que] quod V

²²¹ quas *add. in marg.* P] cum nos V

²²² diximus] dicemus V

²²³ anima *p. corr. ex animata* P

²²⁴ operatio...celi] quod eius autem scilicet anime celi est operatio animalis cuius ratio est V

²²⁵ movendo celi *om.* V

²²⁶ movet] etiam *add.* V

²²⁷ et *om.* Vat

²²⁸ non] autem *add.* V

²²⁹ quod] quasi V

²³⁰ nisi... operationes *om. p. hom.* Vat

²³¹ prout] non efficit anima has operationes nisi quoniam ipsa est exemplum virtutis superioris quasi dicens prout *add.* Vat

²³² quoddam *scrip. sed corr.* P] quoddam V

²³³ ut anima *om.* V; est *add.* Vat

²³⁴ quia] per quod Vat

²³⁵ vivificare] vivere P

²³⁶ animalis id est competit ei operatio *add. in marg.* P; *om.* V

²³⁷ co *scrip. sed del.* P

²³⁸ dixerat] dixit V

²³⁹ nobis *om.* V

²⁴⁰ quia] nam V

²⁴¹ ibi *scrip. sup. lin.* P

270 quomodo²⁴² anima²⁴³ habet operationem divinam, secundo quomodo habet operationem
intelligibilem, et tertio quomodo animalem; secunda ibi: *postquam ergo causavit*; tertia ibi: *Et*
*quia anima*²⁴⁴ *suscipit*. Continuetur ergo sic: bene dictum est quod anima efficit omnes has tres
operationes prout est²⁴⁵ quid extractum a superioribus virtutibus, nam prout est sic
extractum habet operationem divinam, intelligibilem et animalem. *Quod est*, videlicet²⁴⁶ quod
275 anima hoc modo habeat operationem divinam et operationes alias, *quia prima causa creavit*
*animam celestem mediante intelligentia*²⁴⁷. *Et per*²⁴⁸ *illud facta est anima efficiens operationem*
divinam.

Notandum autem non esse²⁴⁹ de intentione huius Auctoris quod²⁵⁰ substantia anime sit creata
a prima causa mediante intelligentia, quia semper primum in omni genere est causa²⁵¹
omnium aliorum que sunt post^{xiv}. Et quia hoc²⁵², intelligimus nomine Dei²⁵³ aliquid quod
280 sit²⁵⁴ ipsum esse²⁵⁵. Omnia alia per ipsum accipiunt esse. Ipse ergo Deus, quia²⁵⁶ est primum
ens, et²⁵⁷ quia est ipsum esse, est causa²⁵⁸ omnium entium. Ut²⁵⁹ ergo videamus²⁶⁰, in quibus
productionibus²⁶¹ cooperantur alia agentia Deo et in quibus non²⁶² dicemus ergo²⁶³ quod
quicquid producitur non per motum sed ex eo quod a Deo accipit, impossibile est quod ad
esse eius faciat aliqua secundarum causarum. Quicquid igitur²⁶⁴ non producitur ex materia
285 preiacente quantum ad suum esse et quantum ad suam substantiam, producitur a solo
primo²⁶⁵, sed quantum ad alias perfectiones et quantum ad alias bonitates possunt cooperari
intelligentie, tanquam inferiores cause. Anima ergo celi dicit quandam substantiam
intellectualem habentem intelligibilem operationem. Secundum ergo intentionem huius
Auctoris²⁶⁶ est quod prima causa creavit animam celi mediante intelligentia, quia²⁶⁷ quantum
290 ad substantiam Deus²⁶⁸ creavit animam, sed quantum ad operationem intelligibilem²⁶⁹ fecit
quod hoc²⁷⁰ haberet ab intelligentia. Quod satis concordat cum verbis sequentibus ubi dicitur
quod *postquam prima causa creavit animam posuit eam sicut stramentum intelligentie*, id est
stravit eam et supposuit | T 11^{va} | eam²⁷¹ operationem intelligentie. Ergo prius intelligitur²⁷²
Deus²⁷³ creasse²⁷⁴ substantiam anime, et postea supposuisse eam operationem intelligentie,
295 ut haberet operationem intelligibilem per ipsam. Hoc ergo modo, secundum huius Auctoris
sententiam, Deus creavit animam²⁷⁵ mediante intelligentia, quia super animam a Deo
creatam intelligentia habet causalitatem non quantum | P 12^{ra} | ad substantiam sed quantum
ad operationem.

²⁴² quomodo] ipsa *add.* V

²⁴³ anima] celi *add.* V

²⁴⁴ anima *om.* V

²⁴⁵ est *om.* Vat

²⁴⁶ videlicet] scilicet V

²⁴⁷ mediante intelligentia *scrip. iterum sed del.* P

²⁴⁸ per] propter V

²⁴⁹ esse] est V

²⁵⁰ anima *scrip. sed del.* P

²⁵¹ est causa] causa est V

²⁵² hoc *om.* V

²⁵³ dei] primi V

²⁵⁴ sit] est V

²⁵⁵ esse] et *add.* V

²⁵⁶ quia] quoniam V

²⁵⁷ et *om.* Vat

²⁵⁸ est causa] causa est V

²⁵⁹ ut *om.* V

²⁶⁰ ergo videamus] videamus ergo V

²⁶¹ productionibus] operationibus V; *om.* Vat

²⁶² et...non *om.* V

²⁶³ ergo] enim V; *om.* Vat

²⁶⁴ igitur] ergo V

²⁶⁵ primo] deo V

²⁶⁶ secundum...auctoris] de huius ergo auctoris
intentione V

²⁶⁷ quia] ita quod V

²⁶⁸ deus] per se solum *add.* V

²⁶⁹ intelligibilem] ipsius anime *add.* V

²⁷⁰ hoc] eam V

²⁷¹ stravit... eam] a (sic!) Vat

²⁷² intelligitur] intelligit Vat

²⁷³ deus] deum V

²⁷⁴ creasse] intelligentiam et *add.* Vat

²⁷⁵ anima] anima V

<Dubium 8. Quomodo anima habet operationem divinam, quia creata est a Deo mediante intelligentia.>

Dubitaret forte aliquis quomodo anima habet operationem divinam, quia creata est a Deo mediante intelligentia.

Dicendum quod operationem divinam habet et anima et intelligentia, immo magis intelligentia quam anima inquantum proximior est primo enti. Ideo non sufficit declarare quod anima habeat operationem divinam quocumque modo, sed oportet ostendere quod habeat eam secundum modum suum²⁷⁶, videlicet inferiori modo quam intelligentia. Et²⁷⁷ ideo ad hoc probandum dixit animam esse productam a Deo mediante intelligentia, ut, quia producta est²⁷⁸ a Deo, participat operationem divinam, quia vero producta est mediante intelligentia, participat operationem²⁷⁹ illam inferiori modo quam intelligentia.

Deinde cum dicit, *postquam ergo causavit*²⁸⁰, | V 12^v | probat secundum, videlicet quod anima habeat operationem intelligibilem inquantum est exemplum superioris virtutis, dicens quod *postquam causa prima creavit*²⁸¹ animam, *posuit*²⁸² eam sicut stramentum. Aliqui textus habent *instrumentum*, sed melior littera est²⁸³ *stramentum*. Posuit ergo eam sicut intelligentie stramentum²⁸⁴, id est²⁸⁵ stravit eam et supposuit eam²⁸⁶ operationi intelligentie quod²⁸⁷ supra²⁸⁸ sic strata operationi intelligentie anima est intelligens et *efficit operationem intelligibilem*.

Deinde cum dicit, *et quia anima*²⁸⁹ *suscipit*, probat tertium, videlicet quod anime competat operatio animalis, quia est exemplum superioris virtutis dicens: *et quia anima suscipit impressionem intelligentie, facta est inferioris*²⁹⁰ *operationis*²⁹¹ *quam ipsa*²⁹² *intelligentia* et subdit quod impressione sua, id est secundum impressionem suam anima agit in id quod est sub ipsa, quasi dicens quod anima²⁹³ suscipiendo impressionem intelligentie facta est inferior intelligentia²⁹⁴ et agit inferiori modo, quia agit per motum et movendo corpora, et²⁹⁵ ideo subdit quod est supra²⁹⁶ quod anima sic agat²⁹⁷, quia ipsa non imprimit in res²⁹⁸ nisi per motum, scilicet *quia id quod est sub ea non recipit operationem eius nisi ipsa anima moveat ipsum corpus. Propter hanc ergo causam*, videlicet quia anima non agit nisi movendo, *fit quod anima movet corpora*²⁹⁹. Et subdit quod *de proprietate namque*³⁰⁰ *est anime*³⁰¹ *ut vivificet*, id est ut moveat corpora, *quando influit super ea*, id est super corpora suam virtutem³⁰², *et directe producit ea*, id est³⁰³ corpora, *ad operationem rectam*.

Notandum autem³⁰⁴ omnes has³⁰⁵ tres rationes, videlicet quod anima habeat operationem

²⁷⁶ suum] infimum V

²⁷⁷ et om. Vat

²⁷⁸ est] sic add. V

²⁷⁹ divinam...operationem om. V

²⁸⁰ causavit om. Vat

²⁸¹ creait] causavit V

²⁸² po scrip. sed del. P

²⁸³ est] que dicit add. V

²⁸⁴ intelligentie stramentum] stramentum intelligentie V

²⁸⁵ id est om. V

²⁸⁶ et supposuit eam om. V

²⁸⁷ quod] quo V

²⁸⁸ supra] supple

²⁸⁹ anima om. V

²⁹⁰ inferioris] virtutis add. sed del.(?) P

²⁹¹ inferioris virtutis operationis] operationis inferioris V

²⁹² ipsa om. V

²⁹³ anima add. in marg. P

²⁹⁴ et...intelligentia om. V

²⁹⁵ et om. VatV

²⁹⁶ supra] supple Vat

²⁹⁷ agat] evenit add. V; om. Vat

²⁹⁸ in res] vires V

²⁹⁹ corpora] corpus V

³⁰⁰ proprietate namque] enim anime V

³⁰¹ anime] cause P

³⁰² suam virtutem] virtutem suam V

³⁰³ id est] scilicet V

³⁰⁴ autem] has V

³⁰⁵ omnes has] has omnes V

330 divinam, intelligibilem, |P 12^{rb}| et animalem ex hoc oriri, |T 11^{vb}| videlicet³⁰⁶ quod³⁰⁷ anima
est exemplum superioris virtutis. Nam supra animam cum³⁰⁸ sit intelligentia et Deus
secundum mentem Auctoris, in tantum anima est³⁰⁹ extracta a superiori virtute inquantum
est producta a Deo mediante intelligentia, quod³¹⁰ quomodo intelligendum sit exposuimus.
Modus tamen iste³¹¹ loquendi non est recipiendus quantumcunque Auctor hoc³¹² non
335 intelligat sicut verba sonant. Dicemus ergo quod, quia anima est sic exemplum superioris
virtutis et est sic producta, ex hoc habet operationem divinam eo scilicet modo quo competit
sibi, videlicet modo³¹³ inferiori quam intelligentia, ut probabat ratio prima. Rursus, quia
anima est sic extracta, et sic³¹⁴ producta, et sic est strata et supposita operationi intelligentie,
ex hoc habet operationem intelligibilem, ut probabat³¹⁵ ratio secunda. Tertio, quia anima³¹⁶
340 est sic producta et sic supposita intelligentie, agit valde inferiori modo quam ipsa, et ideo
non agit nisi per motum secundum mentem huius Auctoris, et ex hoc³¹⁷ habet operationem
animalem³¹⁸ que est movere, ut probavit hec ratio tertia. Ergo et prima ratio probans animam
habere operationem divinam, et secunda ratio probans ipsam habere operationem
intelligibilem, et hec ratio tertia probans ipsam habere operationem animalem³¹⁹. Ex hoc
345 sumunt fulcimentum, quod ideo anima habet omnia ista³²⁰, quia est exemplum superioris
virtutis, scilicet Dei et intelligentie³²¹, quia ab³²² utriusque³²³ influentiam recipit: a Deo
quantum ad substantiam, ab intelligentia vero quantum ad operationem. Bene ergo³²⁴ dictum
est quod superius dicebatur, videlicet quod anima non efficit has operationes nisi
inquantum est exemplar superioris virtutis. Quod dictum est³²⁵, omnes rationes sequentes
350 declarant.

Deinde³²⁶ cum dicit, *manifestum igitur*, |V 13^r| epilogat circa determinata dicens: *manifestum
igitur ex*³²⁷ *nunc quod anima tres habet operationes, quia habet tres virtutes, virtutem scilicet
divinam, et virtutem intelligentie sive virtutem intelligibilem, et virtutem essentie eius, id est
virtutem animalem, secundum quod narravimus et ostendimus.*

355 Notandum autem quod anima celestis habet virtutem divinam et virtutem intelligentie
participative inquantum participat operationem divinam influendo universaliter in totam
naturam, et inquantum intelligendo participat operationem intelligentie, sed hoc est ei magis
proprium secundum hunc Auctorem habere operationem animalem que est vivere³²⁸ celeste
corpus³²⁹ influendo sibi motum, et quia hec operatio³³⁰ sit³³¹ anime celi³³² propria³³³, dicit
360 quod est secundum essentiam |P 12^{va}| eius, id est ei per se et essentialis, id est propria.

<Dubium 9. Utrum movere corpora sit operatio essentialis anime.>

³⁰⁶ videlicet] videntur eo V

³⁰⁷ quod] quia Vat

³⁰⁸ supra animam cum] cum sic animam P

³⁰⁹ anima est] est anima exemplata vel V

³¹⁰ quod] et Vat

³¹¹ iste] ille VatV

³¹² hoc] hic V

³¹³ modo] magis V

³¹⁴ sic om. Vat

³¹⁵ probabat] probat V

³¹⁶ anima om. Vat

³¹⁷ hoc om. Vat

³¹⁸ animalem] universalem Vat

³¹⁹ animalem] et add. Vat

³²⁰ ista] illa V

³²¹ intelligentia] et add. V

³²² ab add. in marg. a. manu P; ab om. Vat

³²³ quia ab utriusque] et quia est virtum que V

³²⁴ bene ergo] ergo bene V

³²⁵ est om. V; add. sed del. Vat

³²⁶ deinde p. corr. ex declarant P

³²⁷ igitur ex] est igitur VatV

³²⁸ vivere] vivificare V

³²⁹ celeste corpus] corpus celeste V

³³⁰ operatio] ipse Vat

³³¹ sit] est V

³³² celi] celesti Vat

³³³ anime celi propria] propria anime celesti V

Dubitaret forte aliquis utrum movere corpora sit operatio essentialis anime celi³³⁴; et videtur quod non, quia si intelligitur quod sit eius operatio essentialis, quia immediate egreditur ab essentia eius, talem | T 12^{ra} | intellectum habere non potest, quia omnis operatio egreditur ab
 365 essentia mediante virtute. Si autem intelligatur essentialis, id est³³⁵ propria et inseparabilis, sic secundum fidem nostram est etiam³³⁶ falsa, quia aliquando cessabit motus celi.

Dicendum quod intentio philosophorum fuit celum nunquam deficere a motu. Et si aliquis³³⁷ philosophorum generavit mundum ut Plato, qui licet non generasset materiam³³⁸, quia³³⁹ hoc terruit³⁴⁰ omnes philosophantes, ut ex nichilo aliquid fieret, ut dicitur in³⁴¹ I *De generatione*,
 370 Plato³⁴² tamen generavit mundum^{xv}, ut in I *Celi et mundi* dicitur³⁴³, quia non posuit ab eterno mundum sic esse, sicut nunc est actum^{344xvi}, nullus³⁴⁵ philosophantium antiquorum posuit mundum finire, ut³⁴⁶ quod aliquando cessaret motus celi. Et quia³⁴⁷ hoc est de ratione anime, ut semper habeat³⁴⁸ in se³⁴⁹ corpori quamdiu durat corpus eius³⁵⁰, cum illa corpora sint perpetua ut perpetuarent celorum motum, dixerunt motores illos esse celorum³⁵¹ animas.
 375 Nos autem ne in hunc laqueum incidamus. Multotiens abhorremus hunc modum loquendi, ut motores celorum vocemus eorum animas. Et si aliquando hoc modo loquendi utimur, exponimus qualiter intelligenda sit animatio illa. Pretermittentes ergo motum³⁵² qui est de perpetuatione³⁵³ motus, dabimus expositionem aliam que non erit contra Auctoris mentem. Dicemus quidem proprium esse animarum celorum movere celos, et hoc competere eis
 380 secundum essentiam suam, quia pro tanto ille substantie³⁵⁴ movent celos, quia in ordine celestium spirituum sunt infime. Et quia sunt infime in genere³⁵⁵ spirituum propter ordinem universi quem Deus statuit, attingunt suprema in³⁵⁶ corporibus et movent³⁵⁷ super celestia corpora, et quia³⁵⁸ proprium est illarum substantiarum habere esse sic³⁵⁹ infimum et nullis aliis hic³⁶⁰ sic competit, et etiam quia secundum essentiam et naturam competit eis quod sint
 385 hoc modo infime, ideo dicitur hoc eis competere per essentiam suam³⁶¹, non quia hec operatio egrediatur³⁶² ab essentia fine virtute³⁶³, sed³⁶⁴ quia habent essentiam sic infimam, ideo competit eis³⁶⁵ hoc officium, scilicet administrare corpora.

ⁱ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, XII.7, 1072b.29-30 (Translatio Arabica-Latina, ed. Venentis 1562), f. 322rA: "Deus igitur est unus aeternus in fine nobilitatis."

ⁱⁱ Proclus, *Elementatio theologica*, Prop. 129 (ed. Boese), p. 65.

ⁱⁱⁱ Aristotle, *Physics*, VIII.5, 256b.14-27.

³³⁴ celi *om.* V

³³⁵ id est *om.* Vat

³³⁶ est etiam] etiam est V; etiam *om.* Vat

³³⁷ aliquis] quis (sic!) Vat

³³⁸ materiam] eum ex nihilo V

³³⁹ nam] quia V

³⁴⁰ terruit] exterruit V

³⁴¹ in *om.* V

³⁴² Plato *om.* V

³⁴³ in...dicitur] dicitur primo celi et mundi V

³⁴⁴ nunc est actum] non esset factus V

³⁴⁵ nullus] etiam *add.* V

³⁴⁶ ut] nec V

³⁴⁷ quia *om.* V

³⁴⁸ habeat] adhereat V

³⁴⁹ in se *add. sup. lin. a manu P; om.* V

³⁵⁰ eius *om.* Vat

³⁵¹ celorum *add. in marg. P; om.* V

³⁵² motum] modum V

³⁵³ perpetuatione] proprietate V

³⁵⁴ ille substantie] substantie ille V

³⁵⁵ *p. corr. ex generatione P; generatione Vat*

³⁵⁶ attingunt suprema in] infima scilicet spirituum uniri supremis corporibus et movere super celestia corpora, quia ergo V

³⁵⁷ movent] movere V; manere Vat

³⁵⁸ et quia] quia ergo V

³⁵⁹ esse sic] sic esse V

³⁶⁰ hic] hoc V

³⁶¹ suam] et *add.* V

³⁶² egrediatur] immediate *add.* V

³⁶³ fine virtutue] nec quia sit eis propria et inseparabilis V

³⁶⁴ sed] ut dicebatur *add.* V

³⁶⁵ quod sint...competit eis *om. per hom.* Vat

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- ^{iv} Aristotle, *De caelo*, II.2, 285a.29-30; II.9, 279a.28-30; II.12, 292a.20-21 and 292b.1-2.
- ^v Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, XII.7, 1072a.26-1072b.14.
- ^{vi} Averroes, *Commentaria in libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, XII (ed. Venice, 1562), f. 310r.D: "Dicit et similiter intendit per intellectum primum movens corpora celestia et per desiderium animam, que est in corporibus celestibus et utrunque; istorum est alteri propinquum"; f. 318r.F-318v.H: "Et videtur de istis principiis que sunt in corporibus celestibus quod desideratum in eisidem est cum intellectu. [...] Hoc igitur est dicere, quod voluptuosum et intellectum est idem in eis. Et ex hoc quidem apparet bene hec corpora esse animata et quod non habent de virtutibus anime nisi intellectum et virtutem desiderativam, que movet in loco."
- ^{vii} John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa*, 6.
- ^{viii} Dionysius, *De ecclesiastica hierarchia*, 86 (Dionysiaca IV), p. 1330: "Lex quidem haec est Divinitatis sacratissima: per prima secunda ad divinissimam suam reducere lucem" (Eriugena).
- ^{ix} Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, VII.6 (Dionysiaca II), p. 407-8: "ipsa enim est, secundum eloquium quae est omnium effectiva et semper omnia concordans, et indissolubilis omnium concordationis et ordinis causa, et semper fines priorum conjungens principiis secundorum, et unam omnis eonspirationem et harmoniam pulehre operans" (Serrazin).
- ^x Daniel 7:10: "Milia milium ministrabant ei, et decies milies centena milia assistebant ei".
- ^{xi} Dionysius, *De coelesti hierarchia*, XIV (Dionysiaca III), p. 981: "Multae enim sunt beatae militiae supermundialium intellectuum infirmam et coarctatam superantes materialium secundum nos numerorum commensurationem" (Eriugena).
- ^{xii} Giles of Rome, *De cognition angelorum*, q. 14.
- ^{xiii} Aristotle, *De anima*, II, 413a.21-22 (ed. Gauthier 1984), p. 77: "Dicamus igitur principium accipientes intentionis determinari animatum ab inanimato in vivendo".
- ^{xiv} Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, II.2, 994a11-19.
- ^{xv} Aristotle, *De generatione et corruptione*, II.1, 329a.5-18.
- ^{xvi} Aristotle, *De caelo*, I.10, 280a.28-31.

APPENDIX C. GILES OF ROME'S *DIVISIO TEXTUS* OF THE *LIBER DE CAUSIS*

Prop. 1: Prophaemium respectu totius operis (f. 1rA)¹

Prop. 2-32: De primariis causis (f. 6rA)

Props. 2-5: De omni tali esse superiori sive de omnibus talibus causis primariis duo facit (f. 6rA)

Prop. 2: distinguitur hec tria genera primarum causarum (f. 6rA)

Props. 3-5: De unoquoque tali esse superiori (f. 6rA)

Prop. 3: De earum [primarum causarum] connexione (f. 9rA)

Props. 4-5: De earum [primarum causarum] distinctione (f. 9rA)

Prop. 4: De distinctione intelligentiarum (f. 13rA)

Prop. 5: De distinctione animarum (f. 13rA)

Props. 6-15: De unaquaque causa primaria secundum se (f. 22rA)

Prop. 6: De prima causa (f. 22rA)

Props. 7-13: De intelligentia (f. 25rA)

Prop. 7: De quiditate intelligentiae (f. 25vA)

Props. 8-9: De eius universalitate (f. 29rA)

Prop. 8: De universalitate suae cognitionis (f. 29rA)

Prop. 9: De universalitate suae influentiae (f. 29rA)

Props. 10-13: De eius intelligere sive de eius cognitione (f. 36rA)

Prop. 10: De speciebus intelligibilibus existentibus in intelligentiis (f. 39rA)

Props 11-13: De actu intelligenti inpsarum intelligentiarum (f. 39rA)

Prop. 11: De intelligere practico intelligentiarum (f. 40rA)

Prop. 12: De earum intelligere speculative (f. 40rA)

Prop. 13: Quomodo intelligentia intelligit se et alia praeter se (f. 41vA)

Props. 14-15: De anima (f. 45rA)

Prop. 14: De anima in comparatione ad alia (f. 45rA)

Prop. 15: De anima in comparatione ad seipsam (f. 48rA)

Props. 16-32: De earum [primarum causarum] comparatione adinvicem (f. 9rA)

Props. 16-19: Quomodo se habeant inferiora ad superiora (f. 51vA)

Prop. 16: Inferiora dependent a superioribus secundum virtutem (f. 51vA)

Prop. 17: In ipsis virtutibus sunt gradus (f. 56vA)

Props. 18-19: Omnia dependent a Deo quantum ad essentiam (f. 59vA)

Prop. 18: Omnes essentiae dependent ab ente primo (f. 62vA)

¹ Folio references are to Giles of Rome, *Super De causis* (Venice, apud Iacobum Zoppinum, 1550).

- Prop. 19:** In ipsis essentiis sunt gradus, quia quaedam sunt essentiae superiores, et quaedam inferiores (f. 62vA)
- Props 20-24:** Quomodo se habeant superiora ad inferiora (f. 51vA)
- Prop. 20:** De regimine causae primae in generali (f. 70vA)
- Props 21-24:** De eius regimine in speciali (f. 70vA)
- Prop. 21:** De ipsius principantis abundantia (f. 70vA)
- Prop. 22:** De eius excellentia (f. 70vA)
- Prop. 23:** De ipsius regiminis universalitate (f. 70vA)
- Prop. 24:** De ipsius regiminis unitate (f. 70vA)
- Props. 25-32:** Comparat universaliter omnia ad omnia (f. 51vA)
- Prop. 25:** De ingenerabili (f. 88rA)
- Prop. 26:** De incorruptibili (f. 88rA): substantiae per se stantes non cadunt sub corruptione (f. 92vA)
- Prop. 27:** [De corruptibili]: substantiae quae cadunt sub destruction vel sub corruption (f. 92vA)
- Props. 28-29:** De ipsis rebus simplicibus (f. 94rA)
- Prop. 28:** Substantia stans per essentiam suam est simplex (f. 97rA)
- Prop. 29:** Substantia simplex stet per essentiam suam (f. 97r-vA)
- Prop. 30-32:** De temporalibus et aeternis (f. 100rA)
- Prop. 30:** Comparat temporalia ad temporalia (f. 100rA)
- Props 31-32:** Comparat temporalia ad aeterna (f. 105rA)
- Prop. 31:** Inter rem quae totaliter est in aeternitate et rem quae totaliter est in tempore est res media (f. 105rA)
- Prop. 32:** De illa re media (f. 105rA)

APPENDIX D. THOMAS AQUINAS'S *DIVISIO TEXTUS* OF THE *LIBER DE CAUSIS*

Prop. 1: Principium totius sequentis operis (p. 3.14)²

Prop. 2-32: De primis causis rerum (p. 11.2)

Props. 2-16: De distinctione primarum causarum (p. 11.3-4)

Props. 2-5: Distinguit causas primas (p. 11.6-7)

Prop. 2: Divisit tres gradus superiorum entium (p. 17.2-3)

Prop. 3: Intendit ostendere quomodo tertium participat et quod est primi et quod est secundi (p. 17.5-7)

Prop. 4: Disitinguit intelligentias (p. 11.12-13)

Prop. 5: Distinguit animas (p. 11.14)

Props. 6-15: Determinat de singulis (p. 11.7)

Prop. 6: De causa prima (p. 42.6)

Props. 7-13: De intelligentia (p. 42.6)

Prop. 7: De intelligentia quantum ad sui substantiam (p. 48.3-49.1)

Prop. 8-13: Quantum ad eius cognitionem (p. 49.1-2)

Props. 8-12: Quomodo [intelligentia] cognoscat alia a se (p. 54.2-3)

Prop. 8: Quomodo cognoscit intelligentia et superiora et inferiora (p. 55.3)

Prop. 9: Ostendit quid sit ea [intelligentia] superius (p. 55.4)

Prop. 10: Quomodo se habeat in cognitionem inferiorum (p. 55.5-6)

Prop. 11: Ostendit quod [intelligentia] cognoscit res aeternas sive incorruptibiles (p. 72.12-13)

Prop. 12: Ostendit modum quo eas [sempiternas] cognoscit (p. 72.14)

Prop 13: Quomodo [intelligentia] cognoscat seipsam (p. 54.3-55.1)

Props. 14-15: De anima (p. 43.1)

Prop. 14: De ea secundum habitudinem quam habet ad res alias (p. 85.2-3)

Prop. 15: De ea secundum seipsam (p. 85.3-4)

Props. 16-32: De coordinatione sive dependentia earum [primarum causarum] ad invicem (p. 11.4-5)

Props. 16-19: Quomodo inferiora dependent a superioribus (p. 93.3-4)

² Page and line references are to *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Super Librum de causis expositio*, ed. H.D. Saffrey (Paris: Vrin, 2002).

Props. 16-17: Quod res omnes dependent a primo secundum suam virtutem (p. 100.1-2)

Prop. 16: Quod omnes vitutes infinitae dependent a prima infinita virtute (p. 93.12-13)

Prop. 17: Quomodo magis vel minus ei assimilantur (p. 93.13-14)

Props. 18-19: Quod dependent omnia a primo secundum suam naturam (p. 100.2-3)

Prop. 18: Ostendit universalem dependentiam rerum a primo secundum omnia quae pertinent ad naturam vel substantiam earum (p. 100.3-5)

Prop. 19: Ostendit diversum gradum appropinquationis ad primum a quo dependent (p. 100.5-7)

Props 20-23: Quomodo superiora influunt in inferiora (p. 93.4-5)

Props. 20-22: De universali regimine causae primae (p. 108.3-4)

Props 20: Ostendit modum universalis regiminis causae primae (p. 109.2)

Props. 21-22: Ostendit idoneitatem causae primae ad regendum

Prop. 21: Ostendit sufficientiam Dei ad regendum [...] secundum Dei abundantiam (p. 112.1-3)

Prop. 22: Secundum eius superexcellenciam (p. 112.3-4)

Prop. 23: De regimine intelligentiae (p. 108.4)

Props. 24-32: Quomodo inferiora diversimode recipient influxum primi influentis (p. 93.6-7)

Prop. 24: Primo manifestat hoc in generali (p. 120.3-4)

Prop. 25-32: Secundo prosequitur in speciali de diversitate rerum quae subsunt divino regimini (p. 120.4-5)

Props. 25-27: De diversitate corruptibilis (p. 124.7)

Prop. 25: De ingenerabili (p. 127.6)

Prop. 26: De incorruptibili (p. 127.7)

Prop. 27: De corruptibilis (p. 127.7)

Props. 28-29: De diversitate simplices et compositi (p. 124.7-8)

Prop. 28: De diversitate substantiarum quae potest attendi secundum simplicitatem et compositionem (p. 131.2-4)

Prop. 29: Propositio conversa prioris (p. 134.1)

Prop. 30-32: De diversitate aeternitatis et temporis (p. 124.9-10)

Prop. 30: Quomodo aliqua dupliciter sunt sempiternal et temporalia (p. 136.5)

Prop. 31: Quomodo est simul et aeternum et temporale (p. 136.6)

Prop. 32: Conditio eius quod est quodammodo aeternum et quodammodo temporale (p. 140.5-6)

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